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Figure 1.2 The Lesser Antilles
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Images of a Prosperous Port Town 
In October 1805, the British lawyer James Stephen published the legal 
polemic War in Disguise; or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags. While the 
principal target of Stephen’s treatise was the burgeoning neutral American 
carrying trade, other minor neutral trading nations did not escape his 
arguments and invectives. Stephen claimed that “Denmark and Sweden 
each possessed islands in the West Indies”, St. Thomas and St. 
Barthélemy, “which might be made entrepôts between their European 
dominions and the French colonies”.1 
The island of St. Barthélemy had since the initial Swedish acquisition 
become the home of an international mercantile community which was 
centered in a new town, christened Gustavia after king Gustav III. Shortly 
after the first Swedish settlement, the town was proclaimed a free port. In 
1800 the island had reached its demographic apex of 6,000 inhabitants. In 
terms of its population, Gustavia became one the largest cities in the 
Swedish kingdom. In 1819, four years after the end of the great European 
conflict, Olof Erik Bergius published Om Westindien, a general overview of 
the West Indies, based in large part on his experience as colonial judge in 
the Swedish colony of St. Barthélemy. His depiction of the regional trade 
conducted from the island’s free port of Gustavia essentially confirmed 
Stephen’s assumptions. During the late war, asserted Bergius, the local 
merchants had “supplied the French colonies with French wines, the 
English islands with American timber, the United States with English and 
                                                          
1 James Stephen, War in Disguise; or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags (London: C. Whittingham, 
1805), 38. 
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East Indian merchandise, France with St. Domingo coffee etc.” While he 
hardly defined this trade in more precise political and legal terms, it would 
have no doubt been just the kind of commercial activity that Stephen 
would have termed ‘war in disguise’.2 
Stephen called for the abolition of the carrying trade of neutral nations, 
with special reference to the commerce between France’s Caribbean 
islands and Europe. Having practiced at the bar in the Vice Admiralty 
Court of St. Kitts, he had had the opportunity to witness contraband trade 
in the Caribbean under the guise of neutral flags. He was also a member of 
parliament, and the ideas he espoused in War in Disguise became the basis 
of British commercial warfare against France, embodied in the Orders in 
Council of 1807. It was passed in order to keep any neutral nations from 
trading between enemy ports. It was answered in France the same year 
with the Milan Decree, which declared that all neutral shipping using 
British ports, or paying British tariffs, were to be regarded as British and 
as such seized and condemned. Despite this state of affairs, the trade of 
Gustavia ostensibly flourished. 
For Stephen and his peers, neutral transit trade constituted a kind of 
clandestine warfare, but reality belied such simple distinctions. The 
profusion of shipping routes and trade flows described by Bergius can 
hardly be characterized as a commercial movement that exclusively served 
the interests of a single national interest. Free ports were by definition 
open to ships of all nations, and were exploited by the commercial actors 
of all nations. The Dutch free port colonies of Curaçao and St. Eustatius 
as well as the Danish colony of St. Thomas had since the 17th century been 
international emporiums of free trade in the region, and its inhabitants 
shared a renowned history of smuggling and interloping throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. Free trade in this context refers to the trade that 
transgressed national and imperial borders throughout the history of 
colonial societies in the Americas, irrespective if it was regarded as legal or 
                                                          
2 Olof Erik Bergius, Om Westindien (Stockholm: Gadelius, 1819). For a brief but insightful 
analysis of the work and its influences, see Harald Elovsson, Amerika i svensk litteratur 1750–
1820: en studie i komparativ litteraturhistoria (Lund: Gleerup, 1930), 123–24, 284–287. 
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illegal. Historians have in recent times tended to speak about “informal 
economies” as a catch-all category, instead of limiting the discussion to 
definition-defying phenomena such as smuggling or illicit trade. The term 
transit trade owes its use to the character free port trade as a mediator, 
connecting markets otherwise closed from each other.3 
The once bustling activity of St. Eustatius, nicknamed “the Golden 
Rock”, as well as Curaçao was however close to extinguished towards the 
end of the century when the Dutch Republic was subsumed by France. 
Danish St. Thomas was occupied by British forces in 1807 as a result of the 
Danish course in the Napoleonic Wars. The effects of these circumstances 
have not been well understood in current historical research. The effects 
appeared however to be quite tangible for the Swedish colony. On location 
in St. Barthélemy during the height of the Napoleonic Wars, Bergius even 
ventured to claim that “gold flowed out in streams out of the very rock of 
the island”, an allusion to the hundreds of ships which could be seen 
frequenting the colony to trade and barter their cargoes at a daily basis. It 
is also an image that is highly reminiscent of the near mythical past wealth 
of St. Eustatius. Indeed, while Bergius’ description of a prosperous St. 
Barthélemy is highly colorful, it is a characteristic sentiment which is often 
mirrored in other sources. Abraham Runnels, a former inhabitant of St. 
Eustatius, compared the histories of St. Eustatius and St. Barthélemy in 
1814 and claimed that “what one [St. Eustatius] owed of her celebrity to 
the War of American Independence, the other [St. Barthélemy] owes to 
the Wars of the French revolution.” At the time of his statement, Runnels 
was living on St. Barthélemy, and had become a naturalized Swedish 
burgher. Runnels was one of many ‘Statians’ that had moved from the 
Dutch colony to St. Barthélemy during the turmoil of the 1790s. Before 
Runnels and family members had become Swedish subjects, he had been 
                                                          
3 Although the term ”informal economy” has been primarily applied in the social sciences 
since the 1970s, it has been incorporated in historical scholarship as well, cf. for example 
Lance Grahn, Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New 
Granada (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); For an overview, see Mark G. Hanna’s entry: 
“Smuggling” in the Atlantic History section of Oxford Bibliographies Online: 
http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com. 
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part of a community which had been trading from Dutch Caribbean 
colonies for generations, but had since then shifted national affiliations in 
order to continue their livelihood.4 
A History Fallen into Obscurity? 
 Why is it, however, that St. Barthélemy remains understudied in Swedish 
and international historiography? Against the backdrop of narratives 
about Dutch commercial primacy through their Caribbean free ports and 
interloping trade, one is at a loss to find any mention of the commercial 
importance of St. Barthélemy. In 1784, St. Barthélemy was acquired by the 
Swedish crown from the French. It is one of the smallest islands of the 
Lesser Antilles, and at the time of acquisition, the island was home to only 
a few hundred French settlers and their slaves. It was one of the least 
economically and politically important islands in the Caribbean. It was 
however, the end-result of Swedish colonial ambitions at the close of the 
eighteenth century. It was decided that the only way to exploit the island 
was to encourage the transit trade within the region in a similar manner as 
had been done by Dutch and Danish colonies in the region, as well as to try 
an attempt to participate directly in the West Indian trade. And with 
Swedish acquisition also came – eventually – a substantial transformation 
of the colony. The Swedish colonial efforts were focused at creating a free 
port town around the rim of Le Carénage, a protected cove on the 
southwest shore.  
The colony’s small imprint on the Swedish economy is however only 
one aspect of its obscured past. There has been uneven attention paid to 
international history in Scandinavian and northern European states. 
Historical conditions have likely led to this state of affairs, as northern 
European states have not experienced significant phenomena of 
                                                          
4 The quote from Runnels to Skogman, 9 June 1814, SBS 3 A, SNA; Han Jordaan and Victor 
Wilson, ”The Eighteenth-century Danish, Dutch and Swedish Free Ports in the 
Northeastern Caribbean: Continuity and Change,” in Dutch Atlantic Connections, ed. Gert 
Oostindie and Jessica V. Roitman (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 278–308. 
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decolonization, such as postwar migration from former colonies, demands 
of reparations and reconciliation with a colonial past, or any kind of 
demand or institutional support for any coherent tradition of colonial 
history in higher education.5 
This detachment from a colonial past has not always been as it is in 
Sweden today. In pre-World War II-Sweden, colonialism was still an 
unproblematic subject. After the war Swedish scholars and writers 
however marginalized colonialism from its place in Swedish national 
narratives, and it became more common to stress the insignificance of 
Swedish colonial projects, as it did not fit very well into the historical 
Swedish self-view as a progressive and liberal welfare state. As a result of 
this development, Swedish colonial history has never been politicized, that 
is, up until very recently. In 2014 Sweden was included in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) list of states held to be responsible for the 
effects of colonialism and slavery, and thus possibly liable for reparations. 
The country’s colonial past has also garnered some recent media attention 
towards current research on St. Barthélemy.6 
Another reason for the relative disinterest into the Swedish colonial 
period of St. Barthélemy is due to the circumstances surrounding the 
sources. Swedish historians have mainly utilized the available material in 
the Swedish National Archives (SNA), which primarily consist of the 
surviving colonial records and reports sent to Stockholm as well as the 
relatively extensive archive of the Swedish West India Company (SWIC). 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of Scandinavian and northern European colonial history, see the 
introduction to a special journal issue on the topic by Pernille Ipsen and Gunlög Fur, 
Itinerario 33, no. 2 (2009), 7–16; For the Swedish situation, see Stefan Eklöf Amirell, ”Den 
internationella historiens uppgång och fall: Trender inom svensk internationell 
historieforskning 1950–2005,” Historisk Tidskrift 126, no. 2 (2006), 257–78. 
6 The quote from Gunlög Fur in “Colonialism and Swedish History: Unthinkable 
Connections?” in Scandinavian Colonialism and the Rise of Modernity: Small Time Agents in a 
Global Arena, ed. Magdalena Naum and Jonas M. Nordin (New York: Springer, 2013), 17–36; 
May-Britt Öhman, “’Sweden Helps’: Efforts to Formulate the White Man’s Burden for the 
Wealthy and Modern Swede,” Kult, no. 7 (2010): 122–42; Alexander Loit, “Sveriges 
kolonilotter,” in Den dolda historien. 27 uppsatser om vårt okända förflutna, ed. Ronny 
Ambjörnsson and David Gaunt (Stockholm: Författarförlaget, 1984), 376–95; Rolf Sjöström, 
”’En nödvändig omständighet’ – om svensk slavhandel i Karibien,” in Svenska överord: En bok 
om gränslöshet och begränsningar, ed. Raoul Granqvist (Stockholm: Sympison, 1999), 41–58. 
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The local government archives of the island council were however left on 
the island when Sweden finally sold St. Barthélemy back to France in 1878. 
These are now held at the Archives nationales d’outre-Mer (ANOM) in Aix-
en-Provence. The records, the Fonds Suédois de Saint-Barthélemy (FSB) have 
suffered through adverse climate, neglect, as well as fires, and are as a result 
in a very bad state of conservation. Large parts were probably destroyed 
and lost forever during periods of foreign occupation of the colony.7 
One of the arguably most important explanations, however, is the weak 
link between international and domestic research on Nordic colonialism. 
There are only a few exceptions, were international scholarship has taken 
note of the colony’s economic role. Albert Keller noted in his great 
synthesis on colonization that during the British occupation of the Danish 
Caribbean colonies in 1807–1815, “American products were diverted and 
passed over St. Bartholomew, which at the time enjoyed an ephemeral 
importance.” Eric Williams also afforded a paragraph to the Swedish island 
in his seminal Capitalism and Slavery when he discussed the need of 
convenient transit harbors in the Caribbean for neutral American traders.8  
There are multiple explanations behind the relative omission of the 
colonies of the Nordic countries in international research, not least of 
which are the linguistic and archival exigencies involved. Another aspect, 
finally is the fact that the historiography of the West Indies and the 
Western hemisphere in the Early Modern period has long focused on 
plantations rather than cities as the hearts of colonial economies and 
                                                          
7 Rolf Lamborn, ”The Archives of Saint Bartholomew Rediscovered,” The Swedish Pioneer 
Historical Society 15, no. 1 (1964), 33–44; Ingvar Andersson, ”Arkivalier från S:t Barthélemys 
svenska tid,” Arkiv, samhälle, forskning 8 (1965), 7–13; Dan Brändström, ”Det svenska arkivet i 
Västindien,” Västerbottens-kuriren, December 12, 1967; Björn Lindh, ”Det svenska Saint-
Barthélemy-arkivet.” Arkiv, samhälle, forskning 16 (1974), 21–25.; Anne Lebel, ”Saint-
Barthélemy et ses archives: une connaissance historique éclatée,” Bulletin de la société d’histoire 
de la Guadeloupe 159 (2011), 91–102. Lebel’s survey is the most recent and initiated treatment 
of the archival history of the FSB, and sheds some light on the problems associated in the 
early days of its organization, as well as the potential this material has for future research. 
8 Adrian J. Pearce, British trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2007), 201, 245; Albert G. Keller, Colonization: A Study of the Founding of New 
Societies (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908), 506; Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 122. 
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societies. Furthermore, little or no attention has been made to 
connections across imperial borders in the colonies themselves, either in 
the form of migration flows, the transfers of ideas and information, or the 
complex networks created through trade and commerce. The history of St. 
Barthélemy, in short, has been largely treated as an isolated Swedish affair, 
and it follows that the relationship between St. Barthélemy and the 
surrounding region is not clearly understood.9 
This study, however, takes the free port town as a point of departure. 
Unlike the plantation colonies, free port towns such as Gustavia were 
created in order to circumvent imperial monopolies rather than uphold 
them, for the gain of individuals as well as national treasuries. I argue that 
the historical role of St. Barthélemy in the economy of the Caribbean is 
not properly understood, and that it is more significant than previous 
research has found it to be. More importantly, I argue that the history of 
St. Barthélemy is important for the understanding of the longer continuity 
of free trade in the region, and in extension, the different colonial societies 
both in the Caribbean and in the North and South American continents. 
The study of free ports and similar subterfuges during times of 
international conflict serves to investigate regional networks and 
relationships integral to the reality of mercantile order in the colonies. 
 
Situating St. Barthélemy in a Regional and Transnational 
Perspective 
St. Barthélemy has not been incorporated into larger frameworks of 
analysis or syntheses in modern historiographies. Scholarly studies as well 
popular histories have been published around the topic of the Swedish 
                                                          
9 Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “Cabotage, Contraband, and Corsairs: The Port Cities of 
Guadeloupe and their Inhabitants,” in Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, and Society in the 
Atlantic World, 1650–1850, ed. Franklin W. Knight and Peggy K. Liss (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 58; Anne Pérotin-Dumon, La ville aux Iles, la ville dans 
l'île: Basse-Terre et Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe, 1650–1820 (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 12–13. 
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colony, but they all share the same basic framework, that of the colony as 
a project connected solely to the agency of the metropole or the nation 
state, a common idea in the treatment of European colonialism. To firmly 
place the free port of Gustavia within a larger context, I argue that its 
history should be linked with the continuity of free trade of the West 
Indies in a long historical perspective, from the days of early colonization 
to the repeal of mercantilist barriers during the course of the 19th century.10 
In short, this study aims to place the economic history of St. 
Barthélemy within a longer historiographic tradition of comparative 
organizations of free trade in the West Indies. At the core of this tradition 
is the ambition to explain how it was virtually impossible for colonial 
powers to attain the ideal of mercantilist and exclusive colonial systems. 
Imperial borders and national privileges were in reality constantly 
challenged, and they often yielded to internal economic necessities, 
ambitions of gain, and pragmatic government policy. I argue that it this is 
the most suitable and conducive context in consideration of the economic 
history of St. Barthélemy. 
 
1.2 Topical Research, Perspectives and Theory 
Strictly speaking, there is no historiographic tradition of transit trade per 
se, let alone an integrated field of historical research. But it is however a 
discernible genre of colonial history with a long continuity. One of the 
earliest examples is Richard Pares’ War and Trade in the West Indies (1938), 
                                                          
10 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, ”Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a 
research agenda,” in Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Frederick 
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); For a short but 
precise overview of smuggling in the Americas, see Wim Klooster “Inter-Imperial Smuggling 
in the Americas, 1600–1800,” in Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual 
Currents, 1500–1830, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009) 141–80. 
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in which the interdependence of different British and French colonies’ 
commercial and political interests is explored, not in the least the 
relationship between the North American colonies and the West Indies, 
particularly the readiness of American merchants to trade with the enemy 
during the wars of the 18th century. He further elaborated on this historical 
relationship in Yankees and Creoles (1956). A recent work on the same theme 
is Thomas Truxe’s Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in New York 
(2008), in which he details the methods and ambitions of New England 
merchants that continued to exchange British goods for French sugar and 
Spanish silver during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). In a broader popular 
treatment, Peter Andreas has focused on the significance of smuggling in 
U.S. history from colonial to modern times in Smuggler Nation (2013).11 
The contraband trade between North American colonies and the 
French West Indies became a problem within the British Empire during 
the 18th century and was part of the impetus behind the British project to 
establish a network of Caribbean free ports. The first study of this project 
was published in 1953 by Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the 
British West Indies. Through the free ports, the British government also 
sought ways to circumvent its own Navigation Acts, by enabling coveted 
trade contacts in Spanish colonies with which direct, legal trade was 
otherwise impossible. The issue of British commercial ambitions in 
Spanish colonial America has been detailed in a more recent study by 
Adrian Pearce, British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808, which builds 
further upon the work of Armytage. Pearce empirically confirms that the 
British goal had always been unrestricted trade with Spanish America, that 
both government and merchants alike were complicit in ignoring treaties, 
                                                          
11 Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739–1763 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1936); Richard Pares, Yankees and Creoles: The Trade between North America and 
the West Indies before the American Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1956); Thomas Truxes, Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit 
Trade Made America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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Navigation Acts, and condoning every sort of interloping and smuggling 
imaginable.12 
Within the same framework one can assign different works on the 
Dutch West Indies during the recent decades. Before Wim Klooster’s 
Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795, the transatlantic trade 
of the Dutch Republic had never received the same scholarly attention as 
the Dutch Asian trade. Klooster’s study of the Dutch free ports on 
Curaçao and St. Eustatius shed new light on the Dutch transit trade with 
Spanish and French colonies. The study added empirical weight in many 
ways to the long-standing narrative of Dutch traders as the perennial 
middlemen of different colonial trade networks, as well as discovering that 
the Dutch transatlantic trade was larger than what was previously thought. 
Klooster has continued to emphasize the role of smuggling and illicit trade 
within the wider early modern Atlantic world. Of the few other historians 
who have concentrated on greater overviews and theories of illicit trade in 
multiple empires, the most notable is Alan Karras.13 
There is a relative dearth of smuggling studies within the French and 
Spanish historiographies. In the French case there are many factors which 
have contributed to the relatively low yield of colonial studies overall. The 
field of Atlantic History has after all been conceived within the Anglo-
Saxon academic world, and the French historical tradition has developed 
independently during the 20th century under the Annales school with its 
new orientations, away from ideologies of colonialism, imperialism, and 
nationalism. In the context of French colonial trade, Jean Tarrade’s 1972 
                                                          
12 Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies (London: Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1953); Cf. Adrian J. Pearce, “British Trade with the Spanish Colonies,” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 20, no. 2 (2001): 233–60; In a recent interesting analysis, Javier Cuenca-
Esteban builds upon Pearce’s estimates of the British trade into Spanish America and posits 
that they could be revised upwards of 29 percent or more. Javier Cuenca-Esteban, “British 
“Ghost” Exports, American Middlemen, and the Trade to Spanish America, 1790–1819: A 
Speculative Reconstruction,” The William & Mary Quarterly 71, no. 1 (2014): 63–89. 
13 Wim Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
1998); 141–180; Alan Karras, “Smuggling and its Malcontents,” in Interactions: Transregional 
Perspectives on World History, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2010), 135–
49; Alan Karras, Smuggling. Contraband and Corruption in World History (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009). 
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volumes on the Exclusif mitigé is still the definitive study, spanning the last 
quarter-century of the l’ancien regime. It differs from many of the above 
works in that it is communicated through the perspective of the French 
monarchy, and its attempts to negotiate the markets of its colonial empire 
with and without Colbertian principles of metropolitan monopoly. It also 
differs somewhat in that Tarrade is almost exclusively concerned with the 
trade between France and its own colonies, as opposed to the informal 
economies with other territories which thrived the peripheries of the 
French empire.14 
It is somewhat more difficult to pinpoint book-length surveys of 
Spanish colonial trade, but economic studies of Spanish America have 
generally given extensive treatment to the issue of contraband and 
attempts to curtail contraband within the Spanish Empire. For instance, 
the larger theme in Stein and Stein’s Edge of Crisis (2012) is the decline of 
the Spanish empire and the colonial heritage of Latin America from a 
dependency-theory perspective. Similar to Tarrade’s study, it focuses 
meticulously on the peninsular policy making of Spain and the subaltern 
colonial relationship of Spain with the other Spanish colonies in the 
Caribbean. In their exposition, the reorganizing of New Spain’s trade in 
1789–93, the Comercio Libre, served to create new fissures within an already 
unstable empire. John R. Fischer’s The Economic Aspects of Spanish 
Imperialism in America, 1492–1810 (1997), as well as surveys by Horst 
Pietschmann are older entries in the research into the economic spheres 
of Spanish imperialism, but no less valid. Fischer’s work is on a grander 
scale as it addresses how the Spanish government treated the economic 
                                                          
14 Jean Tarrade, Le commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l’Ancien Regime : L’evolution du regime 
de « l’Exclusif » de 1763 a 1789, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972); For a 
discussion on illicit trade within the French West Indies, see Kenneth Banks, “Official 
Duplicity: The Illicit Slave Trade of Martinique, 1713–1763,” in The Atlantic Economy during the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel, ed. Peter 
Coclanis (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005); The relative paucity of 
French works within colonial history is explored in Cécile Vidal, “The Reluctance of French 
Historians to Address Atlantic History,” Southern Quarterly 43 (2006): 153–89; For a current 
French work that engages in the Atlantic World, see Sylvia Marzagalli, cf. Guerre et économie 
dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe au XXe siècle, ed. Sylvia Marzagalli and Bruno Marnot 
(Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2006). 
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aspects of its empire, whereas Pietchmann’s overview handles the systemic 
corruption and illicit trade in Spanish colonial society.15 
Scandinavian Colonialism and Historiography 
Within the Nordic countries themselves, colonial studies have been 
limited. The historiography on the Swedish colonial period of St. 
Barthélemy has focused solely on the relationship between metropole and 
colony, and in extension, the colony’s importance for the Swedish 
economy. The only works which have arguably situated the colony’s 
history in more sizeable contexts are Sven Ola Swärd’s study on Sweden’s 
early 19th-century diplomacy and trade with Latin America, as well as the 
smaller case studies of St. Barthélemy’s connections with South American 
rebels and insurgents by Carlos Vidales.16  
Eli Heckscher, the dominant figure of economic historical research in 
Sweden as well as an important name in international circles of the 
discipline, summed up the history of St. Barthélemy as “unimportant”. The 
conclusion was a side-note in a wider sweep of Heckscher’s general critique 
of Swedish commercial policy during the 18th century. Later scholarship 
has nuanced and modified his interpretations, whereas his verdict on the 
economic value of St. Barthélemy has hardly been challenged.17 
                                                          
15 Barbara H. Stein and Stanley J. Stein, Edge of Crisis: War and Trade in the Spanish 
Atlantic, 1789–1808 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012); John R. Fischer, The 
Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492–1810 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1997). The original Spanish edition of this book appeared in print in 1991; 
Horst Pietschmann, “Burocracia y corrupción en hispanoamérica colonial: Una 
aproximación tentativa,” Nova Americana 5 (1985): 9–37. 
16 Sven Ola Swärd, Latinamerika i svensk politik under 1810– och 1820–talen (Uppsala: Almqvist 
& Wiksell, 1949); Vidales’ works are spread over a number of articles and book chapters, but 
notable contributions are Carlos Vidales, “Corsarios y piratas de la Revolución Francesa en 
las aguas de la emancipación,” Iberoamericana 19, no. 2 (1989): 247–62; Carlos Vidales, “S:t 
Barthélemy: en svensk koloni i frihetskämparnas tjänst (1810–30),” in Sverige – Latinamerika. 
Förbindelser och samarbete och samarbete, ed. Weine Karlsson and Åke Magnusson (Stockholm: 
Latinamerika-institutet, 1992), 25–33. 
17 Eli Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia sedan Gustav Vasa (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1936), 
II: 666–667. 
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The most serious effort to do this was however made in a dissertation 
by Ingegerd Hildebrand, published in 1951. Hildebrand’s is the most widely 
cited secondary work on the colony’s Swedish history. For its limited time 
period (1784–96), it is a thoroughly researched work, much occupied with 
the intricacies of political and diplomatic history, as well as the first study 
to investigate some of the economic networks and connections in which 
the Swedish colony was involved, but the main focus still remains within 
the metropole-colony framework.18 
The shifting interest in Sweden about its former West Indian colony 
has produced a range of shorter and longer specialized treatments of its 
history. There is the sounding into the legal history of St. Barthélemy by 
Birger Wedberg (1936), the short study of slave demography by Hannes 
Hyrenius (1977), but also exhaustively researched studies like the 
ecclesiastical and religious history of Jan Arvid Hellström (1987). 
Hellström’s work created one of the first comprehensive bibliographies 
and resources of St. Barthélemy history.19 
The irregular attention to colonial history in Sweden and in the other 
northern European states has, however, in recent years come to change. 
Arguably because of international trends in colonial history, northern 
European scholars have started to attempt the integration of the field of 
Scandinavian colonial history. Interpretative models and frameworks have 
been found readily available not in the least from the field of Atlantic and 
Global history. Global historia från periferin: Norden 1600–1850 (2010)20, is a 
recent anthology which is concerned with early modern northern Europe 
                                                          
18 Ingegerd Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S:t Barthélemy och Västindiska kompaniet fram till 
1796 (PhD diss., Lunds universitet, 1951); Sture M. Waller, “Det svenska förvärvet av S:t 
Barthélemy. Huvvuddragen av de svensk-franska förhandlingarna och parternas syften,” 
Historisk tidskrift 3 (1953): 231–55; Sture M. Waller, S:t Barthélemy, 1785–1801. Yttre förhållanden, 
handelspolitik och statsfinansiell betydelse (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1954), 1–35. 
19 Birger Wedberg, ”S. Barthelemy febern” and ”Lag och rätt på S. Barthelemy,” in 
Tärningskast på liv och död: rättshistoriska skisser (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1935), 39–51; Hannes 
Hyrenius, Royal Swedish Slaves (Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977); Jan Arvid Hellström, 
“... åt alla christliga förvanter...” En undersökning av kolonialförvaltning, religionsvård och 
samfundsliv på S:t Barthélemy under den svenska perioden 1784–1878 (Uppsala: Erene, 1987). 
20 Leos Müller, Göran Rydén and Holger Weiss, eds., Global historia från periferin: Norden 
1600–1850 (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2010). 
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from a global perspective. A result of a Scandinavian scholarly network, it 
contains a number of contributions that illustrate how a focus on the 
consumption of Atlantic products, such as sugar, coffee, and rum, is a way 
of writing Atlantic history for regions that did not have strong colonial 
empires. There are also current works that display a willingness to examine 
some of the larger questions concerning the role of colonial trade for 
European economic growth, rather than simply the presentation of new 
empirical information. An example is Klas Rönnbäck’s dissertation, 
Commerce and Colonisation (2009).21 There has been some interesting new 
developments in the research strictly concerning St. Barthélemy as well. 
Leos Müller’s Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce (2004)22 concentrates on the 
eighteenth century Swedish long-distance trade and shipping and the 
establishment of Swedish consular services around the world, and a survey 
of St. Barthélemy’s role in the Swedish transatlantic trade. Holger Weiss 
has surveyed the current state of knowledge about the involvement of 
Denmark-Norway, Sweden, Courland, and Brandenburg in the slave trade 
and shows how the geopolitical positions of these states conditioned the 
way they participated in the slave trade. It also pinpoints lacunae in the 
research, particularly concerning Swedish slave trade and slavery. He is also 
among the first to study race and urban slavery in Gustavia at the end of 
the eighteenth century.23 
There are however several forthcoming studies on St. Barthélemy. The 
first is the research project of Fredrik Thomasson of Uppsala University, 
which will result in a book on the legal system of St. Barthélemy, centering 
on the law and praxis of slavery in the colony. The other is a thesis by Ale 
                                                          
21 Klas Rönnbäck, Commerce and Colonisation: Studies of Early Modern Merchant 
Capitalism in the Atlantic Economy (Unpublished PhD thesis, Göteborgs universitet, 2009). 
22 Leos Müller, Consuls, Corsairs and Commerce: The Swedish Consular Service and Long-
Distance Shipping, 1720–1815 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis, 2004). 
23 See for example Holger Weiss, ”Danskar och svenskar i den atlantiska slavhandeln 1650–
1850,” in Globalhistoria från periferin: Norden 1600–1850, ed. Leos Müller, Göran Rydén and 
Holger Weiss (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2010), 39–74; Holger Weiss, ”Det svenska 
kolonialprojektets komplexa rum: om slaveri under svensk flagg i slutet av 1700–talets 
karibiska och atlantiska värld,” Sjuttonhundratal: Nordic Yearbook for Eighteenth-Century Studies 
(2012), 59–92. 
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Pålsson, with a focus on the multicultural society of Gustavia and its 
political culture. Both of these works are due to be finished or published 
in 2016. Holger Weiss has continued work on the Swedish slave trade 
through St. Barthélemy, as well as a study on the spatial dimension of race 
and urban slavery in Gustavia in the late 18th century.24 
Perspectives on International Smuggling and Informal Trade 
One could well place the commercial history of St. Barthélemy within 
the organizing frame of reference that is ‘Atlantic history’. The rise to 
primacy of the European economy and the increase in Atlantic trade 
during the Early Modern period have been highly significant events in the 
history of the world, and the linking of the two has given rise to the vast 
body of work contained within Atlantic history. There is however a 
pronounced difficulty in situating the needle’s eye of Gustavia within such 
a large framework. True enough, it can be argued that the colony inevitably 
played a minor role of the wider machinery of merchant capitalism that 
was so prevalent within what historians call the Atlantic World. Still, I 
argue that the body of evidence unearthed during the course of working 
with this dissertation comes out heavily in favor of a sub-regional rather 
than supra-regional perspective. This could be described as an inverted 
variation of Peter Coclanis’ criticism of Atlantic history. Whereas 
Coclanis has argued that the analytical unit of the Atlantic Sea may be too 
confining, I argue that there may be regional relationships which may be 
                                                          
24 Fredrik Thomasson, “Thirty-Two Whiplashes at Quatre Piquets: Slave Laws and Justice 
in the Swedish Colony Saint Barthélemy around Year 1800,” in Ports of Globalisation, Places of 
Creolization: Danish and Swedish Possessions in the Atlantic World in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century, ed. Holger Weiss (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming); Ale Pålsson, “Our Side of the Water. 
Political Culture and Representation in St. Barthélemy in the early 19th century” 
(Unpublished PhD-thesis, Stockholm University, forthcoming); Holger Weiss, Slavhandel 
och slaveri under svensk flagg: Koloniala drömmar och verklighet i Afrika och Karibien 1770–1847 
(Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland, forthcoming); Holger Weiss, ”A 
Divided Space: Subjects and Others in the Swedish West Indies during the Late Eighteenth 
Century,” in Sweden in the Eighteenth-Century World – Provincial Cosmopolitans, ed. Göran 
Rydén (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 275–300. 
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overlooked if the supra-regional perspective takes precedence. There are 
other objections to the choice of Atlantic History, for instance the 
overemphasis on the core-periphery relationship between colony and 
motherland. There is also a tendency within Atlantic history to focus 
politically confined Atlantics, such as the “Dutch Atlantic,” or the “Danish 
Atlantic.” Even though Atlanticists often explicitly reject the national 
confines of traditional imperial history, boundaries based on territory and 
even language are often the chief considerations which define the 
frameworks of individual studies in Atlantic History. For this reason, 
Atlantic historians have been criticized for the inherent arbitrary and 
ahistorical elements which their work can sometimes display, but the 
recent trend in Atlantic History is to increasingly focus on inter-imperial 
and transnational aspect, and many have deliberately marginalized the old 
metropole-colony or core-periphery relationships.25  
If the focus is not on national frameworks or empires, the picture can 
be rendered quite differently. A viable alternative is to concentrate on the 
general history on regional trade and smuggling. Research centering on the 
phenomenon of smuggling and illicit trade has elicited a few recent debates 
regarding merchant commerce within and between empires. A related 
study, Cathy Matson’s Merchants and Empire. Trading in Colonial New York, 
examines attitudes towards mercantile regulations and the subsequent 
crisis in imperial relations between the United Kingdom and their 
American colonies. Her study displays very clearly the difficulty in pinning 
down any consistent economic ideology among merchants who 
continuously traded across imperial borders, and with enemies of their 
                                                          
25 Peter Coclanis, “Drang Nach Osten: Bernard Bailyn, the World-Island, and the Idea of 
Atlantic History,” Journal of World History 13, no. 1 (2002): 169–82; Peter Coclanis, “Atlantic 
World or Atlantic/World?” The William & Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2006): 725–42; Pierre 
Gervais, “Neither Imperial, Nor Atlantic: A Merchant Perspective on International Trade 
in the Eighteenth Century,” History of European Ideas 34 (2008): 465–473; Michael Jarvis, In 
the Eye of All Trade. Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680–1783 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); For recent trends, see Manuel Covo, 
“Baltimore and the French Atlantic: Empires, Commerce, and Identity in a Revolutionary 
Age, 1783–1798,” in The Caribbean and the Atlantic World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money, and 
Knowledge, 1650–1914, ed. A.B. Leonard and David Pretel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), 87–107. 
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sovereign. Her explicit attempt at problematizing and understanding 
merchant ideology and mentalities is one of the few of its kind, as most 
authors and scholars rarely question or scrutinize smuggling and informal 
modes of economic activity, let alone make it a central focus of their 
work.26 
In general, historians have tended to be highly ambiguous in the overall 
treatment of smuggling. Smuggling as a phenomenon has several 
conceptual problems as well as with empirical evidence. Illicit trade could 
go on seamlessly if officials and bureaucrats were in compliance, and 
reliable quantitative data is therefore very rare. It is also hard to define a 
given commercial transaction between nations or between regions as legal 
or illegal, as that distinction often hinged on imperfect and diverging law 
texts, and, most importantly, their interpretations. In reality, one nation’s 
legitimate merchant was another nation’s smuggler. Among scholars, the 
unproblematic acceptance of smuggling as a matter of fact tends to prevail, 
and it is present for instance in the work of Truxes, whose Irish merchants 
in New York were loyal subjects to the Crown but merely considered their 
“business to be business,” even if it entailed trading with the enemy. In 
accordance with this perspective, smuggling and interloping were simply 
staples of colonial life. It was a condition grown naturally out of the 
prevailing governance based on the ‘salutary neglect’ of relatively 
decentralized empires such as Great Britain. One extreme view however 
sees smuggling as a purely illegal activity, perpetrated by avaricious 
merchants and pursued by conscientious administrators, a story of good 
and evil very much present in Pares and others’ expositions. More recent 
contributions such as Pearce have however shown quite convincingly that 
this is in many cases a false dichotomy. According to this perspective, 
inter-imperial smuggling furthered national interests through the access to 
foreign markets and was indeed very much supported in the strategic 
thinking of imperial leadership. This view holds that neutral traders and 
smugglers were simply go-betweens, even “dogsbodies and pawns” of 
                                                          
26 Cathy Matson, Merchants and Empire. Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 313–18. 
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imperial policy. This argument also serves as an explanation why neutral 
trade was exercised and tolerated to such a large extent.27 
Indeed, similar arguments are not confined to colonial empires within 
the Western Hemisphere. An example is the Danish East Indian trade 
during the late eighteenth century. Through his doctoral thesis, India 
Trade under the Danish Flag (1969), Ole Feldbæk raised very serious doubts 
about just how Danish this trade was. He argued that the Danish India 
trade was an element in European expansion in India and that it cannot be 
viewed as an isolated Danish activity but was instead largely based on the 
capital which British subjects, both those in the employ of the East India 
Company and those who were not, brought back to Europe. This so-called 
remitted Anglo-Indian capital was brought home by ships flying the 
Danish flag, because it had often been acquired in an illegal manner 
directly or indirectly at the expense of the British East India Company, as 
the latter had a monopoly on direct sea journeys between India and 
Britain. During the American War of Independence, the Danish Asiatic 
Company thus financed almost the whole of its India trade with capital it 
had borrowed from the employees of its British competitor company. 
Feldbæk’s book therefore supports the view put forward by Holden Furber 
that all the other European nations involved in India contributed willingly 
or unwillingly to the establishment of British domination in the sub-
continent. It is also a valid question if a similar development could be 
traced in the Americas and West Indies at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, where the Caribbean Sea not only became a British territory due 
to its maritime superiority, but due to commercial circumstances as well.28 
                                                          
27 Simon Middleton, review of Defying Empire. Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York, 
by Thomas Truxes, Reviews in History, no. 740, http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/740, 
date accessed: 2 April 2015; John J. McCusker, review of British trade with Spanish America, 
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Feldbæk’s dissertation was criticized by some Danish historians at the 
time of publication, among whom it has been traditional to interpret the 
Danish East India trade as an arena of commercial prowess of domestic 
mercantile dynasties rather than as a straw man for foreign smuggling. The 
extant research on Danish West Indies displays similar national 
interpretations. For instance, the main town capital of the Danish colony 
St. Thomas, Charlotte Amalie, and its history as an international entrepôt 
in the Caribbean, has tended to be treated more as an anomaly rather than 
as the integral economic society of the early modern Caribbean that it 
arguably was.29 
The general reluctance to adopt a more pragmatic view of smuggling 
and illicit trade, and to interpret border-traversing merchant activity in the 
early modern period as driven by something else than treacherous greed 
and self-interest is largely due to the nation state paradigms, but it might 
also find part of its explanation in a long-standing consensus of sorts 
among historians. The “mercantilist consensus” is the tendency, 
particularly among Atlanticists, early Americanists and British scholars of 
empire, to stress the centrality of mercantilism in the organization of the 
pre-revolutionary Atlantic, and the assumption that there was a consensus 
of mercantilist thought in European commercial and high society. It might 
go a long way in explaining the discrepancy of narratives of mercantile 
behavior, as its inherent logic quite easily leads to the interpretation that 
smugglers and interlopers were simply persons who subverted the 
prevailing mercantile order solely for private gain. Up until recently, there 
has been very little new debate regarding the true nature and operation of 
mercantilist consensus, but scholars have begun to question the very 
                                                          
29 The only article which soundly contradicts this statement about St. Thomas scholarship is 
Svend-Erik Green-Pedersen, “Colonial Trade under the Danish Flag. A case study of the 
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existence of it, and consequently its logical extensions and conclusions for 
economic history.30 
There is, however, a general agreement that the mid-1700s ushered in a 
new period of debt-driven pan-European imperial reform in the wake of 
the Seven Years’ War which created entirely new circumstances for 
colonial commerce and a movement towards more free forms of trade. 
Historians have started to pay increasingly more attention to various 
developments in this period, and consequently the perspectives on inter-
colonial networks and merchant activity have become more diversified and 
nuanced. It has also become more common to move away from the 
perspective of empire, the nation state, as well as centers and peripheries. 
A range of new works emphasize inter-colonial networks and 
developments not under imperial purview, but through the self-
organization of peoples within the colonial territories.31  
1.3 Questions, Prospectus, and Methodology 
The overarching question this study strives to answer is simply what role 
the free port of Gustavia came to play in the Caribbean transit trade during 
the international conflicts between 1793 and 1815? A fundamental element 
of the study is the assumption that smuggling – all part and parcel of the 
regional transit trade – was a natural and integral element in the Caribbean, 
especially during wartime. Against the background of debates about 
smuggling in the early modern Atlantic world, it will be of particular 
interest to investigate whose interests the existence and operation of the 
free port ultimately favored? Should Gustavia and its commercial 
                                                          
30 Steve Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the 
Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” The William & Mary Quarterly 
69, no. 1 (2012): 3–34. 
31 For recent developments see for instance Cathy Matson, “The Atlantic Economy in an Era 
of Revolutions: An Introduction,” The William & Mary Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2005). 
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operation be viewed as an isolated Swedish project, or as an institution that 
was a convenient subterfuge for commercial actors of one or several 
nations, or as part of a larger imperial design, where neutral traders simply 
functioned as middlemen? Can and should Gustavia be included in a longer 
narrative of free trade in the Western hemisphere? 
The study is limited to the period of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars because it represents the only period during which 
Gustavia enjoyed considerable commercial activity. As will be showed 
further on, Gustavia descended into a rapid economic decline after the 
conclusion of hostilities in 1815. However, it is not possible to completely 
adhere to the natural terminus of 1815 in a few instances where it becomes 
too restrictive. In the context of this thesis, there are two such cases. One 
is the transatlantic and intra-Caribbean slave trade covered in chapter 3, 
which, contradictory to the general development, was a feature of Gustavia 
trade well into the 19th century. The other case is the relationship of 
Gustavia with the privateering economy of the South American Wars of 
Independence, which lasted until the consolidation of independence of 
most insurgent states towards the end of the 1820s. This relationship is 
developed in chapter 5.3. 
Structure of the Study 
The chapters of this study are organized according to different research 
topics and questions. Chapter 2 and its subchapters mainly explore the 
contextual questions surrounding the Caribbean region’s political and 
economic history, highlighting the integral importance of smuggling and 
illicit trade for colonial societies for centuries since their first settlement 
and exploitation by Europeans. It also contains the background of Swedish 
colonization and its preconditions, ambitions and outcomes. The chapter 
attempts an analysis of the ultimate significance of the colony for Sweden 
and Swedish interests. It further investigates the institutional conditions 
and possibilities offered by the neutral free port of Gustavia for 
international commerce. It also strives to answer contextual questions 
 33 
 
surrounding the nature and operation of illicit trade, as well as highly 
related phenomena such as piracy, privateering and maritime warfare 
conducted through Gustavia. These institutional preconditions will be 
analyzed critically in order to assess the viability of the free port in the 
wider commercial activity of the Caribbean. 
Chapter 3 is a systematic account and assessment of the St. 
Barthélemy’s involvement in the transatlantic and intra-Caribbean slave 
trade. It includes a general survey of the character and function of St. 
Barthélemy in the wider slave trade enterprises of the Atlantic world, as 
well as a general history of Swedish involvement in the slave trade and its 
development towards abolition. Finally, a statistical assessment of the 
scope, frequency, and trajectory of the St. Barthélemy slave trade 
concludes the chapter. A central problem for the chapter is the 
nomenclature of Swedish slave trade and the categorization of different 
slave trade enterprises affiliated in any manner with the Swedish colony. 
Chapter 4 arrives at the central section of the study. Through a 
chronological exposition, the history of the transit trade via Gustavia is 
investigated, and key events and turning points are analyzed. The chapter 
employs the bulk of empirical findings through a combination of database 
and source analysis. 
Analytical frameworks – the Inter-Imperial Microregion 
A compelling alternative framework of analysis has been proposed by 
Jeppe Mulich in the form of the inter-imperial microregion, based on the 
geographic experience of the Danish West Indies. Mulich submits that 
the Danish West Indies could be best understood through an 
understanding of the inter-imperial microregion it was situated within, the 
Leeward Islands (Figure 1.1). As an analytical construct, the inter-imperial 
microregion focuses on the density of networks and interactions found in 
certain areas with multiple competing polities. The Leewards certainly was 
such an area. Though its islands are comparatively smaller to the wider 
Caribbean, with Saba being the smallest at 13 sq. km and Guadeloupe the 
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largest at 1,628 sq. km, it nevertheless included territories claimed by no 
less than five colonial powers. The British dominated ownership with 
some of its lesser colonies in the wider Caribbean region, administratively 
split between the British Virgin Islands to the northwest and Anguilla, 
Antigua, Barbuda, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis in the core islands. 
They were also separated from Barbados to the far windward, the oldest 
British colony in the region. 
France held the largest agricultural colonies in the region, Guadeloupe 
and Martinique in the far southeast. While the French occupied the 
largest relative amount of territory in the Leewards, the British presence 
was dominating. Royal Navy patrols were based on the chief Caribbean 
station at Antigua, while subordinate stations were localized on Jamaica 
and Barbados. The Vice Admiralty Court of Antigua handled cases of 
maritime predation and seizure, and its subordinate courts in Tortola, St. 
Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat and Dominica were equally competent in issuing 
letters of marque to privateers. In times of war, therefore, British maritime 
power was highly tangible in the Leewards. The French colonies of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, while substantial producers of tropical 
staples, were minor possessions compared to the wealthy sugar economy 
of Saint-Domingue. But after the latter colony’s trajectory towards 
rebellion by its freedman and slave population, which led to sovereignty 
from France, Guadeloupe and Martinique remained as strongholds of 
French interests in the region. Guadeloupe became a bastion of 
Revolutionary military efforts after 1794, as the local commissaires 
reorganized the armed forces and authorized hundreds of privateers to 
attack shipping throughout the West Indies. The privateering economy of 
Guadeloupe brought great wealth to the French colonies in lieu of 
plantation agriculture. Like Saint-Domingue, however, the French 
colonies in the Lesser Antilles were also left deeply affected by the 
Revolution, and experienced decades of social upheaval in the wake of 
internal conflicts between royalists and patriots, the latter of which 
introduced and implemented the ideas of the French  
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Figure 1.3 The Leeward Islands and their polities, ca. 1785 
 
Revolution in the colonies. These developments in turn spilled over into 
neighboring colonies in the region, who were affected not in the least by 
the resulting migration movements and maritime warfare. Aside from the 
regional power structure which created real barriers for free movement 
and trade, there were also aspects which furthered the communication 
over imperial borders- Institutions of finance and postal services were for 
instance located in the colonies of larger empires, especially Britain. 
Inhabitants of the lesser colonies depended on these for their own 
immediate and long-term needs. Networks of kinship and commerce 
transcended any and all borders, and the proclivities of supply and demand 
created the incentive to traverse them. The Leewards were interspersed 
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with smaller Danish, Dutch, and Swedish colonies. The free ports were 
special institutions situated in St. Eustatius, St. Thomas, and St. 
Barthélemy all created a sort of imperial crossroads where even 
representatives of warring nations could meet and barter on neutral 
ground. The nature and function of various free ports will be further 
discussed and elaborated in chapter 2.1. 
Whatever the relative merits of this construct, one should of course 
keep in mind that it contains its own arbitrary and constraining elements. 
Economic, political, and social connections can be discerned in every 
direction outside the Leewards. St. Thomas and St. Eustatius certainly had 
established trade contacts with more westward Spanish and French 
colonies like Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba and Saint-Domingue, 
while almost every colony in the wider Caribbean had close contacts with 
American merchants. In fact, the Chesapeake as well as other maritime 
ports in the circum-Caribbean could easily be added to compose a wider 
inter-imperial macroregion if one were so inclined. In a reflection on the 
Atlantic economy during the late 18th-century period of revolutionary 
unrest, Cathy Matson has pointed out what has long been a truism in the 
colonial history of the Americas: 
[...] the economic opportunities and failures of every region in the 
Western Hemisphere became interdependent, shaped by Continental 
European wars, the vagaries of the weather, internal agricultural 
markets, consumer demand, personal commercial networks, and 
government policies.32 
The crucial point here is not to construct the most rigidly defined 
regional perspective, but merely to make visible the contours of regional 
networks and relationships in focus. The sub-regional perspective in use in 
this study puts its primary attention on the immediate relationships 
between the Leeward Islands and their particular place within the circum-
Caribbean, without neglecting the wider relationships with Northern and 
Southern America, Europe, and Africa. 
                                                          
32 Matson, “The Atlantic Economy,” 358–57. 
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Whatever the changing geographic perspective, the object of the 
research in this study is trade. As stated above, this trade can have a number 
of different labels, ranging from smuggling, contraband trade, informal 
trade, transit trade, all used interchangeably. The only common 
denominators for this trade was that it was supranational, i.e. inter-
colonial, and that it was some form of commercial transaction that could 
be considered illegal at least from the vantage point of at least one of the 
colonial powers involved. Insofar as an effective geographic demarcation 
is concerned, this study is solely interested in any trade under the auspices 
of the Swedish colony of St. Barthélemy, either Swedish-registered or 
simply passing through Gustavia.  
Archives, Sources, and Methodology 
This study makes use of a large corpus of a previously unexploited sources, 
the FSB or the local St. Barthélemy government archive. The material, 
consisting of the Swedish administrative records of St. Barthélemy. 
Portions of this collection have been microfilmed in turns beginning from 
the 1950s, and kept in copies both at ANOM and SNA. Unfortunately 
these reproductions are inadequate for extensive reading and 
interpretation, and the majority of the volumes have remained 
unreproduced. Only a small number of Swedish and French authors have 
made use of this material. The archive yields unique opportunities to 
understand and make light of the Swedish colony’s economic role in the 
Caribbean transit trade. It is an exceptional source for the maritime and 
commercial life of the Caribbean around the beginning of the 19th century. 
Headed by Fredrik Thomasson of Uppsala University, a small number of 
scholars including the author was given access to the previously closed 
archives of the FSB in through a project in 2011. Since then, the material 
has gradually been digitally reproduced. The work with quantitatively 
useful material has necessitated the creation of databases in order to 
collect, record, organize, and analyze large quantities of information. In 
this thesis, three separate datasets have been created for various purposes. 
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These are (1) the Wilson dataset on the transit trade of St. Barthélemy and 
St. Thomas, (2) Wilson dataset on the Swedish slave trade, and (3) the 
Wilson dataset on St. Barthélemy mariners. Throughout the thesis they 
are referred to in the presentation of various charts, tables, and aggregate 
figures on economy, statistics, shipping and demography. The datasets 
have been constructed from a wide range of different sources not 
restricted to the FSB. In total, they contain nearly 10,000 separate entries 
on ship registrations, voyages, as well as individual actors collected over a 
span of five years. Despite the varying quality of the records and the 
information they contain, the creation of aggregates and statistics through 
database software has made analyses of general trade patterns and 
individual merchant activity possible. Further details and examples of the 
datasets involved are found in Appendix VI.  
Assessments and analyses of the sources have however at least three 
major limitations in this context. The first concerns the state and 
composition of the archive. It is in many instances impossible to make 
good quantitative datasets as the sources lack in chronological continuity 
(long time-series), contain limited or incomplete information, as well as 
the fact that a great of the material is too damaged or illegible for extensive 
use. The other limitation is due to the nature of the subject at hand. Illicit 
or informal trade leaves comparatively little in the way of reliable 
documentation, except in certain cases were traders were apprehended 
and prosecuted. While this means that accurate figures and estimations of 
commercial activity are near impossible to surmise, it is however possible 
to supplement available evidence with other quantitative indicators such 
as public revenue figures and statistics, as well as with qualitative 
statements and testimonies. The third and final limitation is the 
elementary problems associated with a critical reading of the sources. Both 
quantitative figure as well as correspondence and reminiscences are highly 
complicated historical sources in terms of what kind of information they 
carry. They are shaped and fashioned according to the tendencies and 
whims of their authors as well as the contemporary circumstances they 
were created in. These problems are of course not confined only to this 
material, they are ubiquitous in all the material used by the historian. To 
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this end sources will be compared, contrasted, and scrutinized accordingly, 
in order to arrive at plausible conclusions and interpretations. 
The primary source material is not confined to the administrative 
archives of St. Barthélemy. In order to answer the comparative ambitions 
of this thesis, a range of different national archives have been consulted. 
In total, the national archives of Sweden, Denmark, France, Great Britain 
and the United States all contain pertinent records to provide comparative 
insights into the role of St. Barthélemy in the Caribbean. These range from 
diplomatic and consular correspondence to administrative reports and 
compiled statistics. The United States posted consuls in St. Barthélemy 
and neighboring colonies starting from 1797, who answered to the 
Secretary of State. Their reporting contains invaluable information about 
the American commerce directed via St. Barthélemy. Reports from 
governors and magistrates in the British and French colonies likewise 
contain a wealth of information about the Swedish colony and its inter-
colonial relationships. For comparative purposes the trade and activities 
of other free ports is analyzed when appropriate. The material in the 
Danish National Archives that is used in this study pertains solely to the 
records of St. Thomas, as it is an important source on the free port trade 
in the region. This method is adopted to contrast and gauge the relative 
importance of Gustavia with other free ports in the regional transit trade. 
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2 The Free Port Institution of Gustavia 
2.1 A History of Free Trade in the Circum-Caribbean 
The political and economic geography of the eighteenth century 
Caribbean was highly heterogeneous. While empires had laid claim to vast 
stretches of territory in Caribbean waters, the nature of these claims were 
limited to the effective control over narrow corridors and strips of land, 
small enclaves, fortified towns, and the sea-lanes in between them. 
Territorial control has, furthermore, not been the principal aim of most 
empires in history. Early modern European maritime empires display this 
point emphatically. It has been observed, for instance, that both Spain and 
Portugal understood the Treaty of Tordesillas not as an agreement to split 
the globe into realms of sovereignty, but rather spheres of influence. The 
centuries-long scramble for colonies by European empires made its mark 
on the Caribbean Sea, as conflict and rivalry ensured that there was no 
‘peace beyond the line’. The expression denominated the world west of the 
longitude of the outermost of the Azores and south of the Tropic of 
Cancer. The concept of ‘the line’ was often a representation of the 
lawlessness of the New World compared to the lawful, well-defined realms 
of European rulers.1 
But there was also an opposite tendency in the form of colonial and 
inter-imperial networks, which seemed to emerge seamlessly despite bitter 
and continuous colonial rivalries. Economic necessities, ambitions of 
                                                          
1 Lauren Benton, “Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, no. 4 (2005); 706–21; Eliga H. Gould, “Zones of 
Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 1772,” The 
William & Mary Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2003): 471–510; Carl Bridenbaugh and Roberta 
Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line. The English in the Caribbean 1624–1690 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), 3–5. 
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wealth, and regional trade patterns all conspired to forge informal 
networks of information and contraband trading that clashed with the 
protectionist goals of legal frameworks. Furthermore, the proximity 
between empires of different nations mattered immensely for the inter-
imperial bonds that cropped up in the Caribbean. It has been argued that 
there was “a Caribbean reality of a regional community where geographic 
proximity was often more important than national boundaries.” Nowhere 
in the world did such a dense collection of colonies exist with different 
imperial allegiances. These regional conditions as well as their 
consequences will be the subject of this chapter, leading finally towards the 
major role of free ports in furthering regional contacts.2 
Monoculture, monopoly, and colonial dependence 
The cultivation of sugarcane and its refinement into sugar, molasses, and 
rum became the cornerstone of most West Indian colonial economies. 
Depending on the circumstances, other crops added to the variety of 
cultivation. Caribbean staples included tobacco, cotton, coffee, cocoa, 
indigo, as well as other dyestuffs, fruits and spices. But among all of the 
staple crops produced in the Caribbean, sugar dominated. During the 
seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century, sugar production 
experienced unprecedented growth as the demand swelled in European 
markets. The production of colonial staples created enormous wealth and 
it shaped the social conditions involved in its production in a fundamental 
way. It engaged thousands and thousands of settlers, cultivators, planters, 
agents, merchants, mariners and craftsmen. Its labor-intensive needs led 
                                                          
2 The quote is from Julius Scott III, “The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American 
Communication in the Era of the Haitian Revolution,” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Duke University, 1986), 68; Klooster, “Transnationalism ‘Beyond the Line’, 1655–1763,” 
(Paper presented at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, 6–13 August 
2000), 11. 
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to the enslavement of millions of Africans, who toiled and suffered 
through “one of the harshest systems of servitude in history.”3  
The relative value of sugarcane over any other crop led to the sacrifice 
of all the best land in the colonies. Often perceived as the principal object 
of colonization in the West Indies, sugar prevailed over bare subsistence 
crops and pasture for livestock. Sugar monoculture in the Caribbean had 
many extreme expressions, but Barbados are among the foremost of them. 
Eighty percent of the land in Barbados in 1767 was devoted to sugar cane. 
Some of the Caribbean island economies were more diversified, especially 
the larger islands with more geographic variation such as Jamaica, Saint-
Domingue and Cuba. These had greater preconditions for self-sufficiency, 
but were nevertheless in essence agricultural economies dominated by 
colonial staples intended for export. West Indian societies, with their 
large chattel workforces, in the face of which most white elites lived in 
constant fear, were dependent on the outside world. They depended on 
importations of food. They needed grain, livestock and fish to feed large 
slave populations. They depended as well on the necessaries for island 
infrastructures, ship- and housebuilding, and the artisan industries. 
Deforestation, hurricanes and the volcanic geology of most islands 
necessitated importation from external sources most of the required 
lumber, lime, stone and metal. Vast amount of wood and staves were 
simply needed for the manufacture of crates and barrels essential to export 
the produce of plantation labor. Households and administrative bodies 
needed the smallest refined products such as paper, paint, oils, fats, ink and 
candles. There was hardly any indigenous production of these necessaries 
of life in the highly specialized and bureaucratic societies of the colonial 
Americas.4 
                                                          
3 Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–
1713 (New York, 1973), 224; Carole Shammas, “The revolutionary impact of European demand 
for tropical goods,” in The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, ed. John J. McCusker and Kenneth 
Morgan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 163–185; Douglas R. Egerton et al., 
The Atlantic World: A History, 1400–1888 (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007), 217–50. 
4 Pares, War and Trade, 403–418, 475–94; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 117–34. 
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Colonial empires early on strove for the principle of exclusivity, 
attempting to contain all trade within its own territories. The effort to do 
this within the Spanish empire was articulated by the carrera de las indias, a 
system of regular transatlantic shipments and convoys. The carrera as well 
as other schemes nevertheless quickly turned out to be insufficient. 
Shipments were seldom large enough to meet colonial demand, and they 
were furthermore often infiltrated by foreign cargoes. Dutch and English 
merchants were among the first entrepreneurs to exploit the convoy 
systems, who sold their merchandise to Spanish merchants or simply used 
them as figureheads for their own commercial voyages. After centuries, 
Seville and Cádiz became home to sizeable cohorts of foreign merchants 
actively engaged in the trade with South America. When they finally 
settled in colonies of their own instead of simply encroaching on Spanish 
territories, other European powers harbored ambitions of unrestricted 
trade with bullion-rich Spanish America. Silver was, in the eyes of the 
governments of fiscal-military states, a premium commodity. The asiento 
de negros can be said to be an illustration of these conditions. The asiento 
was the license given by the Spanish government to other countries for a 
monopoly on the African slave trade to Spanish territories in the New 
World. On the one hand, it exemplified the Spanish empire’s inability to 
supply its growing plantations with enough slaves, and the pragmatic 
attitude to foreign profits in colonial trade. On the other hand, the asiento 
came to be regarded as the ultimate prize by European governments, who 
competed to secure it for themselves.5 
In reality, imperial regulatory power was often more circumscribed 
than what many scholars have characterized them to be. Inter-imperial 
smuggling became a time-honored tradition with some strong elements of 
communal solidarity in colonies in the face of imperial authority. 
Smuggling was often condoned or overseen by colonial magistrates, who 
either were forced to accept its necessity for the economic life or indeed 
survival of the societies they were appointed to govern. In other cases, it 
was socially necessary for the colonial administrator to look between his 
                                                          
5 Pearce, British Trade, 11–15, 18–25; Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling,” 154–56, 165. 
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fingers because suppression of illicit commerce would elicit widespread 
protests or even persecution. In the colonial Americas, there were 
numerous accounts of customs collectors and coast guards whose work was 
obstructed, even to the point where coast guard vessels were burned and 
offensive characters were tarred and feathered by angry mobs. Restrictive 
measures could lead to full-blown rebellions, as enforcement of unpopular 
laws were seen as an affront to colonial inhabitants’ way of life.6 
However, the authorities’ limited means to exert power alone do not 
explain the complicity in contraband trade or other irregularities. Officials 
of every rank had to foment good relations with colonial elites, and it was 
these elites that quite often had a large stake in illegal imports and exports, 
if not also the officials themselves. Officials connived at the contraband 
trade, then, for they were after all members of the communities in which 
they resided and had to maintain their most important personal 
relationships. Connivance had its roots elsewhere than only the 
corruptibility of officials. Local elites exerted a strong pressure on colonial 
authority and the practice of everyday decision-making. Sentiments and 
loyalties could go any which way. Connivance for colonial authorities was 
simply a way in which to respond to the mixture of loyalty and opposition 
they encountered among the local elite. Compromises were deemed 
necessary, for strict adherence to the law might prove untenable in a 
colonial situation, or even incompatible with the interests of colonial 
commerce. Enforcing the law was on occasion considered a greater threat 
to communal peace than connivance. Peace and quiet often trumped over 
strict considerations of law and prohibition. Occasionally the officials 
took the issue of law enforcement seriously, if only to play to the gallery in 
the metropole. They could always sidestep restrictions by issuing 
temporary trading licenses to foreigners, by invoking public needs in the 
face of emergencies such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and fires. 
                                                          
6 Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling,” 170, 175. 
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Occasionally, however, governors only fabricated or misrepresented the 
existence of an emergency in order to bypass inconvenient restrictions.7 
Sometimes even national policy came into play when trade restrictions 
needed to be skirted. Great Britain, with its dominating navy, had since 
the period of the Seven Years’ War asserted control over colonial 
waterways and set about disrupting transports of colonial produce from 
the West Indies to France. France countered by lifting its prohibitive 
colonial policies and promptly opened up its trade to neutrals. Neutrals, in 
this context, effectively meant the Dutch. The purpose of this move was 
to take advantage of the simple fact that Britain had since long a “free 
ships-free goods” commitment to the Netherlands dating from a treaty in 
1674. The measure naturally provoked a strong response from the British 
Government, which saw fit to invent a far-reaching judicial doctrine, 
which came to be known as the “rule of 1756.” The doctrine held that as a 
matter of general international law, as opposed to the limited scope of any 
treaty interpretation, neutrals were not to be allowed to enter into a new 
trade relationship during wartime which was closed to them in peacetime. 
The positive effect of this doctrine was now that any neutral ship is good 
prize if it sails under enemy license or charter. The rule could be 
summarized as holding that neutrals were entitled to trade with the enemy, 
but not for him.8 
Neutral traders however quickly devised various stratagems and 
techniques to circumvent it. One of the most obvious and important 
methods was to launder enemy colonial goods by simulating their entry 
                                                          
7 Klooster, “Transnationalism ‘Beyond the Line,’” 6–8; Jacques Mathieu, Le commerce entre 
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8 Stephen Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (New York: Manchester 
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into a neutral port. Thus a merchant vessel would land, or at least certify a 
landing in writing, a cargo in a neutral port after arriving from an enemy 
market, only to carry it further to the enemy motherland, i.e. France. On 
the first leg of this voyage, the cargo would be safe from capture, because 
it would consist of neutral goods, that is, goods consigned to a neutral party 
in a neutral state, while the goods still came from an enemy colony. On the 
second leg of this journey, the goods would also be protected from capture, 
provided that they were carried on a neutral party’s own account, and not 
consigned to any identified enemy party in the destination, the enemy 
state. Various instances of this method, particularly performed by 
merchants in the Thirteen Colonies, was already common during the 
Seven Years’ War, and the British quickly introduced an additional rule, 
or, the continuous-voyage doctrine, holding that such interrupted-voyage 
schemes actually constituted one continuous voyages and thus were in 
violation of the rule of 1756.9 
Whereas smuggling in itself often found tacit or open acceptance by 
colonial leadership, the role of foreigners in domestic and colonial trade 
was always viewed to be detrimental. Colonial societies were often 
ethnically mixed and large cohorts of foreigners usually made up a 
significant portion of populations. The Dutch were often viewed as a 
problem. The crucial role of the Dutch in the carrying trade of several 
nations was indeed a large part of the impetus behind exclusivist trade 
policies such as the Navigation Acts of 1651. The role of the Dutch in 
French domestic commerce was crucial, and was mirrored by similar 
activities in the French colonies. A great number of Dutch traders lived 
and worked in the French Caribbean during the course of the 17th century, 
and sizeable portions of the French residents in the colonies were debtors 
in Dutch banks and commercial firms. The most extreme form of French 
mercantilist measures took place in the French part of St. Kitts in 1663, 
when over sixty Dutch warehouses were set on fire, and was followed by a 
                                                          
9 Neff, Rights and Duties, 65–68. 
 47 
 
range of prohibitions and other legal measures by the French to reassert 
their authority in the colonies.10 
In the long run, however, smuggling and border-crossing trade 
intensified, and was already universal at the beginning of the 18th century. 
A great source of smuggling endeavors besides the Spanish-bound 
commerce was the shipping of British North America. Respective 
problems with their mother countries brought on a close relationship 
between the British colonies and the French West Indies. An expanded 
demand in British North America for French colonial sugar and its by-
products spelled out a solution for aggrieved French sugar cultivators, who 
had problems selling their rum and molasses to France. The illicit imports 
of sugar, rum, and molasses into the British North American colonies from 
foreign colonies was a thorn in the side of the British planters and the 
British West Indian interests in general. In 1733 Whitehall passed the 
Molasses Act in response to the dwindling legal trade of the sugar islands. 
The Molasses Act imposed heavy duties on rum, molasses, and sugar 
imported into the American colonies from foreign colonies. The British 
West Indian interest, a powerful lobby in parliamentary circles, hoped 
thus to force British American colonists to buy from only their own, more 
expensive sugar products. In the ports of New England, the stipulations of 
the Act were however subject to routine evasion and obstruction. Bribery 
at a customary rate which was only a fraction of the statutory tax share of 
the value of foreign goods to customs officials was generally enough to 
clear customs at New York and Massachusetts.11 
During the conflicts of the 18th century, however, smuggling and illicit 
trade could not operate by way of direct exchanges. Neutral shipping and 
free ports became crucial institution by which the continuity of the system 
was guaranteed. Their establishment and history is paramount to the 
understanding of trade in the region. 
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Free Ports and Neutral Subterfuges 
With the passage of time, neutral free ports gradually emerged as 
convenient marketplaces that facilitated commerce between traders of 
various nationalities. These ports were either formally declared free ports, 
or had simply evolved into de facto free ports after decades of established 
practice. Immediately from its first colonization, the English at Jamaica 
exploited the island’s strategic location in the center of the West Indies to 
make it an entrepôt in the Spanish colonial trade. Merchants settled in 
Jamaican Port Royal conducted their commerce all along the Spanish 
Main and in the traditional smugglers’ dens in the islands. By providing 
slaves, these merchants were also capable of trading at the principal ports 
of Portobello, Cartagena, and Havana. This trade, a precursor of the sugar 
economy of the island, accumulated riches and allowed the prospering 
merchants to invest their windfall into the island’s plantation hinterlands. 
The prosperous period was however cut short when Port Royal was 
destroyed by a devastating earthquake in 1692, causing large portions of 
the town to fall into the sea.12 
There were other locales of informal trading which essentially were not 
port towns or proper marketplaces. In 1750, by royal dispensation, the 
Spanish crown had granted San Fernando de Monte Cristi of Santo 
Domingo the right to trade for ten years with ships of all nations that were 
at peace with Spain. Monte Cristi was a sparsely settled village on the 
northwestern tip of Santo Domingo. At the time Monte Cristi was not 
even a proper seaport. The entire Bay of Monte Cristi, was little more than 
the home of a few fishermen and their families. Its proximity to the Saint-
Domingue border and its free trade status however made it to one of the 
largest commercial subterfuges during the Seven Years’ War. There 
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emerged at Monte Cristi became a thinly disguised market for North 
American, Irish, British, and neutral European provisions, lumber, and 
naval stores, as well as slaves and the usual, large variety of manufactured 
consumer goods. The return cargoes in exchange for these wares consisted 
of the produce of the Saint-Domingue plantation economy. Short 
smuggling runs to Cap François on the French side could be arranged by 
having the crews of foreign ships replaced with a Spanish ones in the Bay. 
The new crews would then head westwards by sea while the original crew 
took the land route to market in Cap François. As much as 150 vessels 
could be moored in the Bay at a given day, and made it essentially into a 
floating city, where goods changed hands on seaboard rather than on 
shore.13 
The Dutch were however the most established operators of Caribbean 
free ports. The Caribbean islands of Curaçao and St. Eustatius were the 
essential hubs through which the Dutch interacted with and traded in the 
region. These colonies also became two of the most important subterfuges 
in established colonial systems. The shippers and traders of these colonies 
employed the strategies and tactics of the kleine vaart (small navigation), 
that is, expeditions with small, fast-sailing boats in an unfettered inter-
island commerce. Access and closeness markets were key in this trade, 
which explains why Curaçao traded mainly on the Caracas coast and St. 
Eustatius traded principally with the French Antilles. While European 
goods flowing to the Caracas coast became the essential condition for 
Curaçao, the burgeoning American trade to the French colonies became 
the hallmark for St. Eustatius’ trade. Curaçao’s immense trading 
operations on Spanish settlements on the Caracas coast (present-day 
Venezuela) held sway for nearly two centuries. Dutch shippers carried 
huge quantities of cacao, hides, tobacco, and other products from the 
Spanish colonies in exchange for Dutch and German textiles and 
manufactures which were in high demand. Treaties between Spain and the 
Dutch Republic as well as Spanish law essentially forbade these activities, 
but the relationship was important enough to risk retribution for both 
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sides. The ingenuity of smugglers as well as the connivance of Spanish 
officials would always ensure the continuity of the illicit traffic.14 
From St. Eustatius, the Dutch were integrated into the French colonial 
sphere in a similar way, siphoning off large shipments of French sugar that 
were fed into the colony’s bilateral trade to the Dutch Republic A 
travelling British woman visiting the Lower Town of Oranjestad in 1775 
commented that “From one end of the town of Eustatia to the other is a 
continued mart, where goods of the most different uses and qualities are 
displayed before the shop doors,” She was impressed with the “rich 
embroideries, painted silks, flowered muslins, with all the manufactures of 
the Indies.” She claimed never to have seen such commercial variety 
elsewhere, with different merchants bartering their goods in their stalls “in 
Dutch, another in French, and a third in Spanish.” While the colony built 
on a long tradition, its illicit imports of rum, sugar, and molasses from the 
French and Spanish West Indies to the North American colonies was 
always nuisance for planter interests in the imperial metropoles. The 
British Molasses Act in 1733, directed against the importation of foreign 
sugar and molasses from foreign colonies into North American colonies, 
actually ended up adding incentive to sustain this illicit trade through free 
ports. After the declaration of the act, a majority of the imported sugar and 
molasses into New York had its origin in St. Eustatius.15 
There were other free ports with highly similar characteristics as the 
Dutch colonies. On a smaller scale, French settlers in the Caribbean traded 
with their British neighbors. Danish St. Thomas furnished some 
possibilities for Franco-British trade. During the Nine Years’ War (1688–
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97), it assumed somewhat of a role as a local entrepôt, and while the War 
of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) lasted, rum, sugar, cotton, and indigo 
from the Leeward Islands were diverted through the colony to the French 
islands, as well as provisions from Boston, Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
New York. The governor of Barbados stated that the Danish island “in 
time of war ever has been and is the staple for all sort of indirect and illegal 
trade and commerce.” It also assumed close contacts with its neighbors in 
the Spanish colonies, especially in Puerto Rico where St. Thomas as well 
as St. Croix traders were buyers of sugar.16  
The Caribbean in an Age of Reform and Revolution 
The colonial societies of the Caribbean underwent radical transformations 
in the decades leading up to the 19th century. Revolutionary fervor 
followed in the Thirteen Colonies in the wake of the imperial crackdown 
after the Seven Years’ War, leading finally to the division of the British 
Empire in the West Indies. After U.S. independence, British imperial 
policy immediately underwent a process of review. The question of 
commercial relations between the newly created United States and the 
British colonies was the first concern of a British Committee of Trade 
created in 1784. After years of deliberation, the Americans were 
permanently excluded in 1788. American ships were also, importantly, not 
admitted into the British system of free ports.17 
In the view taken by Whitehall, there was a crucial distinction between 
the tropical colonies of other European powers, for which the free port 
trade had been intended, and the sovereign United States. Along the lines 
of this logic, there was an existing direct trade with the United States in 
British manufactures that should not depend on the free port channels. 
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Secondly, it was reasoned that the American products needed in British 
factories would arrive faster by going directly from American ports rather 
than being transshipped from British colonies. The prime reason for the 
exclusion of American ships was however the very natural fear that 
Americans would become the carriers of British colonial produce to 
Europe, and so injure British shipping which was the linchpin of the 
Navigation Acts. Individual British merchants and planters did however 
not agree with the government’s line, and time to time stressed their own 
dependence on the North American trade. Despite their sometimes 
vociferous protests, the matter was a foregone conclusion in government 
circles. In the designs of certain British statesmen, the Northern 
American territories would supplant the former Thirteen Colonies as the 
prime supplier of the British Caribbean colonies.18 
The United States was in its early years of independence a fledgling 
agricultural-commercial state with an underdeveloped internal economy 
and very narrow industrial sector. Furthermore, it was still reeling from the 
effects of the war and legacy of historical economic ties with Great Britain. 
Its economic policy became as a result increasingly tied to the hopes of an 
economic policy of foreign trade founded on liberal commercial principles. 
Early U.S. efforts were geared towards Caribbean markets as treaties with 
European powers often failed to produce the desired freedoms of trade. 
U.S. overtures concerning possible trading entrepôts were however 
frustrated time and time again. Despite the limited concessions France 
had made to American trade in the West Indies, the way towards opening 
markets further was met face-on by compact mercantile opposition in an 
economically depressed France. Spain and Portugal also refused to open 
up their Caribbean and continental ports for American ships. The Dutch 
were another matter, as they readily agreed to allow American trade with 
its Caribbean colonies of St. Eustatius, Curaçao, and St. Martin, as well as 
Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. After all, St. Eustatius had 
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already established itself in the past as a vital commercial link for the 
rebellious Thirteen Colonies during the newly concluded war. Yet there 
were some serious limitations even in this instance. The Dutch restricted 
what Americans could import and export, especially the most important 
cargoes such as coffee and sugar. Still, even in the face of such restrictions, 
quantities of prohibited goods continued to be smuggled under the guise 
of carrying legal cargoes. The neutral colonial powers were ever-present in 
the thinking of American statesmen. John Adams asserted that “the Dutch 
and Danes will avail themselves of every error that may be committed by 
France or England. It is good to have a variety of strings to our bow.”19 
In the West Indies, conditions became volatile on account of 
revolutionary unrest and international conflict. Most colonies suffered 
either foreign invasion or internal revolt, with tens of thousands of soldiers 
poured into the region between 1793 and 1815, thousands of refugees were 
displaced and local shipping was disrupted on an unprecedented scale. 
Slave rebellions had been commonplace in plantation societies for 
centuries, but when the community of the enslaved and free black 
population revolted in Saint-Domingue in 1791, the pillars of white rule in 
the region where shook in their foundation. The rebels’ defeat of French, 
British, and Spanish armies and the independence of Haiti in 1804 were 
sources of constant consternation and fear among white colonial 
inhabitants, fearing that revolutionary sentiment might spread to slaves 
elsewhere in the Caribbean.20 
Despite the general wartime disruption as well as the removal of vast 
plantation output and the market of Saint-Domingue, the colonial 
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economies of the Americas surged during the turn of the 19th century. Slave 
imports to the Caribbean fell comparatively slowly in the 1790s from their 
peak level in the 1780s. For instance, Spanish West Indian sugar 
production tripled, and plantation agriculture in the British and Danish 
colonies expanded insofar as it compensated for the fall in regional French 
and Dutch production. Taking in the fact of rising markets prizes, 
increased customs duties, freight and insurance rates, the value of 
Caribbean commerce grew significantly during the wars around the turn of 
the century.21  
The entrepôt of St. Eustatius had been destabilized ever since the 
British and French invasions in 1781. The British occupation of St. 
Eustatius in 1781 only lasted for ten months but had caused an immense 
amount of damage: all merchandise, specie, and to some extent also the 
private property of resident merchants and planters were seized. Although 
substantial, the losses did not topple the colony as a regional entrepôt. But 
there were serious worries, about nascent competition from neutral 
colonies of St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy, and about various free trade 
experiments in the region by the Spanish, French and British. The 
situation only turned acute when the WIC decided to introduce a new 
tariff on imports and exports which suddenly turned the prospects of the 
island towards a very uncertain future. The two commercial colonies, 
Curaçao and St. Eustatius, it was thought, were to be made more profitable 
for WIC. For St. Eustatius, this meant that an eight percent tariff would 
be introduced on most articles from both Europe and the American 
colonies that were exchanged on the island. This led to a discussion 
concerning how all the economic interests of all parties involved in Statian 
trade could best be served. The most vehement protests against the 
measures came from the Statian merchants, who carried the sentiments in 
lengthy petitions and letters. The measures were widely regarded as a 
deathblow to the island’s commerce, its only livelihood. Several prominent 
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merchant houses moved to St. Barthélemy in protest, because it was 
expected that Sweden would remain neutral in an eventual international 
conflict. The demise of the Danish free port of St. Thomas followed in 
1807, as it was placed under British occupation as a consequence of Danish 
foreign policy during the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars. In this 
completely altered economic constellation in the Caribbean, St. 
Barthélemy emerged in a novel position as the sole neutral free port in the 
region.22 
The maritime warfare of the region in 1793–1815 was predominantly of 
an informal type. As per an old tradition in the Americas, swift coasting 
vessels were converted into corsairs and privateers and wrought havoc 
among regional shipping. It was a generally recognized precept of 
international law that each belligerent in wartime had the power to set up 
prize courts for the adjudication of enemy prizes. As such, these Courts 
were temporary, separate, and amenable to statutory regulation. Prize 
cases were theoretically subject solely of international laws of contraband 
and blockade as modified by treaties, but they were adjudicated in courts 
that were closely under the control of one nation, by laws completely 
accepted only by that nation. The cases that caused the most disputes were 
the ones in which the application of prize law were tried on neutrals, which 
were also the ones who suffered the worst depredations. In this hostile 
environment, the free port trade through St. Barthélemy could still thrive 
in the face of risk and adversity. The operation and nature of the Swedish 
free port will be discussed in the following chapters.23  
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2.2 Swedish Colonialism and the Foundation of Gustavia 
Despite its diminutive size and its relatively low value to the Swedish 
Crown, St. Barthélemy still faced its owner with the same questions of 
control, stability, and territorial sovereignty as larger colonial empires. 
Strong exertions of pressure both from external powers as well as local 
elites in the colonies. It has been argued that in the colonial societies of 
the West Indies, “the new social class of colonial settlers, planters and 
entrepreneurs were at once, in the English settlements, Anglo-Saxon and 
anti-English, in the Spanish settlements pro-Hispanic and anti-Spanish, in 
the French settlements Gallic and anti-French.” With a weak military and 
administrative infrastructure, metropolitan authorities in St. Barthélemy 
displayed some unique and pragmatic thinking when faced with the 
problems of colonization.24 
Sweden formally acquired the French colony of St. Barthélemy on the 
1st of July 1784. It thus received the island in a relatively calm period in the 
Caribbean, well before the region experienced the great upheavals at the 
close of the century. Sweden’s late acquisition of a colony was however not 
a consequence of lacking ambition. There were other limitations at play. 
Situated in the northern periphery of Europe, the kingdom of Sweden 
faced serious practical and political obstacles in the face of colonial plans. 
The colonies of New Sweden in Delaware (1638–55) and the Swedish slaving 
fort at Cabo Corso (1650–63) on the African West Coast were ambitious 
Swedish endeavors carried out with government support and financing. 
But they also owed substantially to the efforts of foreign actors. Dutchmen 
in particular supplied their personal capital and expertise, and were often 
the primary drivers behind many projects. Dutch entrepreneurs often used 
Swedish institutions as a front against the Dutch chartered companies 
which they themselves opposed. Indeed, foreign expertise and investment 
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was and would remain a salient feature of Swedish colonial and commercial 
efforts throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.25 
The development of early Swedish colonies were also constantly 
hindered by foreign powers. Swedish colonists faced obstruction and 
aggression from neighboring colonies with more resources and more 
experience. New Sweden was seized by the Dutch in 1655 and Cabo Corso 
was taken over by the Danish in 1658. Most Swedish imperial ventures were 
however mostly directed towards its territorial borders and the countries 
of the South Baltic. Expansion finally ceased in the beginning of the 18th 
century. Sweden then suffered significant territorial losses, as the Baltic 
provinces were conquered by Russia and the territories in northern 
Germany reduced.26 
During the 18th century, Sweden experienced a dramatic shift in its 
political system, commonly referred to as The Age of Liberty (1718–1772). 
The disasters in the Russo-Swedish wars heralded this transition, as the 
Swedish monarchy became circumscribed and gave way to the 
parliamentary oligarchy of the Swedish Diet. The period is significant in 
the context of colonial ventures and foreign trade as it brought with it 
reorientations in economic policy. In general, the chief aim was to make 
Sweden more independent in the spheres of trade and industry. One of the 
first and most successful measures of the period was the mercantilist 
Navigation Act of 1724. It was modelled closely after its English precursor, 
and its primary target was Dutch shipping, which had since long 
dominated the grain imports into the Baltic. During the course of the 
century, Swedish shipping expanded considerably both quantitatively and 
in geographic scope. The Swedish share of shipping through the Sound 
(Øresund) rose from 50% in 1734 to 80% in 1776. Prior to 1700, Swedish 
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ships rarely left the Baltic and the North Sea. Sweden also signed formal 
successive treaties with the so-called Barbary States during the course of 
the 18th century. A steadily rising numbers of Swedish ships began 
navigating in Portuguese and Mediterranean ports. An extensive Swedish 
consular network was established in the 1720s and 1730s from Malaga to 
Marseille, Venice, Alicante, Livorno, Alger, Tunis, Tripoli, and 
Morocco.27 
Chartered companies were projects in a similar vein. The single most 
successful enterprise was the Swedish China trade under the helm of the 
Swedish East India Company (SOIC). Created in 1731, the company 
focused on Canton and the tea trade, usually pursuing one or two 
expeditions annually. SOIC traded in Canton under the same conditions 
as the other European companies. Its imports of tea into European ports 
were substantial, and almost all tea was re-exported from Gothenburg. It 
was distributed (and smuggled) to the Dutch Republic, the Austrian 
Netherlands, France, and Britain. Despite its Swedish charter, the 
company initially in fact was a joint effort between the Swedish state, 
Swedish merchants, Scottish personnel as well as Dutch capital. There was 
a strong link between the dissolution of the Ostend East India Company 
(1727–31) and the foundation of SOIC. Its shareholders would however be 
comprised of more and more Swedish merchants over time. The company 
ran through three successive charters before it was liquidated in straitened 
circumstances in 1813. SOIC’s business, although profitable for a long time, 
started to falter when the British and the Dutch imposed more effective 
controls of their imports of tea in the 1780s.28  
Despite the absence of remote territorial conquests, Swedish ideas of 
settlements were never completely abandoned. Long in the wake of New 
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Sweden and Cabo Corso, there followed a string of different projects to 
acquire a colony of some kind. In the West Indies, a recurring design were 
Swedish dynastic claims to the island of Tobago, by virtue of the Swedish 
royal relations to the Duchy of Courland. The question was discussed in 
the Privy Council (Riksrådet)29 and in the Board of Commerce, but never 
amounted to much in the way of concrete action. Tobago was one of the 
so-called Neutral Islands in contestation between France and Britain after 
the island had been all but abandoned by Couronian interests.30  
A short-lived project was the first Swedish West India Company which 
had its charter issued in 1746. The project was quickly thwarted at least in 
part by foreign suspicions of Swedish interloping trade. The charter had 
been awarded to the family firm of Arfwedson in Gothenburg, who had 
abandoned their rights to the company in 1747 after the Spanish minister 
in Stockholm had voiced the policy of the Spanish crown against any 
possible incursions of foreign trade in Spanish America. A share in 
smuggling and illicit trade indeed were among the prospects. Such an 
ambition was present in a project which involved the establishment of a 
trading post around the river Barima. The plan had its origins in a circle of 
Amsterdam merchants in 1728, who sought Swedish support and financing 
for it. A Swedish expedition was organized as a result, through the means 
of a few members of the mercantile elite in Gothenburg. The expedition 
reached its destination, and a treaty was signed with local Indians as a 
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patent for further settlement, but nothing else did however follow out of 
this effort.31  
The ascension of King Gustav III after his 1772 coup was a watershed 
in colonial questions. During his early rule, further economic reform 
programs were undertaken, and colonial trade and production were seen 
as potential revenue devices for long-ailing state finances. Gustav III had 
an intense personal interest in overseas colonies, and would later prove 
instrumental in the negotiations with France that led to the acquisition of 
St. Barthélemy. Gustav voiced many familiar arguments in favor of a 
Swedish colony. A share of the world’s sugar production was a highly 
coveted goal of his, and Gustav was also convinced that a tropical colony 
could bring nothing but benefits to domestic manufactures as well as to 
commercial and maritime interests.32 
In 1784, the same year that St. Barthélemy was finally ceded from 
France, the poet and writer Johan Kellgren published an essay which 
specifically promoted the idea of a West Indian colony. It promoted 
colonialism in Sweden, and summarized the past colonial debate as 
nothing more than empty discussion. Of note, the essay also echoed the 
same pro-colonial opinions and arguments as the king. There is good 
reason to suppose that the essay was written on the request of Gustav III. 
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Kellgren was close to the king and well-informed of his colonial ambitions. 
The essay also borrowed heavily from a longer treatise authored by the 
nobleman Ulrik Nordenskjöld, published anonymously in 1776. 
Nordenskjöld was more focused on the prospects of West African 
colonization even though his treatise formally included the West Indies as 
well. Drawing largely on contemporary literary sources on the African 
continent, he saw the West African Coast as teeming with riches, free for 
the taking by enterprising colonists. Nordenskjöld was one of the earliest 
Swedes to take a serious interest in the colonization of Africa.33  
A short expedition consisting of a few Swedish surveyors was eventually 
dispatched to Senegal in 1787. The ambitions behind the voyage was a 
peculiar blend of commercial enterprise and religious idealism. It was 
funded by royal means, but was spearheaded by representatives of the 
highly idiosyncratic Swedenborgian movement, which was intent on 
creating new utopian societies in colonial territories. The expedition 
lasted only a few months, and was of small gain for its financier and its 
participants. By this time however, negotiations on a new colonial outpost 
had long since been concluded, and a first expeditionary force of Swedish 
officials and soldiers were already engaged in constructing the first 
foundations of a city on the island of St. Barthélemy in the Lesser Antilles. 
The tangible results of Sweden’s colonial efforts would remain within this 
tiny territory, despite future opportunities and ambitions. The long-lived 
ideas of other Swedish settlements in the West Indies never fully expired 
after its acquisition. As it was, Sweden would for some time regard St. 
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Barthélemy as only the first stepping-stone in a potentially wider West 
Indian empire.34 
The Acquisition of St. Barthélemy 
The possibility of a Swedish Caribbean colony had finally arisen during the 
War of American Independence. At an early stage of the conflict, the 
French put forward the proposition that Sweden could obtain a West 
Indian colony, or specifically a British colony soon to be conquered by the 
French in the upcoming naval conflict. As an exchange, Swedish military 
aid to the American rebels was proposed. The idea did not find particular 
favor, especially as it involved a strong deviation from the neutral stance 
Sweden strove to hold in the conflict.35  
Although such an arrangement was impossible, the prospect of a 
colonial acquisition in the West Indies certainly interested the Swedish 
government. The Caribbean war theater was consequently of special 
interest to Swedish diplomats in Paris, and news such as the French 
conquest of St. Vincent was received with particular Swedish enthusiasm. 
Options were discussed, and Tobago was, as often before, a focal point of 
discussion. There were also similar suggestions put forward to the Bourbon 
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court in Spain during this time. A primary focus in this effort was the quite 
audacious idea of receiving Puerto Rico.36 
Despite the frustrated French war effort in the Caribbean after the 
British defeat at Yorktown, negotiations on the colonial question between 
Sweden and France continued. In lieu of a British conquest, alternative 
French colonies were now being discussed. It was clear now, then, that 
Tobago would not be ceded under any circumstances. There were several 
reasons behind the willingness to cede a colony to the Swedes. It has been 
suggested that there was a growing impetus in the French government for 
appeasing gestures towards the Swedish crown. In the background was the 
precarious international standing of France after the war, as well as French 
concerns over Sweden’s closer relations to Russia in 1783–84.37  
Another explanation was that the French government was trying new 
ways to improve its terms of trade with Sweden. After the conclusion of 
the war, the new discussions gave rise to the idea that some kind of mutual 
measure was expected in the event of a cession. The old Franco-Swedish 
trade treaty of 1741 had given French ships staple rights in Swedish 
Wismar, an old Hanseatic harbor that had not served French commercial 
interests particularly well. The French balance of trade with Sweden had 
since long suffered a deficit, and French staple rights in another Swedish 
port were deemed necessary. Gothenburg was offered as an alternative 
instead.38  
There were other economic considerations that served to frame the 
discussion. In particular, there was the argument that the French West 
Indies would benefit from the presence of a neutral Swedish colony. This 
would, in conjunction with the opening of French West Indian ports to 
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Swedish ships, mean that the French would have a suitable substitute for 
the Dutch carrying trade which supplied its colonies in times of need. The 
diplomatic records nevertheless suggest that the colonial supply through 
means of neutral shipping was never a pressing concern for the French 
government. The neutral trade argument was mostly employed by the 
Swedish side.39 
Early suggestions for islands included the French part of St. Martin and 
Marie Galante, but eventually the final French offer arrived at the small, 
sparsely populated island of St. Barthélemy. It is an arid and mountainous 
20 sq. km-island in the Lesser Antilles, in the close vicinity of St. Eustatius, 
Saba, St. Kitts to the south and southwest, and St. Martin and Anguilla to 
the northwest. Under French dominion it never became a plantation 
colony. The island’s colonization had initially been organized by the 
Maltese Knight Phillippe de Longvilliers de Poincy in 1648 from St. Kitts. 
It came into the formal possession of the Order of Malta in 1651. In 1687 
the population reached the number of 501 inhabitants, whereas it modestly 
increased to 523 inhabitants in 1776. The island was not known to be more 
than a home to this small population, and as an occasional haunt for 
privateers and freebooters during the course of the eighteenth century, 
due to its relatively secure cove, Le Carénage, situated on its southwest 
side.40 
 The choice was a shrewd one from the French perspective. It was 
neither of much value to the French crown nor any French commercial 
interests, and it was all but unknown to the Swedish officials involved in 
the discussion. The suggestion finally won acceptance by the Swedish 
court, despite misgivings about the nature of a trade-off between 
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appreciable staple rights and the ownership of a distant territory of little 
or unknown value. The Swedish ambassador in Paris was granted authority 
by Gustav III to work towards a final convention on the matter in May of 
1784.41  
The negotiations were finally concluded with a formal visit by Gustav 
III in Paris. On the last leg of a year-long journey abroad, Gustav arrived 
in France in early June to meet with the French court and government. His 
visit included greater issues of foreign policy, nor merely the signing of the 
colonial treaty. Gustav’s aggressive designs for Norway had been 
temporarily embarrassed by the cool reception by Catherine in Russia. He 
found himself obliged to lean on French financial and military support. At 
the end of talks during the summer of 1784, France secretly pledged a 
subsidy of 6 million livres outright and French maritime assistance in the 
event of a war between Sweden and Denmark-Norway. Even if Gustav had 
insisted on more sizeable French payments, this was the real political 
success of his French diplomatic visit. Troubling questions surrounding 
the traditional French-Swedish bond had been resolved, and amicable 
relations restored. The cession of St. Barthélemy to Sweden, while a result 
of longstanding negotiations and clear Swedish ambition, served in the 
long run more as a convenient cover for the secret subsidy agreement. 
Nevertheless, when Gustav returned to Stockholm, measures were quickly 
undertaken to survey the newly acquired island and to take measures for 
formal possession.42  
The Organization of Colonial Trade 
When reviewing Swedish commodity trade with the West Indies prior to 
1784, it is obvious that Sweden had very little in the way of existing 
networks to build a colonial trade on. The ambiguous meaning of the term 
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West Indies in Swedish trade statistics already sheds some light on the 
issue. The Caribbean islands as well as the Americas were subsumed under 
the same term, without any clear distinction between the two. There was 
no sustained trade between Sweden and the West Indies before the war 
years of 1776–83. Swedish imports from the West Indies chiefly consisted 
of tobacco, coffee, and sugar. In 1782, imports first exceeded a noticeable 
value of 11,000 rixdollars. They surged to over 100,000 rixdollars in the 
following years, but dropped as quickly after the war in 1784. In turn, 
Sweden mostly exported herring – but no iron – to the West Indies. The 
fisheries of the Swedish west coast held a small share in the transatlantic 
exports of herring to feed slaves at the plantations of the Caribbean.43 
Even so, the totals of imports and exports to the West Indies paled in 
comparison with the rest of Sweden’s foreign trade. At the height of the 
wartime boom, imports of 100,000 rixdollars only represented about 2 
percent of total foreign imports (5 million rixdollars). There were very few 
Swedish merchants engaged in this business, as opposed to the iron and 
timber exports to European ports. The occasional ventures of SOIC into 
West Indian expeditions quickly outpaced even the most ambitious 
combined efforts of individual entrepreneurs. In general, the limitations 
set by the low degree of Swedish commercial representation abroad was a 
constantly debated 18th century problem.44 
Swedish officials at the time knew little about the new colony. First 
insights were gained from printed sources and a suite of different 
informants. Summary intelligence about St. Barthélemy was received in 
August 1784 from the Swedish consul in L’orient, Simon Bérard. His 
description was brief and to the point. The island’s soil was poor, its main 
products consisted at most of cotton and salt. Potentially the island could 
produce more than it did, but its main use could not be derived from 
agriculture. Furthermore, the authoritative work of Raynal, the Histoire des 
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deux Indes, was cited in government proceedings on account of its brief 
passage on the island. Its portrayal of the island was not encouraging: 
On lui [St. Barthélemy] donne dix á onze lieues de tour. Ses montagnes 
ne sont que des rochers & ses vallées que des sables, jamais arrosées par 
des sources ou par des rivières, & beaucoup trop rarement par les eaux 
du ciel. Elle est même privée des commodités d’un bon port, quoique 
tous les géographes l’aient félicité de cet avantage.45 
Aside from being represented as a speck of paltry Caribbean wasteland 
without even a decent anchorage, the Histoire also described its population 
in deploring terms. It claimed that the colony was the only one in the New 
World where the white owners were forced to participate in the work of 
their slaves. A tradition held that upon occasional visits of privateers and 
smugglers, they would give morsels of their cargo as alms to the island’s 
poor settlers, out of pity.46 
A Swedish expedition to formally acquire the island was promptly 
organized and sailed from Gothenburg in December of 1784. The frigate 
Sprengtporten carried the colony’s first governor, Salomon Mauritz von 
Rayalin, as well as a garrison of 50 soldiers, commanding officers, a priest, 
and a physician. The frigate reached its destination in early March the next 
year, but was preceded by the Swedish merchant ship Enigheten, which had 
arrived in late January with a commercial cargo. The first impressions 
among the Swedes confirmed the information about the island that had 
been available until then. Sprengtporten’s ship chaplain, Sven Dahlman, 
found the existing buildings in the bay of the Carénage to consist of “5 or 6 
ragged cabins”, the inhabitants to be “poor and wretched”, and their 
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plantation grounds “desolate and uncultivated”. Governor von Rayalin 
reported laconically on the challenges facing the new settlers, as they were 
compelled to commence extensive building, raking, and road construction 
before they could survey the land of the wider interior more closely. Von 
Rayalin wrote to Stockholm after some cursory observation that the land 
appeared “unfit” for the plantation of either coffee or sugar.47 
Despite these sobering accounts about the colony, Swedish officials 
were keen on exploiting it in whatever ways possible. In an early stage of 
government discussion on the colony, influential Stockholm merchants 
were approached by high-ranking officials. They were asked for their 
observations on colonial matters, and were requested to organize a 
commercial expedition to the island. The expedition carried the first cargo 
of necessaries for the first settlement. In return the Swedish government 
would try to exact a license for the ship to buy its return cargo in 
Martinique. A small coterie of influential Stockholm merchants were 
quickly up to the task, among whom were Carl Arfwedson, Lars Rejmers, 
and David Schinckel. Along with a few additional investors, they financed 
and equipped the voyage of the ship Enigheten, the first Swedish ship to 
reach St. Barthélemy. They all held positions in the Trade Society of 
Stockholm (Stockholms grosshandelssocietet). Carl Arfwedson was one of the 
wealthiest persons in the kingdom, and was the son of Abraham 
Arfwedson, one of the persons behind the charter of the first West India 
Company in 1746. Arfwedson was one of the key exporters of Swedish iron, 
and were also successful in banking and finance, with significant 
connections to international credit networks.48 
At any rate, the preconditions for colonial agriculture and production 
never took center stage in their discussions. Instead, the idea of 
constructing a port town and conferring it with the status of free port was 
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the guiding principle of the organizing efforts. The prospect of creating a 
free port akin to St. Eustatius or St. Thomas was seen as the most attractive 
course, as their former success was well known. The absence of other 
means of exploitation indeed would make it the only possible course. In 
fact, the final decision was probably anticipated in a very early stage as von 
Rayalin’s instructions, issued barely two months after acquisition, 
included an order to proclaim the island a free port as soon as possible after 
his arrival.49 
There were many early proponents of the idea. Gustav Philip Creutz, 
the Swedish minister in Paris during the early negotiations, had frequently 
alluded to the possibility in connection with the negotiations with France. 
St. Eustatius was seen as an ideal. St. Eustatius, after all, was also a small 
island with few natural resources, but had nevertheless prospered. Creutz 
remarked boastfully at one stage that the French king and his ministers 
supposedly shuddered at the late realization that contraband trade from 
St. Barthélemy could easily find its way into French ports. Even if this 
statement was primarily intended to put the king’s actions in a positive 
light, it shows that the members within Swedish government showed some 
optimism over the possibilities that could come with a neutral colony in 
the West Indies.50 
The Stockholm merchants that were consulted in the matter had also 
expressed the need to establish a proper trading post on St. Barthélemy. 
Attempts by government were made to this end by pleading with the Paris-
based merchant Niclas von Jacobsson. Von Jacobsson was part of the 
Gothenburg family network headed by Christian Arfwidsson. Christian 
Arfwidsson’s company owned the largest merchant fleet in the city, and 
was a large exporter of iron, timber and herring. Christian Arfwidsson was 
one of few Swedish merchants with a prior established interest in the West 
India trade, primarily through the herring trade. Von Jacobsson also had a 
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varied record of colonially oriented ventures. He owned a sugar refinery in 
Gothenburg, and had attempted to trade slaves during the American 
Revolutionary War. As a means of encouragement, the government 
offered a support of 1,000 rixdollars for the establishment of a Swedish 
firm on St. Barthélemy. Von Jacobsson however declined the offer on 
account of prior commitments, as well as infirmity and old age. Arfwidsson 
and von Jacobsson would instead dispatch their own agents to St. 
Barthélemy at a later stage, without government solicitation.51 
Free ports were far from a novel concept. During the preceding century, 
there was a recurring discussion about the utility of a Swedish free port in 
the Baltic. In fact, the continuity of this idea can be traced at least as long 
back as the 17th century, always as a possible means to lessen the 
dependence upon Dutch shipping. Gustav III’s minister of trade and 
finance, Johan Liljencrantz, had since long envisaged Swedish ports as 
transit points for Russian commodities and naval stores. Russia, similarly 
to Sweden, was a large exporter of naval stores, iron and wheat, but had no 
sizeable merchant fleet. Consequently, Russia’s trade was carried in British 
and Dutch keels. Liljencrantz hoped to divert the majority of Russian 
goods through Sweden. He had started to develop this plan during 
extensive foreign travels in 1758–61, having observed the transit trade in 
the Netherlands, as well as in the free ports of Livorno and Marseille. The 
reasoning presumed two Swedish free ports: one in the town of Slite on 
Gotland, and one on the Swedish west coast, on the far side of the Sound 
and its accompanying taxation. Despite that these ideas were shared by 
many in the Swedish Diet and commercial circuits, the plan could never be 
fully realized. It met with powerful political opposition which argued 
against free ports as a speculative and hazardous scheme. Additionally, 
Russian political support was required for an integral part of the plan to 
work, which in the end proved impossible to obtain.52  
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 Only the free port on the west coast was realized in the end. Marstrand, 
a small town situated to the northwest of Gothenburg in the outer 
archipelago, was endowed with free port rights in 1775. Another important 
aspect was the freedom of burghership, which was an old rationale 
embedded in the idea of the free port. Free ports were originally created in 
part to attract the settlement of wealthy foreigners to promote trade. 
Religious freedom and the absence of guild associations were integral 
elements for this purpose, and Marstrand included both. Swedish 
naturalization of foreigners was made possible, and its only prerequisite 
was that the prospective settler owned enough property or capital. The 
declaration also included an exceptional paragraph, which offered asylum 
for debtors and persons convicted of crimes. This was a component 
adopted from the regulations of Livorno, and would have to be changed in 
the future on account of its peculiar consequences.53 
The trade at Marstrand expanded promisingly over the course of the 
American War of Independence, and became a notorious meeting place 
for French and American merchants as well as privateers. Prize vessels 
caught by French and American privateers found a ready market in 
Marstrand during the war. In 1782, half of Marstrand’s exports went to 
North America. When peace resumed, commerce in Marstrand 
nevertheless waned. The town failed to promote the transit trade it was 
presumed to receive, especially as it was close to larger markets like 
Copenhagen and Gothenburg. The same year, Gothenburg received 
general liberty of entrepôt for foreign merchandise (nederlagsrätt), which 
made it the closest thing to a free port there was on the Swedish west coast 
for years to come. Gothenburg merchants also secured certain exceptions 
from the Navigation Act, with a view for American ships to be able to load 
appropriate return cargoes. The possibilities of American-Swedish trade 
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as seen in Marstrand had not been lost on Swedish commercial interests.54 
This situation in Marstrand had naturally also caught the eye of the British 
and elicited their protests. Sweden kept an accommodating posture 
towards Britain while doing very little to interfere with entrepreneurs 
active in the Marstrand trade. Indeed, during the war, the free port trade 
became significant enough to profit the state financially, which might 
explain the reluctance to control it too strictly.55 
The partial success of the Marstrand free port also served to inspire the 
institution of a free port on St. Barthélemy. Its problems as well as its 
benefits foreshadowed much of the future issues of Gustavia. A royal 
proclamation dated the 7th of September 1785, seven months after the 
Sprengtporten made landfall, established St. Barthélemy’s free port status. 
It is a remarkable document in its sheer brevity. Despite the precedent of 
the Marstrand project, it is remarkable how little direct influence it 
seemed to have on this decision. Whereas Marstrand’s privileges were 
fleshed out in detailed and exhaustive paragraphs, the St. Barthélemy 
proclamation of 1785 only explained that the island was open to the ships 
and goods of all nations, that people of whatever description were invited 
to settle there, and practice their own religion freely. Debtors were also 
offered the customary protection, albeit limited to a duration of ten years. 
Finally, the text did not omit to proclaim the island’s “favorable location, 
healthy climate, and good harbor”.56 
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Swedish officials believed they had good reasons to be brief. What 
mattered in the short term was the immediate construction of a Swedish 
administrative and commercial presence. The Swedish acquisition in the 
West Indies had already attracted some attention. Mercantile interest in 
the colony had one of its earliest instances in the personal effort of a 
Bremen merchant, Henrich Wilmans. Wilmans had almost two decades 
of trading experience in the West Indies, particularly in the Dutch and 
Danish colonies. Wilmans offered his views and suggested possible 
measures in a correspondence with the Stockholm government. 
Unsurprisingly, he espoused the institution of a free port, but added that 
the customs duties at St. Barthélemy would have to be lower than on St. 
Thomas and St. Eustatius. This latter suggestion might seem odd coming 
from Wilmans, who at the time co-owned a merchant firm in St. Thomas. 
But he candidly explained that regional competition would “be attended 
with great benefit to us in St. Thomas, as the Danes must do the same to 
retain merchants among them.”57  
The projects of opportunistic merchants such as Wilmans were a 
source of welcome consultation, and many of his further suggestions on 
administration and colonial jurisprudence would, in fact, be implemented. 
It also gives a hint of what some merchants active in Caribbean trade 
circles expected of the Swedish colony. Indeed, merchants from 
neighboring colonies had already started to arrive in St. Barthélemy by 
1785, purchasing land and adding to the early commercial infrastructure of 
the Swedish colony. A number of Dutch locals from St. Eustatius moved 
in, according to von Rayalin, because of their “malcontent with new 
constraints and charges inflicted upon them by their government.”58 Even 
so, the nature of the Swedish free port was still hardly clear even in its 
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contours. No detailed set of regulations had as yet been issued on such 
basic matters such as naturalization and trading rights. For instance, when 
rumors of an impending war started circulating in 1785, von Rayalin wrote 
to ask if he could furnish foreign ships with Swedish flags, as “had been 
customary in St. Thomas during the late war”. There was as yet no 
instruction on how wartime neutrality could be exploited.59 
Before further details could be settled, Swedish officials considered the 
possibilities of the relationship with the newly independent American 
republic. Despite its reservations about the political nature of the new 
state, Sweden showed an early and keen interest in establishing trade 
contacts. This was in part because of the prospective markets for Sweden’s 
main exports, iron. But it was also part and parcel of the original rationale 
behind the Baltic transit trade. Swedish politicians were eager to invite 
Americans to trade in the Baltic, which they in fact already had done 
during the war. This was one of the reasons why Sweden signed, as the first 
unsolicited neutral state, a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the 
American republic in 1783. The treaty had been negotiated between 
Benjamin Franklin and the Swedish minister Creutz in Paris.60  
The treaty largely followed the French-American treaty of 1778, with 
the customary most-favored-nation clause included to prevent 
discrimination against the United States as compared with other states. 
Additionally, it addressed the conditions of neutrality. However, as per the 
instruction of Congress to Franklin, “the direct and essential object” was 
simply the recognition of U.S. independence by another European power, 
even if Sweden certainly expected commercial gains from the new 
relationship. The treaty also included the mutual right of appointing 
consuls. As early as 1783, Gustav III appointed the first Swedish consuls, 
Richard Söderström for Boston, and Carl Hellstedt for Philadelphia. The 
next year Adolf Schough was appointed for Charleston. Consulates for 
                                                          
59 von Rayalin to Ruuth, 20 May 1785, SBS 1A, SNA. 
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New York and Baltimore would follow, in 1799 and 1810. It would take 
until 1797 for the United States to post their first consul in Gothenburg.61 
At the time of negotiating the treaty, Franklin was acting as a member 
of a European-based commission appointed by Congress to reopen 
commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign powers. Aside from 
pursuing treaties, the early economic policy of the United States included 
inquiries into possible foreign trading posts in the West Indies and on the 
other side of the Atlantic. As a direct consequence of the acquisition of St. 
Barthélemy, this commercial diplomacy also made its appearances in talks 
with Sweden. In late 1784 Thomas Jefferson conversed at length in Paris 
with Per Olof von Asp, the Swedish embassy secretary. Unaware of the 
Swedish plans for its new colony, Jefferson briefly observed that the island 
could be best exploited by granting it an unrestricted freedom of trade. He 
stated his unequivocal belief that the island could be used as a useful depot 
for the exchange for West Indian and American merchandise. In February 
of 1785 Jefferson reported to James Monroe on the frustratingly slow 
progress of commercial discussions with the greater West Indian powers. 
He however remarked in this context that the West Indian trade may go 
on despite the absence of legal treaties, and that “Holland, Denmark, 
Sweden may be of service too.”62 Marking a apparent mutual interest, the 
Swedish minister in 1786 approached Jefferson in turn, now inquiring in 
what ways St. Barthélemy could “be rendered instrumental for promoting 
commerce between Sweden and the United States,” an explicit 
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formulation of the Swedish ambitions to reach the American market 
through its colonial outpost in the West Indies.63 
Jefferson’s reply was as interesting as it was prescient. First of all, the 
actual question received a glossed-over response. He simply demurred that 
the United States could have use for Swedish iron, and that American 
traders would be forthcoming with: 
[…] flour, saltfish, & other things wanting in the other ports of America, 
which by the Swedish merchants at St. Bartholomew, will be run into 
those ports and exchanged for precious metals or commercial 
commodities: or the American merchant taking on himself those 
operations will run his flour or salt fish into those ports himself, take 
cash or such commercial articles as suit Sweden, & go with these to St. 
Bartholomew to pay for the iron he wants.64 
With similar arguments, Jefferson devoted most of the letter making a 
case for St. Barthélemy as an entrepôt for North American and Caribbean 
goods. While free port status was already conferred - as Jefferson most 
certainly knew - he adamantly argued for a free port institution “without a 
single restriction”. Only in this way would St. Barthélemy draw to itself the 
transit trade which found its way through St. Eustatius and St. Thomas. 
These islands were at present, in Jefferson’s words, “only half emancipated 
from the fetters of commercial prejudices.” While Dutch colonial officials 
had since long allowed American trade with its West Indian colonies, the 
competition between the Dutch and American carrying trade constituted 
a barrier in trade relations. Officially, American ships were strictly allowed 
only to ship molasses from the Dutch colonies themselves. All other 
tropical commodities had to be shipped in Dutch vessels. Smuggling under 
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the guise of the molasses trade was still possible, but it was still thought 
preferable to pursue reliable, legal markets wherever possible.65 
Jefferson was very unclear on how Swedish trade could be furthered in 
the process. He only vaguely surmised that Swedish trade would have no 
trouble deriving its due proceeds if the island was indeed a free port. The 
only aspect he made perfectly clear was that at least some degree of illicit 
commerce would be inevitable in order to do so. While Jefferson admitted 
that this suggestion might appear objectionable for a number of moral or 
legal reasons, he maintained that the “oppressive rescripts of Metropolitan 
cupidity” made it a necessity. After all, in a colonial world officially 
governed by mercantilist laws issued in the metropolis, there were few 
ways for outsiders to legally conduct business. From the minutes and 
records of Swedish government, it is clear that illicit trade and smuggling 
were anticipated as a result of a free port. The experiences of Marstrand is 
one of the most evident examples of this circumstance. Swedish officials 
were not overly concerned or averse to the consequences.66 
The organization of domestic commercial relations with the new 
colony was another matter that received extensive treatment in the early 
discussion. It did not take long to raise the question about the possibility 
of a chartered company. The proposals on the matter were however far 
from unanimous. The Wilmans memorandum had unsurprisingly advised 
against a company, seeing as that would only constitute an unwanted 
competitor on the scene. Simon Bérard posted with Swedish consular 
functions in L’Orient, had suggested the creation of a company, but was 
answered by an early disapproval of Liljencrantz. Liljencrantz was no 
unequivocal opponent of trading companies, as he had indeed promoted 
their establishment in the past. However, in the present case he thought 
that a chartered company would go against the spirit of the free port 
institution.67 
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A very plausible motivation behind Liljencrantz’s sentiments is that he 
was deterred from the recent experience of the Danish West India 
Trading Company (Vestindisk Handelsselskab), which ended in a spectacular 
failure. The company had been founded immediately after the outbreak of 
the war in 1778 in an effort to exploit wartime neutrality, with a particular 
attention to the international coffee trade.68 The company’s West India 
branch was located to St. Thomas. The company broke with prior practice 
in that it was the Danish government took the initiative to create it, as well 
as placing considerable sums of capital at the company’s disposal until their 
shares could be sold. The short history of the company can only be 
described as a colossal failure. It was dissolved shortly after the conclusion 
of peace in 1783. The Danish crown took over its assets and liabilities and 
repurchased all its shares at prices which offset all losses to the investors. 
This controversial liquidation put to light a range of failed and unrealistic 
business ventures, mismanagement, incompetence, and most of all, 
egregious losses for the Danish crown chest.69  
Ultimately, the most forceful interest behind the idea of a Swedish 
chartered company were the Stockholm merchants invested in the 
Enigheten-expedition, and they would soon realize their bid. The initial 
offer to von Jacobsson was quickly passed on to Jacob Eliasson Röhl and 
Adolf Fredrik Hansen, second cousins hailing from a family dynasty of 
crown bakers and merchants in Stockholm. Between the two, they shared 
decades of extensive commercial experience in both Europe and in the 
East and West Indies. Röhl had also been one of the early applicants for a 
consulate in the United States after the treaty of 1783. They were closely 
associated with the organizers of the Enigheten venture. They arrived at St. 
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Barthélemy with the same expedition, and bought portions of waterfront 
land in Le Carénage on behalf of the expedition’s patrons, anticipating 
future investments. Their primary task was however to establish a Swedish 
merchant firm on St. Barthélemy. Röhl also drafted a comprehensive 
memorial about the commercial prospects of the island. Like so many 
others before him, he was not very impressed by the Crown’s new 
possession. But he conceded the fact that the island was situated favorably 
in the middle of very important colonial markets, and possessed a good 
enough harbor.70 
Exploitation of this trading post, however, could only be achieved 
through smuggling. The limited free trade concessions of nearby French 
colonial ports only catered to American, not Swedish, products. Röhl 
however thought it would be possible to obtain secret access to trade in 
colonies such as Guadeloupe and Martinique. Dutch contacts had 
informed Röhl of the close relations between the French colonies and 
merchant firms from the Dutch and British colonies. The access to French 
markets was always obtainable through bribery Röhl’s rather detailed 
proposals for illicit trade included the development of island agriculture 
and small industrial facilities, especially rum distilleries. These would 
however not serve mainly for profit, but rather as convenient cover for 
Swedish ships who could then pass off their cargoes as domestic 
production with some degree of credibility.71 
More to the point, Röhl concluded that a chartered Swedish company 
was the only means for domestic interests to gain a share in this trade. He 
argued that this was the only way to promote the Swedish carrying trade 
and the dissemination of Swedish goods. In other cases, the colony would 
simply amount to nothing more than a convenient mart for Americans and 
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their inter-island smuggling business. Von Rayalin had incidentally 
envisioned basically the same scenario, reporting that the Americans 
“counted on” the island in the future.72 
Individual efforts of Swedish merchants would most likely fail 
according to Röhl, as they would be frustrated by competition and lack of 
adequate resources. Only a chartered company, in which individual 
merchants could participate through the purchase of shares, would ensure 
the continuity and stability of Swedish trade to the West Indies. A 
company was also more likely to be able to defray the costs and risks 
associated with ventures such as African-bound slaving expeditions, an 
important pre-condition for colonial development according to Röhl.73 
Röhl emphasized the connection between a prospective company and 
the investors in the first commercial expedition. The memorial swells with 
praise over their “patriotic zeal, unanimity, courage, and enterprise.” 
When the final issues of colonial administration were being decided in 
September of 1786, a group of Stockholm merchants headed by Carl 
Arfwedson presented their observations to an appointed colonial 
committee. Their observations repeated many of the pro-company 
arguments in the Röhl memorandum almost verbatim.74 
The committee was inclined to agree that the creation of a chartered 
company was the most prudent option. Neither did Liljencrantz voice his 
earlier objections against such a decision. His reversal cannot, however, 
only be ascribed to the influence of the merchant bourgeoisie of 
Stockholm. He was most likely moved towards acceptance on account of 
the high costs and risks involved in the colonization of a remote territory. 
A commercial organization financed in large part by the country’s 
mercantile elite was finally seen as the best alternative to offset future 
liabilities. A great deal of these considerations became embodied in the 
charter of the Swedish West India Company (SWIC) as well as the first 
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comprehensive set of administrative regulations for St. Barthélemy, both 
issued on the 31st of October 1786.75 
SWIC was awarded the rights to trade with St. Barthélemy, the West 
Indies, North America, and the West African coast for an initial period of 
fifteen years. It was a joint stock company with a limited charter, meaning 
that other Swedes or foreigners were not barred from the commercial 
intercourse with St. Barthélemy. Nevertheless, SWIC enjoyed extensive 
reductions in domestic taxes and tariffs, which gave it a privileged position 
vis-à-vis other Swedish actors. It also enjoyed the right to establish 
factories and warehouses in foreign West Indian colonies, and had 
jurisdiction over its own personnel. Finally, it would receive three quarters 
of the total incomes from St. Barthélemy customs, the collection of which 
it would organize with its own means. The company leadership itself 
answered to the Swedish Board of Commerce in matters concerning the 
West Indian trade at large.76 
In return for these various privileges, SWIC was burdened with the 
maintenance of the colony’s public works and infrastructure. This entailed 
the dredging and keeping of the harbor, the construction of a wharf, 
development of the island salines, and the payment of salaries to a 
significant part of the Swedish colonial officials. This trade-off was an 
expression of the government’s cost-adverse minimalist approach to 
colonial governance, which had developed during the first two years after 
the acquisition.77  
The regulations for St. Barthélemy were a mix of the cumulated projects 
and propositions considered up until that time. Thus the island’s (limited) 
defense and official representative duties would be combined in the 
powers of the Governor. The main executive and legal body, the council 
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(konselj), was modeled on the government of St. Eustatius as Wilmans had 
suggested. This model supported the inclusion of local inhabitants into the 
council, four of its “permanent residents,” elected among themselves. The 
remaining four council members consisted of the Governor, acting as 
chairman except in judicial cases, when the judge (justitiarie) would preside. 
The remaining two seats would be filled by representatives of SWIC. 
Coincidentally, the judge was to be salaried by SWIC, not the crown. The 
judge was also vested with the powers of notary public. One can see here 
the considerable leverage offered to the company in colonial 
administration, which would make its own peculiar imprint on the future 
history of the colony.78 
The SWIC was modelled very closely on the Swedish East India 
Company, albeit with a few significant differences. One was the heavy 
involvement of government, both in its initial stages, and as owner. The 
king was formally entitled to appoint the directors of SWIC. Gustav III 
was content with appointing only one director, Eric Ruuth, who had 
succeeded Liljencrantz as minister of finance in 1786. The four other 
directors were chosen among the initial shareholders, and included the 
financiers of the Enigheten as well as Niclas Pauli, another noted Stockholm 
merchant. Ruuth would long remain as the chairman of the board of 
directors, holding the largest single share in the company, 8,000 rixdollars, 
on behalf of the king.79 
Another characteristic was the absence of foreign capital in SWIC. The 
company was in fact Swedish-owned, and included the capital of a 
significant portion of the mercantile bourgeoisie of Stockholm and 
Gothenburg, as well as a few notable noblemen and government officials. 
The Swedish colonial project had thus, it seemed, gained momentum in 
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joining the forces of government and the mercantile elite. The combined 
institutions of free-flowing commerce and chartered trade would however 
prove problematic. 
The Growth of a Transient Maritime Society 
During the first few years under Swedish governance of St. Barthélemy, 
Gustavia was built up from ground, and in the beginning resembled little 
less than a temporary campsite around the cove of Le Carénage, virtually 
uninhabited prior to the arrival of Swedish expeditions. At the time of 
acquisition, there lived on the island 458 white settlers, 281 slaves, and 10 
free blacks. To this number was soon added a small troop of Swedish 
officials and functionaries as well as a small contingent of Swedish troops. 
As this was hardly enough to get construction going, the first Governor 
von Rayalin expropriated daily slave labor from the slave-owners on the 
island in order to build the earliest roads, fortifications and buildings. 
Gustavia soon emerged as a string of seafront buildings, the principal ones 
being the property of the Swedish crown and SWIC. While foreign 
settlers were anticipated, it would take some time until actual settlement 
from neighboring colonies would begin in earnest. The colony began 
attracting interest soon enough, when news of its free port privileges were 
dispersed in print in neighboring colonies. By 1786 a motley group of 18 
settlers had moved in from St. Martin, St. Kitts, and St. Eustatius.80 
From the very beginning the Swedish colony relied, very much as its 
Danish counterparts, on colonization by invitation. Migrants and settlers 
from nearby Caribbean would become the backbone of the growing urban 
population of Gustavia. The strategy to invite foreign settlers to its colony 
was deliberate rather than borne out of necessity over a long period of 
time, as it had been in the case of the Danish West Indies. The Swedish 
government even saw itself prompted to prohibit the “imprudent” desire 
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of a popular peasant movement in Finland to emigrate to what it saw as a 
promised land in the New World.81 
The settler society of St. Barthélemy was to have very diverse origins. 
Bengt Anders Euphrasén, a student accompanying a Gothenburg 
merchant ship to the colony in 1788, commented on the growth of the 
colony and its heterogeneous makeup of “Swedes, Englishmen, 
Frenchmen, Danes, Jews and Americans” in the town. There were also 
groups of German, Italian and Dutch-speaking residents. By the time of 
Euphrasén’s description, the city housed 1,131 inhabitants, of which nearly 
half were enslaved. Gustavia had grown larger than the original settlements 
of French Catholic planters dispersed around the island. There began to 
be a pronounced distinction between Gustavia and the settled hinterlands. 
Very few settlers bought land explicitly for plantation ventures, except for 
a “few Englishmen”, who had bought plantations on which they resided a 
few months of the year. The distinction of town and countryside persisted 
throughout Swedish possession of the island and into modern times, as 
evidenced by the remarkable cultural continuity and isolation of the 
French families living on the island to this day. The rural population were 
relatively secure in their religious and property rights afforded to them in 
the provisions of the French cession.82 
Still, the society witnessed by Swedish observers at the close of the 
eighteenth century was only the beginning of the burgeoning free port that 
Gustavia was growing into. The town can be described as a heterogeneous, 
polyglot society whose population was characterized by a high degree of 
mobility. Settlers were seldom sedentary urban dwellers, but rather 
undertook constant voyages throughout the West Indies, and had families 
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and property in other colonies. Populated by mostly Protestant settlers, 
enterprising actors in Gustavia of different vernaculars favored and 
conformed to business dealings in English. Other indications point 
towards the nature of Gustavia as a highly anglicized community. Official 
communications and statutes were printed in English and French. The 
island newspaper, The Report of Saint Bartholomew (1804–19) ran most of its 
content and editorial matter in English.83  
The source of the island’s growing population was not as much a result 
of the appeal of economic privileges and exemptions as much as to 
destabilizing crises in the region. The ruptures of the French Revolution 
in neighboring colonies were the first of these movements. The merchant 
Daniel Öström commented in a letter to SWIC director Rejmers that 
“articles of provisions etc. are exceedingly expensive on account of the 
arrival of about 1 500 Frenchmen, which have also made household rents 
as well as food very dear.” There were undoubtedly a large contingent of 
French refugees, but these are not so easily noted in the censuses of the 
colony during the early revolutionary years.84  
Table 2.1. shows a modest population growth in the early revolutionary 
years. Between 1789 and 1790 the town population even dropped 
significantly. The simple explanation is that the majority of the French 
refugees did not choose to settle in the island, and instead migrated to 
other locales in the Caribbean as well as North America. The first 
significant growth in the urban population occurred between 1793 and 
1796, when the town received nearly 800 new inhabitants, of which almost 
500 were slaves. While it can be discounted that this was partly an effect 
of the slave trade, it suggests that new colonists with households and 
capital, i.e. slaves, were settling down in a growing pace. Drawings and 
maps of Gustavia from the period 1792–99 (Figure 2.1) supports this  
  
                                                          
83 Roderick Cave, Printing and the Book Trade in the West Indies (London: The Pindar Press, 
1987); Roderick Cave, “Early Printing and the Book Trade in the West Indies,” The Library 
Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1978): 163–92. 
84 Quote from Öström to Rejmers, 10 January 1795, SNA. 
 86 
 
T
ab
le
 2
.1
 P
op
ul
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 S
t. 
B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 17
65
–1
89
7 
 
Is
la
nd
   
to
ta
l 
37
1 
57
9 
75
4 
73
9 
1,
42
0 
1,
58
0 
1,
66
3 
1,
55
6 
1,
62
2 
1,
46
8 
1,
98
4 
2,
21
2 
2,
89
3 
*6
,0
00
 
- 
R
ur
al
 S
t B
 
to
ta
l 
37
1 
57
9 
75
4 
73
9 
93
4 
1,
00
7 
1,
00
7 
1,
03
4 
98
8 
92
0 
99
7 
1,
06
8 
1,
14
1 
- - 
G
us
ta
vi
a 
to
ta
l 
- - - - 48
6 
57
3 
65
6 
52
2 
63
4 
54
8 
98
7 
1,
14
4 
1,
75
2 
- 
3,
06
1 
R
ur
al
 S
t B
 
W
hi
te
 
25
8 
32
8 
41
9 
45
8 
51
9 
53
5 
54
3 
56
5 
52
3 
45
5 
50
9 
54
7 
58
5 - - 
Fr
ee
 B
la
ck
 
- - - 10
 
- 8 - - - - - - 28
 
- - 
Sl
av
es
 
11
3 
25
1 
33
4 
28
2 
41
5 
46
4 
46
4 
46
9 
46
5 
46
5 
48
8 
52
1 
52
8 - - 
G
us
ta
vi
a 
W
hi
te
 
- - - - 24
4 
30
1 
37
7 
29
2 
35
2 
29
0 
50
5 
59
0 
68
2 - 83
5 
Fr
ee
 B
la
ck
 
- - - - - 80
 
- - - - - - 38
8 - 80
2 
Sl
av
es
 
- - - - 24
2 
19
2 
27
9 
23
0 
28
2 
25
8 
48
2 
55
4 
98
1 - 
1,
42
4 
 
Y
ea
r 
17
65
 
17
67
 
17
75
 
17
84
 
17
87
 
17
88
 
17
89
 
17
90
 
17
91
 
17
92
 
17
93
 
17
94
 
17
96
 
18
00
 
18
06
 
 87 
 
 
5,
49
2 
4,
58
7 
4,
01
5 
- 
2.
96
5 
2,
55
0 
2,
63
5 
2,
82
6 
2,
89
8 
2,
37
4 
So
ur
ce
: C
en
su
s r
ec
or
ds
 fo
r S
t.
 B
ar
th
él
em
y 
17
87
, 1
78
8 
&
 17
96
, S
B
S 
28
, S
N
A
; A
gg
re
ga
te
 fi
gu
re
s f
or
 c
en
su
se
s 1
78
7–
94
, F
SB
, S
er
ie
 P
O
, 
vo
l. 
29
2,
 A
N
O
M
; T
he
 sa
m
e 
ag
gr
eg
at
es
 a
re
 fo
un
d 
in
 a
n 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 to
 G
ov
er
no
r B
ag
ge
’s 
re
po
rt
, 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 1
79
5,
 S
B
S 
1 B
:2
; 1
80
6 
fig
ur
es
 in
 a
 m
em
or
an
du
m
 o
f B
er
gs
te
dt
 a
nd
 F
ah
lb
er
g,
 2
4 
D
ec
em
be
r 1
80
6,
 S
B
S 
1C
, S
N
A
; 1
81
2 
fi
gu
re
s f
ro
m
 G
ov
er
no
r S
ta
ck
el
be
rg
’s 
re
po
rt
, 5
 O
ct
ob
er
 18
12
, S
B
S 
2,
 S
N
A
; B
.A
. E
up
hr
as
én
, B
es
kr
if
ni
ng
 ö
fv
er
 sv
en
sk
a 
ve
st
in
di
sk
a 
ön
 S
t. 
B
ar
th
el
em
i i
 W
es
tin
di
en
, s
am
t ö
ar
ne
 S
t. 
E
us
ta
ch
e o
ch
 S
t. 
C
hr
ist
op
he
r (
A
. Z
et
te
rb
er
g,
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
, 1
79
5)
, 2
0–
21
; Y
ol
an
de
 L
av
oi
e,
 C
ar
ol
yn
 F
ic
k 
an
d 
Fr
an
ci
ne
-M
. M
ay
er
, “
A
 
P
ar
ti
cu
la
r S
tu
dy
 o
f S
la
ve
ry
 in
 th
e 
C
ar
ib
be
an
 I
sl
an
d 
of
 S
ai
nt
 B
ar
th
él
em
y:
 16
48
–1
84
6”
, C
ar
ib
be
an
 S
tu
di
es
 2
8,
 N
o.
 2
 (1
99
5)
, 3
84
; 
Y
ol
an
de
 L
av
oi
e,
 “H
is
to
ir
e 
so
ci
al
e 
et
 d
ém
og
ra
ph
iq
ue
 d
’u
ne
 c
om
m
un
au
té
 is
ol
ée
: S
ai
nt
 B
ar
th
él
em
y 
(A
nt
ill
es
 fr
an
ça
is
es
), 
R
ev
ue
 
d’
hi
st
oi
re
 d
e l
’A
m
ér
iq
ue
 fr
an
ça
ise
, v
ol
. 4
2,
 n
o.
 3
 (1
98
9)
, 4
14
; F
re
dr
ik
 E
dv
ar
d 
Få
hr
ae
us
, “
St
at
is
ti
sk
a 
up
pl
ys
ni
ng
ar
 rö
ra
nd
e 
sv
en
sk
a 
ko
lo
ni
n 
S:
t B
ar
th
él
em
y,
” S
ta
ti
st
isk
 ti
ds
kr
ift
 2
 (1
86
5)
: 2
56
–5
7;
 H
an
ne
s H
yr
en
iu
s,
 “R
oy
al
 S
w
ed
is
h 
Sl
av
es
,”
 R
ep
or
ts
 o
f t
he
 D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
In
st
itu
te
 15
 (1
97
7)
: 1
3,
 2
2–
23
. 
N
ot
e:
 W
he
re
 y
ea
rl
y 
ce
ns
us
 d
at
a 
on
 th
e 
fr
ee
 b
la
ck
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
is
 m
is
si
ng
, i
t o
nl
y 
m
ea
ns
 th
at
 th
e 
da
ta
 is
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
fig
ur
es
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 w
hi
te
s o
r s
la
ve
s.
 T
he
re
 w
as
 n
ev
er
 a
n 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
co
nv
en
ti
on
 o
f c
ov
er
in
g 
th
is
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
ca
te
go
ry
. 
1,
61
1 
1,
67
7 
1,
70
4 
- 
1,
55
3 
1,
48
0 
1,
49
9 
1,
68
3 
1,
99
0 
1,
58
1 
3,
88
1 
2,
91
0 
2,
31
1 
1,
78
6 
1,
41
2 
1,
07
0 
1,
13
6 
1,
14
3 
90
8 
79
3 
93
3 - 
1,
61
3 
- 
1,
20
0 
1,
04
1 
1,
01
8 
1,
22
5 
- - 
90
 
- - - - 73
 
14
7 
45
8 - - 
58
8 - 91
 
- 35
3 
36
6 
33
4 - - - 
1,
03
8 
- 
1,
44
4 
55
2 
1,
07
4 
83
0 
29
0 
30
4 - - 
1,
02
5 
- - 
70
6 - - 64
1 
83
9 - - 
1,
81
8 
- 86
7 
52
8 
33
8 
24
0 
20
0 - - - 
18
12
 
18
19
 
18
28
 
18
35
 
18
38
 
18
40
 
18
46
 
18
54
 
18
66
 
18
75
 
 88 
 
 
F
ig
u
re
 2
.1
 U
rb
an
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
o
f 
G
u
st
av
ia
, 1
79
2–
17
9
9
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
a 
su
rg
e 
of
 se
tt
le
rs
 to
 th
e 
co
lo
ny
 to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
18
th
 c
en
tu
ry
. O
ne
 o
f t
he
 re
su
lt
s w
as
 th
at
 
ur
ba
n 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
 a
nd
 re
si
de
nc
e 
in
 G
us
ta
vi
a 
ga
in
ed
 m
om
en
tu
m
. T
he
se
 m
ap
s g
iv
e 
an
 im
pr
es
si
on
 o
f t
hi
s d
ev
el
op
m
en
t.
 T
he
y 
ar
e 
da
te
d,
 fr
om
 le
ft
 to
 ri
gh
t,
 a
t 1
79
2,
 17
96
 a
nd
 17
99
. S
w
ed
is
h 
M
ili
ta
ry
 A
rc
hi
ve
s (
K
ri
gs
ar
ki
ve
t)
. 
 89 
 
argument, as it is evident that considerable construction was underway in 
the town, and that lots of land were being bought and occupied at an 
unprecedented speed. Whereas population figures around the turn of the 
century are sparser, it was reported that the total population exceeded 
6,000 inhabitants. In 1806, when more reliable figures are again available, 
the total population of Gustavia stood at 3,061 inhabitants. Despite the 
lack of precise data for the rest of the colony, it is evident that the town 
superseded the countryside during this period. Relative to the size of the 
island, Gustavia became a bustling urban center. Considering its number 
of inhabitants even during its most active period, it was a middling 
settlement in comparison with commercial centers such as Havana, which 
had over 40,000 inhabitants in 1791. Larger port towns in North America 
and on the Spanish Main exceeded 20,000 inhabitants during the same 
time, and Gustavia was also smaller than its most comparable urban 
equivalents, the free ports. Willemstad on Curaçao had over 11,000 
inhabitants in 1789, Charlotte Amalie had 2,085 in the same year, and the 
total population of St. Eustatius in 1790 was 7,830.85 
 The island council gave a detailed report in 1801 of the growing 
contours of the shoreside city. Gustavia had then become the home of 
about 40 wholesale merchants with real estate property. Among the 
wealthiest merchants who had settled to St. Barthélemy were a number of 
former prominent St. Eustatius merchants who had relocated from the 
Dutch colony after 1795. One example was the house of Vaucrosson & Son. 
The father and head of the family firm, Anthony Wachter Vaucrosson, had 
been one of the two merchants which had dominated the sugar exports on 
St. Eustatius, the other was the Bermudian-born Richard Downing 
Jennings, who instead had relocated to St. Thomas. The elder Vaucrosson, 
who had been active in the remonstrations against the planned redirection 
in Statian economic policy, took out Swedish burgher rights as early as July 
1786, in search for, as he put, a more tranquil environment after the Dutch 
                                                          
85 Population figures of various port towns in Wim Klooster, “Curaçao as a Transit Center 
to the Spanish Main and the French West Indies,” in Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680–1800: 
Linking Empires, Bridging Borders, ed. Gert Oostindie and Jessica V. Roitman (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 44–45; Enthoven, “That Abominable Nest of Pirates,” 247. 
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were caught up in the international conflicts of the time. It would take 
until 1793 for the whole family along with their property, to make a 
complete resettlement in Gustavia from Oranjestad. In the Lower Town 
the family left a renowned family and business residence, with rooms that 
“were richly upholstered and from the upper gallery a bridge spanned the 
street to a garden laid out on the roof of a warehouse”86.  
Even though there are no details that suggest that the Vaucrossons built 
equally conspicuous buildings in Gustavia, their dwellings would have had 
to hold a sizeable household, consisting in 1796 of 23 people, of which 5 
white men, 1 white woman and 17 slaves. The elder Vaucrosson, who died 
an old man in St. Barthélemy in 1813, was survived by his eldest sons, 
Jacques Antoine and Jean Jacques Vaucrosson, who carried on the business 
of their family well into the 1830s.87 
Another wealthy Statian merchant that settled in St. Barthélemy during 
the 1790s was John Joseph Cremony, who had been born in Gaeta in the 
kingdom of Naples. Cremony and his business house seem to have been 
established in Gustavia by 1796 at the latest. He was a merchant with a 
wide network and no clear field of specialization. He held shares of 
plantations in Guadeloupe and in the French part of St. Martin during his 
lifetime. His business activities necessitated the use of a small staff of 
clerks in Gustavia, as well as an agent stationed in St. Eustatius. He himself 
                                                          
86 On Richard Downing Jennings, see Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade, 354, 406–07; and “List of 
the most prominent merchants of St. Thomas,” C 260, FSB, ANOM; Jordaan and Wilson, 
“Free Ports,” 285, 296, 303; Quote from Johan Hartog, History of St. Eustatius (Aruba, De Wit 
Stories, 1976), 43–44. 
87 Per Tingbrand, Who Was Who in St. Bartholomew during the Swedish Epoch? 
(Stockholm: Swedish St. Barthélemy Society, 2001), 566–569; Handlingar Uti Det Hos Kongl 
Majt anhängiga Mål, angående den af handelshuset på Öen St. Barthélemy, Vaucrosson & Son, i 
underdånighet förde klagan öfwer wåldsam medfart af Gouverneuren och Conseillen på nämnde Ö, 
m.m. (Stockholm, A.J. Nordström, 1799), 19, Sten Simonssons samling, vol. 7, SNA. 
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acted from time to time in the capacity of agent for commercial actors 
elsewhere, for example Liverpool-based slave traders Robert Todd & Co.88 
Later settlements signaled the arrival of significant merchant wealth 
that would have a longer intertwined history with the island. The German 
business house of Elbers and Krafft was a representative of this kind of 
movement. Johann Bernard Elbers and Johann Philip Krafft were natives 
of Mülheim an der Ruhr in North-Rhine Westphalia, who had arrived to 
the Swedish colony a few years into the new century, as testified by their 
maritime activities in 1804. Their business was quickly established as one 
of the most prominent in the island. They built their imposing mansion, 
Mühlheim, not in the streets of Gustavia, but reclusively to the north shore 
in a little bay west of Saint Jean. It was of a peculiar octagonal design, built 
out of marble to bear witness of the success of their business as well as to 
the status of the merchant elites in the region.89 
Settling merchants with these kinds of financial and social resources 
invariably became influential members of island society. The Vaucrossons, 
Cremony, Elbers, Krafft and several others from time to time became 
members of the council, aldermen, delegates and representatives of 
commercial committees. As such, they became the principal actors with 
which the Swedish council had a mutually dependent relationship. This 
relationship was often double-edged. On the one hand, their wealth 
                                                          
88 Probate inventory of John Joseph Cremony, 18 October 1820, S 310, FSB, ANOM; 
Tingbrand, Who Was Who, 152–153; For Cremony’s slave trading activities, see chapter 3; For 
some details regarding the Cremony family and their plantations on St. Martin, see John 
Hackett, Narrative of the expedition which sailed from England in 1817, to join the South American 
Patriots (London: John Murray, 1818), 35–41. John Joseph Cremony’s tombstone is situated on 
Loterie Farm (Formerly Lottery Estate) on French St. Martin, where he settled in his later 
years. 
89 Tingbrand, Who Was Who, 198–99, 325; Erik O.E. Högström, “S:t Barthélemy under 
svenskt välde” (Unpublished PhD-thesis, Uppsala University, 1888), 35, 40, 47, 52, 57–58; For 
the description of the Elbers & Krafft estate, see Goës, “Minnen,” 163–64. The description 
by Goës is based on his own visit to the ruins of the estate in the 1880s. Governor Stackelberg 
inhabited the estate after 1815; On a general note, see also Klaus Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute im 
Atlantikhandel, 1680–1830. (München: Beck, 2004), 37–86; Klaus Weber, “From Westphalia 
to the Caribbean: Networks of German Textile Merchants in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
Cosmopolitan Networks in Commerce and Society 1660-1914, ed. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl 
(London: London German Historical Institute, 2004), 53–98. 
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financed important infrastructure and communal projects, their 
commercial activities drew revenues to Swedish state coffers, and their 
advice and expertise was needed in the unceasing flow of administrative 
matters. On the other hand, the council’s relationship with them had to be 
constantly negotiated and re-negotiated. Their interests and personal 
dealings often came head to head with the governance and jurisprudence 
of the Swedish colonial administration. They often used their relative 
power as council members as they saw fit, either hindering or furthering 
the work of the administrative body. Some of them seriously challenged 
the Swedish administration in matters of politics and jurisprudence. Elbers 
and Cremony were among the ringleaders responsible for the mutiny of 
1810 which ousted the judge and government secretary from the island. 
The mutiny is further described in the following chapter.90 
Masters and Mariners 
Another picture of the colony’s cosmopolitan make-up is provided by 
surviving muster-rolls from 1814–15. The muster rolls holds records of 
individual mariners’ age, task, pay, race, as well as birthplace or place of 
residence. Most masters and seamen were white creoles and hailed from 
nearby Caribbean colonies. An overwhelming majority came from Dutch 
colonies or from colonies with a strong Dutch cultural dominance. 
Curaçao, St. Eustatius and St. Martin was the birthplace of many, while 
Saba was the greatest source of maritime professionals engaged in the 
shipping of St. Barthélemy. Names like Barnes, Beakes, Beal, Dinzey, 
Hassell, Heyliger, and Simmons were commonplace Saban family names 
active in the transit trade in small vessels, names which particularly survive 
on St. Barthélemy to this day. There was also a significant contingent of 
French regulars that came primarily from Guadeloupe and Martinique, but 
also Saint-Domingue, Les Saintes, and Marie Galante. From the other 
                                                          
90 Petition of St. Barthélemy merchants, 14 November 1810, Ankarheim’s report, 14 June & 
7 September 1811, SBS 1C, SNA; Tingbrand, Who was who, 63, 198–99.  
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colonies, St. Thomas, St. Croix and Puerto Rico were among the most 
notable sources of maritime personnel, but comparably few came from 
British colonies. Only Anguilla, Bermuda and St. Kitts had any real 
representation among mariners.91 
 It is telling to note that among the European mariners (612), a majority 
were in fact Swedes either from Sweden proper or from the recently ceded 
Finnish territories (288). There were many reasons for this relatively high 
concentration of Swedish mariners. First of all, there was a demand for 
Swedish masters and skippers onboard neutral Swedish vessels registered 
in St. Barthélemy, as it enhanced the appearance of legitimate trade in the 
eyes of foreign privateers and cruisers. On another note, there were 
comparably many Swedish sailors that absconded to southern waters, 
attracted by high wages, especially onboard American-owned ships as well 
as the prospect of evading domestic conscription in the wake of Russo-
Swedish conflicts.92 
The remainder of the Europeans mainly had origins in Italian (68), 
French, (65) or Spanish (28) port towns, as well as a plethora of maritime 
centers in the Mediterranean. There were many records of mariners from 
Galicia, Genova, Leghorn, Lissabon, Malta, Marseille, Nantes, Naples, 
Oporto, Sardinia, Sicily, Ragusa, Trieste, and Venice. Comparably few 
came from the regions of the Baltic and North Sea, with only a few 
mentions of Altona, Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Hamburg. Most of 
them were German natives of Stralsund (25), and were recorded as Swedish 
subjects. A nationality almost as heavily represented among the mariners 
were the Americans (206). Most of them were simply recorded “America” 
as their birthplace but there unsurprisingly high numbers of people from 
New York and Philadelphia and their respective hinterlands. There were 
                                                          
91 Wilson dataset on St. Barthélemy mariners (2015), extracted from 1814–15 muster rolls, in 
AM 265, FSB, ANOM. The dataset includes a total of 275 registered vessels and a total of 
1,980 mariners. The total figures do not represent altogether unique vessels and persons, as 
there are numerous double entries due to the fact that vessels were registered more than once 
during these years. 
92 Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, 188; The Swedish mariner problem is mentioned in 
several of consul Söderström’s letters to the Board of Trade between 1786–90, vol. 1, 
Diplomatica Americana, SNA. 
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a few mariners from diffuse South American origins (29), such as “Brazil”, 
“Oronoco”, or simply, the “Spanish Main.” 
As vessel owners likely hired whomever was available, there was little 
regard paid to the national or ethnic compositions of crews. Especially the 
larger ship crews could be a real mix of worlds, like the ship Norrköping of 
235 tons and a crew of 14, owned by the aforementioned J.J. Cremony and 
registered in July 1814. The master was from Rhode Island, the skipper 
from Campeche, the boatswain from Wolgast, while the seamen hailed 
from Portugal, Uddevalla (Sweden), Curaçao, the Azores, Marguerite, 
Gothenburg, Jamaica, and Philadelphia. Only rarely did the ship-owners 
bother to assemble more homogenous crews. A shipowner who did this 
fairly constantly was the English-born William Cock, one of the richest 
and most respectable merchants of St. Barthélemy, who also sat several 
terms in the island council. He registered his hermaphrodite brig Eliza 
twice in 1815. One of her voyages carried a crew of 14, consisting of 5 
Swedes and the rest of Americans from the continental United States. The 
other voyage carried 15 crew members, of which 12 were from Sweden and 
Finland while the remainder were French or American. Regional affinities 
or family networks also seemed to have an effect on crew composition. 
Saban ship-owners were comparably often also the master onboard their 
relatively small vessels, carrying with them a limited crew of Sabans and 
their own slaves.93 
Members of the black population, both free and slaves, were a 
significant portion of the composition of crews, 354 out of 1,980, or nearly 
18 percent according to the muster-rolls of 1814–15. Larger ships regularly 
carried a few slaves as cooks or “boys”, while the smaller, particularly the 
ones owned by Sabans or natives from other neighboring colonies could 
consist of a majority of slaves. For instance, the schooner Intrepid, owned 
by Pierre Arnaud, was captained by the Saban James Vaughan, the only 
white man onboard, the remaining six seamen were all slaves. The 
                                                          
93 “Mr Guilleaume Cock, le plus riche et respectable de nos négociants et un des membres du 
Conseil d’Administration et de finance; possedoit un Brick, appellé Eliza, qui’il envoya avec 
un cargaison de valeur au Brasil [...]” Norderling’s report, 3 September 1817, SBS 5A, SNA. 
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schooner Lisa of tons, was manned by two whites from St. Martin and St. 
Lucia, the rest were slaves; Mingo, Tom, Jack, Will, John, and two named 
Peter. They were all the property of the shipowner Auguste Rabainne. 
Usually the slaves who were part of the crew belonged to the ship-owner, 
but there are numerous records of slaves who were rented out by third 
parties for individual expeditions. There were a few free black ship-
owners, of which William Panilio was the most prominent in 1814–15. 
During that time he had registered Basseterre of 35 tons, with a crew of two 
whites and seven slaves, and Penelope of 20 tons, with an all-free, creole 
crew. The slaves all belonged to Panilio, and he was indeed one of the 
largest slave-owners among the merchants directly involved in shipping. 
He also had the distinction of having the only recorded free black person 
as master of a vessel, the “Negro” Dominic Mathias Rafael, a 30-year old 
Curaçaoan who helmed the Penelope. 
Urban Life and Commerce 
The commercial society of Gustavia included its cohorts of retail 
traders, hawkers, hucksters, shopkeepers and insurance brokers. In 1800, 
the city had 37 on record. An example was Joseph Hart, a North American 
who had settled in St. Barthélemy around the beginning of the 19th century. 
He rented a house on East Strand-Street where he retailed American goods 
such as “Beef, Pork, Hams, Cheese, Corn, Codfish, Lard, Soap, Candles, 
Tar & Potatoes.” Gustavia was also home to a range of artisans and 
professionals catering to different needs, including 6 tailors, 8 masons, 18 
carpenters of different descriptions, 6 bakers, 4 butchers, 2 hatters 
(including 1 modiste), 6 surgeons, 3 shoemakers and cobblers, a blacksmith 
and a watchmaker. In this commercial variety there is still the clear 
imprint of maritime enterprise and its needs. A special indication of this is 
the abundancy of taverns, inns, grog-shops and billiard houses. There were 
8 buildings recorded as lodging-houses, and 22 establishments with license 
to serve liquors and “keep billiards”. Different forms of gambling, 
cockfights and card games were popular preoccupations in the town, but 
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none were apparently as popular as billiards. It was a typical mid-day 
amusement, when the air was too hot for most to work or conduct their 
business. During games people drank wine, rum, punch, grog, lemonade or 
water, and the losers would traditionally foot the bill of the last few rounds. 
Rum- and grog-shops were often a source of nocturnal unrest and 
consternation, despite the officially strict curfews and regulations 
pertaining to them. Drunken brawls and disputes among mariners and 
soldiers of the garrison were not uncommon. Dances were permitted on 
weekends for “Negroes in the Town” until eight o’clock in the evening, 
providing that they should not “exceed a Number, from which dangerous 
Consequences may be suspected.”94 
As in any other Caribbean colony, the economy was based on slave 
labor, despite the fact that there was no intensive, large-scale agricultural 
plantations as in the large sugar islands. Sweden had no experience of 
managing the complex legal framework of slavery, as it had abolished 
serfdom in the 14th century. Slavery was regulated by a Swedish ordonnance 
de police, containing 34 articles. It was a slightly abridged version of the 
French Code noir, and was introduced on the island in 1787 as a 
confirmation of the previous situation during French rule. It has been 
argued that because St. Barthélemy did not possess large plantations, it did 
not feature the darker, bloodier forms of slave exploitation that went with 
it. But the fact is that wherever slavery was a cornerstone of society, 
violence was key and duly administered in the face of possible slave 
rebellions and insurrections. In fact, St. Barthélemy had a fair share of 
racial tension and public incidents, primarily present in the strenuous 
relation between whites and the free black population. As in other colonial 
                                                          
94 Joseph Hart’s advertisement in The Report of St. Bartholomew, April 30, 1804; Högström, 
“S. Barthélemy”, 15–16; Euphrasén, Beskrifning, 55; Regarding slave dances, see article 31 of the 
Ordinance of Police relative to the Treatment of Black and Colored Persons, 30 June 1787, SBS 1 A, 
also printed in The Report of Saint Bartholomew, 5 April & 7 May 1804. 
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societies, a consistent policy towards the free blacks was difficult to 
uphold, given their legal status between slaves and whites.95 
At least a few of the taverns in the city doubled as brothels. This is clear 
owing to the fairly frequent references to prostitution and filles de joie in 
court cases as well as governor’s reports. As in other urban societies in the 
Caribbean, prostitution exclusively befell Afro-Caribbean women. 
Methodist preachers visiting the city in the 1820s observed as much of the 
“wicked” and “depraved” youths living in the city, whose poverty-stricken 
parents saw no other financial outcome than to have their “black daughters 
[…] live with white men”.96 
This is not to suggest that prostitution was the only resort for the 
impecunious and racially segregated female population of Gustavia. Afro-
Caribbean women, both free and slaves, were in the majority among 
females in the city. In the Gustavia census of 1796, there were 996 women 
out of a recorded total population of 1,752. A free black female majority 
was a common characteristic of regional urban demographics, which is 
usually explained by the relatively high occupation of domestics and 
servants employed in households, which however does not hold true for 
Gustavia. In Gustavia there was a sexual balance among the slaves as the 
town’s trade, warehousing, construction, and portuary activities 
necessitated a variety of skilled and unskilled labor. Free women of color 
precluded the reliance upon domestic slaves as they provided basic service 
as laundresses and seamstresses. In a 1787 census, the proportion of 
households headed by women are high among the free blacks of Gustavia, 
                                                          
95 Fredrik Thomasson, “’Contre la Loi mais en considérant les Circonstances dangereuses du 
moment’. The Swedish court of law at Saint Barthélemy during the revolutionary period.” 
(Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Caribbean Historians, 
Curaçao, May 2012), 7–8; Rosenstein’s report, 6 July 1787, SBS 1B:1, SNA; For a typical 
representation of slavery on St. Barthélemy, see Per Tingbrand, “A Swedish Interlude in the 
Caribbean,” Forum Navalae 57 (2002): 64–92; Sjöström, ”’En nödvändig omständighet’,” 42–
44. 
96 Rolf Sjöström, ”Conquer and Educate. Swedish colonialism in the Caribbean island of 
Saint-Barthélemy 1784 – 1878,” Paedagogica Historica 37, no. 1 (2001): 74–75; Norderling to af 
Wetterstedt, 4 May 1820, SBS 7A. 
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43 percent, as opposed to white households, where there were only 11 
female heads in a total of 112 households.97  
Free black women were also frequently independent business-owners 
rather than menial workers. They sold their merchandise on the streets or 
from their own shops, and held their own lodging-houses and taverns. In 
1802, a town tax record shows 13 taverns and three billiards, out of which 
five are registered under female owners. Furthermore, slave-owning 
women often rented their slaves for different kind of work as a principal 
income, as was common among the island’s slave-owning population. As 
Ale Pålsson has noted, whereas women’s share of the internal commerce 
of St. Barthélemy reached significant values, their involvement in the 
maritime professions and trade was virtually nonexistent. In this divide 
between the maritime and the non-maritime world there was a significant 
distortion of wealth, where only the wholesale merchants active in 
shipping were the ones who accumulated large fortunes and capital.98  
The polyglot society of Gustavia was the single most important 
consequence of the Swedish aquisition of St. Barthélemy. The majority of 
this new population proved to be transitory in nature, in fact settlers had 
sought out the Swedish colony to settle permanently. They were in most 
cases seeking refuge or testing the prospects of a convenient port to 
conduct business which had been made difficult elsewhere, such as St. 
Eustatius. In large part, the settlers became formally sworn Swedish 
subjects, but there was no Swedish cultural hegemony that followed by the 
event of naturalization. As will be explored in the next chapter, the 
Swedish administration in the colony would have problems 
accommodating its newly acquired subjects both politically, economically, 
                                                          
97 Yolande Lavoie, Carolyn Fick and Francine-M. Mayer, “A Particular Study of Slavery in 
the Caribbean Island of Saint Barthélemy: 1648–1846,” Caribbean Studies 28, no. 2 (1995): 369–
403; Cf. for instance the exposition of the urban demographics of Charlotte Amalie in Neville 
Hall, Slave Society in the Danish West Indies. St. Croix, St. John, and St. Croix (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 88–91; The Gustavia town census of 1796 in SBS 28, SNA. 
There were 323 women out of a total of 682 among the whites, 192 women out of 388 among 
the free black population, and 481 women out of 981 in the slave population. 
98 The town tax record of taverns and billiards in 1802 is found in CP 75, FSB, ANOM; 
Pålsson, “Our side of the water,” 70–71.  
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and socially. The Swedish foray into the free port trade of the Caribbean 
as well as the commercial organization of the Swedish West India 
Company would have several challenges to face. 
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2.3 Colonial Ambitions and Colonial Realities 
What kind of commercial system sprung out of the Swedish colony? On 
the surface, free ports such as Gustavia were devoid of most commercial 
restrictions common to the 18th-century Caribbean, and as such 
constituted an attractive subterfuge for merchants willing to circumvent 
various trade restrictions. The free port and the commercial society it 
fostered could possibly be understood as an economic institution, devised 
to structure political, economic and social interaction. As described in a 
seminal 1991 article by Douglass North, such an institution can be said to 
consist of both informal constraints as well as formal rules. While informal 
constraints include various sanctions, taboos, custom, traditions, and 
codes of conduct, formal rules are codified in constitutions, laws and 
property rights. The institutional perspective is important as institutions 
determine transaction and production costs, and hence the profitability 
and feasibility of engaging in a given economic activity. The lax regulations 
and liberal trade policy of Gustavia, coupled with the neutrality of Swedish 
shipping, then, could be understood as the chief components of Gustavia’s 
institutional composition.99 
But how successful was this combination of ostensibly beneficial 
liberties and rights? The political and legal context in which maritime 
commerce took place in the Caribbean and Atlantic was after all highly 
complicated, volatile and constantly dynamic. Even though neutrality held 
avenues of commerce open in times of war, neutral merchants and shippers 
still faced the hazards of maritime depredations of warships or state-
sanctioned privateers, and the subsequent costs of seizure and legal 
procedures. Wartime conditions nevertheless created opportunities for 
extraordinary profits for those willing to brave the daunting risks involved. 
Colonial magistrates too faced a daunting task of securing the rights of its 
Swedish subjects, indeed even the territorial sovereignty of island waters. 
                                                          
99 Douglass North, “Institutions,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112. 
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As soon as the war broke out in 1793, Gustavia at once became subject to a 
range of commercial, political, and social effects of wartime settings in the 
Caribbean. Commercial traffic boomed as the utility of neutral free ports 
gained in importance, but the local shipping also became exposed to new 
perils at sea, and the inevitable involvement in privateering economies 
entailed novel and challenging diplomatic disputes for the colonial 
magistrates, who had limited means of securing and prosecuting neutral 
rights. 
To highlight the institutional limitations of the free port society of 
Gustavia, one could paraphrase a concise characterization originally made 
by Neville Hall in the context of the Danish West Indies, that is, a 
“colonial power without dominion”. Similar to Denmark, Sweden did not 
need and indeed could not establish and maintain possession to a degree 
that previous European settlements in the West Indies had to do. Akin to 
the Danish process of settlement in their limited Caribbean empire, 
Sweden claimed sovereign control over its colony through formal legal 
channels and purchase, and then invited foreign settlers and merchants 
into its colony. In a parallel development, the Swedish government and 
leading Stockholm merchants attempted to organize a direct commercial 
link with the new colony, backed by company charters and privileges not 
readily entitled to naturalized settlers of the colony. This chapter will try 
to assess the impact of Swedish trade through the colony as well as the 
relative importance of neutral international trade that the colony 
facilitated in regional trade networks.100 
Company and Private Swedish Trade 
SWIC commenced its activities in 1787. An early problem was to attract 
the interest in company stocks, and the initial mass of stockholder capital 
never reached adequate levels to finance larger long-term investments such 
as ships and cargoes, and the directors saw themselves obliged to dig deep 
                                                          
100 Neville Hall, Slave Society in the Danish West Indies, 1–33.  
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into their own accounts to meet immediate financing needs. Funding and 
overhead costs were serious strains throughout the company’s brief 
history. SWIC was beset from the beginning with a range of other 
problems, both in Stockholm and in the colony itself. These aspects of 
SWIC’s history are relatively well known since initial studies in the 1950s, 
but this section will present research and analysis on the problems which 
led to the quick disappearance of the company, and the circumvention of 
Swedish trade per se from the transit trade of St. Barthélemy.101  
The brief history of SWIC can in fact be viewed as a never-ending string 
of misfortunes, missed opportunities, and outright disasters. SWIC went 
through its first fifteen years of the initial charter only to suffer severe 
losses in the face of a British occupation of the colony in 1801–02, as its 
stores and property were plundered and destroyed by British forces. The 
charter was renewed ad interim during the occupation with a view to allow 
the directors the time to reorganize and to claim just compensation. And 
while in the end the claims against the British were pressed home 
successfully, this process endured until 1808 and only resulted in a pittance 
of the initial claims. Long before the resolution of that particular problem, 
the question had arisen whether SWIC’s charter should be renewed. In 
March 1804 the directors held what was to be the last meeting of SWIC 
stockholders at the Stockholm Stock Exchange. At this moment the 
directors unveiled in detail the difficulties the company had had to 
endure.102  
                                                          
101 Ingegerd Hildebrand’s thesis on the Swedish colony and SWIC has the obvious drawback 
of only covering the period up until 1796. Therefore, it is not surprising that it lacks in more 
definite conclusions about the company’s achievements, see for instance the summary in 
Ingegerd Hildebrand, “S:t Barthélemy,” in Den svenska historien (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1968), 
VII: 88–90, 96–97; Subsequent research largely builds on this work, cf. for instance Leos 
Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Contraband, 175–180; Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 145, 153. 
102 ”Herrar hufvudparticipanters Berättelse till interessenterne”, litt. B., 12 February 1804, 
SWIC Minutes, 17 March 1804, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157, SNA; For the Swedish claims, 
see the undated appendices in the same minutes. SWIC made claims for 38,170 Spanish 
dollars, most of which was rejected by the British government. In late 1804 SWIC accepted 
the repayment offer of 18,161 dollars, which was mostly comprised of the estimated value of 
goods procured and sold from its warehouses in Gustavia. See also “King’s warrant for 
payments due to the Swedish St. Barthélemy claims,” 27 March 1805, WO 1/120, TNA. 
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The first commercial expedition, Enigheten, returned to the Baltic only 
to be seized and condemned by Russian naval forces, a fateful consequence 
of the Russo-Swedish war of 1788–90. During the total twenty year-period 
of company charter from 1787 to 1806, the company dispatched a total of 
21 voyages, three of which ended in shipwrecks, and three others which 
ended up in the possession of belligerent forces. Two additional vessels, 
which were purchased in the West Indies in order to facilitate inter-island 
trade under company auspices, were captured and condemned during their 
maiden voyages under Swedish flags.103 
A critical blow to the company’s business on the domestic market 
occurred in 1794, when the Swedish government reinstated a ban on coffee 
and other luxury commodities, which had been a recurring imposition on 
consumption in Sweden during the course of the 18th century. During the 
existence of the company, coffee became the company’s mainstay of 
homebound cargoes, as it was a comparably accessible commodity in the 
West Indies and easily sold at a profit at Stockholm auctions. After the 
1794 ban, coffee could still be landed into Swedish harbors, but only on the 
condition that it would be sold to foreign markets and not for 
consumption within the kingdom. At this juncture, the company directors 
directed a plea to the Swedish government, as the ban was seen as too 
injurious for the company to continue. If the company could not be given 
some form of dispensation, the only other viable alternative was to ask the 
crown to buy the company stock in its entirety, as had been done by the 
Danish crown when it bought the stocks of the ill-fated Vestindisk 
Handelsselskab. This fact was explicitly mentioned in the directors’ 
suggestion to the government in the wake of the coffee ban, but was 
                                                          
103 For details on SWIC ships and expeditions, see Appendix VII. 
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however promptly turned down, and the question was never raised again as 
the ban was again lifted in 1796. 104 
Acquiring competent local agents and maintaining good working 
relations with them was another precarious aspect of company business. 
The first company superintendent arrived in the colony in 1787 only to 
develop a grave mental illness, fever, and die within a year. Subsequent 
iterations of agents and company clerks were hired and dismissed in rapid 
succession, all according to their individual lack of competence or support 
from company directors. Governors and other magistrates were fast to 
point out whether company hands failed to meet the right criteria. Many 
agents were found to lack in necessary linguistic, book-keeping, or trading 
skills, and were promptly dismissed if they were not up to their tasks. After 
the superintendent’s death, the business house of Röhl & Hansen were 
finally appointed as company agents as late as 1790, but soon incurred the 
disapprobation of stockholders for different reasons. Their handling of a 
company-affiliated shipwreck case was deemed dubious and too costly for 
the investors. Röhl & Hansen were suspected of pocketing a share of the 
bottomry loan of the ill-fated ship. Additionally, Röhl & Hansen were not 
salaried agents, but received commissions on a share of the company 
profits. This was a condition which particularly fell out of favor with the 
directors. Röhl & Hansen were also rumored to have a poor business 
reputation in French colonial markets vital to company interests. After 
their dismissal in 1794, the new agent Gustav Wernberg demanded 
commissions instead of a fixed salary, only to see himself dismissed within 
                                                          
104 The ban was in effect 1794–96 and 1799–1802. See Leos Müller, “Kolonialprodukter i 
Sveriges handel och konsumtionskultur,” Historisk tidskrift, no. 2 (2004): 225–48; For the 
directors’ suggestions, see the undated and unsigned document “Reflectioner”, in Handel och 
sjöfart, vol. 190, which was in undoubtedly recorded by the board of directors early in the year 
1794; Cf. Duke Carl to the SWIC board of directors, 6 February and 4 December 1794, 
Handel och sjöfart, vol. 190, SNA; Hildebrand, Det svenska västindiska kompaniet, 291–94. 
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less than a year. The directors cited his demands as a breach of contract. 
He would instead become an associate of the firm of Röhl & Hansen.105 
The last agent of the company, Carl Dreyer, assumed his position after 
Wernberg’s departure and made a promising start. He was responsible for 
the company’s business on St. Barthélemy from 1796 to 1801, and enjoyed 
a degree of support from the directors which his predecessors never had 
had. But in the end he would however become the single most expensive 
catastrophe for the company under its initial charter. Shortly after his 
employment had commenced, concerns were raised over irregularities in 
the accounts current. It was only in the middle of 1800 when detailed 
accounts were received that it was revealed that Dreyer had racked up an 
alarming personal debt to the company. In 1801, Dreyer’s balance in the 
ledgers amounted to a tremendous sum of 90,288 rixdollars, nearly a third 
of the total recorded capital (See Table 2.1).  
Table 2.2 Yearly capital accounts of the Swedish West 
India Company, 1790–1805, in Swedish rixdollars  
1790 51,154 1796 111,418 1802 271,365 
1791 - 1797 124,299 1803 253,545 
1792 55,057 1798 145,654 1804 298,262 
1793 - 1799 181,401 1805 366,164 
1794 91,190 1800 212,167   
1795 - 1801 278,787   
Sources: Swedish West India Company journals 1790–1805, vols. 107–118, Swedish 
West India Company general ledgers 1790–1805, vols. 90–101, Handel och sjöfart, 
SNA; Lennart Bondeson, “Bokföringen i Västindiska Kompaniet,” Affärsekonomi, 
no. 20 (Stockholm, 1951), 1353. 
Quite understandably, the directors were both infuriated and 
embarrassed by the whole affair. The Crown and other shareholders were 
not notified until two years after the board of directors caught wind of the 
                                                          
105 For discussion on the SWIC agents, see von Rosenstein to Ruuth, 10 June 1788, SBS 1 A, 
and von Rosenstein to Ruuth, 1 September 1788, SBS 1 B:1, SNA. Interestingly, Governor von 
Rosenstein wanted SWIC to hire Fredrick Sugnin, a Swiss merchant recently moved from 
St. Eustatius to St. Barthélemy; Cf. Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 167–170, 191, 230. 
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situation.106 In the meantime, Dreyer was given the opportunity to repay 
his outstanding debt, but as it quickly turned out, he was in no way capable 
of balancing his economy. The matter soon became very inflamed, and the 
company withdrew his employment as agent and made arrangements for 
the seizure and sale of his property. Dreyer however suffered a sudden and 
untimely death in 1802 before a full investigation into the state of his 
economy had been mounted, and the company could only recoup a fraction 
of their losses from the whole ordeal. The exact reasons behind his debt 
were never resolved, but it was never seriously suspected that he 
embezzled the funds. The prevailing belief was that he had either made 
private expeditions which had resulted in serious losses, or that he had 
been swindled by his business associates in neighboring colonies. 
Whatever the true reasons, he had entrenched himself neck-deep into 
debt by borrowing into the Swedish West India Company stores, with the 
ultimate losses accruing to the company itself.107 
The yearly accounts of the company in Table 2.1 gives a rather fair 
picture of its funds. After an unassuming start, consolidation seems to have 
taken place towards the end of the century, and the years leading towards 
the abrogation of the company’s charter gives the impression of a 
commercial association that had gained some considerable traction. As has 
been detailed above, the accounts however concealed some underlying 
negative developments. There were others besides spendthrift agents. The 
British occupation of 1801–02 was another net loss, as well as individual ill-
fated expeditions already mentioned. It should be pointed out in this 
context that the company guarded itself well against the risks of its 
ventures. Cargoes and ships were insured and full repayments were almost 
always guaranteed, as the directors prudently portioned out their policies 
on private insurers in Stockholm, London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg. 
                                                          
106 SWIC Minutes 24 July 1800, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 156, SNA; Af Ugglas to Gustav IV 
Adolf, 28 July 1802, SWIC Minutes 16 July 1802, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157, SNA. 
107 SWIC Minutes 17 March 1804, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157, SNA; Among the sequestered 
and sold property were his domestic slave Betzy and her child – Dreyer’s son – born shortly 
after his death in 1802. See Fischer & Stenqvist to SWIC, undated letter, Handel och sjöfart, 
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Here too, however, misfortune could strike. When one of the company’s 
ships, L’Amerique, was shipwrecked in the English Channel with total loss 
of cargo and crew, only a portion of the insurance could be retrieved. That 
was because one of the policies taken out in Marseille could only be 
received in worthless revolutionary assignats.108 
There were positive developments too. The company’s rights to most 
of the public revenue of St. Barthélemy entailed that the company 
benefitted from the expansion of maritime commerce in Gustavia. 
Towards the close of the century, public revenue made out anything 
between 10–20 percent of yearly net profits. For a commercial 
organization that received public revenue and thus comprised a part of the 
public authority and island government, the company was however 
distinctively a non-entity. This condition led to serious criticism towards 
the role of the company in the island administration. In 1789 Jean Turcon, 
a French wine merchant who had been one of the first to become a 
naturalized Swede after colonization, wrote a scathing treatise directed at 
the inactivity and failures of the company as well as the incompetence of 
colonial magistrates in general. The situation in 1789 was fast approaching 
a critical point for its new settlers, claimed Turcon: 
[...] La devastation de cette nouvelle ville gustavia, fairoit [feraient] tout 
de peines, au peu de personnes qui y sont Encore, et Le Ridicule qu’il se 
                                                          
108 Tom Söderberg, Försäkringsväsendets historia i Sverige intill Karl Johanstiden (Stockholm: 
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1830, ed. Pierre Gervais, Yannick Lemarchand and Dominique Margairaz (London: Pickering 
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seroit acquis dans L’Etendüe de cette amerique, qu’on ne peut Le 
cachér, n’y ay Roy n’y a La compagnie, afin d’y Remedier, ou il faut 
Entierement L’abandonnér [...]109 
He explained that the slow and unproductive manner in which the 
company conducted its business caused financial harm as well as sowed 
prejudice and discontent among the island’s trading population. 
Shipments from Sweden were eagerly anticipated by local merchants, but 
they often waited in vain for long stretches of time. When Swedish cargoes 
occasionally arrived, they “came and went”, claimed Turcon, “without 
much ever having transpired either for the good or bad of the colony.”110 
It is perhaps not surprising that the budding society of Gustavia 
merchants did not take well to a serious competitor protected by royal 
privilege, but the perceived harm was serious enough that criticism also 
found its voices among Swedish officials. At the turn of the century, 
Governor Ankarheim opined that the company charter should be revoked 
and never reinstated. He observed the hemlock that was imposed on local 
trade by the protections inherent in company privileges. Even as the 
company was bound by its own charter to use its assets to develop island 
infrastructure, little in way of public projects was ever undertaken. Among 
local merchants, the company’s monopolies as well as its apparent lethargy 
in questions for public good created an atmosphere of hostility towards it. 
They also naturally saw with distaste that the greater part of official 
revenues, money paid from their pockets, went straight into company 
coffers.111 
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Two decades later, Johan Norderling, then newly inaugurated as 
Governor, recalled the same dismissive sentiments of the company in a 
retrospective on his earlier tenure as colonial judge in 1788–92: 
Dans les tems de la soidisant Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, de 
triste memoire, même misere et apathie; le gain de ces gens-là était les 
¾ des revenus de l’isle, que le Gouvernement avait été assez bon de leur 
accorder, pour faire rien, ah! J’ai tort, ils gouvernaient l’isle, en nommant 
aux places principales, et avec un discernement, don’t nous nous 
souviendrons longtems ici.112 
It is important to note that in his office as judge, Norderling had been 
salaried by the company. Vocal objections such as these were all important 
considerations, when, in 1805, the Swedish Board of Commerce finally 
reviewed a possible renewal of the company charter. The Board took 
written suggestions by the directors of the company as well as private 
merchants, represented by the Association of Stockholm merchants. 
While assessing the development of the company’s charter during the 
preceding twenty years, grave criticisms were voiced over the company’s 
abuses and shortcomings. The private actors of merchant associations 
were naturally privy to repeal the yoke of privileged trade, but the weight 
of evidence was also against the company. The company had not been able 
to fulfill its ambitions of furthering Swedish commercial interests in the 
West Indies, let alone perform its most rudimentary public 
responsibilities as per its initial charter.113 
The Board of Commerce proposed that the present charter should be 
revoked, but left an opening for a new association to be formed with a 
much more limited set of privileges. Among the key adjustments to the 
new projected charter were that the company would not receive any part 
of the public revenues of St. Barthélemy, and its personnel would not have 
any seat in the colony council. The proposal was accepted in the King’s 
                                                          
112 Norderling’s report, 20 November 1819, SBS 6 A, SNA. 
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Kongl. Maj:t, SNA. 
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council despite the protests of the company directors, who let it be clear 
that they would not helm a future company under such poor auspices. No 
one else stepped forward either, which instantly terminated any lingering 
presence of a Swedish commercial association on the island. The trade 
company project had come to an end, and the free port was left to run itself 
without a distinct Swedish commercial interest.114 
The company’s dismal achievements was in no way atypical for the kind 
of Scandinavian chartered companies of the time. Their general marginal 
success has been understood as an outcome of the fundamental problem 
that faced Scandinavian maritime expansion, the markets. During the 17th 
century, the Swedish home market was characterized by marginally 
developed economy and a high degree of self-sufficiency. This kind of 
market had a limited ability to receive colonial goods, seeing also that a 
large portion of the sugar, coffee, and other tropical imports into Sweden 
came from Copenhagen as Danish re-exports. Conversely, in foreign 
markets, the Swedes had to compete with traders of other European 
nations without the benefit of domestic privileges.115 
This was all the more clear, since despite the recent opportunity left by 
the company’s disappearance for private trade, there was no renewed 
movement of private Swedish expeditions to St. Barthélemy. During the 
first two decades of Swedish ownership of St. Barthélemy, there had been 
no shortage of interest in Sweden outside company circles. Between 1785 
and 1805, there were at least 35 private Swedish expeditions conducted to 
the island from the Baltic (See Appendix VIII) The Gothenburg-based 
Christian Arfwidsson & Sons, whose close associate Niclas von Jacobsson 
had been offered the first position as company agent, was one of the early 
key players. Arfwidsson sent a commercial expedition, to the colony as 
early as Christmas Eve 1785, the ship Fred och Ymnoghet. It carried a cargo 
calculated for the West Indian trade as well as a young agent and relative 
of Arfwidsson’s, Paul Gustaf Teuchler. Shortly thereafter, Teuchler along 
with another associate opened the business house of Teuchler & Schürer 
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115 Ole Feldbæk, “The Danish Trading Companies,” 204–18. 
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& Co. “Co.” was nothing but a thinly veiled placeholder for Arfwidsson 
himself. Teuchler & Schürer set up their business and went about 
conducting their affairs. 
Their initial spirit of enterprise notwithstanding, the members of the 
business house soon experienced harsh goings when they tried to convert 
their merchandise into cash or exchange goods. After trying their hand at 
creating some contacts during the summer of 1786, they found themselves 
without any partners and an almost unsold inventory. Circumstances for 
the house had already turned critical when they learned in October that 
one of their bills of exchange had been protested in London. It was only 
one of many to follow. The reason for the vanished credit was that the firm 
of Arfwidsson & Sons suddenly plummeted towards bankruptcy amid a 
scandalous case of loans fraud. Creditors quickly closed in on Teuchler & 
Schürer, and their complete mass of property, stocks, and slaves were 
seized. Teuchler ignominiously left the island in 1787 with unpaid debts 
and a tarnished reputation as a swindler, while Schürer remained for many 
years on St. Barthélemy, working in turns as shopkeeper and merchant, but 
also as official translator, interpreter and vice government secretary of the 
island council.116 
Despite the hints at foul play, the commercial failure of this particular 
Swedish firm displays many of the inherent difficulties that outsiders faced 
in establishing a business operation in the 18th century Caribbean. Creating 
working business relations required time, as well as important building 
blocks of competence and trust, in the form of linguistic skills, kinship 
links, religious connections, and so on. While Arfwidsson’s agents 
certainly did not lack in financial backing - at least from the outset - it is 
very doubtful whether they possessed the necessary competence to garner 
trust and to build stable commercial relations. When their wealthy patron 
became insolvent, their operations finally unraveled. The Arfwidsson 
family itself moved towards a concentration on domestic mines and 
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ironworks, and there was no other speculator in the West Indies trade 
after Christian Arfwidsson died in 1799.117 
There were however Swedish entrepreneurs who fared better in the 
commercial riptides of the West Indies and managed to establish viable 
business houses. One such person was Daniel Öström, established in the 
island at the same time as Teuchler & Schürer. He started out by bartering 
small wares, and sold provisions and rum mainly to the Swedish garrison in 
partnership with an Englishman named Kelly. He later expanded his 
business operations and founded the business house of Öström, Procter & 
Co. At the height of his career, he had established a regional trading 
network which included contacts in the United States. His apparent 
success was displayed through the size of his town property, a 
“commodious” residence in Gustavia on Kungsgatan which counted “a 
large Hall, six Chambers, two Galleries, a large and convenient store with 
Compting-Room, shelves & Counter” as well as “three small pleasant 
Chambers in the Yard, a large Cistern, Negroe-Rooms, Kitchen, Cellar, 
[and] Pantry [...].” One obvious key to Öström’s success was his ability to 
create commercial ties in the region and beyond, through his partnerships 
with Anglo-Saxon actors and firms. Crucially, he married into an English 
family in 1790. He however did not trade primarily in Swedish-produced 
goods, but in British manufactures. Daniel Öström died in 1803 or 1804, 
without a successor to continue the family business. Daniel Öström is thus 
an example of Swedes who were proficient and competent enough to make 
a living as merchants in the Swedish colony, but his business did not do 
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much to tie any links of Swedish industry and trade to the region. Precisely 
as others similar to him, his success was a highly individual one.118 
Finally, a condition that worked against the establishment of St. 
Barthélemy as a gateway for Swedish exports was the slow development of 
the commercial exchange between Sweden and the United States. High 
hopes were entertained in Swedish maritime and commercial circles when 
the U.S.-Swedish trade treaty was signed in 1783. The United States would 
indeed become, alongside with the United Kingdom, one of Sweden’s 
most important export markets. Yet, this development is of a considerably 
later date, American-Swedish trade failed to materialize in a significant 
way until at least 1809, when trade picked up for reasons which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. The reason for the initial slow 
advancement of this trade this lies in a manifold set of factors. The 
dynamic patterns of the international iron trade were crucial. The 
possibility for another export market for iron in the United States aroused 
some expectations in the Swedish iron industry, but Russia had managed 
to supersede Sweden in the exportation of iron to the United Kingdom 
after 1780, and Russian iron was also favored by American buyers. 
Additionally, the U.S. – Swedish trade treaty did not accord Americans any 
exemptions from the Swedish Navigation Acts, and they traded at a 
distinct disadvantage in Swedish ports. It is also of note that the market at 
St. Petersburg could absorb a greater quantity of goods than Gothenburg 
or Stockholm, so the Russian market attracted the majority of American 
trade with destinations in the Baltic. The Baltic trade as a whole, from the 
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American perspective, remained a supplemental and experimental source 
of business for a long time.119 
Even when Swedish goods did arrive in the Caribbean, they were often 
regarded as oddities in a commercial world accustomed to certain 
standards, fashions, and tastes. Swedish rope and cordage, for instance, was 
found too thick and too richly tarred by presumptive buyers, in 
comparison with more popular Dutch variants. Market preferences 
applied to a wide variety of goods from small nails to spars, lumber, and 
ironware, and there was never any apparent success in meeting the 
customers with small adjustments or changes in the production of Swedish 
goods. Company agents and officials often complained of poor 
assortments in outward cargoes. To meet certain demands, outward 
company ships often had foreign goods loaded, such as Russian canvas and 
naval stores, which always found ready buyers. Perhaps the single most 
convincing indicator of the weak link between the Swedish and Caribbean 
market was that after the revocation of the company charter in 1805, there 
is no record of a Swedish ship clearing for St. Barthélemy until 1812. The 
first ship entered the Sound from St. Barthélemy in 1810, but then again 
this was an American ship under the command of a captain named James 
Armstrong, headed for Rostock. Naturally, this condition should be 
viewed in light of the considerably higher risks for transatlantic trade in 
the age of the Napoleonic Wars and the Continental System. But even so, 
it shows rather clearly that if St. Barthélemy occupied an economic role of 
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whatever importance imaginable, it was never that of middleman in the 
commercial exchange between metropole and colonial markets.120 
Free Port Trade and Privateering 
The arrival of the war in 1793 also signaled the return of outright 
commercial warfare in the West Indies. Britain promptly resurrected the 
old rule of 1756 which had been dormant since the conclusion of the Seven 
Years’ War, albeit in a more severe form than before. In 1793, Britain 
promulgated orders that barred neutrals not merely from carrying goods 
between enemy colonies and the mother country, but also from carrying 
goods from the enemy colonies to the neutrals’ own home territory for 
domestic consumption. The rule however was extremely difficult to 
enforce effectively. In the British West Indies, the role of enforcer and 
prize adjudicator was assumed by the Vice Admiralty Courts. They were 
indispensable in helping the British Royal Navy and the privateers defend 
the islands and prosecute the war. By the end of the 18th century, there was 
a dense network of British Vice Admiralty Courts in the West Indies. 
Beginning in the 17th century, there were permanent courts established in 
Jamaica, Barbados, Bermuda, Bahamas, St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, 
Dominica, Tobago, Tortola and Trinidad. The practice of establishing 
temporary wartime courts in captured enemy colonies also added to the 
list Santo Domingo (1794), Martinique-St. Lucia (1795), Curaçao (1801), St. 
Vincent, St. Croix (1809) and Guadeloupe (1811).121 
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Privateering efforts during wartime could also be a response to 
progressive economic and political marginalization, as it became in the 
French colony of Guadeloupe under revolutionary leadership. In an early 
stage of the war, Guadeloupe became entrenched in prolonged turmoil 
after internecine clashes between royalists and patriots. The factional 
conflicts also gained another dimension after the abolition of slavery and 
proclamation of free black populations’ rights. After changing hands a 
number of times between 1789 and 1793, Victor Hugues reclaimed the 
island for France and instituted a range of deep-going societal changes. A 
significant alteration was the liberation of slaves, the latter of which 
numbered around 90,000 in 1789. Conversely, the white population was 
decimated as a large majority of the 13,000 whites either fled or were 
guillotined by the revolutionaries in the wake of the upheavals. The 
economic structure founded on agriculture was thrown into disarray, and 
an extensive policy of privateering was instituted in order to maintain the 
colony both economically and politically in the midst of the maritime 
conflict with Great Britain.122 
When the British conquered Martinique in 1794, Guadeloupe was the 
only colony left under French control in the Eastern Caribbean. The 
Guadeloupe caboteur tradition during the second half of the 18th century 
had thrived on smuggling as well as privateering, and was deeply dependent 
on the extensive port networks which facilitated trade between the 
southern North American colonies and the Spanish American mainland. 
St. Barthélemy was a recent addition to this network at this time, along 
with the Danish and the Dutch islands which were long since established. 
The intercolonial relationship between St. Barthélemy and the 
surrounding French colonies after the revolution would assume more 
complicated forms, at once mutually beneficial as well as increasingly 
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problematic. As soon as the war broke out in 1793 many French coasting 
craft were fitted out as corsairs in Martinique and Guadeloupe. As a result, 
the buccaneering aggressions of the French revolutionary authorities 
would be operated largely out of the port cities of Guadeloupe. The 
corsairing ships were manned by an increasing number of privateers 
(corsaires particuliers), owned and commanded by local caboteurs. The 
increasing armament of privateers was a direct consequence of rapidly 
dwindling naval forces sent from France in 1794 and 1799, operating as 
letters of marque (corsaires de la République). In general, the distinction 
between privateers and letters of marque was straightforward. Letters of 
marque were primarily merchant vessels which conducted regular trading 
voyages, but were empowered by state authorities to attack and capture 
enemy vessels while at sea. Privateers on the other hand were solely 
occupied with cruising for enemy prizes. To support the French 
privateering ventures in the Caribbean Sea, revolutionary authorities set 
up agences de prises, or bounty courts, in neutral islands to oversee the sale 
of privateering prizes and to repair, equip and supply their own ships.123 
Whereas St. Barthélemy was situated directly in the middle of a net of 
British Vice Admiralty jurisdiction, a French bounty court was set up in 
Gustavia itself under the guidance of a local French citizen, Balthazar 
Bigard, around 1794. The bounty courts were not legal institutions per se, 
the actual decisions and condemnations were effected in Guadeloupe. The 
bounty courts only functioned as the handlers and auctioneers of seized 
enemy property, as well as mediators and middlemen between privateers 
and local authorities. Thus, in St. Barthélemy, Bigard was also the resident 
French consul. The presence of the bounty court was beneficial for locally 
settled merchants, insofar as cheap cargoes and ships were to be had when 
French corsairs brought them into Gustavia. They served as an outlet for 
seized colonial commodities, spoils of war, and a purchase center for the 
provisions, military supplies, manufactures and food products the 
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Republic no longer sent to its Caribbean colonies. In the ports were 
French bounty courts were present, Guadeloupe also exported its reduced 
crops of sugar, coffee and cotton.124 
For better and worse, St. Barthélemy and its merchant community 
became more closely associated with the French privateers and letters of 
marque than with their British counterparts. In a letter to the American 
consul in St. Barthélemy, the Swedish Governor af Trolle transmitted the 
claims of Gustavia merchant firm Messrs. Terrasse père & Ebbens, on 
sundry goods, as well as the claims of Alexander Wardrobe, on 100 beams 
of writing paper, all laden on board the French letter of marque Buonaparte, 
which had been caught by “one of the United States’ ships of war”. Af 
Trolle asked for the recovery of these goods as they had been “bona fide 
Swedish neutral property”. As long as the relationship between St. 
Barthélemy and Guadeloupe was tenable, there were often mutual benefits 
in the offering. Hugues himself asserted in official correspondence that 
with the assistance of benevolent Swedish governors, Guadeloupe had a 
ready means of supply of both victuals and firearms.125 
But the institution of the French bounty court in Gustavia also became 
an economic nuisance for resident merchants, and ultimately, a political 
liability for the Swedish government. The activities of French corsairs was 
at times all-pervasive in the small free port, and they would occasionally 
jump on the opportunity to harass visiting merchant vessels. An infamous 
case strained relations between the revolutionary authorities on 
Guadeloupe and the administration on St. Barthélemy to a breaking point. 
In early November of 1796, a French privateer seized an outgoing Danish 
sloop in the road of Gustavia, and forced the vessel into the custody of a 
French bounty court in St. Martin for adjudication. Despite emphatic 
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objections among the inhabitants and a few Swedish officials the corsair 
was later allowed by the Governor to return to anchor in Gustavia. Besides 
infuriating other members of the St. Barthélemy council, this incident was 
the source of popular protest among town merchants. The heated 
discussions following in the wake of the incident eventually resulted in an 
official plea for protection for their commerce as well as a request that the 
governor af Trolle denounce this violation of neutral commerce. The 
authorities on Guadeloupe quickly caught wind of the ongoing protest in 
St. Barthélemy, and followed suit with their own rebuttal against the 
reaction of the town’s merchants. The St. Barthélemy judge, Johan 
Norderling, was especially targeted for his involvement in the reactions. 
His tenure would not survive this affair, as he was recalled in 1798 by the 
orders of the Swedish West India Company. The Company directors saw 
independent actors such as Norderling as rogues and a grave threat to 
peaceful relations with neighboring islands.126 
The presence of a French consul can be contrasted with the attempts 
of the United States to establish a consulate in St. Barthélemy. The 
American government had seen fit to commission a consul on the island 
since 1799. The appointment of U.S. consul had been received by Job Wall, 
an American but also Swedish burgher. He nevertheless failed to be 
recognized by the Swedish Governor. In fact, no American consul was 
accepted by the Swedish authorities until 1821, despite that several were 
sent out until that time. All of them met with refusal. The St. Barthélemy 
governors time and again explained this course with similar reasons. An 
American consul could issue various legal documents instead of island 
authorities and would thus deprive them of a share of their emoluments. 
The council however never had the political leverage to oust the French 
consul from his position, even though were good enough reason to do so. 
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Ironically, the refusal to recognize any U.S. consul was motivated by 
negative past experiences the French consulate and the bounty court in 
Gustavia. Finally, American merchants and seafarers alike did not 
necessarily see an American consul in a free port as an unequivocally 
positive situation. The presence of an American consul would also, in a 
sense, entail the presence of American law. American shipping passing 
through Gustavia was after all often engaged in branches of trade which 
were prohibited by domestic laws.127 
Meanwhile, the question of privateering activity in the port of Gustavia 
was a difficult one which continued to engage colonial magistrates as well 
as the government in Stockholm. At an early stage, Governors voiced the 
request that the Swedish colony should be able to admit foreign privateers 
of all nations as well as their bounty, as this had been an established 
practice in other free ports such as Charlotte Amalie for decades. The 
argument in favor of this praxis was that it was impossible to prohibit 
individuals in the participation of privateering economy of the region, and 
that the Swedish crown should at least exact the customary taxes and port 
charges for privateers in order to gain some revenue in return. The 
response of the Swedish government, however, was a categorical refusal to 
permit such a policy.128  
Whether this sentiment was sincere or if it was only a convenient stance 
to apply in official diplomatic relations, it was in any case impossible to 
maintain in practice. In a reflection on colonial affairs, the Swedish 
minister von Asp pithily asserted that: 
 In a West Indian possession, be the oversight as adequate as it may be, 
it will always be impossible to prevent the Inhabitants to pursue such 
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commerce that is prohibited in the quarters of the region, or to lend 
their assistance to the same; - and, especially in wartime, it would be 
vain to try and restrain all actions, which would give reason to the 
protests of foreign powers. It could never be in the power of Sweden to 
meet with armed force those aggressions which time after another 
would be occasioned from such trade.129 
Colonial administrators had a difficult task of staking out some kind of 
middle ground between the protection of their subjects’ commercial 
interests, and the cautious diplomatic stance towards foreign powers. The 
Swedish government could in his view never afford to think that it could 
control its overseas subjects completely in terms of trade policy. Nor could 
it realistically hope to claim justice for its naturalized subjects involved in 
neutral or illicit trade, as it would occasion too high a material and political 
cost. 
In practice, foreign privateers were seldom refused entry into Gustavia. 
At any rate, it was also beneficial for the colony. The SWIC agents were 
quite open with the fact that a large part of their purchases during the 
1790s were often from British prize-vessels, escorted by French privateers 
from Martinique and other privateer hotbeds. It was often the only way 
for them to get reasonable prizes on sugar shipments to Stockholm. 
Sometimes it was hard to control the transactions in nearby territorial 
waters belonging to the Swedish crown. Ile Fourchue to the southwest of 
St. Barthélemy, or Five Islands as it was also known, became a notorious 
rendezvous point for privateers and smugglers. It was simply a convenient 
place to regroup and liquidate cargoes with the aid of willing merchants 
and collaborators on nearby islands, including the burghers of Gustavia but 
without the supervision of Swedish authorities. While inside Swedish 
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territory, it could not be controlled effectively by Swedish forces. As such, 
it became a kind of free port unto itself, where transactions of the most 
illegal and questionable kind could and did take place.130 
The engagement of Swedish subjects in privateering and their attempts 
to arm and equip vessels registered under Swedish colors were however 
promptly prosecuted. Moses Mendez, a Gustavia burgher who had 
naturalized in 1793, had his property sequestered by the Swedish council in 
1799 when it was unearthed that he had equipped privateers under the flag 
of the French republic. The Swedish administration was quite consistent 
in regard to this praxis, and many others who attempted similar operations 
met with the same fate. An official proclamation to the effect of these 
decisions was made in 1808. This also entailed that individual merchants 
faced serious obstacles even if they wanted to arm their own commercial 
vessels only for their own protection.131 
Commercial Warfare and Commercial Risk 
Individual merchants and seafarers engaged in regular trade, in turn, had 
to run the gauntlet during their inter-island voyages during the wars. The 
fate of vessels and others taken by privateers and naval vessels varied. At 
worst, both cargo and vessel were lost, awarded as prizes to the captain and 
crew by whom they were taken. At best such vessels were detained, often 
for long periods, while a prize court decided their fates. In the latter case, 
owners lost the use of their vessels for an indeterminate time and often 
incurred substantial losses because of changes in the market prices of 
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commodities detained, spoilage and lack of return on capital invested in 
sequestered cargoes. The privateers and even the lawyers and officers of 
the Vice Admiraly Courts themselves were dependent on the earnings 
from prize sales, a situation which lended itself in times to corruption and 
other effects of vested interests. Verdicts of condemnation could at times 
fall at the presence of the flimsiest of pretexts. Even if the vessels were 
finally acquitted, court and procedure costs often befell the owners of 
seized ships. In British Vice Admiralty Courts, for instance, this was made 
possible by the institution of the Writ of Probable Cause. According to 
this prescript, the judge of the Vice Admiralty Court could certify, when 
seized vessels or cargoes were acquitted, whether the seizers had been 
justified in their suspicions. If so, the unfortunate defendant was held 
liable for the costs of his otherwise successful case. This was another 
instance of the generosity that the British Crown bestowed upon 
informers, seizers, and captors, in order to prosecute its maritime war 
against foreign powers.132 
In addition to the perils of due process, the violence and avarice of 
privateers and their crews were especially notorious in the eyes of neutral 
traders. A Danish merchant trading out of St. Thomas, Johan P. Nissen, 
described Tortola privateers as the worst kind of seaborne ruffians 
imaginable. Violence and robbery was their business, and they typically 
cruised in small schooners with 25 to 30 men on board. This relatively large 
crew was maintained so as to be able to steer both the privateer and the 
prize vessel to the nearest British port with a Vice Admiralty Court. It was 
not unusual that captives complained of theft before the matter of their 
case was decided. Money, clothes and liquors were among the first articles 
that privateer crews cleared from cargo holds. British privateers cruising 
the road of Gustavia regularly showed their audacity by pursuing their 
targets almost right into Le Carénage. During the few years after 1793, St. 
Barthélemy was virtually blockaded by them. The town batteries were 
quite frequently forced to fire at ships preying on arriving craft, and the 
                                                          
132 Craton, “Vice Admiralty Courts,” 67–68. 
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musket and grapeshot fire aimed at fleeing merchantmen sometimes 
sprayed the shores of the road.133 
While they brought danger and a risk-filled existence, wars also 
provided opportunity. General earnings from a successfully completed 
voyage wages skyrocketed in wartime, as well as sailor’s wages and 
complementary trades. Merchant vessels that tried their luck in the face 
of hostile waters thus could offer wages far higher than others. Nissen, who 
described his encounters with Tortola privateers, was “captured and 
plundered” seventeen times by British privateers during the wars, but he 
nevertheless thrived as a well-to-do wine merchant in St. Thomas, despite 
his losses. Additionally, the business of privateering offered mariners to 
make another kind of living as well as to express political commitments 
and affiliations, especially during the French Revolution. For free blacks 
and slaves, work onboard a privateer could be the difference between 
servitude and freedom. It has also been suggested that privateering 
enabled seamen of different persuasions to remain outside of the imperial 
framework. A Spanish agent visiting St. Thomas in 1795 observed the 
presence of several French privateers in the harbor of Charlotte Amalie, 
but he could only single out a minority of Frenchmen among their crews. 
Instead, the privateers were operated by a small number of Danes and 
Italians along with a majority of mariners whom he termed as “people 
without a fixed place of residence.”134 
Finally, means of circumventing commercial thresholds were offered by 
the competing colonial powers themselves. Britain finally came to the 
conclusion that the continuous legal wrangling with neutrals over the rule 
of 1756 was fruitless, as neutrals were always adept at circumventing 
innovations and adjustments in prevailing legislation. Instead, it was 
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 125 
 
proposed that neutrals were to be permitted to carry enemy goods to 
France, albeit under British-issued licenses, which would provide a new 
income for the British treasury as well as alleviate the complications arising 
from the many cases pending in prize courts in the colonies. The licensing 
scheme, however, was only put into action in the later stages of the French 
wars, and was instituted in a number of Orders-in-Council in 1807. This 
rerouting of neutral trade was combined with other elements of economic 
warfare, such as the mass smuggling of British goods into French domains. 
Still, the combined efforts of British naval vessels and privateers led to the 
seizure of thousands of vessels. The period between the beginning of 1807 
and the middle of 1808 was coincidentally the busiest for the Caribbean 
Prize Courts during the entire Napoleonic War. The activities of French 
privateers in Caribbean waters were continuous during the war, only 
ceasing completely after the British occupations of Guadeloupe and 
Martinique in 1810. In 1794–98, the prize court of Guadeloupe alone had 
adjudicated the condemnation of 890 seized vessels. The high tide of 
seizures was largely a result of a post-revolution conflict between the 
United States and the French Republic, which escalated into the so-called 
Quasi-War (1798–1800). The frenzied pace of seizures continued towards 
the close of the century, but was significantly tempered after the 
resolution of the undeclared state of war between the United States and 
France. The departure of Victor Hugues from Guadeloupe in 1799 after he 
had fallen out of favor with the French Directory was also a factor in this 
decrease.135 
An illustrative case of both the kind of disguised foreign shipping that 
was the norm of wartime Gustavia as well as the belligerents’ view of it is 
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shown clearly in the process of the St. Barthélemy-registered and Swedish-
flagged schooner Malmö in 1809. Malmö was seized while sailing a two miles 
off the western shore of Grande-Terre, Guadeloupe by the British 
privateer Spitfire and brought into Antigua for adjudication. The small 
schooner with a crew of 4 Americans, now naturalized Swedes, was 
reportedly on a round trip from St. Barthélemy to Marie Galante, and was 
carrying a cargo of “American goods”. Besides sailing outside a French 
colony, there were many other factors which made the crew of the British 
privateer suspicious. For instance, the crew had an American flag onboard, 
allegedly to “hoist in case they should have been spoken to by a French 
privateer.” On the way to Antigua, the crew of the Malmö seized their 
captors and threw their arms overboard, but “finding that the vessel could 
not be retaken unless the Captors were killed,” the crew relented from any 
further resistance. The evidence was already quite unfavorable for the crew 
members, but the Vice Admiralty Court of Antigua seized upon the 
nationality on the crew members and owner as the definitive proof of foul 
play. The deck hand Matthew Aken testified as having a wife and family in 
Boston, but nevertheless considered himself a Swedish subject. The guilty 
verdict was brought home with reference to the owner, Emanuel Rey, 
because he was a Frenchman by birth.136 
As far as British wartime doctrines were concerned, the verdict was 
correct. There was little that was frivolous in the accusations against the 
Malmö and its owner. Emanuel Rey was a Frenchman who had resided in 
New York before he settled and applied for Swedish naturalization in St. 
Barthélemy in February 1809, only few months before the Malmö was 
seized. The schooner itself had also undergone a recent naturalization 
process, and was previously named the Trial under American colors, built 
in Cape Ann, Massachusetts. The Antigua court records suggest that its 
master Thomas Jones was its real owner, having sold it fictitiously to Rey 
after the latter had acquired Swedish burgher documents in Gustavia, to 
facilitate a quick neutralization of the vessel. It appears that Rey and his 
                                                          
136 Copy of the Minutes and interrogatories of the Antigua Vice Admiralty Court, 28 March, 
29 March, and 19 April 1809, AM 275 bis, FSB, ANOM.  
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compatriots did not make any serious attempt at redress, but possibly just 
bought the schooner back after it was condemned. As late as March of 1815 
is the final registration of a ship named Malmö, this time again by Rey, 
albeit with an expanded and ethnically more diverse crew. This also 
illustrates the continuity and tenacity of this kind of trade in the face of 
many challenges.137  
One of the most curious Swedish cases that were brought before the 
Vice Admiralty court of Jamaica was the ship Medborgaren, of 200 tons. 
The ship had been sighted as early as July of 1797 by a SWIC agent in 
Gustavia, who reported that the ship had anchored in the port under the 
command of a captain A.N. Schale. It had reportedly sailed out from 
Gothenburg where it had been sent out by the owner, L.E. Yvon. It carried 
a shipment of wines and assorted dry goods addressed to a local Swedish 
merchant house in Gustavia, and was apparently headed back towards 
Europe, to Bordeaux, with a return cargo of coffee and sugar.138 No record 
is available on the ship’s departure from the island, but she turns up in Vice 
Admiralty minutes the next year, as she was captured off Jacmel on the 2nd 
of December 1798 by the H.M.S. Diligence, and sent into Jamaica for 
adjudication. The ship was now helmed by a man named Eyserman, and it 
was reported at this instance that the ship had set out from Gothenburg to 
the United States by way of St. Barthélemy, but after leaving the Swedish 
colony, while driven off course by bad weather, she was taken by a French 
privateer, carried into Santo Domingo and condemned in the Spanish 
Admiralty Court. Repurchased by the supercargo, she was impressed by 
the Spanish authorities and sent to Jacmel with “154 slaves and 29 
passengers.” It was on this leg of the journey that she fell in with the British 
naval ship. On the 28th of February 1799 the vessel was acquitted, but the 
cargo of African captives was decreed as British recaptures. The ship’s 
misfortunes were, however, far from over. After leaving Jamaica without a 
cargo, she was seized by another British ship, the H.M.S. Abergavenny, on 
                                                          
137 Notarial record of Emanuel Rey’s naturalization, February 1809, CP 75, FSB, ANOM; 
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the 21st of May 1799. This time, the same Vice Admiralty court uncovered 
frauds in the alleged ownership. The original owner were said to have been 
not L.E. Yvon of Gothenburg, but Öström Procter & Co. of St. 
Barthélemy. Somewhere down the line, she had been sold to a member of 
the Danish Haasum family of St.Thomas. Ultimately, then, the ship was 
condemned as French property on June 24, 1799, being said not to have 
been on her way to St. Barthélemy but to Hispaniola.139 
The case is important in the wider context of neutral free port trade of 
this time, as it illustrates just how deceptive the records surrounding it can 
be. As there were exceedingly few Swedish ships arriving from the Baltic 
to St. Barthélemy, never mind a ship this size or with such an uncommon 
name, there is good reason to suggest that the ship Medborgaren reported 
by the SWIC agent and the ship subsequently seized by British naval 
cruisers were one and the same. At the very least, the ship documents 
scrutinized by the Vice Admiralty court of Jamaica probably had the same 
origins as the ones possessed by the Medborgaren sighted at Gustavia in 
1797. One reasonable conclusion is that the ship was engaged in some form 
of tramp shipping until landing in Gustavia, at which point she was sold or 
passed on to actors in need of genuine Swedish ship’s documents, for 
whatever convoluted purpose. In any case, one is still at a loss as to arrive 
at any certain conclusions regarding the exact plans and ambitions of this 
particular expedition, as the only surviving documentation display such an 
array of smoke-and-mirrors-tactics from her owner(s) and crew to distort 
the truth behind her voyages.140 
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The Relative Benefits of Neutrality and Free Trade 
As it was not a European power of the first rank, it is not surprising Sweden 
had its colonial sovereignty compromised two times during the 
Napoleonic Wars. The first occupation occurred in 1801–02 by the British 
and again in 1807 by the French. As shown in the previous chapter, St. 
Barthélemy sometimes assumed a role of political satellite to neighboring 
colonies, especially the French for long periods of time, but as a free port, 
it was readily exploitable for any actor with similar ambitions. 
In a very early stage, Swedish government officials quickly recognized 
that it would be too costly and unrealistic to establish any attempt at a 
credible external defense. Defense of the harbor and road of Gustavia as 
well as a small military garrison for internal policing was seen as sufficient. 
The garrison tasked with duties of defense and police could number as 
much as 50 soldiers, but was generally much less than that. Maintaining a 
functioning military force was a constant problem. Concerns with health 
and discipline were commonplace, and the rate of mortality among regular 
troops was very high. Soldiers lost their lives to tropical diseases, dangerous 
manual labor, as well as cheap rum. There was only one soldier who ever 
died in combat. He perished when he fell in with ambushing French forces 
during the night of the Guadeloupe expedition in 1807, described further 
below. In the early years of the colony, a guard-ship was also on duty to 
patrol the road and perform inspection duties on visiting ships. This was 
quickly found to be too costly to maintain, and the ship was left to rot to 
pieces in the harbor when its hull became prey to the wasting effects of the 
Caribbean Sea. Gustavia was the only fortified enclave on the island, 
cornered by three batteries of cannon, two posted at the sides of the 
mouth of La Carénage, and one guarding the southward cliffs of Gustavia. 
There was at times a battery on the north coast of the island, in Anse de 
Saint Jean, but it could rarely be manned effectively for long periods of 
time. Surveillance and lookouts could seldom patrol the mountainous and 
convoluted terrain in order to have sight in all directions. This is exactly 
why a small French force could land in a cove east of Gustavia in the night 
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in November 1807 and overwhelm the small Swedish forces after a short 
skirmish. Six years prior the islanders had the opportunity not to engage in 
hostilities in the face of overwhelming military superiority. When a small 
British fleet appeared on the southern anchored outside of Gustavia in 
March 1801, an ad hoc defense council unanimously opted for surrender. 
The British force was allowed to embark and occupy the colony without 
any resistance.141 
While this pragmatic approach to defense on a small remote island was 
the only one that was found realistic, there were still concerns raised over 
sovereign duties of protection. The most pressing point was the protection 
of shipping by convoys or other means. The question of convoying quickly 
became a linchpin in matters of taxation. In the spirit of the free port idea, 
a poll tax was not exacted from the settlers and newly naturalized Swedish 
subjects in the earliest days of colonization. When the council decided to 
gradually levy new taxes towards the close of the 18th century, they found 
it impossible to justify, as local settlers accurately pointed out that the 
Swedish administration could not guarantee the safety of regional shipping 
leaving or entering the harbor. Discussions borne out between 
representatives of local merchants and the administration resulted in a 
request for a Swedish man-of-war as a convoy ship. The company directors, 
who handled the request in Stockholm, exacted the cutter brig Huzaren to 
be dispatched to St. Barthélemy from its post in the Mediterranean. The 
idea was that it would function as an itinerant convoy ship for Swedish 
ships in the region, and that local merchants would be levied small 
increases in port charges in order to finance its operations. The crux of the 
matter that made the expedition irrelevant, however, was that the 
commander of the Huzaren had received some very exact instructions not 
to convoy any other than Swedish ships proper that were homebound to 
Swedish ports. Naturally, the merchants were disinclined to pay for the 
protection of the few yearly Swedish West India Company and private 
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Swedish ships returning to the Baltic, rather than for the protection of 
their own property. The ship stayed in the colony for almost a year before 
returning to its initial post. A replacement was planned, but the project 
finally was finally abandoned after the British occupation in 1801.142 
This concluded the attempts of maritime protection in the colony, and 
consequently also the matter of direct taxation. There were certainly 
inklings of projects and attempts to resurrect the old question but they 
were ultimately unsuccessful. The settlers and naturalized burghers of St. 
Barthélemy were as a result taxed very lightly. The only necessary duties 
came in the form of payment for different bureaucratic services and 
documents.143 
Already vulnerable to external attack, colonies like St. Barthélemy with 
an open colonization policy received a substantial number of foreign 
Europeans for whom the normative cultural values of the metropole 
mattered very little, and who could challenge the authority of the Swedish 
administrative presence. Uprooted colonial residents who had fled in the 
wake of the Revolution were often seen as a source of instability in the 
small free port colony when they settled there. It was widely rumored that 
the Guadeloupe expedition to St. Barthélemy in 1807 was aided by local 
French expatriates. The object of the French attack was the property of a 
recently settled American merchant, William Israel, whose main business, 
trading with revolutionary Saint-Domingue, was a serious enough affront 
to the French interests as to mount an attack on the Swedish colony. 
Runnels, a Dutch settler from St. Eustatius, placed the incident in a wider 
context when relating it to a Swedish official: 
                                                          
142 Minutes of the island council and committee of commercial interests, 9 July 1799, PJ 143, 
FSB, ANOM; Minutes of the SWIC, 13 December 1798, 26 January, 23 April, 10 July, 29 July, 
27 November 1799, 13 March, 10 April, 24 July 1800; vol. 156, Handel och sjöfart, SNA; af 
Trolle’s report, 23 April 1800, SBS 1 B:2, SNA; Cf. also Per Tingbrand, Med svenska örlogsmän 
till S:t Barthélemy, 1785–1994 (Marinlitteraturföreningen: Stockholm, 1997), 58–59. 
143 “His Majesty’s Gracious Taxation Act”, 26 March 1804, The Report of Saint Bartholomew, 
26 September 1804; Cf. Minutes of the SWIC, 2 September 1803, appendix A, vol. 157, 
Handel och sjöfart, SNA.  
 132 
 
[---] if we have been able to wean ourselves of Native prejudices, or to 
learn in Theory even, to look up to Sweden as a Mother Country, and to 
feel that we are Essentially incorporated with that Nation, and hold a 
common Interest with her, will be best determined by an Examination 
of the occasions which have called for display of those sentiments, and 
especially that one which occurred in November 1807. Driven here, 
some by accident but more by desire of subsistence and gain; we have 
not yet thrown off our early local prepossessions, or acquired new state-
affections: nor can we in sincerity claim credit for more real sympathy 
in your concerns or the great Interests of the Nation, than if you were 
detached from this planet altogether.144 
In the face of internal stability and security, then, colonial magistrates 
often toed a fine line. As the present garrison was not sufficient for internal 
defense, a solution was proposed in the formation of a colonial militia, 
consisting of all free, able-bodied men of sufficient age. Many attempts 
were made at the creation of this form of auxiliary military force to 
supplement the corps of Swedish soldiers. The task was not easy, as settlers 
with more means were unlikely to find the time away from work and daily 
business to do this type of service. Another cause for consternation was 
that many white settlers positively resented falling into line with free 
blacks, as if they were their peers. It is important not to understate this 
point, and it is the reason why there were different companies of white and 
black militiamen, however always commanded by a white officer.145 
The formation and dismemberment of different militias ensued several 
times during the Napoleonic Wars, but the last and most significant 
occurred after the short French invasion in 1807, when an enthusiastic 
effort to create and auxiliary defense was mounted by the Swedish judge 
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Anders Bergstedt. If earlier militia projects had been met with popular 
discontent and protest, this one presented the Swedish administration 
with perhaps a more serious threat to colonial sovereignty than either of 
the foreign invasion during the present decade. In September 1810, 
members of the white militia companies took to the streets of Gustavia 
and mutinied, arrested judge Bergstedt, put the Governor in house arrest, 
and put the remaining number of Swedish officers, fiscals, and magistrates 
under lock and key. After the initial unrest had settled, the mutineers, 
represented by some of the wealthiest merchants on the island, simply 
demanded the expulsion of judge Bergstedt, himself commander of the 
militia. They succeeded in their demands, and also managed to have 
another Swedish official and militia officer, Samuel Fahlberg, deported. 
Fahlberg was accused of having given the order to fire upon the mutineers 
from one of the town’s batteries. The Swedish soldier given the order was 
according to popular belief to have refused to follow the command, and 
became subject of public adulation afterwards.146 
The underlying conditions for this individual rebellion was not merely 
a protest against the much reviled auxiliary military service. There were 
long-standing grievances between the local merchant elite and the Swedish 
magistrates, particularly the judge and his de facto rule over colonial life. 
There were several persons who felt they had been wronged by the judge 
in juridical matters and in individual cases pending before the court. There 
were many who voiced complaints when, in 1805, a committee of 
commercial interests had been disbanded. The merchants comprising this 
committee had hoped to have a real say in colonial affairs, but the 
formation of the committee had served the Swedish administration mostly 
as a forum for communicating with the population at large. Among leading 
colonial residents, there was a distinct distrust against the island council. 
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After the demise of the company and its officials, it was not thought that 
the island council fared any better at promoting matters of public good. 
The often staunch response of officials to popular criticism led to an 
atmosphere of antagonism. As an example, popular sentiment was 
sometimes ridiculed in the island newspaper. The publication of the 
newspaper was closely tied to the council, especially judge Bergstedt, who 
had introduced it to the colony in 1804. According to a short satirical text 
in an 1806 issue, the so-called Street Corner Club of Gustavia was having 
one of its regular discussions, where one of the members, “Mr. Curilurio,” 
asked: “Why Gentlemen how is this? Police and Oeconomy left in the 
hands of three persons. How will that succeed? I look upon the Country as 
ruined, and it will be ruined, and shall be ruined as sure as - as - as my name 
is - as – Curilurio.”147 
 It is not significant here to recreate the specific course of events. It is 
only important to note the ease of success that the mutineers had in their 
ambitions. When the offending Swedish magistrates had been removed, 
tranquility and stability seemed to return as quickly as the mutiny had been 
mounted. The mutineers addressed a letter to the Swedish Crown in which 
they apologetically explained their actions, and reaffirmed their oaths of 
allegiance to Sweden with an affectionate language very contrary to the 
apparent indifference towards the motherland that Runnels had 
described. The mutineers themselves were never tried in court or 
questioned by royal inquiries afterwards. Bergstedt returned to live a life 
of prolonged poverty in Sweden, followed nearly to the end of his life by a 
redress of a judicial proceeding that he started in St. Barthélemy in 1797 
against a merchant house, a case in which he was found to have gravely 
misconducted. Fahlberg was involved in later complications following his 
own deportation which resulted in a verdict of high treason. He died in 
exile on St. Eustatius in November 1834 before he could receive news of 
his pardon, issued in Sweden a few months earlier. The remainder of the 
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Swedish administration acquiesced to what had passed, and the work of 
the council and garrison resumed shortly afterwards. Only in 1815 was the 
garrison relieved by reinforcements, and Swedish magistrates never again 
put arms in the hands of the colony’s inhabitants.148 
The incident also puts light on a difficult issue in Swedish colonial 
administration. Colonial officials and magistrates were not likely to offer 
each other support in situations like these, let alone openly condemn 
actions such as those made in the mutiny of 1810. The Swedish 
administrative history of St. Barthélemy is marred by acrimony, infighting, 
squabbling over details of hierarchy, internal political struggles, as well as 
ambitious competition for titles and employment. There were certainly 
signs of the kind of “imperial boredom,” experienced by colonial officials, 
often men with a military background, in the face of the everyday tedium 
of colonial bureaucracy. When Governors were not tired of uninteresting 
work, they were tired of unruly subordinates and the troublemakers and 
radicals among the colony’s population. Subsequently, Governors’ reports 
strikingly often were endless jeremiads, punctuated by offers of 
resignation and pleas for transfers to other posts.149 
 It has been argued that the Swedish officials were torn into different 
factions as they were caught up in the European power struggle that had 
spilled into the colonies, either landing them with pro-French or pro-
British attitudes and affinities. Whereas this explanation certainly has its 
merits in some contexts, it is nevertheless an oversimplification of a 
complex matter. Judge Norderling for example complained of a kind of 
“jealousy between military and civil men” when he explained the 
continuous rifts between himself and the men who served as Governor of 
the colony. This was an obvious reference to social distinctions, as military 
officers were most often members of the nobility. But there was a power 
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struggle between the Governor and the judge inherent in the very 
foundation of Swedish colonial law. The island council, the highest 
executive power in the colony, could have various different compositions 
depending on the matter at hand during a given session. Often the judge 
rather than the Governor would preside over the most important cases and 
discussions. Moreover, the judge acted as first notary public as well as 
prosecutor, which vested the office with significant practical power 
relative to the Governor, whose duties in practice were often ceremonial 
and bureaucratic. When Governor Ankarheim arrived at his post early in 
1801, he complained that he felt that the colonial hierarchy was lopsided, 
and that he received more rather than gave orders to the presiding judge.150 
Whatever effect the power structure and hierarchical implications of 
Swedish colonial rule, it is also clear that some of the debilitating quarrels 
had their source in personal idiosyncracy. There were no more bizarre 
examples of high-handedness and arbitrary justice than under the short 
period of Governor Stackelberg, who stunted the work of the Swedish 
administration by his constant bickering with judge Bergius. After a period 
of several incidents where the Governor had harangued him both in public 
office and in person, Bergius left for Sweden via a purported sojourn in the 
United States and never returned. Stackelberg also had a number of other 
running enmities, such as one with the Swedish doctor, whom he had jailed 
for a short stint after losing to him in a game of cards. Stackelberg was also 
accused of embezzling large funds from the colonial chest, containing all 
the proceeds from tariffs and taxations due to the crown.151 
What today would be considered as widespread corruption was a mere 
collection of symptoms of an administrative system that differed 
significantly from the ideal. Local colonial authorities drew a fixed salary 
which was supposed to make them well-off and therefore not dependent 
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to von Fersen, 30 March 1801, Hans Axel von Fersens samling, vol. 12, Stafsundsarkivet, SNA; 
Ankarheim to Gyllenborg, 20 October 1801, Fredrik Gyllenborgs brevsamling, UUB. 
151 Bergius to af Wetterstedt, 14 January 1816, SBS 4A, SNA; af Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 
19 April 1817, C 258, FSB, ANOM; of special interest is also Stackelberg’s official and personal 
financial reports 1812–16, in SBS 26A, SNA; Tingbrand, Who was who, 526–27. 
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on emoluments and other incomes. Nothing was however farther from the 
truth. The salaries were calculated in the amount of rixdollars that was the 
norm for personnel in public office, but they did not account for the 
difference in cost of living between Sweden and the Caribbean region. The 
governors, judges, agents and notaries could not be men of property based 
on their fixed income alone. Emoluments for official documents, 
translations, and the like became essential additional incomes for the 
officials vested with the power to exact such payments. It is not suggested 
here that official greed or the ambition for personal enrichment were the 
prime driving forces of corruption. Rather, high costs of living often 
necessitated a certain degree of conformity with the established praxis of 
laissez-faire colonial governance usual in many Caribbean colonies. The 
Governor, for instance, had to maintain a certain esteem for the Swedish 
crown in matters of official representation, largely footed by his own 
personal capital.152 
Popular discontent also had its source in the often confined 
possibilities of free trade in the war-torn West Indies. Operating as a 
neutral Swedish burgher in a free port did not in itself offer limitless 
opportunities for free trade. One key aspect was the limited rights 
endowed by registering a Swedish neutral vessel. The registers, or sea-
passes, as they were called in official documents, were issued for a fixed 
period of time, usually six months, during which time the registered vessel 
could travel any number of voyages anywhere throughout the Western 
Hemisphere as well as the West African coast. European destinations were 
however only limited to Swedish ports. This was an immensely important 
detail which created problems for local merchants as well as the colonial 
magistrates. The limitation was naturally set in place to direct colonial 
trade to Sweden as well as to limit the risk of contraband trade to European 
ports, which were bound to create diplomatic complications. The 
restriction was however subject to a continuous stream of protests, even 
                                                          
152 For a description of living costs, relative purchasing power, and the situation of Swedish 
officials in St. Barthélemy, see the apostilles of a letter from Ankarheim to von Fersen, 15 July 
1801. 
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early on from colonial administrators who felt that the stipulation was 
harming the colony economically. Judge Bergstedt pleaded for the 
expansion of rights in 1803, and claimed that local merchants always had 
recourse for European-bound voyages, but could only in their present 
situation pay freights for “Americans, Hamburgers, and Danes” in order to 
send their consignments away to Europe. During the charter of the SWIC, 
there was however no ambitions in Stockholm to expand the seafaring 
rights of local St. Barthélemy merchants.153 
This limitation would however, despite numerous protests and 
constant lobbying be in place during the whole duration of the French 
Wars. This occasioned a steady demand for foreign vessel registrations and 
consignments, and conversely lessened the demand for Swedish vessel 
registrations. Whereas foreign ship documents and naturalizations were 
easily enough obtainable for a proper sum of money, it sometimes 
demanded some unscrupulous methods. In 1814 under the close of the War 
of 1812, the German merchant Elbers designed to have one of his brigs 
seized outside the road of Gustavia by a small British privateer, and had it 
condemned in St. Kitts. The vessel was then repurchased as British 
property and with a British sea-pass, but still with Elbers remaining as sole 
owner. Despite the possibility of similar procedures and the apparent 
compliance of both British privateers and colonial official, it was a road 
much less traveled because of the high costs involved. For instance, the 
charade that Elbers construed in concert with the British cost him a 
prohibitive 1,000 Spanish dollars in all.154 
Abraham Runnels, a former St. Eustatius resident often consulted in 
commercial matters by the council and the Swedish government, expanded 
on the multiple problems facing local merchants in a letter, and asserted 
that: 
                                                          
153 Anders Bergstedt, undated P.M., SWIC Minutes, 2 September 1803, Handel och sjöfart, 
vol. 157, SNA; The negative response from the SWIC directors to Bergstedt regarding sea-
passes in SWIC Minutes, 26 March 1804, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157, SNA; Ordinance in order 
to prevent foreign Vessels from sailing under the Swedish flag. Given Gustavia 25 May 1804. In The 
Report of Saint Bartholomew, 28 May 1804. 
154 Bergius to af Wetterstedt, 13 October 1814, SBS 4A, SNA. 
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[...] three essential links in the chain is wanting. Namely the confidence 
of the Merchants in Sweden, the facilities of Markets for colonial 
produce within her Territories and the faculty of navigating with the 
vessels of this colony in the European Seas & Ports. If the comparison 
[of St. Barthélemy with St. Eustatius] be rendered complete by 
supplying the chain with these three links, we might be unconcerned 
about the rivalry of any new free ports (which could grow out of a new 
order of things) possessing no greater physical means that we do; but 
possibly not so favoured in the matter of jurisprudence.155 
This lack of confidence is perhaps best illustrated by the weaning 
commercial transatlantic link between Sweden and its West Indian 
colony. Since the dissolution of the Swedish West India Company, it had 
never amounted to anything substantial. In 1814, when Runnels penned 
this letter, it had been at least ten years since any regular traffic had been 
seen between metropole and colony. But the lack of communications did 
not merely imply a dearth of saleable merchandise from the metropole, it 
also brought with it the consequent problem of lacking credit. 
Accustomed to the readily available financial and commercial institutions 
in Amsterdam during the heydays of St. Eustatius’ commercial life, 
Runnels saw the relationship with Stockholm and Gothenburg as poor 
substitutes. Naturalized Swedish merchants in St. Barthélemy were well 
advised to direct their loans and investment elsewhere in Europe. There 
was simply not much investment in the West Indian trade in Sweden. In 
extension, Runnels also saw the lack of markets in Sweden as well as the 
restriction in European ports of destination as a particularly hampering 
condition. St. Barthélemy vessels were for the most part of the French wars 
prohibited to sail to any other European ports than those in Sweden. As 
this was seldom worth the effort, European-bound expeditions were rare 
in St. Barthélemy.156 
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detailed in an undated memorial by Governor Ankarheim, probably produced in 1814, in SBS 
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The most striking effects of the limitations was uncovered in a case of 
Swedish passport forgery in 1815. Accusations of forgery had been rife 
during the wars, coming both from consuls posted in the United States as 
well as embittered Gothenburg merchants whose ships had encountered 
false Swedish ships while plying American waters. Despite receiving a 
multitude of similar complaints, governors and magistrates of St. 
Barthélemy vehemently denied any involvement. But when the sergeant of 
the police and marshal of the island council, Peter Löfman, died in 
February 1815, the administrators had to admit that forgeries had indeed 
been distributed in St. Barthélemy and that the perpetrators had been 
hiding in plain sight. Due to suspicions against Löfman, the posthumous 
investigation of Löfman’s estate found incriminating documents that 
implied that he and other Swedish officials as well as the local island printer 
had been manufacturing and selling forged Swedish passports and 
documents for a long time. As the involved Swedes had close ties to the 
colonial council and its members, they had had access to all the necessary 
material for such forgeries, as witnessed by the subsequent discoveries of 
seals, stamps, signatures, and other paraphernalia in the suspects’ homes.157 
Further inquiries led to the discovery that another former Swedish 
fiscal in St. Barthélemy had made several trips to New York with the 
documents, and had sold them locally. The documents included all 
applicable formalities of Swedish naturalization and shipping registry, 
from oaths of allegiance, muster rolls, manifests, clearances as well as the 
actual passports. All in all, they at least two principal purposes, either to 
impose a false registration of a Swedish vessel, or a simulated entry and 
clearance into Gustavia. This fit quite well with the former reports of 
forgeries and falsified Swedish vessels recorded on the North American 
coast during the wars. There is however no means to estimate how many 
forgeries that had been made and sold. The Swedish officials who 
unearthed the affair found dozens of readymade documents, and the 
                                                          
157 Council minutes, 27 February & 27 March 1815, PJ 174, ANOM; Speyer to Monroe, 19 
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 141 
 
operation had by all appearances been going on seamlessly for a number of 
years.158 
The incident highlighted a number of institutional limitations present 
in the free port colony. On the one hand was the incentive towards foul 
play created by some of the restrictions inherent in the free port trade. 
Merchants who did not wish or simply did not have the time to naturalize 
themselves as Swedish burghers could by way of these forgeries purchase 
neutralizing documents. On the other hand there was the complete lack of 
oversight by colonial magistrates in the control of their own bureaucracy. 
The matter at once caused a few important changes in the technicalities of 
passport issuances, for instance the requirement to specify the port of 
destination in passports instead of a simple date of expiry as before. 
Another substantial alteration was that all passports were issued with 
bonds as a security for the return of the passport.159 
Incidentally following these changes, St. Barthélemy vessels were also 
finally endowed with the right to depart for all European ports granted the 
trade was supported by international treaties. The late grant of this 
coveted right was however not received with collective praise in the 
colony. Almost as soon as the governor had received the new law from 
Stockholm, he wrote a critical response. His main objection was with the 
clause that the new passport with stated destinations entailed that vessel 
owners had to renew their passports with each individual journey, 
something which would unavoidably bring with it higher costs for 
shippers. Prior to this alteration, passports were granted for 12 months at 
a time. The governor feared that this change might drive merchants and 
vessel owners out of colony into nearby free ports with more lax 
regulations. Coincidentally, the corruption of colonial magistrates alluded 
to previously would nevertheless always ensure a certain flexibility in the 
interpretation and enforcement of the rules. Therefore it was possible for 
enterprising individuals to bend the rules just enough for the safeguarding 
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of individual privileges and rights in their business ventures. Governors 
and magistrates often acted for what they saw as the greater good of the 
colony, even when it meant skirting established laws and practices. Their 
independent actions were indeed acutely necessary because of the large 
communication gap between motherland and colony, and were often 
sanctioned afterwards by officials in Stockholm who realized this fact.160  
The Colonial Realities of a Neutral Free Port 
The nature of the Swedish colonization project, then, led to a weak 
military and administrative infrastructure, and the long-term national 
interests, embedded in the failed goals and ambitions of the Swedish West 
India Company, had to be sacrificed for short-term expedients. What 
those entailed were colonial stability and self-sufficiency, as far as it could 
be realized within the framework of the free port. In the wake of early 
Swedish settlement, a polyglot society of maritime and commercial actors 
sprung up. As evidenced by the mutiny of 1810, its settlers could turn 
against the Swedish crown representatives. This did not entail, however, 
that disobedience and objections against the metropole amounted to full-
blown doctrines of insurrection and treason. Grievances were often 
particular rather than general, directed personally at salaried functionaries 
and officials as well as the monopolies of company charters. Finally, the 
limitations of St. Barthélemy’s liberal trade police and Swedish neutrality 
led to many instances of extralegal conduct by naturalized Swedish 
burghers themselves. The demands of commercial enterprise and 
individual avarice during the wars were simply not fulfilled by the mere 
presence of neutral free ports. It can be observed that there is much that 
holds true in a terse observation made by the Swedish colonial judge 
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Bergius in 1819: “A free port is nothing but a marketplace that is rented to 
foreign merchants, nothing more.”161  
Nevertheless, the free port only suffered a few short periods of 
interrupted trade, which is remarkable by the fact of its isolated position 
and role as a neutral subterfuge, which was often found offensive to the 
military arm of larger colonial empires. Whereas the revolutionary 
authorities of Guadeloupe had found in St. Barthélemy a means to extend 
the network of its own maritime predatory economy, the course of the war 
after the Peace of Amiens pitted the French colony against its former 
proxy. This was however less due to international politics than to regional 
realities, where the actions of individuals could violate existing power 
relationships. In this case also the Swedish free port colony was left to 
recommence its daily operations after the offending element had been 
removed. To snuff out the Swedish colony permanently was by all 
appearances a too costly and unnecessary an effort. Furthermore, its 
continued existence, as will be shown in the following chapters, was an 
enduring resource for other colonies in the region. It would soon be the 
only free port left in the Lesser Antilles.
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3 Gustavia in the Atlantic and Regional 
Slave Trade 
3.1 Slave Trade Connections 
Andrew Steinmetz was born on St. Barthélemy in 1816. As an heir of a wealthy 
family with roots in St. Eustatius, he left the colony for an education in 
London when he was fifteen, and would later become a barrister and author. 
One of his publications was the highly declamatory and sentimental A Voice 
in Ramah, or, the Lament of the Poor African, an abolitionist poem about the 
horrors of the slave trade.1 In a line in its second canto, he depicts a slave-ship 
departing towards the West African coast, destined to brave “Plague and 
Famine’s agony.” Steinmetz was building on a long established tradition of 
abolitionist prose, but he also drew from his own first-hand accounts of the 
debilitating health conditions that so often became the fate of the slaving 
crew and its captives during the middle passage. In a note, he mentions a 
memory of his as a young boy, as he had seen sailors of a slave-ship repairing 
into Gustavia after having disembarked their human cargo in one of the 
neighboring French colonies. The vessel had come to the Swedish colony to 
refit, and some of her crew had to be treated for a range of diseases. Steinmetz 
explained that mariners’ “wan and hideous appearance” had left a deep 
impression on him.2  
Whereas Steinmetz’s text is a rare eyewitness account of the transatlantic 
slave trade from within the Swedish colony, very little has been known about 
the slave trade conducted under Swedish flags or through St. Barthélemy. 
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Larger treatments of the slave trade with a focus on quantitative assessments 
tend not to list Sweden as a slaving nation in their statistics. There are of 
course more or less valid reasons behind this omission. Compared to other 
states involved in the slave trade, Sweden occupied an inconspicuous share. It 
only possessed a fort on the West African coast for a few decades during the 
seventeenth century, and it did not possess any colony founded upon a slave 
economy until St. Barthélemy in 1784. The merchant communities of Swedish 
port towns did not figure prominently in the branch of the slave trade. The 
conclusion - or assumption, rather - that seems to follow, is that while there 
may be a few odd Swedish slave ships left to find for the diligent researcher in 
the extant records, the bulk of the Swedish slave trade was not large enough 
to represent a meaningful category in the larger picture of the history of the 
transatlantic slave trade.3 
Still, a few attempts have been made to survey the extant records on the 
Swedish colonialism in the Caribbean, as well as the slave trade. The results 
vary from misrepresentation to misunderstanding, exemplified in the case of 
the slave trade in the erroneous claim of Ernst Ekman in 1975 that “while some 
Swedish subjects may on occasion have participated, this was never legally 
done under the Swedish flag.” On the other extreme, there are works like 
those of Göran Skytte’s Kungliga svenska slaveriet, published in 1986. While 
Skytte’s work in parts is more thoroughly researched than Ekman’s, for 
instance, it tends to skewer the picture of Swedish slave trade profiteering 
towards a sensational causerie more geared towards reader amusement than a 
serious attempt at historical accuracy.4 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to address a few pertinent 
questions about the Swedish involvement in the slave trade, which will serve 
to broadly reconstruct how the slave trade manifested itself in the free port 
of Gustavia. I will also try to address questions surrounding the profitability 
and legality of the slave trade in the context of neutral Swedish free trade in 
the Caribbean. Towards that end, a quantitative assessment of the trade will 
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also be made, grounded in new archival research as well as the construction of 
a database from existing sources as well as compiled catalogues and datasets. 
Swedish Ambitions Foreign Participation in the Gustavia Slave Trade 
Throughout the organization of the Swedish colonization of St. Barthélemy, 
the institution of the slave trade was always regarded as a means to several 
ends. An expanded importation of slaves into the new colony was a 
precondition for island agriculture, and there were new, lucrative markets in 
the West Indies where slaves could be sold. Cuba opened up its importation 
of slaves to all nations in 1789 which initiated a renewed interest in the trade. 
Furthermore, there was a consistent belief among traders in St. Barthélemy 
that the loss of lives among the enslaved in the French colonies during 
revolutionary conflicts would lead to an insatiable demand for slaves from the 
West African Coast.5 
The formal implementation of these various plans naturally befell the 
Swedish West India Company, but its shortage of capital and perennial 
troubles eventually spelled out its nonparticipation in the trade. There is one 
single planned voyage on record. In 1787 the company directors signed a 
contract with a Danish captain for an intended journey towards the Guinea 
coast, and a suitable cargo for the slave trade was procured. The intended 
voyage was however never put in motion, as the Russo-Swedish war of 1788 
made the risk of a Russian seizure in the Baltic unacceptable to the directors. 
The cargo was instead later sent to St. Barthélemy in 1791 as the company saw 
no promise in the “less secure enterprise” of the slave trade.6 
There were a handful of individual Swedish merchants that were no 
strangers to the slaving business. Richard Söderström, Swedish consul in 
Boston since 1784, had dabbled a few times in the slave trade and made small 
but, according to himself, handsome profits. He deplored the slave trade as a 
                                                          
5 Röhl & Hansen to the Board of Commerce, 21 June 1791, SBS 1A, SNA; Röhl & Hansen to 
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“wicked” business, but nevertheless congratulated himself on his successes in 
the branch in a letter to an unknown business associate. There were certainly 
more Gothenburg merchants such as Söderström who participated in or 
financed their own slaving voyages. A known instance is the expedition of the 
ship Sweriges Wapen, owned by the merchants Fåhraeus and Laurin. The ship 
left Amsterdam in February of 1796 under Swedish colors. The ship left the 
trading fort of Elmina for the West Indies the same year with 168 slaves, but 
was seized by a British privateer outside of Grenada before the slaves were 
disembarked, and would later be condemned as good prize along with its 
cargo.7 
While the voyage of Sweriges Wapen might be only one of many overlooked 
instances of Swedish slave trade, the paucity of Swedish slave ships in the 
statistics and in the records is naturally due to the fact that direct Swedish 
participation in the transatlantic slave trade was marginal. The new Swedish 
colony would however give rise to a certain degree of raised activity in the 
traffic of African slaves perpetrated by Swedish actors. The Stockholm 
merchants Röhl and Hansen, who had been SWIC’s local agents during the 
early years of the colony, would become the most ambitious Swedish slave 
traders in the colony. Beginning in 1791, they regularly engaged the board of 
directors into partnering in prospective slave trade ventures. Röhl and 
Hansen specifically pointed towards the revolutionary unrest in Martinique 
and other French colonies as a rare opportunity to seize upon. In the wake of 
the disturbances, thousands of enslaved Africans had been slaughtered, and 
while the French authorities were seemingly reclaiming the prior stability in 
their colonies, Röhl and Hansen suggested that importing new slave 
replacements into the French colonies would be especially well timed. They 
also anticipated the consequences of a possible British abolition of the trade, 
which in their mind could only favor future Swedish projects.8 
While awaiting a response from the board, they proceeded with plans of 
an expedition of their own. They purchased a ship of 200 tons in St. Eustatius, 
                                                          
7 Söderström to unknown, 8 August 1784, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 9, SNA; Hildebrand, Den 
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the Zombie, and brought it to St. Barthélemy where it was rebuilt and refitted 
for the requirements of the slave trade. A crew of 14 was also recruited, 
commanded by an experienced English captain. They planned for the vessel 
to sail for the coast of Guinea, the Gabon River as well as Cape Lopez before 
a return voyage. They calculated a minimum requirement of 150 slaves to turn 
a sound profit. Despite frequent lobbying in their regular correspondence 
with the company, the board of directors positively declined any participation 
in the project, which Röhl and Hansen acknowledged in an April letter in 
1793.9 
By that time, the Zombie had long since departed for the coast in the 
autumn of 1792. The expedition would turn out a disaster for everyone 
involved. The ship lingered on the African coast for well over two years, 
during which time ship and crew endured storms, weathered mutinies and 
African resistance, until it was finally driven ashore in the vicinity of Cape 
Coast Castle. The ship’s remaining cargo of 100 “bad conditioned slaves” and 
some ivory was reportedly seized and sold by the British.10 
Despite its outcome, the Zombie expedition became the starting point of a 
long career in slave trading for both partners in the firm. After the Swedish 
West India Company decided to sever its ties with Röhl and Hansen in 1795, 
Röhl travelled to Stockholm and never returned to the colony. Hansen stayed 
on the island as head of the firm, while Röhl operated as a factor in 
Stockholm, where he would occasionally provide the firm’s ships with 
Algerian passports and additional documents needed for longer and more 
ambitious voyages. They were in all likelihood the only business house on St. 
Barthélemy capable of doing so. Their successor as agent for the Swedish 
West India Company, Gustaf Wernberg, became an associate of Röhl & 
Hansen in 1795 after having had his own disagreements with the company. 
Gustaf Wernberg had also caught wind of the lucrative prospects of the slave 
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trade. According to a manifest issued in January 1797, he had dispatched the 
schooner Anna Maria to Cuba with 64 “Guinea Negroes”.11 
Hansen and Wernberg were joint owners of the brig Stockholm, which had 
made an earlier trip to Cuba in 1795 with a smaller cargo of 45 African captives. 
Its captain was a Gustavia resident named Ferdinand Deurer, the same person 
which would helm Wernberg’s Anna Maria as supercargo in 1797. The 
Stockholm also made an expedition to the coast of Guinea in 1798. It nearly 
met a similar fate as the Zombie, as an onboard epidemic deprived the crew of 
both captain and supercargo for its homeward journey. It however safely 
reached St. Barthélemy with 57 African captives in 1799. Wernberg himself 
perished in Dover during a journey from the West Indies in 1799, in all 
likelihood from some form of illness. Whether he accompanied the 
aforementioned voyage is unknown.12 
The Stockholm was one of several ships mentioned in an administrative 
controversy surrounding the issuance of Swedish passports in St. Barthélemy. 
The issue concerned the right of the island council to convey ship documents 
to Swedish vessels above 20 lasts. The company and its agents accused the 
council of handing around passports with a liberal hand towards the close of 
the century. The exasperated judge faced the accusations with the rebuttal 
that the issuance of the passport to Stockholm a couple of years prior had been 
just as blatant a violation of this rule as the ones now brought to light. In that 
case however, not a single company agent or clerk had however raised any 
objections. The reason that the vessel had been registered in apparent 
violation of regulation was that the SWIC director Rejmers had been one of 
the consignors of the cargo. The slave trade proposals of Röhl and Hansen 
had ostensibly not been lost on Rejmers, as opposed to the other directors. 
The matter of the registration was passed, as judge simply concluded that the 
captives could hardly have been shipped to Havana in smaller boats.13 
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While there is little direct evidence that Röhl & Hansen organized further 
slaving voyages of their own, it is evident that the firm stayed in the business 
for a long time, and possibly through different forms of participation other 
than independent organization. In February 1808, the Charleston-registered 
U.S. ship Farnham arrived at St. Barthélemy with 319 Africans, consigned to 
Röhl & Hansen. The firm also seem to have been consignees and agents for 
the Spanish-flagged ship San Francisco de Asis, lying at anchor in Gustavia in 
January 1810 loaded with 142 captives and 500 pounds of ivory. The ship 
Rebecca without any stated nationality was also tied to the firm, likewise 
anchored in Gustavia in December 1810, with 193 slaves. Possibly the Rebecca 
is the same Swedish-flagged ship which is recorded as having made two 
landings in Havana, one in October 1809 with a cargo of 84, and one in March 
1810 with 80. The owner of the Rebecca was a Havana merchant named 
Clemente di Ichazo. If it indeed was the same ship, it would strongly suggest 
that Ichazo would have consigned several cargoes to Röhl & Hansen during a 
prolonged period of time.14 
Röhl & Hansen were at any rate capable of handling a limited traffic of 
slaves to St. Barthélemy either on their own account or for foreign 
correspondents. Hansen himself lived until his death in 1844 in St. 
Barthélemy, and owned a sizeable waterfront property in Gustavia, on which 
he had built a gaol or “slave-shop” for storing captives until the time of sale or 
re-shipment (see Figure 3.1). A building which could have been identical to 
this one was known, according to popular tradition, as la maison d’esclaves until 
its destruction in the early 20th century. It is evident that captive Africans 
languished in storage either onboard ships or in shoreside detainment, as 
sundry lists show that “newly arrived African negroes” perished while in 
  
                                                          
14 The Farnham recorded in TAST, no. 25513; Minutes of the council, 24 February 1808, PJ 154, 
FSB, ANOM; Lloyd’s Lists, 26 April 1808; Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave 
Trade to America (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1930), IV: 525; San Francisco 
de Asis is not recorded in TAST; Minutes of the council, 17 January 1810, PJ 160, FSB, ANOM; 
Rebecca is not recorded in TAST, but 2 entries are included in Klein’s Cuban dataset based on the 
AGI, with Clemente de Ichazo as the stated owner. 
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 Gustavia. In 1808 26 African captives died, while 28 died in 1811. These may 
well have been slaves belonging to Röhl & Hansen and other town merchants, 
and were in port awaiting further transshipment.15 
The records further suggest that Röhl & Hansen made a niche for 
themselves by smuggling their human cargo into British colonies after the 
abolition in 1807. According to informants in Nevis, “A gentleman named 
Hanson of St. Bartholomews” was rumored to have supplied them to St. Kitts 
for reshipment to other British islands, having at one time “imported there 
two hundred and sixty Africans at once, and three hundred at another time,” 
according to British informants, as per their account before the justice of the 
peace in Nevis, written down in 1815.16 
A Swedish traveler visiting the island in 1888 claimed to have then seen 
Hansen’s remaining books and letters, among which he found a general 
ledger. In it he could find occasional years with a turnover of over 500,000 
Spanish dollars, a great deal of which would have been earned through the 
slaving business, he maintained. Through his marriage with a rich Statian 
heiress of the Benners family, Hansen inherited sugar plantations which also 
made him the largest known Swedish owner of slaves. Even if it can be said 
with definite certainty that Röhl and Hansen’s business was the most 
significant of Swedish ambitions in the slave trade and slavery, its extent and 
nature remains inexact.17  
An Ambiguous Path to Abolition 
While individual Gustavia burghers continued to engage in the slave trade 
well into the 19th century, the legal status of the trade on Swedish keels quickly 
assumed an ambiguous character. The case of Röhl & Hansen’s Zombie is 
illuminating again in this regard. Röhl & Hansen had applied for an Algerian 
                                                          
15 Real estate property of Röhl & Hansen in Matrice Cadastrale Suédoise, Hôtel de la Collectivité 
de Saint-Barthélemy; lots no. 84, 85, 87, fo. 11; Aggregate list of deaths in Gustavia 1808–13, SBS 
28, SNA. 
16 Deposition of Richard Brodbelt and James Stanley Waiter, 15 April 1815, Lamborn-samlingen, 
vol. 110, SNA, The original is found in CO 239/2, TNA. 
17 Goës, “Minnen,” 156. 
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passport and toll exemptions for the ship from the Swedish Board of 
Commerce. The Board turned down the request, and the Zombie was left to 
sail to the coast without privileges and protection afforded to other Swedish 
ships.  
This was not altogether unusual, as the Board infrequently issued passports 
and exemptions for foreign-built hulls such as the Zombie. But the most 
striking feature of the Board’s response was its explicit statement against the 
voyage’s stated destination for “the slave-trade, so detested by all enlightened 
nations”. This rejection has been interpreted as a significant turning point in 
Swedish perceptions of the slave trade. According to this reasoning, Swedish 
government officials had started paying attention to the British debate and 
the movement against the slave trade. Additionally, officials reasoned 
towards an abolitionist stance with a view to protect the young king, the 
largest shareholder in the West India Company, from foreign scrutiny. There 
are however other facts to consider in the Zombie rejection, most importantly 
the vested interests present in the Board of Commerce. Apart from the 
SWIC directors’ prior grievances with Röhl and Hansen as company agents, 
they had never taken any favor with the firm’s slaving project, likely in part 
because they saw such an independent effort as unwanted competition. Both 
the company directors – some of which had seats on the Board of Commerce 
– as well as the Stockholm trade society were consulted in the matter of the 
Zombie passport with negative answers as a result. Non-shareholders were 
engaging in a branch of trade that was viewed as company territory, after all. 
Still, the international climate in the question of the slave trade should not 
be discounted. Gustav III had indeed been approached by the British 
Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade on the matters of slavery and 
the slave trade as early as 1790. In a letter to the Swedish king, the committee 
entreated Sweden to take the lead in abolishing the slave trade, to which 
Gustav responded with his belief that no Swedish subject had embarked in 
this branch of trade, and that he would “do all he could” to keep it so. A 
peculiar argument developed in the Swedish diplomacy on abolition, namely 
that the slave trade had never been permitted to Swedish subjects. Swedish 
attitudes towards slavery and the slave trade is however a separate subject that 
warrants further research. What is important here is that the slave trade 
through St. Barthélemy continued with varied forms of domestic support – or 
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non-intervention, at the very least – until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It 
would take a decade and a half more until Sweden explicitly forbid its practice 
with effective laws.18 
Swedish slave-ships instead steadily ran into limitations set by other 
national legislatures. This was the case with the merchant house of 
Vaucrosson & Son of St. Barthélemy, which financed at least two slaving 
expeditions, in 1797 and 1798. Their career in the slave trade was possibly cut 
short by legal exigencies in the United States. They sailed their Swedish-
flagged brigantine La Neutralité under the command of Daniel Campbell to 
New York in 1796. While in port, the brigantine was refitted for the 
particular needs of the slave trade. The ship’s reconstruction attracted the 
attention of a few local Quaker abolitionists, who in March of 1797 decided 
to notify the New York customs collectors about the matter. The ship’s 
captain was promptly apprehended by port authorities. The brigantine fell 
under a section of the late Slave Trade Act of 22 April 1794, which prohibited 
foreign ships from equipping or loading a cargo intended for the slave trade 
on U.S. soil. The ship was cleared from port, but only after the captain signed 
a 10,000$ bond declaring that the ship would not take part in the slave 
trade.19 
After the rebuilt Neutrality had returned to St. Barthélemy in late April, 
the Vaucrossons and the Governor of St. Barthélemy both tried their hand at 
getting the bond revoked. The Vaucrossons attempted to deny the suspicions 
altogether, and claimed that while the ship was indeed headed for Africa, it 
was intended for a purchase of ivory, not the slave trade. The Vaucrossons 
even sent one of their agents to New York to make inquiries and demand 
redress, but without any success.20 
                                                          
18 Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 224–25; The undated letter of the Committee to Gustav III, 
signed by Granville Sharp, in F420, XI, UUB, also printed in Appendix to the New Jerusalem 
Magazine, 1791,  294–96; Gustav III’s reply summarized in Thomas Clarkson, The History of the 
Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the Slave-Trade by the British Parliament 
(London: Taylor, 1808), I: 565–66. 
19 Affidavit of Isaac Hicks, 8 March 1797, Hicks to Rogers, 5 May 1797, RG 59, M664, NARA, 
fos. 113, 128–29. 
20 Minutes of the St. Barthélemy council, 14 September 1797, PJ 142, FSB, ANOM; Sands to 
Wolcott, 11 May 1797, M664, RG 59, NARA. 
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The Swedish Governor adopted a different approach and wrote directly to 
president Adams. He appealed to the mutual rights guaranteed by the U.S.-
Swedish Trade Treaty of 1783. He never tried to contest the fact that the ship 
was fitting out for the slave trade. Instead, he claimed to admire “the motives, 
and the principles of benevolence and humanity” behind the U.S. Slave Trade 
Act, but that he was also “astonished and frightened” of the “monstrous 
consequences” it laid bare on foreign nations trading with the U.S. He 
stressed the mutual benefits inherent in the relationship between neutral 
powers generally, and between American merchants and St. Barthélemy 
specifically, guaranteed by the late Treaty. He entreated the president to get 
the case reviewed by a duly qualified court. The matter transpired quietly 
after the U.S. Treasury Department compiled all the pertinent 
documentation on the case for review before the U.S. Attorney General. His 
opinion was that the Slave Trade Act of 1794 in no way conflicted with the 
Treaty of 1783. The bond had been issued according to prevailing practice and 
was by no means unlawful. No further complaints were put forward from St. 
Barthélemy.21 
More serious legal challenges against the Swedish slave trade would 
eventually come from the British government, as a consequence of its 
ambitions to negotiate the abolition of the slave trade with other nations after 
1807. The first result of British ambitions were addressed in a separate article 
of the 1813 treaty which formally ceded Guadeloupe to Sweden. The 4th point 
of the separate article stated that Sweden was to “forbid and prohibit” the 
slave trade into Guadeloupe and “the other possessions in the West Indies of 
His Swedish Majesty.” The cession was nevertheless annulled, and 
Guadeloupe was returned to France in 1814. Great Britain instead payed an 
indemnification to the Swedish crown in lieu of a colony. The existence of the 
treaty has erroneously made 1813 the common year of reference for when 
Sweden abolished the slave trade. The real consequences of the treaty were 
                                                          
21 af Trolle to John Adams, 18 April 1797, af Trolle’s official protest, 18 April 1797, Lee to Wolcott, 
29 April 1797, Wolcott to Söderström, 1 May 1797, M664, RG 59, NARA, fos. 102–12, 121–23; 
Instead, the owners simply renamed the ship after which it departed for the West African coast 
as intended. In October 1797 a Swedish brigantine by the name of Neptune under the command 
of Daniel Campbell arrived in Havana with 98 slaves. Campbell and the Neptune made at least one 
more expedition, disembarking a larger cargo of 185 slaves in Havana in February 1798. Whether 
the Vaucrossons organized even more voyages to the African coast is unclear. 
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however unclear for a long time afterwards. The Swedish council of St. 
Barthélemy encountered many cases of slave trade after 1813 which it had 
serious difficulties in treating consistently.22 
The impetus behind British diplomacy in the matter did not merely spring 
out of mere conjecture. Considering the limited extent of the Swedish slave 
trade, The British government was quite well informed. Governor Elliot of St. 
Christopher wrote to Whitehall in 1811 that he was concerned over the fact 
that “several Individuals in the Island of St. Bartholomew take a considerable 
share in the Portuguese and Spanish Slave Trade”. The British High Court of 
Admiralty reviewed the case for the Swedish schooner Diana following a 
seizure and condemnation by the Vice-Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone a few 
years prior to the 1813 treaty. The Sierra Leone court had suspected 
Portuguese or American slavers hiding behind Swedish colors, but it also 
addressed the question if Sweden sanctioned the slave trade at all. One of the 
most important arguments for its condemnation was that the slave trade had 
been abolished “by most civilized nations,” and was not “at the present time 
legally authorized by any.” The High Court of Admiralty saw fit to reverse the 
initial judgment, as it could not sustain the Vice Admiralty court’s blanket 
claims. No evidence could simply be found that the Swedish crown had 
abolished the slave trade. The court made a passing reference to the late 
treaty, which had been signed as late as the 3rd of March 1813, two months 
prior to the aforementioned reversal in the High Court of Admiralty.23 
The Swedish Governor of St. Barthélemy was also at a loss for answers 
when a French slaver put into Gustavia with around 100 African captives in 
1814. The ship had first touched at British-occupied Guadeloupe, where the 
British governor had turned it away but advised the captain to go to St. 
Barthélemy instead. The Swedish Governor, while unsure of how to respond 
to the unexpected arrival, still granted the captain the right to either sell his 
                                                          
22 Minutes of the Committee graciously appointed for matters relating to the island of 
Guadeloupe, 27 September 1813, Pommerska expeditionen och kolonialdepartementet , AI:3, 
SNA. 
23 Elliot to Lord Liverpool, 3 September 1811, CO 152/98, TNA; Lamborn-samlingen, vol. 107, 
SNA; The Diana, TAST i.d. 7548; John Dodson, Reports of cases argued in the High Court of 
Admiralty, commencing with the judgments of the Right Hon. Sir William Scott, Trinity Term, 1811, ed. 
George Minot (Boston, 1853), 1: 95–103; The ship was indeed the property of Swedish burghers in 
Gustavia, see minutes of the council, 6 & 26 October 1812 PJ 165, FSB, ANOM, 450–55, 530–32. 
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cargo or prepare the slaves for transshipment. Since no explicit declaration of 
abolition had come to his notice, he decided not to turn the ship away. The 
Governor turned to the Court chancellor for instructions in the event of 
future instances, and the chancellor’s response marks an important while 
inconclusive turn in the question. The chancellor notified the governor about 
the late treaty with Britain and its concerns with the slave trade. While he 
confessed that the treaty did not explicitly cover the specifics of the case in 
question, he nevertheless strongly urged the governor to take a more cautious 
course in the future. He made specific mention of the ongoing debates on the 
slave trade during the Congress of Vienna, and the determination behind 
British ambitions in the question. Even if the 1813 treaty and its separate 
articles could be considered null and void, it was anticipated that this 
document had only been a preliminary to future negotiations on the matter.24 
In 1819, the Governor of St. Barthélemy was furnished with more precise 
instructions regarding the slave trade, where it was importantly stressed that 
no admission of foreign slave ships would be tolerated: 
Si dans d’autres isles voisines le trafic des Negres se fait encore, malgre les 
engagemens contraires, qui ont ete generalement adoptes, le Roi vous 
enjoint d’autant plus severe a empecher ce commerce honteux a St. 
Barthélemy.25 
However, there were at least three principal problems facing Swedish 
administrators attempting to prohibit the foreign slave trade through 
St.Barthélemy. One was the sale of captured slave cargoes by South American 
insurgent privateers and the other was the illegal slave trade practiced by 
neighboring colonists, primarily the Frenchmen of Guadeloupe. Both found 
their way into St. Barthélemy by exploiting its neutral character and 
commercial demands. Illegal sale of slaves were conducted on the islet of 
                                                          
24 Stackelberg to Wetterstedt, 26 December 1814, SBS 3A, SNA; Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 2 
April 1815, C 258, FSB, ANOM, 53–55; Stackelberg to Wetterstedt, 3 July 1815, SBS 3B, SNA; This 
was also the case with treaties made with Portugal and Denmark during the same period, see 
Jerome Reich, “The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna – A Study in English Public Opinion,” 
The Journal of Negro History 53, no. 2 (1968): 129–143. 
25 Wetterstedt to Berghult, 6 February 1819, C 258, FSB, ANOM. A copy is found in Pommerska 
expeditionen och kolonialdepartementet, AI:6, SNA.  
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Fourchue to the northwest of St. Barthélemy, with or without the aid of 
Gustavia burghers.26 
In 1821 one such incident at Fourchue brought to light the problems facing 
the Swedish government of St. Barthélemy. An American brig carrying 380 
captives was captured by insurgents and brought to the small islet where the 
cargo was sold to the naturalized Swedes Bigwood & Debouille, who 
transshipped them on their own accord, likely to Puerto Rico or Guadeloupe. 
There were numerous similar cases where Swedish St. Barthélemy subjects 
were implicated.  
The second problem was the resurgence of the slave trade within the 
French colonies after the war, particularly Guadeloupe. French slave traders 
maintained a steady traffic to their colonies as well as foreign markets such as 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. For their purposes, St. Barthélemy assumed the 
character of a subterfuge for illegal activities. Swedish documents were 
procured for illegal vessels, crews were recruited from St. Barthélemy, and 
equipment, iron and gunpowder for the coastal trade was purchased in 
Gustavia, as was frequently also the case at Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas.27 
The third problem and the crux of the Swedish position was the slave 
trade’s profitability in a time of post-war economic slump. Administrators 
were reluctant to turn away at least the most indirect and discreet instances 
in view of its commercial importance for the colony. Governors and senior 
members of the administration were accused of having a hand in or at the very 
least turning a blind eye to the most blatant infractions of international 
treaties. Governor Norderling had initially held a firm line with slave 
smugglers who exploited the islet of Fourchue and indeed captured or chased 
away a few ships during the early years of his period. He however soon caved 
in to the realities of the illicit slave trade. He soon noticed that the ailing 
economy of Gustavia in the post-war years quickly showed signs of 
rejuvenation if only slave ships and privateers were given leeway. He admitted 
as much himself in his official reports to Stockholm. Many French slavers that 
regrouped in Gustavia during or after a sale often came to his notice. He 
                                                          
26 Per Tingbrand, “Femöarne,” 136–62. 
27 Josette Fallope, “Négriers de la Guadeloupe sur la côte africaine au début du XIXe siècle,” in 
L’Afrique entre L’Europe et l’Amerique. Le rôle de l’Afrique dans la rencontre de deux mondes, ed. Elikia 
M’Bokolo (Mayenne: UNESCO, 1995), 103–18. 
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however justified their presence with the fact that the burghers of Gustavia 
were “such smugglers of sugar and coffee of Guadeloupe and Martinique”, 
that it would be the “height of ingratitude” to denounce or subvert their 
affairs. Good relations needed to be retained with the French colonies in 
order for St. Barthélemy to retain some of its lost commercial vivacity. It is 
however uncertain whether he himself or other Swedish officials profited 
from this state of affairs, as per Harrison’s reports and others.28 
The Swedish government’s ambiguous relation to the insurgents was also a 
cause of recurring difficulties. Norderling had been firmly instructed not to 
pursue or prosecute individual slavers or privateers to firmly so as to injure 
prospective commercial relations with them. The Swedish government’s view 
– especially that of Charles XIV – was that commercial ties with South 
America’s rebels was to be carefully encouraged and cultivated, so long as it 
did not put any unnecessary stress on diplomatic relations with Spain or its 
allies.29 
While the Swedish administration of St. Barthélemy continued its 
pragmatic policy towards foreign slave traders, it clamped down on the slave 
trade under Swedish flags to a higher degree. An 1824 treaty with Britain 
marked a new commitment from the Swedish side in the question of the 
international slave trade. The treaty was the first to unequivocally proclaim 
the complete abolition of the Swedish slave trade and established the right of 
search for Swedish and Norwegian vessels suspected of trading in slaves, as 
the two kingdoms were joined since 1814. When the treaty was made public 
in St. Barthélemy, the Governor was however faced with an obstinate council. 
Two members of the council were concerned with the consequences of 
individual slave sales between households. A third council member, Gerhard 
Röhl, a relative of Jacob Röhl and associate of the Röhl & Hansen firm, footed 
                                                          
28 Norderling’s report, 15 October 1819, SBS 6A, SNA. “ [...] Sire nous sommes ici de si grands 
contrebandiers en Sucre, Café e& de la Guadeloupe et Martinique, et nous avons un si grand 
bésoin de l’indulgence des Gouverneurs de ces Isles, qu’à peine osons nous penser à leurs péchés, 
encore moins les dénoncer, ce serait de notre part le comble d’ingratitude.” 
29 Norderling’s instruction, 29 April 1819, C 256, FSB, ANOM. A copy is found in Pommerska 
expeditionen och kolonialdepartementet, BII:3, SNA. An excerpt read as follows : “Quant aux 
batimens Negrieres ou aux prises faites sur les Nations Espagnoles et Portugaises, elles ne 
pourront ni être recues, ni vendues à St. Barthélemy; mais pour des effets, parvenus légalement 
dans la possession d'un tiers, encore que provenant d'une capture, aucune poursuite, de la part du 
Gouvernement, ne pourra avoir lieu.” 
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more categorical objections against the treaty. As an interesting precondition 
to the discussion in the council, Sweden and Norway were united under the 
same crown, and as a result the Danish-Norwegian text of the 1792 abolition 
was fully included in the 1824 treaty between Sweden and Britain. Röhl pithily 
objected that it was widely known that the 1792 decision had never been 
executed in St. Thomas, and ascertained that no changes should be made in 
prevailing practice. The treaty’s stipulations were nevertheless upheld with 
only a few concessions in the final proclamation to allow for the sale and 
purchase of slaves for household needs.30 
The increasingly firm stance shows in the sudden break of the fairly 
constant trickle of Swedish-flagged slaving voyages until 1814. That year the 
last legally registered Swedish slave ship, Pilot, owned by the merchant house 
of Elbers & Krafft, departed from St. Barthélemy for the West African Coast. 
In 1820 the last known Swedish-flagged slave ship entry in Havana was 
recorded. Even as the official slave trade withered out, the record is marred 
with reports of illicit departures and violations of port regulations. Governor 
Norderling estimated in 1825 that “dozens” of Swedish ships had illicitly left 
for the slave trade on the Coast of Africa, all the while with false destinations 
and forged documents. There were similar observations being made by British 
naval officers, ones who disdained the “false notion of encouraging trade” 
among the Dutch, Danish, and Swedish Governments by instructing “their 
Authorities in the West Indies not to be too strict.” Facilities to acquire 
documents of different national origins and thus ostensibly acquire several 
national characters were readily available for the illegal slave traders. Frequent 
                                                          
30 The right of search was included but Sweden opted out of seating a representative at the mixed 
court in Sierra Leone. Instead the council of St. Barthélemy was vested with the powers of the 
projected ‘mixed court’, see Bloomfield to Canning, 11 March, 8 April, 29 April, 27 August, 11 
November 1824, in Memoirs of Benjamin Lord Bloomfield, ed. Georgiana Bloomfield (London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1884), I: 102–03, 116–18, 137–38, 234, 258–60; Minutes of the council, 22 February 
& 14 March 1828, SBS 10A, SNA. Drafts of the minutes are also found in PJ 160, FSB, ANOM. 
Röhl’s claim was well grounded in some aspects, insofar as the Danish slave trade via St. Thomas 
was perpetuated well beyond 1802 contrary to the stipulations of the 1792 decision. See Green-
Pedersen, “Colonial Trade,” 110–11.  
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reports and rumors in fact led to the long-held British belief that the slave 
trade was secretly being protected at St. Barthélemy.31 
In 1830 Sweden however reinforced its earlier commitment to abolition by 
instituting a penal law against the slave trade. The death sentence was 
reserved for the gravest offenders, whereas the pertained ship and cargo were 
to be forfeited to the crown. The same year a trial on St. Barthélemy delivered 
a guilty verdict for the ship Gotland, due to have been commissioned to the 
African coast by the Gustavia burgher Samuel Vaughan. The ship and cargo 
was seized and sold to the benefit of the crown, whereas the owner and crew 
were spared any corporeal punishment. It was the last Swedish-flagged slave 
ship on record to have attempted a transatlantic slave trade expedition from 
St Barthélemy.32  
Even so, spurious accounts continued of foreign slave ships that exploited 
Gustavia as a port of convenience continued well into the 1830s, and would 
only cease when the abolitionist efforts of other nations, particularly France, 
became effective enough to suppress the illegal smugglers of human captives. 
The Swedish abolition of the slave trade was thus not enforced – as it is often 
claimed – from the beginning of 1813, but rather was instituted piecemeal over 
the course of several decades, whereas the relation to the foreign illegal slave 
trade was never properly negotiated or formulated. Gustavia was thus a 
comparatively safe asylum for the illegal slave trade that slowly waned during 
the course of the 19th century, and its burghers took active part in many parts 
of its organization, recruitment, as well as in its supporting and associated 
trades and commodity chains.33 
                                                          
31 Pilot is recorded in Klein’s Havana dataset as an arrival with 61 slaves at the Havana in February 
1815. The ship is however not recorded in TAST. The Pilot’s Muster roll dated 17 December 1814, 
in AM 265, FSB, ANOM; The Swedish vessel that landed in Havana in 1820 was a vessel named 
Maria, TAST i.d. 112.; Norderling’s report, 11 May 1825, SBS 9A, SNA; Bloomfield to Canning, 22 
February 1833, Memoirs of Lord Bloomfield, II: 296–97. 
32 Kongl. Maj:ts Nådiga Förordning, angående answar för Negerhandel och delaktighet deruti, 7 
January 1830, in Swensk Författnings-Samling, no. 33 (Stockholm, 1830): 325–28; Regarding the 
Gotland, see Haasum’s report, 4 September 1830, SBS 10B, SNA. 
33 There is one other reported Swedish slave ship, the Victorina or Victoria, said to have cleared 
out from Havana for the coast in November 1837, but there is little else known about this ship 
and her ownership. See HM:s Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 30 November & 2o 
December, 1837, in Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, Rio de 
Janeiro and Surinam, relating to Slave Trade, 1837 (London, 1838); For the case of the Gotland, see 
Minutes of the council, 4 September 1830, SBS 10B, SNA. 
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3.2 An Assessment of the Gustavia Slave Trade 
Any quantitative investigation of the Swedish involvement in the slave trade 
during the 18–19th century must start with the CLASH catalogue, or as it is 
titled, the “Répertoire” de la traite négriére: Saint-Barthélemy (Suéde). With a 
special focus the colony of St. Barthélemy, it is the most detailed single 
collection of references to the Swedish slave trade available. It is hosted 
online among a vast range of miscellanea pertaining to the history of St. 
Barthélemy, collected and published by Richard Ledée, a St. Barthélemy 
resident and amateur historian.34 
While the CLASH catalogue has been described as a slave trade database 
in scholarly productions and used as such, it is not a database in the strictest 
sense of the word. More precisely, it is a catalogue of all manner of references 
to slave trade having been perpetrated with any kind of affiliation with St. 
Barthélemy or the Swedish flag. There are aspects about the Répertoire which 
make it problematic and which have further misconstrued the picture of the 
Swedish slave trade through St. Barthélemy. Whatever its relative demerits, 
the catalogue is the essential foundation of this section, without which such 
an investigation would be impossible. There are conceptual problems with 
operationalizing Swedish slave trade in the catalogue that are serious enough 
that I have chosen to omit 25 dubious entries in the CLASH catalogue. 
Additionally, 10 slaving voyages not included in the catalogue have been 
added, following empirical studies of unexploited archival records.35 
The quantitative assessment presented in this section also incorporates a 
wide range of data from different primary sources as well as databases and 
digital repositories, in order to build a dataset with the expressed goal of 
surveying the total extent of the slave trade through St. Barthélemy. The 
                                                          
34 CLASH is short for Le Comité de Liaison et d’Application des Sources Historiques. 
http://www.memoirestbarth.com/st-barts/traite-negriere/pdf/repertoire-traite-negriere-saint-
barthelemy-suede.pdf, date accessed 18 June 2015. It does not incorporate the 17th-century slave 
trade of Swedish Cabo Corso. While the material varies on the website varies, Ledée has taken a 
special interest in how the slave trade and slavery has affected the history of the island. The last 
update of the slave trade catalogue was on June 15, 2011. An earlier version of the catalogue is used 
in Weiss, “Danskar och svenskar,” 60–62.  
35 See appendices IX and X for details. 
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CLASH catalogue also builds upon these. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
Database (TAST) and Herbert Klein’s dataset on the importation of slaves 
into Cuba 1790–1820 are two other essential components. The TAST is 
however somewhat difficult in this particular context as it is belied with some 
problems regarding the study of Swedish ships, as Swedish-flagged voyages are 
covered under the umbrella category of ‘Danish/Baltic’ ships. Also, it is not 
always possible to ascertain a particular ship’s connection to St. Barthélemy 
through the database. Coverage of all pertinent slaving voyages is also lacking. 
Some of its omissions are hard to understand, as one of the many components 
of TAST is the Klein dataset, which in turn includes these. Some of the 
relevant entries on Swedish slave ships in Klein’s dataset are not included in 
TAST presumably because the TAST does not include smaller intra-
Caribbean voyages. However, slaving voyages that made the Atlantic passage 
under Swedish flags or with Swedish participation are omitted from TAST 
while still being a part of Klein’s older dataset.36 
In order to make a serious attempt to assess the Swedish slave trade 
through St. Barthélemy, there is need for an operationalization of what the 
Swedish slave trade was and what it was not. There is also a need to 
characterize the nature of foreign exploitation of Gustavia for the needs of 
the slave trade. To this end, 8 categories of slave trade organization and 
affiliation have been devised (Table 3.1), as well as 7 categories of different 
voyage outcomes (Table 3.2). The manifold varieties of slave trade through 
Gustavia across a large time-span - from the era of legal to illegal trading – as 
                                                          
36 The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (TAST), www.slavevoyages.org; Herbert S. Klein, 
“North American Competition and the Characteristics of the African Slave Trade to Cuba, 
1790–94,” The William & Mary Quarterly 28, no. 1 (1971): 86–102; Herbert S. Klein, “The Cuban 
Slave Trade in a Period of Transition, 1790–1843,” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer (1975): 67–
89; For Klein’s raw data and documentation, see the University of Wisconsin’s Data & 
Information Services Center’s copy: Herbert S. Klein, Slave Trade to Havana, Cuba, 1790–1820 
(accessed October 10, 2014). http://www.disc.wisc.edu/archive/slave/slave09_index.html. Klein’s 
dataset includes 16 relevant voyages not covered in TAST. Other notable data collections apart 
from TAST and Klein include James A. McMillin, The Final Victims: The Foreign Slave Trade 
to North America, 1783–1810 (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2004), Appendix B; 
Gregory E. O’Malley, Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619–1807 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Serge Daget, Répertoire des Expéditions 
Négriéres Françaises á la Traite Illegale 1814–1850 (Nantes: Centre de recherche sur l’histoire du 
monde atlantique, 1988); a few entries extracted from Michael Reidy, “Admission of Slaves and 
Prize Slaves into the Cape Colony, 1797–1818” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, 1997); and Jean Pierre Leglaunec, “A Directory of Slave Ships with Slave Cargoes, 
Louisiana, 1772–1808,” Louisiana History 46 (2005): 211–30. 
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well as the exigencies of national affiliation has necessitated this level of 
complexity and detail. 
Categories 1–4 can be termed as the framework within which Swedish slave 
trade proper can be identified, starting with Swedish St. Barthélemy-ships 
(Category 1) which were by all appearances organized, financed, registered, 
and deployed from St. Barthélemy by bona fide Swedish subjects. Cases that 
can be confirmed as Swedish-flagged slave ventures financed and realized by 
Swedes or naturalized Swedish Gustavia burghers fall under this category. 
While a case could be made for the inclusion of the runaway slaves and slave 
convicts sold by the island government on public auctions in Gustavia, these 
are however not included. Although it may also be termed as a form of 
Swedish slave trade, is it distinct from the organized commerce in human 
captives by sea that is the focus of this investigation. Category 2 simply 
includes Swedish-flagged voyages which suggest a departure and base in a 
Swedish port town in the Baltic, with little or unknown connections to the 
Swedish colony.  
Category 3 is more difficult to categorize, as it pertains to the legally 
ambiguous activity of coloring ships with ship documents of one or more 
national origins. An example of such an instance was the brig Regulator, for 
which the Gustavia inhabitant Samuel Parsons registered a Swedish sea pass 
on the 22nd September 1794, for a journey “to Surinam and the African coast 
and back here again.” The extant records tell us nothing about the subsequent 
fate of this supposedly Swedish-flagged slaving voyage, but a British brig 
named Regulator sailed from London in May 1795 towards Cape Coast Castle 
and Accra, and arrived in Barbados with a cargo of African captives in 
November the same year. There are some inconsistencies between the short 
record in the Swedish pass-registers and the information amassed about the 
Regulator in British sources, but it is however not unlikely that the two were 
the one and the same ship. If they were the same ship, the London owners 
could have procured Swedish ship documents through Parsons, a British 
colonist who had become a naturalized Swedish burgher. The documents 
could have fit any number of purposes, although a precaution against 
maritime predation was the most likely. It did not necessarily entail that the 
 165 
 
ship primarily flew Swedish colors, if at all. This is also a fact worth noting 
when reviewing the total numbers of exported slaves under each category.37 
Category 4 includes foreign slave ships with one or more bona fide Swedish 
subjects attached in some manner to the necessary commercial operations of 
the voyage. Gustavia merchants did not always freight slave ships of their own, 
but instead acted as agents and consignees of foreign-based slave traders. Such 
was the case with John Joseph Cremony, who was the agent for the large firm 
of Henry Clarke and George and Robert Tod & Co. of Liverpool. The firm 
had bought and fitted a ship of 270 tons, the Kitty’s Amelia, which made four 
African journeys between 1804 and 1808. For an 1805 expedition, the captain 
was instructed to dispose of the “Women & Male Negroes at St. Kitts for 
short Bills or Produce” after which he was to proceed with the remainder to 
St. Barthélemy, where Cremony was a possible contact. Cremony would then 
see to it that the remaining slaves could be dispatched to Havana, as he had 
assured the captain upon his return to the West Indies:38 
The Negroes continue in great demand to windward, and I think in Six 
weeks, or two months, I will be able to turn your Cargoe into Government 
Bills, or Cash, provided your Cargoe is good, & I have very little doubt of 
its being so – from the choice I have seen you make before. I will likewise 
engage to give you, either here or at St. Kitts, a full freight for your Ship. 
[…]39 
                                                          
37 The British brig Regulator recorded in TAST, no. 83301; Additional references to it in Adam 
Afzelius, Adam Afzelius Sierra Leone Journal 1795–1796, ed. Alexander Kup (Uppsala: Studia 
Ethnographica Upsaliensia, 1967), 32; Lloyd’s List 8 May, 4 August, 8 December 1795, 11 March 
1796; The pass-register notation for the Swedish brig Regulator in AM 265, ANOM, 75; Samuel 
Parsons listed as a Gustavia burgher in the St. Barthélemy census of 1796, SBS 28, SNA; see also 
Wernberg to SWIC, 10 August 1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA. 
38 The voyages of Kitty’s Amelia are recorded in TAST, nos. 82200–03; Correspondence and other 
records relating to Cremony’s connections with Liverpool slave traders in DX/170/1–9, Maritime 
Archives & Library, Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool; see also Charles R. Hand, “The 
Kitty’s Amelia, the last Liverpool slaver”, Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire and 
Cheshire, vol. 28 (1930), 70–73. 
39 Cremony to Nuttall, 13 August 1806, in Hand, “The Kitty’s Amelia,” 76. 
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Table 3.1 Categories of Slave Trade Organization and 
Affiliation 
 1 (Swedish St. Barthélemy-ships) Swedish-flagged voyage registered and 
organized by bona fide Swedish subjects stationed in St. Barthélemy. 
 2 (Swedish ships proper) Swedish-flagged voyage registered and 
organized by bona fide Swedish subjects, but with unclear or non-
existent connection to St. Barthélemy. 
 3 (Colored foreign ships) Swedish-flagged voyage registered and 
organized by foreign actors with the assistance of bona fide Swedish 
subjects in St. Barthélemy as agents and/or consignees. The ship may 
have possessed documents of registration etc. of foreign origin, i.e. a 
so-called colored voyage. 
 4 (Foreign ships with Swedish agents) Foreign-flagged voyage operating 
with the assistance of bona fide Swedish subjects in St. Barthélemy as 
agents and/or consignees. The ship may or may not have touched at or 
even disembarked slaves in St. Barthélemy during a leg of its voyage. 
 5  (Foreign ships) Foreign-flagged voyage with unclear or nonexistent 
connection to St. Barthélemy. The ship nevertheless touched at or 
even disembarked slaves at St. Barthélemy during its voyage. 
 6  (Foreign prize ships) Foreign-flagged voyage brought to St. 
Barthélemy by way of privateering activities. St. Barthélemy may have 
been either an accidental or pre-planned rendezvous point and/or 
slave market. Varying degrees of involvement and connivance by 
colony merchants and officials. 
 7 (Foreign proxy ships) Foreign-flagged voyage which merely used St. 
Barthélemy as a convenient port for armament, refitting, sale of ship, 
or crew recruitment. 
 8 (Illegally colored foreign ships) Foreign-flagged voyage with forged 
Swedish documents but no confirmed Swedish connections. 
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Table 3.2 Categories of Slaving Voyage Outcomes 
A Delivered slaves as per the original intent. 
B Captured and condemned, slaves sold before capture. 
C Captured and condemned, slaves sold or freed after capture. 
D Captured by South American insurgent privateers. 
E Original goal thwarted due to shipwreck, mutiny, or natural hazard. 
F Outcome unknown 
G Other 
 
Cremony and other Gustavia merchants like him took it upon themselves to 
liquidate the shipments of foreign-owned slaves into the final payoffs and 
profits. Some of the slaves were even likely sold on location in St. Barthélemy 
even if the confirming evidence for this is very much lacking in the records. 
While voyages such as these cannot be termed Swedish slave trade per se, it is 
nonetheless a very tangible form of Swedish participation in the slave trade. 
 Categories 5–8 on the other hand encompass different forms of slave 
trade, from planned to purely transactions incidentally finding their way 
through St. Barthélemy by necessity, brought on by either adverse weather, 
maritime predation, or damages to the vessel. In this category voyages such as 
that of the U.S. frigate La Feliz can be found. La Feliz made an Atlantic passage 
during 1788 and returned with 228 captives in Louisiana in October, but only 
after touching at St. Barthélemy, ostensibly for the convenience of a last stop 
before the final leg to the continent. Other ships in this category seem to have 
carried larger shipments of captives from the African coast and indeed sold 
them at St. Barthélemy, but this is inferred only by the fact that these ships 
do not turn up as having different destinations in other sources. To present 
knowledge, there are no detailed preserved records of slave sales out of the 
cargoes of transatlantic slavers, only a few instances where there exists witness 
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accounts of a slave cargo sales having been made. In those accounts, there are 
seldom any explicit or reliable numbers of slaves mentioned.40 
Category 6 comprises all known accounts of privateer-seized slaves either 
sold to Swedish subjects in St. Barthélemy or simply transshipped through 
Swedish territory, specifically within the conveniently uncontrolled waters of 
Ile Fourchue. Category 7 includes all foreign slave ships known to have 
employed St. Barthélemy in a number of indirect ways. It could concern 
partial purchases of the cargo intended for barter on the African coast, 
recruitment of mariners, as well as refurbishment and repairs of ships outside 
of their own national jurisdictions. Category 8 includes all ships known to 
have forged Swedish documents and were in no other way connected or 
affiliated with the legal or commercial frameworks of St. Barthélemy. 
Before a breakdown of the extent of different categories (Tables 3.3 and 
3.4), it should be noted that the known numbers and ships involved in the 
dataset are empirical findings, not calculations or extrapolations. The 
maximum recorded amount of slaves for a particular ship is thus included in 
the dataset. If the amount of slaves is not known, there is no figure added to 
the dataset. So, for ships that entered Gustavia with an un-enumerated cargo 
of “New Negroes from the Islands” as so often happened, only the ship itself 
is recorded. The same goes for information on destinations and ports of 
departure, if these are not known then they are marked as “unknown”. 
The complete amount slave ships included is 87 ships with a total of 7,370 
slaves. It should be noted that out of these 87 ships, there are only information 
on slaves for 61 of them. The hidden figure of slaves should however not be 
very large, as most of the ships without details on slave cargoes were smaller 
crafts involved in inter-island commerce in the West Indies. Out of the total 
figure of ships there are a few observations to be made. 37 ships (Categories 
1–2) made their expeditions under Swedish flags, the great majority of which 
were based in St. Barthélemy. Comparatively few foriegn ships made use of 
the Swedish colony (3–4) as a slave market or port of transshipment. The 
  
                                                          
40 The voyage of La Feliz is recorded in TAST, no. 41844; see also Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards, 
Planters, and Slaves: The Spanish Regulation in Louisiana, 1763–1803 (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 1999), 124, 286; Leglaunec, “A Directory of Ships,” 220; McMillin, The Final 
Victims, Appendix B. 
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Table 3.3 Slave Ships by Category 
 A B C D E F G Total 
1 28 - 1 - 1 2 1 33 
2 4 - - - - - - 4 
3 2 2 1 - - - - 5 
4 5 - - - - 1 2 8 
5 11 1 - - - 2 - 14 
6 - - 1 4 1 2 1 9 
7 1 1 3 - - 5 3 13 
8 - - 1 - - - - 1 
Total 47 4 7 4 2 12 7 87 
Table 3.4 Slaves by Category 
 A B C D E F G Total 
1 2,087 - 84 - 100 64 n/a 2,335 
2 434 - - - - - - 434 
3 66 312 107 - - - - 485 
4 971 - - - - 51 140 1,162 
5 1,023 35 - - - n/a - 1,058 
6 - - 207 380 n/a 330 152 1,069 
7 114 n/a 202 - - 511 - 827 
8 - - n/a - - - - n/a 
Total 4,695 347 600 380 100 956 292 7,370 
Figure 3.2 Slaves by Category, Chronology 1785–1839 
 
Source: Wilson dataset on the Swedish slave trade (2015). 
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relative weight in slave numbers that these ships had should however be 
noted. The eight ships in category 4 carried nearly half the amount of slaves 
as the 33 Swedish St. Barthélemy ships. This would indicate that the ships 
employed by Swedish slave traders were comparatively small and were 
employed mostly in a more limited inter-island trade, transshipping portions 
of captives from the coast that had arrived in larger ships. Indeed, there is 
reliable information of African landings for only a handful of Swedish ships. 
A comparative number of ships made use of St. Barthélemy as an 
intermediate stop between the African coast and their ultimate destinations 
(5), whereas a sizeable portion of slaves were illegally sold through St. 
Barthélemy and its outlying territories (6) by insurgent privateers in various 
modes of conduct. Illegal slavers (7), primarily French vessels from 
Guadeloupe, also made an appreciable impact on the total figures. These last 
categories constitute a collection of uncertainties as to their exact extent. 
Due to their clandestine and illegal nature, their extent will never be fully 
known, but is however very possible that their numbers could be quite larger. 
There is only one known vessel with forged Swedish papers (8), the Joseph, 
naturally because it was condemned in the mixed courts of Sierra Leone in 
1820 after having been captured and its papers confiscated. Judging by the 
number of suspicions and sundry reports to this effect, there were certainly 
several others which carried forged papers of Swedish and other nationalities, 
but none of these can be confirmed.41 
The majority of voyages in this database were completed successfully for 
the organizers, 47 ships carrying 4,695 captives reached their destinations 
without succumbing to the hazards of the weather, illness, maritime 
aggressions or the vigilance of anti-slaving cruisers. An even greater extent of 
the Swedish slave ships, 87 percent of the category 1 vessels, were completed 
successfully. There are however a large amount of slave ships and slaves whose 
ultimate fate are unknown (F), whereas the ships and slaves in the ‘other’ 
category (G), most often refer to ships which have been detained by various 
authorities but subsequently released. Their ultimate outcome after that are 
often obscure.    
                                                          
41 The Joseph recorded in TAST, no. 2329. 
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A chronological analysis (Figure 3.2) of the different categories illustrates 
a few further points. The growth and development of the slave trade in St. 
Barthélemy started in the 1790s and culminated in the final years of the war. 
The foreign share of the slave trade indeed seems to have been very marginal 
until the post-war era, and only increased again after the 1815 recession with 
the South American independence movements and the regular slaving 
activities of their privateers, as well as the French illegal slave traders. This is 
however an over-simplification, as foreign actors often had consignments or 
shares in Swedish vessels, as well as the fact that many Gustavia burghers were 
involved in and earned their livelihoods by participating in the illegal slave 
trade of neighboring colonies. The peak years for the trade however fell 
within the first ten years of the 19th century, before the following decades of 
the post-war illegal trade. The reason why this latter period (1830–39) contains 
no reliable data on the numbers of captives transported is precisely due to its 
illegal character. There are eight separate vessels which can be linked to St. 
Barthélemy but none of their associated documents contain reliable - if any - 
information on their cargoes. 
These data can be complemented with an overview of the overall trajectory 
of the trade (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). The overwhelming majority of the slave trade 
went to the Spanish Caribbean, primarily to Cuba, but a portion also went to 
Puerto Rico, as well as a few shipments to destinations on the Spanish Main. 
This fits rather well with the chronological development of the trade, which 
picked up in the early 1790 at precisely the time when Spanish colonies 
opened up their ports for the foreign importation of slaves. St. Barthélemy 
itself was the second largest recipient of slaves, but this figure likely does not 
reflect the true number of slaves that were finally sold and put to work in the 
Swedish colony. Most of these were most probably transshipped to 
neighboring colonies, Cuba, or other larger markets. That is not to say that a 
significant influx of slaves occurred in St. Barthélemy during the peak years of 
the trade. This can be best attested by the large growth of the urban slave 
population of population which grew more than sevenfold from the early 
years of the colony (242 slaves in 1787) until the later years of the war (1,818 
slaves in 1812). Some portion of this development must however also be 
attributed to the settlement of newly settled colonists who brought their 
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households and slaves with them in tow. It is however hard to make this 
distinction in concrete numbers due to the lack of precise sources. 
French colonies were unsurprisingly the third most frequented 
destination, attributable to the Swedish colony’s close ties to Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, and St. Martin, during the era of the legal as well as the illegal 
trade. British colonies and the North American seaports were on the other 
hand a relatively small piece of the overall trade, but these numbers could well 
may be adjusted upwards to the existence of an illegal trade after the 
respective abolitions of United States and Great Britain. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Swedish-flagged slave trade, 
either organized by Gustavia merchants, or colored foreign vessels, was small 
in scope and intensity when put into the wider context of transatlantic slave 
voyages during the period covered. In comparison with, for instance, the 
Danish slave trade organized through the free port of Charlotte Amalie on St. 
Thomas, which in many respects was very similar in character, it was of a 
minor scale. Between 1790 and 1807, there were 191 recorded landings of 
Danish slave ships in Havana, with a total of 12,341 captives. The 
corresponding Swedish numbers reach 20 recorded landings and 1,676 
captives, and this is in the period up until 1820. The slave trade was 
furthermore only a small piece of the much larger transit trade of Gustavia. 
 On the whole, however, one should note that there existed some impetus 
for foreign slave traders to make use of Swedish ships as a cover for their 
activities. This became especially prevalent towards the middle of the 19th 
century, when international treaties and laws were codified in an overarching 
ambition to end the transatlantic slave trade. Gustavia could and did offer the 
facilities for seekers of protection or extralegal opportunities. The important 
role of local agents as intermediaries in the trade makes it difficult to make a 
more precise estimate of the transportation of African captives which had any 
links to the Swedish colony. There may be yet a significant portion of the 19th 
century slave trade which can be traced to the activities of actors in St. 
Barthélemy. There are also some very concrete conceptual issues regarding 
what exactly constituted Swedish slave trade. These have been discussed at 
 175 
 
some length in this chapter, but the result has been that a majority of the slave 
trade covered can be attributed to important Swedish actors in the colony.42
                                                          
42 Note that these are only the Swedish-flagged imports of slaves into Havana recorded in Klein’s 
dataset. TAST does not record all of these arrivals. There were other shipments to Cuba from St. 
Barthélemy, but under other flags; For the Danish slave trade through St. Thomas, see Svend-
Erik Green-Pedersen, “The History of the Danish Negro Slave Trade, 1733–1807, An Interim 
Survey Relating In Particular to its Volume, Structure, Profitability, and Abolition,” Revue 
française d’histoire d’Outre-Mer, no. 65 (1975): 196–220; “Colonial Trade under the Danish Flag,” 99.  
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4 Gustavia and the Caribbean Transit 
Trade, 1793–1809 
4.1 A Growing Free Trade Outpost, 1793–1801 
This chapter is devoted principally to the investigation of the scope, volume, 
and intensity of the transit trade to and from Gustavia during from the 
outbreak of war in the early 1790s until 1820. The previous chapters have 
shown that Gustavia was subject to shifting developments from the time of 
its foundation. The complex regional developments during the closing decade 
of the eighteenth century were the sources of its increasing population and 
activity. But besides lending itself as a neutral sanctuary for a host of different 
settlers and political refugees alike, what role did it come to play in the 
economy in the region? After the abrogation of the Swedish West India 
Company’s charter in 1805, trans-Atlantic voyages to and from Sweden soon 
became virtually non-existent. Naturalized burghers were not allowed to fly 
the Swedish flag on European-bound voyages. Its future as a free port was 
ultimately dependent on its utility as a Caribbean marketplace in the 
following two decades of warfare, as well as on the independent shipping 
activities of its cohorts of naturalized merchants, traders and sailors. 
Calculating the commercial movements through Gustavia during the wars 
presents a wide range of difficulties. Yet, a useful starting point of reference 
for the overall development of trade in St. Barthélemy can be found in the 
Gustavia customs revenue records (Table 4.1.), which are available in 
aggregate figures from 1791 onwards. Although far from an ideal measurement 
of trade frequency to allow for many definitive conclusions, some inferences 
can be made about the ebbs and flows of the commercial life of Gustavia. The 
collected revenues consisted of importation and exportation duties, as well as 
a number of minor fees for pilotage, anchorage, weighing and gauging. 
Importation and exportation duties were subject to differential tariffs. The 
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primary logic behind differential duties was to safeguard the importation of 
essentials, i.e. provisions and building materials, as well as to favor the 
carrying trade under Swedish colors. In essence this meant that the 
importation of all goods that could be passable as “American” and “West 
Indian” coming from within the Americas were free of duty. This included 
the whole spectrum of staples produced in the colonies, to all kinds of 
American-produced provisions and livestock. Importation of lumber in any 
form was subject to a half percent duty, unless carried in Swedish bottoms, 
when no duty was necessary. The highest duties were on European goods and 
manufactures, which were as high as three percent when imported in foreign 
bottoms, two percent in Swedish. When European goods where imported 
from North America or the West India islands, the duties were slightly lower, 
two percent for foreign ships, one and half for Swedish ships.1  
These were very low duties, but they were intentionally so. The low duties 
were put in place in order to attract surrounding commerce in the region from 
the other principal free ports. But it also diverted a lot of potential revenues 
from the island coffers. Calculations of the value of vessel cargoes passing in 
and out of the harbor were made by the customs collector in 1799 for the 
preceding three years. In 1796, the starting year, the valuation of export and 
import cargoes landed at 1,007,161 Spanish dollars, while the total share of 
that value collected into the colonial chest was 6,270 Spanish dollars. The rate 
of the “rent” for the transit traffic in Gustavia in 1796 was only 6 promille. 
1797–99 displayed equal rates. Exploiting the transit traffic financially was one 
of the prime concerns for the council, and tariffs were subject to successive 
revisions in 1790, 1800, 1803, and 1804 to address annual fluctuations in prices 
and to improve gains, but these revisions have a very limited effect on how to 
review the overall development between these years. In conclusion, the high 
discrepancy in total value and collected duties raises a sound enough warning 
about using the revenues as a reflection of real commercial value entering and 
                                                          
1 The 1786 regulation in SBS 23, SNA; and Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 308–309; The 1790 
regulations in Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 310–311; His Royal Majesty’s letter to the Council 
of Gustavia, 12 March 1790, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 160, SNA; The Report of St. Bartholomew, July 
4, 1807; The 1800 regulation in The Report of St. Bartholomew, July 4, 1807; The 1803 regulation in 
The Report of St. Bartholomew, March 4, 1804; The 1804 regulation in Government Minutes, 
March 26, 1804 SBS 1 C, SNA; C.A. Wachtmeister et al to the Board of Directors of the SWIC, 
March 26, 1804, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 190; SNA; The Report of St. Bartholomew, September 26, 
1804. 
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leaving the free port of Gustavia, but they still offer some possibilities to 
discern some patterns if taken at face value.2 Judging by these patterns, there 
can be at least three distinctive time-periods in the economic history of the 
free port. The first, beginning in 1790 and ending in 1808, conveys a process 
of stable growth and consolidation, albeit small. From very modest 
beginnings, the last decade of the 18th century saw incremental annual revenue 
growth with a sudden expansion in early 1800 and 1801 before the British 
occupation. Recovery after the Peace of Amiens was brisk, as well as the fact 
that the beginning of the 19th century reached similar levels as before the stop 
of 1801. Revenues in 1806–08 on the other hand suggests that trade 
contracted considerably. 1809–15, the second period, was exceptional in 
contrast with the preceding years. 1809 saw a sudden and significant increase 
of commerce. While revenues during the preceding period averaged an annual 
sum of 15,611 Spanish dollars, 1809–15 averaged 86,840 Spanish dollars, an 
increase of 82 percent over a few years. 1815 marked the peak of this high tide 
of commerce, before a third period of marked decline started in 1816, trailing 
off to pre-1800 levels by the start of the 1820s. One can of course sense some 
of the underlying causes for the developments in these figures in the course 
of the political history enveloping the region, but it is worth taking a closer 
look at the commerce that made up the fortunes (and misfortunes, as will be 
argued as well) of the free port, which will be the emphasis of the following 
chapters. 
                                                          
2 “A Calculation of the Value Sums of Ships and Vessels Cargoes, which have been entered and 
Cleared at the Custom House of Gustavia Island of St. Bartholomew, since the beginning of the 
year 1796 until the Last Day of June this year 1799,” in PJ 143, FSB, ANOM. The document offers 
no basis for how the values were calculated, although it can be assumed with some certainty that 
they were based on the enumeration of cargoes in customs journals. The surviving excerpts of the 
1787 customs journals shows a fairly detailed and systematic record, which would surely have 
produced some good estimates if combined with accurate price information. Usual caveats 
involve the importation of dry goods and bullion, which were notoriously difficult for customs 
authorities to record, and the ever present possibility of frauds and misreporting of cargoes. It is 
not stated whether these considerations affected the estimates in any way. 
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The Outbreak of War in 1793 
A “circumstance of great novelty” in the words of some observers after the 
outbreak of war in 1793, was that the Caribbean Sea was covered with vessels 
bearing the colors of the neutral powers. The principal neutral carriers in the 
region were now the Americans, the Danes, and the Swedes. Especially the 
trade of the United States trade experienced a rapid expansion with different 
West Indian colonies. New opportunities for trade opened on the southern 
continents as the war progressively undermined the Spanish and Portuguese 
monopolies on trade with their American colonies. The trade of belligerents 
found a greater need for the carrying capacity under neutral flags than ever. 
The great concessions that American diplomacy and liberal trade advocates 
could not even have imagined during the peace, was now essentially ushered 
in overnight. Staunch protectionism gave way for a pragmatic policy of 
subsistence in many colonies. The French opened their ports in 1793, and 
English officials in the Caribbean greatly expanded the practice of permitting 
trade otherwise forbidden by means of provisionary proclamations.3 
While colonial ports were opened to a greater extent, the war however also 
created the need for neutral carrying capacity. American shipping had by far 
the most to gain from this development. Still, statistics of issued sea-passes in 
St. Thomas and St Barthélemy (Figure 4.2) suggest that also Swedish and 
Danish carrying capacity was in demand. Pre-war issues of sea passes convey 
a lame level of activity, when St. Thomas vessels averaged only 30 to 40 vessels 
a year, while St. Barthélemy had even less. But the war seemed to have an 
instant effect on this, as Swedish vessels registered in higher numbers than 
ever, as much as 90 in the year 1793. But the phenomenon in St .Thomas, on 
the other hand, was unprecedented. From 1795 onwards it is as if a sizeable 
neutral merchant fleet simply materialized in the island. Of course, the 
buildup of shipping at St. Thomas started earlier, but there are not any official 
records of registered vessels for the two preceding years. Even so, the increase 
                                                          
3 Quote from Observations of Archibald Gloster, 18 April 1795, FO 73/20, TNA; John H. 
Coatsworth, “American Trade with European Colonies in the Caribbean and South America, 
1790–1812,” The William & Mary Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1967), 243–266; Alice B. Keith, “Relaxations 
in the British Restrictions on the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783–1802,” 
Journal of Modern History 20, no. 1 (1948), 1–18. 
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in carrying capacity is remarkable. During the years leading up to the turn of 
the century and the subsequent British occupations, there was not nearly the 
same amount of neutral vessels registered in St. Barthélemy. The more 
restrictive sea pass regulations in force in St. Barthélemy as well as the larger 
merchant community in St. Thomas easily suggest themselves as likely causes 
for this discrepancy. A single telling circumstance was that island-registered 
ships were restricted to 20 lasts burden or less. Another measure that 
definitely stymied demand for Swedish ship documents was the prohibition 
of European-bound voyages (save for Swedish destinations). In any case, the 
war entailed that the governors of both St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy were 
granting Danish and Swedish navigation documents on a more frequent basis 
than ever.4 
Other differences may also explain the fact that St. Thomas was better 
situated for an expansion of neutral trade. On top of institutional advantages, 
St. Thomas derived some benefits purely from its geographic position. The 
proximity of St. Thomas to the larger Caribbean colonies, especially the 
Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo and Cuba, but also French 
Saint-Domingue, conveyed some potentially lucrative opportunities for 
westbound traders stationed in St. Thomas. The British Vice Admiralty 
records of Jamaica point to the ascension of this sort of trade quite visibly. 
Out of the vessels libeled in the Vice Admiralty Court of Jamaica between 
1793 and 1802, at least 232 of the vessels had been engaged in voyages that 
originated in St. Thomas. 134 were engaged in round-trips beginning and 
ending (at least officially) in St. Thomas. Another 27 were engaged in voyages 
that originated in St. Thomas, and the remaining 72 were engaged in voyages 
that included St. Thomas as a port of call, of which exactly half originated in 
the United States and the other half in other ports, mostly Caribbean. The 
peak year for seizures of Danish vessels was 1799, when the 82 prosecuted St. 
Thomas cases represented over 20 percent of the Jamaica total that year. If 
the passport registries of St. Thomas for the same period is compared to this 
data, it is evident that almost ten percent of the St. Thomas merchant fleet 
ended up in the clutches of the British Navy or British privateer vessels. 
                                                          
4 For the restrictions on Swedish passports and their perceived effects during this time, see 
Ankarheim to von Fersen, 15 July 1801, Hans Axel von Fersens samling, vol. 12, Stafsundsarkivet, 
SNA; and Söderström to von Ehrenheim, 14 May 1799, Diplomatica Americana, vol. 1, SNA. 
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Navy patrolling areas around the Jamaica station were restricted to some 
key areas: the Yucatán Channel to the northwest, a southwest-northeasterly 
strip along the Rosalind Bank towards the Yucatán Peninsula, as well as the 
entirety of the coast of Hispaniola and the southeastern coast of Cuba. 
Patrolling rarely stretched as far north than the Turks and Caicos. Along 
these focus areas, the majority of Danish vessels were caught along the 
southern coastline of Hispaniola, often outside the major French and Spanish 
ports of Hispaniola. The corresponding seizures of Swedish vessels or vessels 
with some sort of affiliation to St. Barthélemy was only 25. There is nothing 
to suggest that British cruisers and privateers were any less likely to capture 
Swedish-flagged vessels, so these numbers offer some measure of 
understanding of the difference in activity between Swedish and Danish 
neutral shipping in the region. That is, of course, only the activity around the 
Greater Antilles. The high frequency of Danish naturalized trade in the 
region was due to the fact that St. Thomas was increasingly playing host to at 
least two great foreign channels of trade. One was the British trade with 
Spanish America, and the other was the American transit trade to Caribbean 
colonies, Saint Domingue being one of the chief ventures.5 
It should, however, be stressed that American shipping was far from 
enjoying an empty field when it came to exploiting neutral carriers. An 
embittered Philadelphia merchant observed that Dutchmen employed the 
same method in the Saint Domingue coffee trade: 
The Danes, or rather Dutch, under Danish colours, are powerful and 
jealous competitors for a share in this commerce: Their flags being also 
neutral, they swarm here [Saint Domingue] from St Thomas’s &c. – and […] 
endeavour to undersell us. The usual custom among the sellers of this 
article, when they arrive in town, is, at first to go into al the American stores 
                                                          
5 Udskrift af St. Jan og St. Thomas søpasprotokol 1788–1807 365/384 Vestindisk-guinesisk 
renteskriverkontor, Generaltoldkammeret, Ældre del, DNA. The percentage was 8.9 percent, 
to be exact, or 232 seizures out of a total of 2,597 registered vessels during the years 1795–1802. 
Many of these decisions were appealed, but still a very high proportion of the St. Thomas cases 
between 1793 and 1802 ended up with the complete condemnation of vessel and cargo. It is worth 
noting that Danish vessels libelled in Vice Admiralty Courts elsewhere in the British Caribbean 
are missing from these figures. See Craton, “Vice Admiralty Courts,” 287–289. 
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and learn the highest prices they will give, and then go and sell to a Dane 
for six deniers more.6 
At the Danish free port itself, the greatest part of the shipping entering 
were “American vessels, small Spanish sloops and boats, and large English 
merchantmen”. It was further told that “the Americans brought in provisions, 
lumber and shingles, and they took out rum and sugar in return. The Spaniards 
exchanged German linens and English manufactured goods &c.&c., - bringing 
along much cash from the main land and Porto Rico.” Spaniards smuggled it 
into St. Thomas and exchanged it for German linens and British 
manufactures. The concentration of bullion and specie in St. Thomas was 
meaningful for British interests, as the land and sea forces in the British 
Caribbean demanded a steady flow of money, Jamaica often excepted, as it 
had its own established sources. It is nearly impossible to give an estimate of 
Anglo-Spanish exchanges performed in this way through St. Thomas, but 
some contemporary observers guessed that about two millions of dollars per 
was carried away from St. Thomas for British destinations on a yearly basis. 
British government bills of exchange were often the means of payment for 
these shipments of bullion, highly valuable for remittances and facilitation for 
international trade.7 
It is clear that the Greater Antilles were not the most frequented markets 
by St. Barthélemy vessels. Another area where it did not register prominently 
were the British colonies (See Figures 4.3 and 4.4). In a rare compilation of 
statistics concerning the commerce of British free ports, the tonnages and 
values of shipping entering the British Caribbean are covered for the years 
1788–95. Very little tonnage from Swedish, Danish or Dutch colonies entered 
during the years for which there is any data. Tonnage is of course a very crude 
measurement, but the valuations of cargoes do not suggest any differing  
 
                                                          
6 Pennsylvania Gazette, 1 April 1795; McDonald, “The Chance of the Moment”, 463–464; See also 
James Alexander Dun, “’What avenues of commerce will you, Americans, not explore!’ 
Commercial Philadelphia’s vantage onto the early Haitian revolution,” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2005), 473–504. 
7 For the contemporary accounts, see Nissen, Reminiscences, 9, 40, 60–61; and John P. Knox, A 
historical account of St. Thomas (New York: Scribner, 1852.), 100–01; for the Anglo-Spanish trade 
through St. Thomas see Pearce, British Trade with Spanish America, 148, 201; cf. Craton, “Vice 
Admiralty Courts,” 212, 267. 
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conclusion. By 1794, the British free port system had been made perpetual for 
Jamaica, Dominica, Grenada and Nassau in the Bahamas. The free ports had 
been envisioned as conduits for the Anglo-Spanish trade as well as 
competitors to neighboring foreign free ports. Instead, the evidence from the 
last decade of the eighteenth century shows that the British free ports had 
become depots for North American goods, something which legislators in 
Whitehall certainly never had had in mind. American tonnage as well as cargo 
value far outweighed any other nations before and after the war. Danish and 
Swedish ships had a minuscule share in this trade. This fact is unsurprising, as 
the goods that were reshipped from St. Thomas or St. Barthélemy had their 
primary origin in the United States as Americans could carry their 
merchandise into British harbors directly themselves, there was no particular 
need for neutral middlemen in this particular branch of trade.8 
Gustavia, the United States, and the revolutionary French Caribbean 
As St. Barthélemy-affiliated commerce seemed to be conspicuously absent 
from most of the region during the first few years of the war, it is interesting 
that an anonymous author stated in The Report of Saint Bartholomew that the 
island “had become an outpost, or kind of depository and ware-house for the 
American West-India commerce”9 during the same time. In order to explain 
this, figures for the American trade with St. Barthélemy must be considered. 
Figures 4.5–7 contain official estimates of American exports to Caribbean 
colonies. These export statistics are compiled from reports of the US 
Secretary of Treasury, printed in American State Papers, VII, Class 4: Commerce 
and Navigation (Washington, D.C., 1832). Early US trade statistics such as 
these have garnered a mixed reputation, but they stand as the only foreign 
trade data for this period, and researchers have thus been obliged to use them. 
Furthermore, most of the recognized inaccuracies in the statistics occur on 
                                                          
8 For a discussion of the statistical series that these observations are based on, see Pearce, British 
Trade with Spanish America, 98–101. 
9 ”Extracts from M.S. Sketches of a political and commercial review of the island of. 
Bartholomew…” in The Report of St. Bartholomew, 15 June, 1811. The text is a brief political and 
commercial history of the island, and spanned several numbers, was reportedly written “by a 
member of the court of justice”, which almost certainly was Abraham Runnels. 
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the import side. Export values, on the other hand, have been concluded to be 
reasonably accurate.10  
Taken together, the American exports to the Swedish, Danish, and Dutch 
ports from 1793 to 1799 constituted about a quarter of the whole American 
export figure to the Caribbean. At best, St. Barthélemy stood for about 5 
percent of this commerce, which in itself is not inconsiderable as the volume 
of American trade grew prodigiously during the war. From 1795 to 1801 the 
average annual value of the goods exported in American bottoms to St. 
Barthélemy was $685,000, and the annual value of the imports to American 
harbors from St. Barthélemy during the same period, was $500,000.11 Danish 
and Dutch ports drew comparably more traffic from the North American 
mainland than Gustavia did during the 1790s, but the difference was fairly 
uniform up until the years 1798–1799, when exports to Danish and Dutch 
ports peaked, totaling 8.5 million dollars together in the year 1799. This trade 
never reached these levels again after the Peace of Amiens. Gustavia 
meanwhile did not experience the same surge before the turn of the century, 
or at least not according to the official statistics. 
To explain this difference, the trajectory of the American trade to South 
America needs to be elaborated. A large part of the American exports were 
directed towards French colonies. US exports to the French Caribbean 
exceeded those to the British and Spanish islands during the early years of the 
war, from 1793 to 1798. The largest part of these exports could be carried 
directly in American bottoms, but there were at least two pressing reasons for 
Americans to employ an indirect route to French ports by way of neutral free 
ports or neutral flags. One was the increasingly hostile British stance towards 
neutral shipping after 1793. The British Orders-in-Council issued the same 
year, along with the arrival of admiral Jervis in the Caribbean, signaled the 
coming of a time of increasing maritime depredations of British cruisers and 
                                                          
10 It was not until 1820 that United States import values were collected. Official figures for the 
years before 1820 were estimated only as late as 1835. For a discussion of the source material, see 
for example Douglass C. North, “The United States Balances of Payments, 1790–1860,” Trends in 
the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 198–
199; Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790 to 1860 (Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1961), 24–25, 270–271; and Coatsworth, “American Trade,” 243–266. 
11 Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America: Its 
connections with Agriculture and Manufactures: and an Account of the Public Debt, Revenues, 
and Expenditures of the United States (Hartford: Hosmer, 1816), 198–199. 
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privateers alike. Any vessel detained and suspected of carrying French 
property or carrying on trade with the French colonies were considered good 
prize, and American ships were especially targeted during the early years of 
the war.12 The other reason were the deteriorating relations between the two 
young republics. Unresolved issues after the American War of Independence 
as well as the political course taken by the United States after the Jay Treaty 
with Britain led to a state of undeclared war between the United States and 
France, also known as the Quasi-War. In practice this meant that American 
merchant ships were no longer safe from the hostilities of French privateers. 
French privateers were arming in increasing numbers in Guadeloupe after its 
recapture from the British in 1794.13 
It is important to note that the American trade to the French colonies 
contracted at the same time as trade to the neutral ports (Dutch included) 
increased in 1799. This was the likely result of an American ban on 
commercial intercourse with the French colonies following in the wake of the 
Quasi-War. Enterprising American merchants sought to circumvent 
domestic legislation by assuming neutral burgher rights, and Danish papers 
were very sought after. The Swedish consul Richard Söderström reported 
from Philadelphia in 1799 that the U.S. Admiralty Court had recently 
concluded a number of cases that had been initiated against “new-made 
Danes” engaged in the forbidden French trade. Problems of this kind were 
quite serious at this time, and any merchant adventurous enough to try his 
luck in this kind of operation was in risk of facing prosecution in US courts. 
Söderström had to his relief not received any information about Americans 
masquerading as Swedes for the same purpose, and it was thought to be less 
common for Americans to assume Swedish burgher rights in this way.14 
The case of American trade to the Dutch colonies on the other hand had 
less to do with the exploitation of foreign neutrality, but it was also at least 
                                                          
12 Clauder, “American Commerce,” 30–34. 
13 Michel Rodigneaux & Hélène Servant, “La guerre de course aux Antilles 1793–1810,” Bulletin de 
la Société d’histoire de la Guadeloupe (2005), 13–39. 
14 Söderström to von Ehrenheim, 14 May 1799, Diplomatica Americana, vol. 1, SNA. 
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partly a result of Franco-American trade being circumvented through other 
channels than before. Considering the commodity of coffee, statistics would 
have that Americans increasingly directed their purchases of coffee to the 
Dutch West and East Indies towards the close of the century. It is however 
highly probable that a considerable quantity of the coffee coming from the 
Dutch colonies in 1798 and onwards had originated somewhere else. 
American imports of coffee leaped from 3.9 million pounds in 1797 to more 
than 10 million pounds the following years. The Dutch produced coffee in 
their Caribbean colonies, but it is impossible that they produced quantities 
sufficient to explain this increase. It is more likely that Dutch merchants, as 
well as others, reshipped Saint-Domingue coffee and other commodities to 
the United States during the Quasi-War.15 
Gustavia’s place in the overall scheme of Franco-American trade was 
somewhat different. American merchants did indeed resort to Gustavia as a 
port of convenience. Expeditions like the ones made by the American brigs 
Nancy and Sally from Philadelphia in 1794 and 1795 were examples of such a 
scenario. The vessels were owned by the prominent Philadelphia merchant 
Stephen Girard. Placed under the command of Captain Paul Post, Nancy was 
insured for $3500 and carried a cargo insured for $10,000. The captain if the 
Nancy received instructions to make sail for “St. Bartholomew and a market.” 
The cargo was not to be sold unless at an advance of 40 percent on the invoice 
valuation of $12,639. If this condition was not met, the Captain was to go to 
any neutral or other ports not blockaded by belligerents, and sell the cargo 
there instead. Girard requested that the brig return with a cargo of green 
coffee. Sally also sailed for St. Barthélemy, “or a market in the West Indies” 
in December, with a cargo valued at $23,414. Before the latter ship’s departure 
for the Swedish colony, she had returned to Philadelphia in November from 
Aux Cayes of Saint-Domingue with a cargo of sugar, coffee, and cotton. 
Girard, born a Frenchman, had since long specialized in the trade to the 
French Caribbean, and at the time of these expeditions, he was heavily 
involved in the flour trade to Saint-Domingue as so many other Philadelphia 
merchants. Expeditions specifically headed towards St. Barthélemy and other 
neutral islands were comparatively rare occurrences in his overall business 
                                                          
15 McDonald, “The Chance of the Moment,” 463–64. 
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operation. Neutral ports as primary destinations made some practical sense. 
American traders could make free ports such as Gustavia their first place of 
landing, and only then inquire about market conditions, trying to find the 
most prudent way of selling their cargo.16 
The evidence suggests that reaching greater colonial markets such as 
Hispaniola and Cuba safely was more difficult from St. Barthélemy than St. 
Thomas, which would entail that merchants basing their ventures from the 
island had fewer options. But there was a steady link of cabotage in small and 
fast sailing boats to the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe to the 
southeast. This kind of traffic was a time-honored institution, as it had been 
established and frequently pursued during the inter-war years.17 
The relationship between Guadeloupe and St. Barthélemy however 
deteriorated very badly as a result of a string of controversies surrounding the 
activities of French privateers and citizens caught in legal quandaries in the 
Swedish colony. The colonies were economically linked as before, but the 
French authorities in Guadeloupe became more and more adamant that the 
representatives of the Republic would dictate the terms of the relationship. 
In November of 1796, Victor Hugues finally turned completely on the neutral 
islands. In an instruction to Bigard, he explained that “it is time for us to put 
an end to the violation of neutrality in St. Barthélemy since it is now 
populated by our enemies.” He called for the repatriation of all French 
citizens now living in St. Barthélemy. All the French-controlled ports, 
including the Dutch, he informed Bigard, were now off-limits to Swedish 
ships. But, on a conciliatory note, he added that “honest Swedes” could be 
offered “all possible assistance” as to the needs of their colony. Bigard was 
encouraged to tell the Swedes that their prior help in sheltering “true 
Frenchmen” should never be forgotten, and that the French authorities have 
                                                          
16 John Bach McMaster, The Life and Times of Stephen Girard: Mariner and Merchant (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott, 1918), 280; Albert J. Gares, “Stephen Girard’s West Indian Trade, 1789–1812,” 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXII (1948), 311–342. At least one of the 
expeditions turned awry, as the Nancy never reached Gustavia. She was captured by a French 
privateer and taken to Petit Canal, Guadeloupe, where the captain was brought in for a forced 
sale of the cargo; Cf. Williams, The French Assault, 257. 
17 Öström to Reimers, 10 January 1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA; Pérotin-Dumon, 
”Cabotage, Contraband, and Corsairs,” 64–67. 
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only been “forced to take these measures for the sake of the honor of the 
Government they represent.”18 
French privateers were thus ordered to steer clear of St. Barthélemy, and 
French merchants being found near its waters would no longer enjoy the 
protection of the French government. French privateering now spared no 
ship, whether American, Dutch, British, Danish or Swedish. It is quite 
evident that although Hugues probably felt genuine regret over the measure, 
he was eager to root out elements in the free port traffic that did business with 
the British colonies. Individual merchants known to have British connections 
were often singled out. A case in point was the capture of the Swedish brig 
Hedvig, captain Magnus Andersson, in the vicinity of Antigua in 1796, by the 
sloop Le Rienzy, captain Bastien Navarre. The brig and its cargo was the sole 
property of the house of Röhl & Hansen. The cargo consisted of naval stores, 
tar, bar and sheet iron, canvas, lampblack, and red wine. The brig and cargo 
was deemed good prize since it had carried contrabands of war, it was stated.19 
Especially problematic for Gustavia was that the vital American export 
traffic as well as the island’s own ships was preyed upon regularly. The 
American consul in Gustavia sent repeated pleas to the Swedish Governor 
whenever instances of seized American merchantmen arose. It was not 
unusual that American ships were pulled into Gustavia for auctioning by the 
French bounty court, even despite Hugues’ orders of 1796. The Governor was 
powerless to help with redress, as the French bounty court and Bigard could 
not be persuaded in such cases. Even the Swedish government was opposed 
to the Swedish court of the island meddling with the French revolutionary 
                                                          
18 The whole section pertaining to St. Barthélemy goes as follows: “Il est temps que nous fassions 
cesser la violation de la neutralité à Saint-Barthélemy puisqu’il se peuple de nos ennemis. […] 
Vous intimerez le même ordre [de quitter l’île] à tous les corsairs particuliers et autres bâtiments 
français, sous peine de leur retirer leur commission et punir le capitaine de désobeissance et aux 
bâtiments marchands de perdre la protection du Gouvernement. Tous les ports français et ceux 
hollandais sous la protection de la France sont fermés au Suédois pour le commerce et n’y seront 
reçus que par relâche pour cause d’avarie. Vous ferez offer […} aux honnêtes suédois, de toute 
assistance possible soit en vivres, eau et autres objets pour les besoins de leur colonie. Vous leur 
direz que nous ne pourrons jamais oublier que Saint-Barthélemy a été jadis l’asile des vrais 
Français, et que nous sommes forces de prendre ces mesures pour l’honneur du Gouvernement 
que nous représentons.” Hugues to Bigard, 3 November 1796 (13 brumaire an V), C7A 49, f. 54; 
Cf. Rodigneaux, Guerre de course, 101; See also Norderling to SWIC, 12 November 1795, Handel 
och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA. 
19 Dreyer to SWIC, 24 December 1796 & 4 July 1797, Fahlberg to SWIC, 25 May 1797, Handel 
och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA; Rodigneaux, La guerre de course, 280–81. 
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authorities. This was illustrated in full force in the case of the American brig 
Polly of Portland, captain Joseph Clement. The 182-ton brig had left London 
in October of 1796, heading for Norfolk. It was however seized in late March 
of 1797 by the French privateer L’Amour de la Patrie and subsequently brought 
into Gustavia. Captain Clement’s papers and some of the crew were sent to 
Guadeloupe. Af Trolle however then seized the brig, and asked for 
instructions from Stockholm regarding the proper course of action. The 
measure was disapproved by royal orders, and Gustav IV Adolf decreed that 
the vessel and cargo be turned over to the captors. The orders expressed that 
there was no provision in the Swedish-American commercial treaty that 
necessitated such actions from the Swedish government on the island. This 
situation suggests a likely cause why the American exports were at such a low 
level in Gustavia compared to the Danish and Dutch ports.20 
The French commerce brought in by the bounty court surely compensated 
in some part for missing U.S. shipping, which is supported by a comparison of 
the rising customs revenues of St. Barthélemy with the estimates of American 
exports to the Swedish colony, the former of which were at a low point at the 
turn of the century. It is however extremely difficult to arrive at any estimates 
of the significance of the French trade. Swedish Governors were officially 
quite silent on the matter, but it is clear that they acknowledged it as an 
important part of the island economy. Governors entertained a regular 
correspondence with French authorities on Guadeloupe regarding 
commercial as well as political affairs throughout the period in question.21  
This was of course not a situation Swedish administrators were entirely 
content with. It was by no means a result of conscious, deliberate policy. The 
emigration waves from the French colonies along with the nature of the free 
port institution had made St. Barthélemy a kind of French proxy colony. 
Certainly the island was bound to be regarded more as a French than Swedish 
                                                          
20 Af Trolle’s report 27 May 1797, SBS 1B:2, SNA; Gustav IV Adolf to af Trolle, 14 September 
1797, ES 286, FSB ANOM; William, The French Assault, 287. 
21 Wernberg to SWIC, 24 April 1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA; Norderling to SWIC, 13 
July 1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, SNA; Pérotin-Dumon, “Témoignages,” 17–21. See also the 
memoirs of the French privateer captain Jean Landolphe for numerous references to the French 
privateer traffic in St. Barthélemy in J.S. Quesne, Mémoires du Capitaine Landolphe, conentant 
l’histoire de ses voyages pendant trente-six ans aux côtes d’Afrique et aux deux Amériques (Paris : Betrand, 
1832), II: 207, 212, 216, 233, 244. 
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by the British. The French recapture of Guadeloupe in December of 1794 had 
already raised eyebrows in the British camp. The island had been in British 
hands since the end of April, but had ultimately been overrun by the 
combined forces of the French commissaire Victor Hugues, in an action “as 
unforeseen as unexpected” for the British. Questions were being raised as to 
how the French, now without a single viable bridgehead in the Caribbean to 
support such a mission, could have pulled it off. The neutral islands and free 
ports in the Caribbean were being viewed with increasing skepticism after 
this event, and especially St. Barthélemy was seen as having a decided 
partiality to “the French cause”. Rumors and various intelligence reports 
about the contacts between neutrals and the French colonies were rampant, 
and created sensational reports such as the following excerpt shows: 
The moment Pointe-a-Pitre was known to be Recaptured, St. Thomas and 
St Bartholomew vomited forth the numerous Partizans that had there 
apparently waited for such an Event. Danish and Swedish Bottoms were 
devoted to their service and carried up Men, Provisions and warlike Stores 
of all Denominations and in return they were busily employed in 
Transporting from Pointe-a-Pitre and the out Ports, the rich Booty which 
this daring and Succesful Enterprize of the Republicans had recaptured 
from Great Britain and from the unfortunate Royalists.22 
An event which dispelled any lingering doubts about the collusion between 
the French colonies and St. Barthélemy was the affair with the brigantine Le 
Courrier. She was captured by a British vessel off of Guadeloupe on the 
morning of December 16th, 1794. She was sailing under Swedish colors and 
under the command of Aaron Johan du Bordieu, the Swedish place major of 
St. Barthélemy. After an inspection, the British officers found enough 
incriminating evidence onboard as to send her immediately to the Vice 
Admiralty court in Antigua. Three French officers and two British deserters 
were found on board, as well as a cargo of gunpowder. The brigantine was 
reportedly headed for St. Barthélemy, and was said to have been purchased by 
du Bordieu in Pointe-à-Pitre from Victor Hugues. There were a lot of 
diverging testimonies regarding the affair. The ship had enough supplies 
                                                          
22 Archibald Gloster, ”Observations upon the conduct of the Neutral Powers in the West Indies 
since the Commencement of the War,” 18 April 1795, F.O. 73/20. 
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loaded onboard for a voyage to Europe, and it was told by various witnesses 
that the ship either was bound for Gothenburg in order to purchase supplies 
for the French colonies, or to France with important despatches. The ship 
had originally been a British merchant ship, and had recently been captured 
by French privateers. Whatever the reality behind the different allegations, 
the case showed that Swedish authorities themselves colluded with the 
revolutionary leadership of Guadeloupe. The ship, along with its cargo, was 
condemned as good prize in Antigua.23 
The place major du Bordieu had in fact been engaged in many expeditions 
to the French colonies, parlaying about commercial affairs and running 
correspondence between the islands. Swedish shipping from Gustavia had 
been running into British vigilance at sea since before the start of the war, as 
attested by the bulging dossiers of complaints by merchants and ship-owners 
that were sent to Stockholm and London. But after the Courrier affair British 
skepticism towards Swedish neutrality turned into outright hostility. Admiral 
Jervis promised “execution” to the island of St. Barthélemy.24 The free port 
of Gustavia then, after a promising start, was already facing external threats. 
That is, the commerce of the island was besieged both by French and British 
military action at sea, and its professed neutrality was nullified by the close 
ties to the revolutionary French Caribbean. Gustavia’s place in the Caribbean 
transit trade during the early years of the war was primarily as a conduit 
between Martinique and Guadeloupe and the other markets in the Americas, 
primarily the United States. American shipping was however far from 
protected in going into Gustavia, which is showed by regular attempts at 
redress of American traders in St. Barthélemy. The Swedish authorities were 
too heavily influenced by the commissaires of Guadeloupe to address the worst 
effects of revolutionary activities and privateering.25 
Still, despite the British reports about the collusion between the neutral 
islands and the French colonies, the British government did not act before 
                                                          
23 CO 152/77, TNA; Norderling to SWIC, June 30, 1796, Handel och sjöfart vol. 169, SNA; Anne 
Pérotin-Dumon, ”Témoignages,” 17–21; Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin, 276–277; Lydia 
Wahlström, Sverige och England under revolutionskrigens början: Bidrag till den Reuterholmska 
regeringens historia (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1917), 235–238. 
24 Jervis to Bagge, 18 June 1794, FO 73/18, TNA; Bagge to Jervis, 27 June 1794, SBS 1 B, vol. 2, 
SNA. 
25 Wall to Pickering, 5 August, 24 October & 31 December 1799, M72:1, RG 59, NARA. 
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the formation of the Second League of Armed Neutrality in 1800. Orders 
were swiftly sent out the naval stations in the Caribbean to seize the Danish 
and Swedish islands, and they were swept up during the summer of 1801 
without much resistance. On the morning of the 19th of March 1801, a group 
of about 16 sail were spotted far to the south of St. Barthélemy. It was a British 
expedition from Antigua which was headed for the island with the goal of 
capturing it. The Swedish administration was well aware that British 
hostilities might lead to an occupation well before this day, and the French 
agents of Guadeloupe had even offered the assistance of two companies for 
the defense of the island. The condition was however to surrender the 
command of St. Barthélemy, which the Governor, H.H. Ankarheim, could 
not accept.26 The British expeditionary force landed on the 20th of March, 
and after the exchanges of terms of capitulation, the St. Barthélemy convened 
for an emergency meeting where it was decided to accept the British terms 
and not to put up any resistance. St. Barthélemy was the first neutral island to 
be captured by the British in this year, whereas St. Thomas, St John, St. Croix 
and St. Martin were occupied a few weeks after. 
4.2 The Transit Trade after the British occupation of 1801 
The British lockdown of the neutral islands meant that the transit trade 
ground to a halt. Freedom of movement was circumscribed for the colony’s 
inhabitants. Confiscations of both private and crown property was quite 
widespread despite the efforts of the Governor, and the conduct of British 
soldiers were described as that “of pirates and brigands”.27 When the orders 
of occupation had been sent from London, it had been stated very clearly that 
the seizure would be of a temporary nature. The British had no intention of 
keeping the Danish and Swedish islands, and the conflict in Europe was 
approaching a temporary truce. Furthermore, in the summer of 1801 after 
                                                          
26 Dundas to Trigge, 14 January 1801, WO 1/90, TNA; Trigge to Dundas, 22 March 1801, WO 
1/90, TNA; Duckworth to Nepean, 27 March 1801, ADM 1/323; Ankarheim’s report, 21 March 
1801, SBS 1 C, SNA 
27 Bergstedt’s memorial, SWIC Minutes 2 September 1803, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157, SNA. 
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Nelson’s victory in Copenhagen, Denmark, Sweden and Russia started 
negotiating with Great Britain about surrendering the policy of armed 
neutrality, a process which was completed in the following year. 
Arrangements were made for the return of St. Barthélemy after this, and on 
the 10th of July 1802 the remaining British forces departed the island. If we 
lend full credence to the reports and letters of Swedish officials. The British 
left the island in a state of destitution. Many had lost their means of income 
and subsistence, especially the urban residents. Meanwhile, the recess from 
war did not bring about any immediate prospects for business at the free port. 
But this situation would not last longer than twenty months, and in 1803 the 
activity in the harbor had regained the same pace as before the occupation.28 
The best wide-ranging commercial records in Gustavia during this time is 
supplied by the island’s newspaper, which carried a section named ‘Port 
Intelligence’ in which were recorded the arriving vessels, their names and 
their captains, as well as their previous port of departure and their cargo. 
Cargoes were however never enumerated except in the occasional arrivals of 
slaves, as shown in chapter 3. It is thus impossible to arrive at an estimation 
of quantities and values of cargoes, but the assortment of cargoes can create 
some basic understanding of the patterns of trade. Nationalities of ships were 
noted for over 80 percent of the arrivals, and the information on the ports of 
destination is another instance of uncertainty and vagueness. A majority of 
vessels were referred to as arriving from “the Islands”, most certainly meaning 
nearby islands in the Lesser Antilles. Despite these considerable limitations, 
an analysis of the information contained in The Report of St. Bartholomew can 
supply a substantial understanding about the scope, intensity and pattern of 
commercial activity through Gustavia during 1804–06.29  
The data suggests a slow recovery of the free port in the wake of the British 
occupation (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). A total of 2,708 arrivals are included in a 
                                                          
28 Dundas to Trigge, 16 June 1801, WO 1/90, TNA; Ankarheim’s report, 22 July 1802, SBS 1 C, 
SNA. 
29 It is possible in some cases to complement this information with the surviving ship manifests 
in M 1, FSB, ANOM, which include detailed information on cargoes. These are however far from 
complete. The volume contains manifests for 1805, 1809 and 1819. The 1805 manifests are the 
most extensive, but still they contain only 95 instances of arrivals and departures, of a total of 
1,402 arrivals as recorded for the same year in The Report of St. Bartholomew. For the creation of 
the newspaper and its intended use, see SWIC Minutes, 26 March 1804, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 
157, SNA. 
 201 
 
dataset based on the Port Intelligence section of 1804–06. 1805 offers the 
most complete figures, and provides a general picture of trade after the 
resumption of war. St. Barthélemy-registered ships dominated the traffic 
through Gustavia. In 1805, these ships stood for 1,051 arrivals and thus 
represented 75 percent of the total. The second largest presence was, as 
before, American ships, with 211 arrivals. The Danish and British were also 
visible, with 74 and 59 arrivals respectively. Spanish and French vessels landed 
infrequently, and others exceedingly were rare, such as Hamburger, Prussian, 
and Austrian ships, of which there were a few odd sightings during the years 
covered, arriving from various locations in the North Sea. Judging by the 
assortment of cargoes, the American ships laying anchor in Gustavia were 
invariably the most diverse and in all probability carried the largest cargoes. 
The American schooner Diana, captain Engelhardt, arrived from Norfolk in 
Gustavia in the fall of 1805 with a cargo consisting of 1,983 feet of lumber, 
10,000 shingles, 200 bushels of corn, 10 hogsheads of tobacco, 18 tierces of 
nails, 6,000 hoops, 25 barrels of pilot bread, 75 barrels of navy bread and 30 
barrels of ship bread, “all American produce”. The totality the cargo was 
unloaded and sold, and the Diana proceeded to St. Kitts with a smaller 
assortment of wares, 31,254 feet of boards, 50 shooks, 56 headings and 9,780 
cypress shingles. The Diana, being one of the few American ships doing 
business in Gustavia of which there survives a more detailed record, is also 
important as it gives an impression of the size of ships and cargoes involved in 
this trade.30 
There were good reasons for this kind of variety in a single cargo. It was 
mainly aimed at the risk of glutting the small island markets with any one 
article of merchandise, but it was also a result of the often haphazard ways in 
which the export cargoes were collected on the continent. Goods were often 
bought at a number of locations on the North American coast before an 
expedition had assembled a viable cargo. Thus, American ships would traverse 
various suitable islands, gather intelligence about market and price conditions 
and sell parts of their cargoes as they went whenever suitable. In time, their 
                                                          
30 Manifest of the schooner Diana, signed Gustavia, 5 November 1805, M 1, FSB, ANOM. The 
same vessel apparently made several intra-Caribbean round-trips during the following months, 
arriving again in Gustavia on the 14th of November and the 24th of December, in ballast on both 
occasions. See The Report of St. Bartholomew, 21 November, 1805 and 25 January, 1806. The initial 
arrival from Norfolk was not recorded in the Report. 
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outward cargo would be sold and their holds laden with a return cargo of 
colonial goods. Still, in some cases, a single stop was enough if conditions were 
favorable. This was the case for the Alexandrian schooner Sampson, captain 
Jesse Cox, which landed in Gustavia in early July of 1805, negotiated its cargo 
of 566 barrels of flour, 60 half-barrels of crackers, 42 bags of bread, 10,000 
shingles and could return to Alexandria loaded with 58 casks and 140 barrels 
of muscovado sugar.31 
 
Table 4.1 Gustavia arrivals, Flags of Vessels, 1804–1806 
 1804* 1805 1806** 
 Total Ballast Total Ballast Total Ballast 
Sweden 199 83 1,051 576 401 211 
USA 37 1 192 19 49 7 
Denmark 25 12 74 35 9 9 
Great Britain 8 3 59 21 32 10 
France 5 - 7 3 9 2 
Spain 10 2 8 4 - - 
Other/Unknown 513 - 11 - - - 
 
 
Table 4.2 Gustavia arrivals, Ports of departure, 1804–1806 
 1804* 1805 1806** 
 Total Ballast Total Ballast Total Ballast 
Caribbean 640 102 1,426 651 468 237 
North America 91 - 102 - 31 - 
South America 32 - 19 9 1 - 
Europe 20 - 26 1 4 - 
Africa 1 - 3 - - - 
Other/Unknown 3 - 8 4 3 3 
*Figures are limited to March 25 – December 30, 1804. 
**Figures are limited to January 1 – June 16, 1806. 
Source: Wilson dataset on the transit trade of St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas (2015); 
The Report of Saint Bartholomew 1804, 1805 & 1806.  
 
The mainstay of American exports was flour, nearly half of the ships carried 
some quantity of it with them. Victuals unsurprisingly comprised the bulk of 
                                                          
31 Manifest of the schooner Sampson, signed Gustavia 22 July 1805, M 1, FSB, ANOM. 
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the American produce carried to Gustavia. Corn, corn- and rye meal, rice, 
barley, peas, beans and onions were some of the most usual agricultural 
products carried. As for proteins, bovine, dairy and pork products far 
outweighed fish proportionally in terms of occurrence in cargoes. Derivatives 
of the fishing industry were far more common than fish itself, such as 
different oils, fats and tallows as well as spermaceti candles. Besides 
provisions, American holds were filled with essentials for construction, 
shipbuilding and the Caribbean export economy. Lumber, boards and 
especially shingles were well represented, as well as shooks, staves and hoops 
for making indispensable barrels for exportation. Masts, spars, pitch, tar and 
cordage were sparse imports, present only in a few odd ships. There was also 
a small proportion of tobacco as well as wine, Madeira and other spirits 
imported. Presumably the tobacco had its origins in Virginia as it was a 
common American staple, but liquors other than rum were likely to be re-
exports.  
In general it can be said that cargoes carried with American ships would 
seem to have been mostly American in origin. Official American estimates 
recorded the share of foreign to domestic produce exported on American 
ships from 1803 onwards, and these figures display that American produce 
outweighs re-exports in the trade to St. Barthélemy. In 1804, the proportion 
of American to foreign produce exported to St. Barthélemy was 70.3 percent, 
in 1805 66.5 percent and in 1806, 65.2 percent. The remaining shares of foreign 
re-exports consisted, in most part, by British and other European 
manufactures. The Gustavia records and manifests cannot reveal any details 
about this trade, as manufactures were nearly always concealed behind the 
ubiquitous, catch-all category of dry goods. The relatively high share of 
foreign re-exports might also be a consequence of the more mixed and 
itinerary American trade to neutral islands, as opposed to the trade to British 
colonies, for example. In every year from 1803 to 1812, domestic American 
exports accounted for more than 89 percent of all US exports to the British 
Caribbean. These figures reflect the degree of the British naval presence in 
the Caribbean and the fact that British merchants were well situated to 
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maintain commercial contact with their colonies without resorting to neutral 
carriers on a larger scale, at least when it came to manufactured goods.32 
Figure 4.8 Ports of departure of arriving American ships, 
1804–06 
 
Source: The Report of Saint Bartholomew 1804, 1805 & 1806. Wilson dataset on the 
transit trade of St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas (2015). 
 
Looking at geographic provenience (Figure 4.8), the majority of American 
ships unsurprisingly came from two large commercial centers on the North 
American seaboard, New York and Philadelphia. Together they represented 
33.7 percent of the American shipping that landed in Gustavia during 1804–
06. The Chesapeake region was generally well represented, and ships also 
came from Saco, Salem, Georgetown, New Bern, Newburyport, Savannah and 
Swansborough. Thirteen of the American arrivals had not departed directly 
from US ports, but came from various Dutch and French ports. 
The Swedish ships were a different matter altogether. They carried into 
Gustavia considerably smaller assortments of goods. Barthélemy ships 
consisted generally of small sloops and schooners, utilized mainly in the intra-
                                                          
32 American State Papers, Class IV: Commerce and Navigation, vol 1, 590, 671, 696. For total 
values, see Figures 4.10 and 4.11; Coatsworth, “American Trade”, 256. 
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Caribbean trade with islands in the Lesser Antilles. They carried any range of 
goods, but the emphasis was clearly on colonial staple goods; sugar, coffee, 
rum and cocoa. Of all the Swedish ships, 49.5 percent arrived with some 
quantity of sugar. Judging by the available information, the return cargoes to 
Gustavia from the island trade could be exceedingly small. On the 26th of July 
1805 Francisco de la Rosa, master of the small schooner Sally, signed a 
manifest declaring an outward cargo of building materials, lime, nails, hinges 
and padlocks bound for Guadeloupe. Before his departure he had come from 
the same island with a cargo of 20 barrels of muscovado sugar. Captain de la 
Rosa plied Caribbean waters quite regularly during the course of the year, as 
his ship arrived at least six times from other islands, carrying at all times 
carrying some cargo of either sugar, coffee, cotton or wine. In late December, 
the Sally arrived from as far away as Curaçao with campeche wood and coffee. 
The ship and its voyages is a good example of the small-scale cabotage traffic 
that had its base in neutral islands. She was a small schooner, measuring only 
10 lasts, and was at least in the nominal ownership of Gustaf Norgren, one of 
the few Swedish-born merchants on the island.33 
The overall pattern of Swedish and American vessels would seem to 
support the basic assumption that American ships arrived from the North 
with victuals, timber products and other necessaries which could be sold in 
St. Barthélemy for return cargoes of colonial staples. These staples would then 
in turn have to have been collected from mostly nearby islands in the Lesser 
Antilles by small Swedish ships that sailed unceasingly throughout the year. 
However, Swedish ships landed with no cargo with a very high frequency. 
Nearly half of all Swedish vessels arrived in Gustavia in 1805. It is therefore 
not that easy to suppose that Gustavia functioned only as a market where 
American exports and colonial products changed hands. St. Barthélemy-
registered ships must have made a significant amount of intra-Caribbean 
trading expeditions without the intention or final outcome of bringing 
colonial staples to trade in Gustavia. Issued sea-passes for these vessels were 
comparatively high for the years 1804–06. In 1805, 180 passes were issued. 
                                                          
33 Manifest of the schooner Sally, signed Gustavia, 26 July 1805, M 1, FSB, ANOM; Wilson 
dataset on the transit trade of St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas (2015); Passport of the Sally issued 
to Norgren in The Report of St. Bartholomew, 21 June 1806; Possibly the ex-Governor Bagge could 
have been her owner and Norgren only an agent, as a newspaper advertisement in the Report of 
St. Bartholomew, 15 March 1806, stated that Norgren had been employed by Bagge. 
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Combining this information with the data on arrivals, we can come to the 
conclusion that the minimum median amount of voyages St. Barthélemy-
vessels made in this year lay between 5 and 6. It is therefore far from 
impossible to suppose that these ships maintained commercial connections 
between other Caribbean colonies. A retrospective published in The Report of 
St. Bartholomew described exactly this more than five years later: 
It was reserved to the present times [after the peace of Amiens] to exhibit 
the novel, and not uninteresting sight of a close maintenance of all the 
relations of amity and commerce in the midst of war, between the colonies 
of France, and (some of those) of England, by means of the Swedish flag. In 
this intercourse National obligations, were not always regarded as strong 
enough to supersede the weightier considerations of personal Friendship, 
or private emolument, and it was not unfrequently extended to articles of 
contraband; for which unhappy Neutrals, would have been severely 
trounced.34 
In the short recess from war in 1802–03, British merchants had begun trading 
very actively with French colonies. The sudden resumption of hostilities left 
merchants of both belligerent nations with many unresolved affairs and 
dependencies on the wrong side of enemy lines. Additionally, the mutual 
benefits derived from this commerce left many unwilling to abstain from it in 
the future. Neutral flags such as the Swedish and Danish furnished the means 
of prolonging this trade, even if it was officially outlawed. It was therefore not 
surprising to see, as observers did during this time, “many of the British 
droghing vessels […] metamorphosed into Swedish ones.” The practice of 
buying and registering vessels in the names of others therefore continued 
among Gustavia burghers with renewed and increased frequency. Many 
Swedish vessels returning to Gustavia, then, seldom visited their home port 
for the purpose of bringing goods to market, but to renew their sea-passes. 
Even during these years Swedish vessels were not as numerous as Danish St. 
Thomas-registered vessels, but the picture was far removed from the one-
sided dominance of Danish vessels in the neutral Caribbean trade of the late 
1790s. Swedish neutral shipping was a more prominent presence than before. 
                                                          
34 “Extracts from M.S. Sketches of a political and commercial review of the island of. 
Bartholomew…” in The Report of St. Bartholomew, 3 August, 1811.  
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This probably had a lot to do with the extension of navigation rights issued in 
1803, which abolished the old prohibition on vessels larger than 20 lasts. Still, 
the St. Barthélemy-registered vessels could not make sail for European 
destinations other than Sweden, which explains the almost non-existent 
outward commerce to Europe. On an inward route, there arrived 20 ships 
from European ports in 1804, followed by 26 ships in 1805. There were some 
merchants in Gustavia who had connections to port cities in the North Sea 
and the Mediterranean. But they were obliged to freight their expeditions 
under a different flag, not uncommonly American. But this was a costly a 
circuitous way of doing business, and explains why merchants based in 
Gustavia did not do a lot of direct business with European markets.35 
While it is certain that the largest share of the Swedish-flagged transit 
trade consisted of different sorts of round-trips to Caribbean colonies, it is 
impossible to discern which colonies were frequented the most because of the 
ambiguities in the records. Only 290 out of 2,356 ships landing in Gustavia 
from Caribbean destinations were supplied with specific information on the 
port of departure. Yet, with the information in these, it seems to be clear that 
Swedish neutral shipping was directed mostly to smaller British and French 
islands in both the Windward and Leeward islands. The connections to 
Martinique and Guadeloupe continued, and there were a considerable share 
of shipping from Antigua, Anguilla and Barbados. Overall, there were not 
many locations in the wider Caribbean that were not represented in these 
arrivals, but colonies such as Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica and Puerto Rico were 
not regular, established destinations.36 
Colonial Blockades and a Brief End to Swedish Neutrality 
A significant turn came when formal Swedish neutrality ended when Sweden 
entered the Third Coalition against Napoleon in 1805. This fact had its 
consequences for the trade between St. Barthélemy and the French colonies 
                                                          
35 “Extracts from M.S. Sketches of a political and commercial review of the island of. 
Bartholomew…” in The Report of St. Bartholomew, 3 August, 1811; SWIC Minutes, 2 September 
1803, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 157. 
36 Wilson dataset on the transit trade of St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas (2015). 
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in the region. There was however no immediate backlash. Instead, the usual 
informal relations between the islands continued. On 11 July 1806 a formal 
letter was received in St. Barthélemy from General Ernouf, the Governor of 
Guadeloupe, informing the Swedish council of the recently declared Franco-
Swedish War. The French generals and colonial officials continued to 
entertain a friendly disposition towards the Swedish island despite the war. 
General Villaret of Martinique had protected Swedish ships laying in the 
harbor of St. Pierre, in the face of demands by Jérôme Bonaparte to confiscate 
them during a visit to the island. French privateers that had ventured to 
capture Swedish vessels early on in the conflict were disappointed to see that 
they were promptly restituted to their owners and allowed free passage. 
Villaret, for instance, had even allowed the remaining Swedish vessels to hoist 
French colors and return safely to Gustavia. Ernouf likewise stalled any 
possible hostile measures, keeping the official declaration under wraps for 
several months after having received information about it.37  
The attitude maintained by French officials after the declaration of war 
was to a certain extent a result of some calm and sober considerations. The 
limited usefulness of molesting a colony from which there was not much to be 
feared was one aspect, and the increasingly precarious state of the French 
colonies in the Caribbean was another. The threat of a British landfall was 
beginning to be very real. But the non-hostile course taken by Ernouf and 
Villaret also speaks a great deal about the utility of a neutral free port to the 
French colonies in the Lesser Antilles. Ernouf revealed as much in a 
communication to the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies, in which he 
cited the need for an access to neutral entrepôts, and St. Barthélemy was in 
this respect a much safer and close alternative than St. Thomas. He also made 
a point of the fact that a large share of the population in the Swedish colony 
was French, and that the merchants of St. Barthélemy were both by their 
connections as well as their birth closely bound to France and were “real 
agents for our colonies”.38 
But this mutual understanding in the region was not any real guarantee for 
keeping up previous commercial engagements, as no one was convinced that 
                                                          
37 Ernouf to Ankarheim, 7 July 1806, SBS vol. 1 C, SNA. 
38 Ernouf to Decrés, 1 October 1806, Col. C7A 65, fols. 57–59, ANOM. 
 209 
 
this sort of relationship would be tenable in the long run. British watchfulness 
was one factor that worked against it. After the declaration of war, a British 
frigate paid a visit to Gustavia, and its commanding officers offered to land a 
garrison of British soldiers and to post a maritime patrol around the island’s 
waters to protect the island from an impending French invasion from 
Guadeloupe. This visit and its implications sent a wave of panic among the 
Gustavia merchants long since associated with the Guadeloupe trade. The 
merchants interpreted the British offer only as a pretext for widespread 
confiscations of French merchandise, bearing of course the late occupation in 
mind. Concerned inhabitants pleaded with Governor Ankarheim to dispatch 
a messenger to Guadeloupe to ascertain the truth behind the rumors of an 
alleged invasion. In Basse-Terre there were similar signs of public outrage, as 
many owned property in Gustavia either in their own names or through 
naturalized relatives living in the free port. Few, it was claimed, did not have 
any sort of connections or outstanding debts or payments due in the Swedish 
colony. The rumors about an invasion were ultimately proved to be entirely 
false, and General Ernouf believed them to be fabricated by British sources, 
created in order to ensure British control of St. Barthélemy. Such hearsay did 
its harm, however, and ensured that the formerly stable bonds between St. 
Barthélemy and the remaining colonies under French rule began to 
deteriorate. People started to leave Gustavia in droves, and there was a visible 
drain of vital capital as a result. The formal declaration of war finally came in 
early September from Guadeloupe, and from that time the shaky balance in 
Franco-Swedish relations was gone. French privateers were again a real threat, 
and their presence outside the road of Gustavia was duly noted in the 
Governors’ increasingly somber reports. A few merchants, it was told, even 
had procured Danish flags at exorbitant rates in a desperate attempt to gain 
protection from French seizures.39 
Faced with this situation, Gustavia officials and merchants began to 
scramble for solutions. Urged by a petition of remaining burghers and 
merchants, Ankarheim decided to negotiate with the commanding generals 
on Guadeloupe and Martinique. The idea was to try to convince them of 
respecting St. Barthélemy as a neutral island. After all, this was not a 
                                                          
39 Ernouf to Ankarheim, 18 January, 4 July, 9 July, 12 July & 1 October 1806, 2 January 1807, SBS 
1C, SNA. 
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phenomenon new to a wartime Caribbean. St. Martin had served this function 
for both French and British vessels during the American War of 
Independence, it was argued. Ankarheim was sure the French side would 
agree, but was wary of waiting for royal acceptance of this arrangement from 
Stockholm. In the present situation, he claimed, the allied British were 
causing more harm to the island than the French, as the former continued 
seizing and condemning vessels engaged in the inter-island trade, while the 
latter allowed some measure of dispensation. Nevertheless, both Ernouf and 
Villaret could not stretch their authority to accept this sort of agreement, and 
declined in politely articulated letters. While neither party desired any 
hostilities, open economic contacts could not be maintained as before.40  
Matters would however suddenly come to a head because of some 
burgeoning commercial transactions between St. Barthélemy merchants and 
newly independent Haiti. In the United States, pronounced Southern fears 
concerning the possible spread of black emancipation to the United States 
meant that an American recognition of the new island nation was out of the 
question. There were also concerns about the issue of French privateers 
seizing American merchant vessels on the trade routes to Haiti since the 
declaration of Haitian independence in 1804. France actively pursued an 
aggressive policy towards Haitian commerce after the failure to restore 
French rule and impose slavery anew on the island in 1802. These 
considerations and others led to the final isolation of Haiti by the U.S. in 1807 
by means of a trade embargo. Despite the destructive impact of decades of 
internecine warfare, Haiti was still considered as an important market by 
American merchants. Since Denmark also had issued severe restrictions on 
any type of communication with Haiti, St. Barthélemy remained as one of the 
few channels through which any commercial adventures to Haiti could be 
attempted. One American who ventured to go this way was William Israel. 
Israel was one of the wealthiest independent merchants in Gustavia at this 
time, and he had set up a correspondence with traders in Haiti for future 
expeditions. He had attained burgher documents in Gustavia sometime 
around the beginning of the century, he set up a business operation there. In 
                                                          
40 Memorandum signed Anders Bergstedt and Samuel Fahlberg, 24 December 1806, SBS 1 C, 
SNA; Petition of 47 Gustavia merchants, 6 December 1806, SBS 1 C, SNA; Ankarheim to Ernouf, 
27 December 1806, SBS 22, SNA. 
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1806 he issued sea-passes for at least two vessels, the schooner Leonidas and 
the brig Ann and Contempt, of 39 and 36 lasts, respectively.41 
It did nevertheless not take long until the French in Guadeloupe caught 
wind of these plans, and Ernouf reacted promptly. Lacking regular maritime 
forces, he commissioned a few privateers and loaded them with troops for a 
hostile expedition to St. Barthélemy, which resulted in the short French 
occupation of 1807 mentioned in an earlier chapter. Ernouf’s intention was to 
arrest Israel and to seize his property on the island. During the night between 
the 11th and 12th of November a detachment of French soldiers landed 
clandestinely in a southern cove of the island. The plan was to subdue the 
Swedish garrison quickly and then to seize Israel for a quick return with the 
spoils. When guards spotted the French forces encroaching the town at night, 
a small skirmish soon took place, in which a Swedish soldier was killed before 
Gustavia was surrendered. The expedition was a failure insofar as Israel was 
never apprehended, but a few of his smaller vessels as well as the contents of 
his warehouse, was confiscated. It was reported that it was stocked wall-to-
wall with Haitian coffee. The French occupation was over in less than 24 
hours, but the French left the island with the promise of renewed hostilities 
if any Swedish burgher was found doing business with Haiti.42 
                                                          
41 Tim Matthewson, ”Jefferson and Haiti,” The Journal of Southern History 61, on. 2 (1995), 234–
238; Congress passed a law already on March 3, 1805, which put restrictions on the trade. As it 
turned out, it proved to be only marginally effective, and was subject to revisions until repassed 
on February 24, 1807. It expired the next year, but because of the general embargo of December 
22, 1807, U.S. trade with Haiti remained illegal until the spring of 1810; Israel’s registrations in 
The Report of Saint Bartholomew, 31 January 1807. 
42 Ankarheim’s report, 27 November 1807, SBS 1 C, SNA; Forsström to Lindblad, 19 March 1808, 
Linköpings stiftsbibliotek, Lindblomska brevsamlingen, vol. 16, 1808:134. 
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5 An Anglo-American Port of 
Convenience, 1809–1815 
After the British occupation of St. Thomas in 1807, St, Barthélemy 
remained as the only neutral free port in the Lesser Antilles. This position did 
however not lead to any immediate advantage, as the colony was shook hard 
by American Embargo Act of 1807. It had the effect of slowing vital American 
imports to a trickle. Strict controls on the exportation of flour and other 
foodstuffs were instituted by the island council, and prices on bread were 
fixed as an attempt to alleviate starvation among the town’s poor. The second 
period of the Napoleonic Wars in the Caribbean was characterized by an 
initial spurt of neutral seizures, the provocation of Denmark into war, and the 
systematic British conquest of enemy colonies. St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. 
John were seized by the British in December 1807. The occupation of the 
Danish islands completely eradicated the trade with the French and Spanish 
colonies which had previously existed. Deprived of supplies and outlets for 
their produce, the French colonies were now highly vulnerable, and all were 
occupied almost at will by British forces between 1807 and 1810. Saint-
Domingue’s export sector had all but been destroyed by civil warfare during 
the preceding decades. Dutch Curaçao was also occupied in 1808. Other 
conflicts ended, such as when the Anglo-Spanish War was concluded in July 
1808, and an eventual Anglo-American war was only staved off momentarily 
by the assimilation of belligerent colonies with which the Americans could 
trade. Anglo-American relations steadily deteriorated as Americans were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the British blockade of the European continent, 
as well as with the virtual monopoly which the British now exercised on trade 
in the Caribbean. Violations of U.S. neutrality also continued, and the U.S. 
Congress finally responded to the mounting conflicts with commercial 
warfare. The Embargo Act was signed into law on December 22, 1807 and 
lasted until 1809. The idea behind the embargo was to chasten Great Britain 
and France and impose economic hardships on them as belligerents. The 
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embargo however turned out to be counterproductive, and was in the end an 
economic and diplomatic failure.1 
A few crafty American merchants still found ways to evade the embargo 
and reached St. Barthélemy from time to time. Unscrupulous shippers found 
a loophole in the original embargo act by the requirement that goods loaded 
and cleared for a coasting voyage had to be landed in an American port, 
“dangers of the sea excepted.” An example of an exploitation of this kind was 
the case of the American brig James Wells, which had left New York with a 
cargo of more than 1200 barrels of flour on the 26th of February 1808. The ship 
was cleared for St. Mary’s in Georgia, but on account of foul weather and the 
leaky condition of the ship, the supercargo, who was also the owner, declared 
that he was obliged to put into Gustavia. Once there, he declared that he had 
to land his cargo because it was damaged, and afterward, since the island 
council had forbidden the export of provisions, he was forced to sell his flour. 
It must be added that the affair ended most opportunely for him due to the 
prevailing shortage of imports, as he could sell his flour at a very high price. 
Once back on American soil, the owner of the James Wells was prosecuted and 
the case finally came before the Supreme Court. The evidence showed that 
the supercargo’s explanations were either bogus or unfounded, as the ship 
apparently had made no effort to reach an American port, and the vessel was 
therefore condemned.2 
Aside from the American embargo, British men-of-war were now 
patrolling outside the road of Gustavia against the French, effectively 
blockading the little commercial traffic that was left. British cruisers seized 
in- and outgoing ships during this time, even Swedish-flagged vessels despite 
the protection agreement between the Swedish council and Admiral 
Cochrane. This quickly prompted an outcry among town merchants. Faced 
with this situation, Governor Ankarheim wrote Cochrane in August 1808 and 
called for the removal of British protection, as Gustavia now stood, as he put 
it, “near the brinck of ruin”. The British cruisers eventually complied with 
                                                          
1 Craton, “Vice Admiralty Courts,” 260; Clauder, “American Commerce,” 132–47. 
2 Brig James Wells vs. U.S., 11 U.S. 22 (1812); Clauder, “American Commerce,”136. 
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Ankarheim’s request and departed.3 In short, 1808 passed as a dismal year for 
St. Barthélemy, but things were soon to change. 
5.1 The Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 
The immediate source of reversed fortunes was that the American Embargo 
ended in 1809 and was supplanted by the Non-Intercourse Act. Thus the 
previous, partial non-importation policies were supplanted by a complete ban 
on all British goods, on all British colonial produce, and on all import from the 
French Empire or occupied territories. British and French ships were 
completely shut out of American harbors as well. American ships were not 
permitted to go to British and French ports. This was the last step in the 
efforts of the US government against the maritime depredations against its 
merchant fleet. The plan was appended with a promise of forgiveness in 
return for the abandonment of the French decrees or the British Orders-in-
Council insofar as they violated the neutral commerce of the United States.4 
American Non-Intercourse entailed some immediate and interesting 
consequences for St. Barthélemy. It has been pointed out that the limited 
freedom granted to American ships in the Act “bedeviled the whole plan”. 
When the Embargo was lifted in mid-March, American merchantmen cleared 
for permitted foreign ports, usually ones that previously had been more 
unusual destinations. Gothenburg, Tönningen, and other Scandinavian ports 
burst into popularity. In the West Indies, St. Barthélemy was “inundated with 
spring cruisers”.5 Albert Gallatin had correctly foreseen this effect, as 
explained in a letter to Jefferson. His belief was that the “true effect” of the 
lifting of the total embargo “would be to open an indirect trade with Great 
Britain, which, through St. Barthlomolomew and Havana, Lisbon, Cadiz, or 
                                                          
3 Ankarheim to Cochrane, 10 August 1808, SBS 1C, SNA; Ankarheim’s report of 2 September 
1808, SBS 1C, SNA. 
4 Herbert Heaton, “Non-Importation 1806–1812,” The Journal of Economic History 1, no. 2 (1941): 
191–92. 
5 Heaton, “Non-Importation,” 192. 
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Gottenburg, would receive […] all the provisions, naval stores and raw 
materials” that Britain possibly could want.6  
The effects of the Act had also been anticipated in a petition of Gustavia 
merchants written to the Swedish council in January 1809. The merchants 
very correctly expressed their belief that it was very probable that the Swedish 
flag and Swedish territories would “be in the number to be exempted from the 
resolutions of that act”. Information and rumors about the Act’s contents had 
clearly been disseminated and discussed among the well-informed local 
merchants. The prospects of the Act raised both hopes and concerns. On the 
one hand, the merchants expected some benefits to arise from the new order 
of things, but on the other hand they were worried that the “unthinking” 
among the naturalized burghers would be tempted to take out sea registers in 
their own names and sell or lend them to Americans, as they had “seen of late 
that hardly a single vessel is come to this port with the American Flag, which 
has not gone out from it without our own”. They also suggested some 
measures be enacted against the expected influx of American flag-changers, 
which the council duly accepted. Sea-passes were now restricted to four 
months instead of six, African-bound ships excepted. Furthermore it was 
decided that sea register applicants be forced to deposit a security bond, at 
the same value as the register. The bond was to be forfeited if the register was 
not returned within the prescribed time limit.7 By all appearances, the new 
restrictions never had the desired effect. It is telling alone that 1809 saw the 
record amount of St. Barthélemy sea registers taken out in a single year, 204. 
A year later, the Swedish consul in Philadelphia, Richard Söderström, 
confirmed the anticipated effects as he reported that the Swedish-flagged 
vessels arriving into American ports frequently changed their flags: 
[…] the vessels that arrived today under the Swedish trading flag show the 
American flag tomorrow […] [they] go from here under the American flag, 
                                                          
6 Gallatin to Jefferson, 9 September 1808, in The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 434–45. 
7 Merchants’ petition, 23 January 1809, Council Minutes, 1 February 1809, PJ 156, FSB, ANOM. 
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and in 5 or 6 weeks arrive once again from some port under the Swedish 
flag.8 
It should be noted that the previously French-controlled islands around the 
Swedish colony had all come under British control. St. Barthélemy and the 
American goods in transit through the port of Gustavia thus posed no kind of 
nuisance to the blockading strategy of Britain. Quite the opposite, the 
commerce of St. Barthélemy was serving a vital function within a British 
economic sphere in the Caribbean. The Swedish colony could transmit much 
needed American goods to the British colonies which they were no longer 
able to receive directly from U.S. ports. From his vantage point in New York, 
the Swedish consul Henrik Gahn noted the worsening of relations between 
the United States and Britain. He also noted that the Non-Intercourse Act 
made Swedish carrying capacity and commodities desirable in American 
ports. In particular, he thought, St. Barthélemy would benefit, as the 
American vessels would be able to unload their cargoes there.9 The American 
traffic had appeared in Gustavia in full force beginning in April 1809. In fact, 
there were so many ships arriving each day that the customs inspector 
Furuträd became overwhelmed with the growing size of his daily tasks. He 
stated that on the first eleven days of the month, 86 American ships had 
arrived, not counting other ships from the surrounding islands. He did not 
think it within his means to accurately register each and every ship in the 
customs journals, and requested additional assistance in his chores to avoid 
any losses to the crown.10  
Americans engaged in the transit trade through Gustavia during this time 
employed all manners of methods to defraud customs and to avoid additional 
costs. It was observed by local merchants and officials alike that Americans 
tended to arrive with their cargoes and arrange sales onboard while anchored, 
rather than perform the required unloading, selling, and loading of goods. 
William Israel, who had received a commission as American consul on St. 
                                                          
8 Söderström to the Board of Trade, 28 April 1810, E VI aa 374, Huvudarkivet, 
Kommerskollegium, SNA; Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, 210–211. 
9 Gahn to the Board of Trade, 25 November 1809, E VI aa 352, Huvudarkivet, 
Kommerskollegium, SNA; Müller, 211–212. 
10 Furuträd’s memorial 12 April 1809, PJ 157, FSB, ANOM. 
 217 
 
Barthélemy, reported to the Secretary of State that some had instead sold 
their cargoes at interdicted ports, and only arrived at Gustavia to obtain 
certificates of landing as to mask their real commercial destination. Many 
Americans, he wrote, even sported fictitious names in official dealings. 
Though they often confessed regret of their conduct before the American 
consul, they claimed that the current times required a certain attitude and 
that especially the northern merchants who dealt in fish would be the “most 
firm supporters of the Laws” in the future when other circumstances would 
allow them to.11 
Even if the heavy traffic and obvious frauds led to some inevitable profits 
evading the council coffers, the year of 1809 was unlike any other preceding 
year in terms of commercial gain for the Swedish crown. The windfall from 
customs revenues that year yielded 107,778 Spanish dollars, as opposed the 
previous annual average of 15,600 Spanish dollars. The corresponding official 
estimates of American exports to St. Barthélemy for the same year was over $ 
3,600,000 (See Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Compared to the earlier decades, the 
Swedish crown was now raking in prodigious profits from the transit trade 
through the port of Gustavia. The simple explanation for this is because the 
American shipping had few other entry points to Caribbean markets except 
for Spanish ports. Curaçao and St. Thomas, who had previously enjoyed a far 
larger share of the American exports throughout the years 1790–1807, were 
now under British lockdown. How and why did St. Barthélemy escape British 
occupation during the remainder of the European conflicts? Surely, an 
occupation would not have been any less simple than before, and it would have 
snuffed out another subterfuge for American shipping. Diplomatic relations 
between Sweden and Britain in 1809 were indeed strained and complicated. 
The fragile alliance was held upon the fact that Sweden was very much 
dependent upon the British crown, its only ally at the time. The British also 
had much to gain from keeping trade links to the Baltic open during the war. 
France was a common enemy as well. This changed after the 1809 coup against 
Gustav IV Adolf and the subsequent Treaty of Paris, as the Swedish 
diplomatic trajectory shifted towards a friendly stance against France, which 
in effect forced a formal declaration of war against Britain in November 1810.  
                                                          
11 Israel to Smith, 26 April 1809 and 23 July 1809, M72, RG 59, NARA. 
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Still, this amounted only a fictitious conflict, and diplomatic and commercial 
channels between Britain and Sweden remained as open as before.12 
This might do well to explain why St. Barthélemy was spared any further 
British hostilities, but regional circumstances should also be considered. 
When St. Thomas was occupied by the British Navy in December of 1807, 
vociferous complaints were voiced by interested assemblies of British 
merchants. Complaints were made by a sizable group of British merchants 
trading to St. Thomas, and showed that it was British and not Danish 
commerce which was made to suffer by the recent takeover. The island had 
acted as a leading entrepôt for trade between the Britain and Spanish 
colonies. During the war years 1796–1802, St. Thomas was a focal point of the 
British slave trade with the Spanish colonies. But the main concern on the 
event of its capture was the British textile trade to the Spanish Main, which 
had employed St. Thomas extensively as a base of operations. The merchants 
protested the ruinous consequences of stifling British annual exports 
amounting “to a sum almost incredible”. They also observed that a great deal 
of the seized property on the Danish island in fact belonged to British 
subjects. St. Thomas was not, however, granted the status of British free port, 
as had been the case with other conquered foreign islands previously involved 
in the trade with the Spanish colonies, such as Curaçao. Instead, St. Thomas 
was allowed only to partake in the much more restricted licensed trade.13 
The Americans, meanwhile, were finding themselves increasingly shut out. 
The diplomatic situation between the UK and the US had since the Non-
Intercourse Act become critical, and relations were also still being worsened 
by continuing seizures of American vessels. The tension was only eased by the 
abrogation of many of the objectionable clauses of the British Orders-in-
                                                          
12 The growing North American share in the Spanish regional economy of the Americas, see for 
instance Jacues A. Barbier, “Silver, North American pentetration and the Spanish imperial 
economy, 1760–1800,” in The North American role in the Spanish Imperial Economy, ed. Jacques A. 
Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 6–12.; Cf: Fischer, 
Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism, 197–216; Regarding the war between Great Britain and 
Sweden, seeUlf Sundberg, Svenska krig 1521–1814 (Stockholm: Hjalmarsson & Högberg, 1998), 
391–93. 
13 The merchants calculated a value of £210,000 in British exports to St. Thomas in 1807 alone, 
see B.T. 1/37 No. 31. Memorial of merchants trading to St. Thomas, 5 October 1807; B.T. 1/37 No. 
32. Memorial of merchants of Lancaster trading to St. Thomas, 3 October 1807; Armytage, 87; 
Pearce, British Trade, 201–202; Armytage, The Free Port System, 103.04. 
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Council by the General Orders of 13 March, 1809. Another means of British 
détente was that the virtual British monopoly on trade in the Caribbean had 
the useful effect of decreasing the number of American seizures necessary to 
maintain the British blockade of Napoleon’s Europe. After 1808, the business 
of the Caribbean Prize Courts grinded down to a pause, especially after orders 
were received to restore American vessels that were already seized.14 
Given that the Caribbean was now effectively under British imperial 
control, a small American trade was deemed tolerable, indeed it was seen as 
beneficial, as British colonies still were far from solving their chronic problem 
of undersupply. St. Barthélemy, in this situation, assumed the role of a 
convenient conduit for Anglo-American trade, a subterfuge which allowed 
some exchange between the belligerents. An editorial notice in a January 
number of The Report of Saint Bartholomew was quite open about the prevailing 
order:  
That the British navigation act is strictly followed in some of the British 
Islands, is very true; but it is as true, that English vessels carry American 
produce from hence to British islands every day, and that even Swedish 
vessels with American produce are admitted in some.15 
The British were not unaware of the fact that the goods flowing out from St. 
Barthélemy were nothing but re-exports from the United States and the 
surrounding islands. Governor Elliot of the Leeward Islands, writing in 1811 
to the Earl of Liverpool, admitted that if the Non-Intercourse Act between 
the United States and Britain been strictly observed and enforced, the British 
Leewards would be in dire need of the necessary supply of provisions, lumber 
and livestock from North America. St. Barthélemy was the crucial link to 
these supplies, but Elliot still was unsure, as many other British officials in the 
region, in what view British colonial relations with St. Barthélemy was legally 
to be considered, as Sweden was a nation formally at war with Britain, as well 
as the “singular” nature of the free port institution of Gustavia, which had 
created opportunities for Britain’s enemies in the past.16 Even before Elliot’s 
                                                          
14 Craton, “Vice Admiralty Courts,” 327–328. 
15 The Report of St. Bartholomew, 10 January 1810. 
16 Elliot to Lord Liverpool, 3 September 1811, C.O. 152/98. 
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inquiries were known at the Foreign Department in London, a dispatch was 
planned to be forwarded to him, instructing the Governor that “the same 
lenient policy maintained towards Sweden should be pursued towards her 
Dependencies in the West Indies”.17 
This situation was essential for the economic livelihoods of nearly all 
parties concerned. Whereas the British colonists could secure a steady supply 
despite the state of war with the United States, merchants of St. Barthélemy 
subsisted on the “intercourse with the People of the United States,” and were 
“Active or Languid, in proportion to the demands of the British Possessions.” 
The Americans, as before, carried provisions and articles of necessity for the 
British colonies to St. Barthélemy, where local merchants purchased and 
stored them until they could be runned into the British colonies, “in such 
small parcels, as either do not attract the Notice of their Revenue Officers.” 
American traders, too, were obliged to resort to this scheme even though it 
entailed trading with the enemy. The American exports to the West Indies 
had quickly plummeted to levels that were prevalent in the immediate post-
Independence period. The only markets in left for the Americans to access 
were St. Barthélemy as well as the Spanish colonies. The coming conflict with 
Great Britain would perpetuate this condition for the remainder of the 
Napoleonic Wars.18  
                                                          
17 Smith to Peele, 7 September, C.O. 152/98; Earl of Liverpool to Elliot, 21 September 1811, C.O. 
53/34. 
18 Quotes from Runnels to Skogman, 31 March 1812, SBS, vol. 2, SNA; Coatsworth, “American 
Trade,” 247, 251–54; Clauder, “American Commerce,” 229–32. 
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5.2 The War of 1812 
The conflict between the United States and Britain formally began on the 18th 
of June 1812, when president James Madison signed the measure into law. The 
U.S. declaration of war came as the end-result of American grievances against 
Britain for a long period. Ironically, the British government had started to 
embark on a more reconciliatory policy towards the United States, and had 
issued a repeal on the 11th of May 1812 of past Orders-in-Council aimed 
towards neutral trade. The news of the British repeal did however cross the 
Atlantic before the declaration of war had been put into effect. Neither side 
was particularly well prepared to prosecute the war, and especially Britain 
took a very pragmatic course in order not to cramp existing trade 
relationships between the North American mainland and British colonies. 
The trade on the Canadian-American border in fact flourished during the war, 
even when the U.S. government was determined to stamp out trade with the 
enemy through commercial sanctions. Even as U.S. leaders still put their faith 
in commercial prohibitions, British officials left New England unblockaded 
precisely in order to facilitate this trade. At the beginning of the war, British 
officials in Canada authorized the export of all goods outright to the United 
States, and ordered British subjects in the colonies not to molest the goods or 
vessels of American citizens, so long as they did not show any hostility when 
encountered.19 
The sea-lanes between the North American coast and the West Indies 
were exceptions to this general condition. The trade with the enemy was 
generally condoned by U.S. authorities as long as it was conducted in neutral 
ships: Neutral ships flying Swedish and Spanish colors were known to operate 
from the British dominions to U.S. ports. Since the beginning of the U.S. 
Embargo policy, the Swedish government was beginning to take notice of the 
recent surge in traffic at St. Barthélemy. Official letters from the Colonial 
Department reveal both the possible benefits and risks that were expected. 
Wary of possible actions from the part of British Admiralty, instructions were 
issued to the Swedish Governor, to act, as always, carefully and discretely. 
                                                          
19 Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2012), 28–47, 169–170 
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Special attention was given to the policy of issuing sea-passes, officials at the 
Department were especially firm on the point of observing the proper 
formalities of applications, and to always ascertain that only Swedish burghers 
were the true owners of trading ventures under Swedish colors. While these 
considerations were stressed, the instructions also carried the argument that 
British colonies and their responsive officials would act pragmatically during 
the war. In other words, it was expected that a certain measure of clandestine 
trade from North America was to be permitted in order to meet immediate 
needs.20 
In a telling move, the Board of Commerce clearly exploited the situation 
by allowing Swedish consuls unprecedented rights to issue certain registers 
and ship’s documents in the fall of 1812. The most crucial point was that 
American ships were now allowed to be naturalized while anchored in 
American ports. In other words, American ships could be sold to Swedish 
burghers or their agents in North American ports and apply for Swedish 
documents. After this naturalization process, ships were allowed to sail for 
Gustavia and obtain the proper sea-pass for further expeditions. In this way 
American ships could slip past the British blockade and cruising ships outside 
the Continental seaboard.21  
While this measure was made to make the most out of the war situation, 
the Swedish government was still uncertain as to the British opinion on the 
matter. The matter was simply put forward in Britain by the resident Swedish 
minister Johann Gotthard von Rehausen, still on location in London despite 
the formal state of war between Sweden and Britain. The solicitous response 
came in the form of the so-called American Prizes Act of 1 February 1813, 
which modified a certain passage of the earlier Orders of 11 November 1807, 
which held that belligerents (i.e. Britain’s enemies) could not sell their ships 
to neutrals, as they would then be held as good prize. Now, it was decided, 
that the Orders would be confined to the ships of France and her overseas 
possessions, as this was thought to be “expedient”. The Orders were 
personally communicated by Castlereagh to Rehausen. They were forwarded 
                                                          
20 Hickey, The War of 1812, 234; af Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 12 November 1812, Image 18–19, 
vol. 258, Correspondance (C), FSB, ANOM. 
21 Af Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 3 February 1813, Image 29–31, vol. 258, Correspondance (C), 
FSB, ANOM. 
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to the Governor in St. Barthélemy, already translated into French from the 
English original. He was urged to make these “most fortunate proceedings” as 
widely known and public as possible.22 
In essence, then, these Orders amounted to nothing less than the tacit 
approval from Whitehall of American trade under the Swedish flag. 
Moreover, Admiralty had informed its officers stationed in the Caribbean 
that the Swedish flag was to be respected at sea. In fact, this had for a longer 
time been the prevailing order. Already in early 1812, the U.S. consul Speyer 
in Gothenburg informed the Secretary of State of his suspicions: 
This government is desirous to draw from that possession [St. Barthélemy] 
all the revenues it is capable of yielding and I am induced to believe that 
England will not oppose it. – There must doubtless exist a friendly 
understanding with that govt., as a number of Swedish merchant vessels, 
which had been detained, were given up.23  
This dispensation was readily exploited, as shown by the statistics of the 
Gustavia customs journals in 1811–1813 (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Whereas the high 
frequency of British and American vessels in Gustavia in 1811–12 reveals an 
ongoing breach of the American Non-Intercourse Act, the American vessels 
all but disappeared in in 1813, as there were only 35 recorded arrivals as 
opposed to 395 during the previous year. In contrast, there was a conspicuous 
increase in Swedish arrivals during these years. The corresponding figures for 
tonnages reveal, however, that it was probably not only a matter of American 
ships merely changing flags, as median tonnages for the Swedish ships in 1813, 
for instance, was considerably smaller than their American counterparts, as 
an American ship generally measured well above 100 tons, while a Swedish 
ship registered in Gustavia was slightly above 30 tons. A total of 39 ships 
arrived with “consular papers”, which is nothing other than American ships 
that had been naturalized with Swedish documents on the North American 
Coast. While the amount of these vessels amounted to only 6 percent of the  
  
                                                          
22 For the American Prizes Act, se 53 Geo. 3 c. 63; af Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 20 February 
1813, Rehausen’s report, 12 January 1812, C 258, FSB, ANOM. 
23 Speyer to Monroe, 8 January 1812, T230, RG 59, NARA. 
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total arrivals, they nevertheless represented nearly ¼ of the total recorded 
tonnage. The business of vessel naturalization was witnessed by Swedish 
vessels arriving in the United States from Gothenburg in 1813, who duly 
complained about “such a stagnation in shipping in trade” that they were 
compelled to return eastwards to Cadiz or Lissabon with small or unprofitable 
cargoes. The Swedish vessels proper were prospecting for precisely those kind 
of neutral tramp shipping ventures to the Caribbean which American vessels 
could obtain Swedish papers for, either through legal channels via Swedish 
consuls on the North American Coast or simply through forgery.24 
Governor Elliott, who had been cautious in the British intercourse with 
regard to the American trade over St. Barthélemy during the years leading up 
to the war, now had reason to be less circumspect. Since the trade was 
informally condoned, he could take to issuing licenses to British subjects to 
consign a ship under any flag, except for France, in order to import necessaries 
from any U.S. port. In a license to the Darrell firm of Antigua, he explicitly 
included the permission for Darrell’s vessel “to touch at Saint Bartholomews,” 
which had the convenient function to allow the ship to clear for a neutral port 
while in the United States. Still, while this trade was readily promoted by 
British authorities, it should be noted that the value of American exports 
from U.S. ports was at an all-time low since independence. The total arriving 
tonnage in Gustavia in 1813 had also dropped to about half of the recorded 
tonnage of 1812. Turning to official American estimates, 1813 was the most 
prominent wartime year for American exports to St. Barthélemy, amounting 
to a value of $1,758 862 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). It can then be deduced that a 
small-scale traffic of exports from the North American coast persisted during 
war years, or rather was allowed by the British to continue. In the years 1813–
14, as had been the case in 1809, St. Barthélemy was the destination for over 
30 per cent of the total, albeit very diminished, American exports to the 
region. The Treaty of Ghent on the 24th of December 1814 restored relations 
between the United States and Britain, and signaled a slow recovery of the 
U.S. trade with the West Indies. The coming peace after the Treaty of Vienna 
also began the normalization of affairs in the region, but whereas the 
                                                          
24 von Brinkman to Stackelberg, 30 October 1813, C 258, FSB, ANOM; A copy of the letter is also 
found in PJ 172, FSB, ANOM. 
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commerce of St. Barthélemy was concerned, it was the start of a long downhill 
development.25  
                                                          
25 License for J. & S. Darrell of Antigua, 2 February 1813, PJ 170, FSB, ANOM; Ernst Ekman has 
noted before that St. Barthélemy stood at the receiving end of over 20 percent of U.S. exports in 
1814, but explains nothing of the overall trade figures of U.S. shipping, which were gravely 
diminished at the time. See Ernst Ekman, “A Swedish Career in the Tropics: Johan Norderling 
(1760–1828),” Swedish Pioneer Historical Society 15, no.1 (1964): 3–32. 
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5.3 Epilogue: The Peace of 1815 and Ambiguous Decline 
It is intriguing to gauge the response of the news of the impending peace in 
Gustavia. It was rarely met with expressions of joy or relief. Instead, the 
prevailing feeling among the council and merchants of the colony was 
concern. It was no secret that the colony’s commerce had occasionally thrived 
as a cause of the conflict. The unavoidable return of normal peacetime 
relations was anticipated with dour concern in commercial circles. A 
particular cause for concern was that the rival free ports of St. Thomas and St. 
Eustatius would soon return to their former owners.26 
Despite numerous efforts to accommodate foreign commerce by lowering 
taxes and granting new liberties, St. Barthélemy officials were hard pressed to 
relieve the situation. Governor Stackelberg had an informant in St. Thomas 
who relayed the official Danish tariffs at six percent for imports and seven and 
half percent on exports, “but in reality not more than 2% are actually paid.” 
The governor’s reports of Samuel Rosenswärd in 1817–18 convey a continuous 
state of despair and alarm. The hopelessness was compounded by the fact that 
the colony’s enterprising merchants had begun to leave the island for 
commercial opportunities in other islands. There were very few left who had 
stable capital enough to pay for transiting cargoes in cash. Especially 
American traders had grown uncertain whether they could dispose of their 
holdings in St. Barthélemy, and had begun preferring St. Eustatius and St. 
Thomas as primary stops on their West Indian journeys. The mass departure 
of local merchants were a sign of the times. Many traders and merchants who 
had enjoyed a lively business during the war now were faced with an imminent 
depression of available trading possibilities. Creditors closed in their debtors 
and demanded payment of outstanding debts. Many were left insolvent in this 
process, and settlers on St. Barthélemy was no exception.27 
                                                          
26 Af Wetterstedt to Stackelberg, 14 January 1815, C 258, FSB, ANOM; af Wetterstedt’s 
memorial, 16 August 1816, SBS 1C, SNA. 
27 Petition of St. Barthélemy merchants to Skogman, 17 April 1815 & Stackelberg to Skogman, 22 
April 1816, Skogmanska samlingen, SNA; Rosenswärd’s report, 18 November 1817, SBS 4B, SNA; 
Berghult’s report, 22 March 1819; 21 June 1819, SBS 5B, SNA. 
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In the light of the peacetime problems, it is therefore not surprising that a 
lingering hope for the commercial prospects of St. Barthélemy found a source 
in the political turbulence generated in the wake of the Spanish American 
Wars of Independence. The disintegration of Spanish authority in the New 
World created conditions which were at once advantageous and harmful to 
maritime commercial activity. Alternative markets were found among the 
coastal waters of the Spanish Main for enterprising neutral traders, as well as 
the possibility for private maritime predation to flourish once again as it had 
during the late French wars, as Spanish American revolutionaries relied 
heavily upon privateering St. Barthélemy felt both the positive and negative 
effects of these regional developments during this continuing period of war 
and violence. They will be the subject of the final chapter.  
Reorientations in the Post-War Period 
The election of Jean Bernadotte, subsequently Charles XIV, as heir-
presumptive to the Swedish throne, brought with it significant reorientations 
in Swedish foreign policy. One often neglected side of Charles’ foreign policy 
thinking was his apparent conviction of the future potential of the South 
American countries not only as export markets, but as new political entities 
and prospective allies. After the conclusion of the war, Sweden was highly 
oriented towards Britain in its foreign policy, and was also quite simply 
following cautiously along in the foreign ambitions of Canning’s ministry 
towards the insurgents in South America. In some respects influenced by the 
Enlightenment, Charles XIV was familiar with the work of Raynal but also 
particularly the more recent polemics in 1817 by abbé de Pradt about the 
South American revolutions. Charles XIV granted the Swedish translation of 
de Pradt’s work as a propagandistic measure, in part at least in order to further 
the Swedish commercial interest in South American markets. In 1819 the 
former St. Barthélemy judge Bergius furthermore published his Om 
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Westindien, his reflections on the colonies in the West Indies and South 
America which very strongly endorsed the ideas and sentiments of de Pradt.28 
In this context, of St. Barthélemy had begun to assume a special role in the 
foreign policy of Charles XIV. Since the Diet of Örebro in 1812, St. 
Barthélemy had become a crown colony, and was separated from the state 
finances. All the funds accruing from the tax and tariff collection in Gustavia 
was at the personal disposal of the Swedish king. During the conflict between 
the United States and Britain in 1812–14, these funds had become quite 
significant. The windfall from the Anglo-U.S. war had been generously 
disposed of for public as well as private costs. For a number of years, the St. 
Barthélemy funds, as they were termed under the renewed auspices of the 
monarchy, were used to pay wages and pensions for officials in the foreign 
ministry and the colonial department, finance diplomatic travels and 
exigencies, but also a costly range of widely differing cultural investments, 
such as the debts of the Stockholm Theatre. The funds were however most 
importantly a means of maintaining independent financial backing for the 
Swedish government’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Furthermore, the king 
was involved in costly operations involving the purchase of foreign bills of 
exchange in an effort to stabilize the Swedish economy. It is also through 
these facts that the royal interest in South American speculations should be 
seen.29  
Count af Wetterstedt, the court chancellor, also had personal economic 
interests which were connected with the West Indian colony. He owned 
extensive shares of the ironworks in Finspång in southern Sweden since his 
marriage into the wealthy family of De Geer. Finspång had since several 
centuries been one of the largest manufacturers of artillery pieces in the 
Swedish kingdom, but since the early 1790s the cannon foundry of Finspång 
had been subject to a heavy slump as a result of the loss of the lucrative Dutch 
markets. Alternative foreign markets for munitions were therefore of utmost 
                                                          
28 Per G. Andreen, Politik och finansväsen. Från 1815 års riksdag till 1830 års realisationsbeslut 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958), II: 154–57; Torsten Gihl, ”Kabinettskassan,” Historisk 
tidskrift 56 (1936): 341–92; Swärd, Latinamerika i svensk politik, 293–94; Elovsson, Amerika i svensk 
litteratur, 249, 286; Torvald Höjer, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia (Stockholm: Norstedts, 
1954), III:2: 241–54. 
29 Andreen, Politik och finansväsen, II:137–53; Gihl, ”Kabinettskassan,” 347–49, 353–54; Swärd, 
Latinamerika i svensk politik, 151–52. 
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importance, and af Wetterstedt had displayed a particular willingness to 
explore different opportunities. As court chancellor, his personal 
responsibility for colonial affairs could also further his private ambitions in 
the foreign arms trade.30  
When governor Rosenwärd died in 1818 he was succeeded by Johan 
Norderling, who had been judge in the colony in the 1790s. He left Sweden 
for St. Barthélemy in 1819 with thorough instructions by the crown prince 
Charles XIV to make amicable contacts with the leaders of insurgency on the 
South American continent as well as the government of Haiti, although taking 
care to never to officially acknowledge their independence. The king-in-
waiting wanted to exploit the opportunity of his departure to envoy a large 
cargo of cannons, rifles, gunpowder and other munitions. Norderling was 
advised to sell these goods in a way that he saw best fit, although he should 
take care to arrange sales discreetly. Contracts and deals were struck through 
local merchants who were knowledgeable and well connected with agents on 
the Spanish Main. Through these operations, some merchants and officials of 
St. Barthélemy became closely associated with economic and military 
developments in the Spanish Americas. Johan Bernard Elbers became an 
established agent in Colombia, where he traded in arms and munitions. The 
Swedish government also made clandestine use of agents, such as the officer 
Severin Lorich. In October of 1816 he arrived in Les Cayes and went by land 
to Port-au-Prince. During his sojourn in the republican capital, he discussed 
matters of trade and politics with the Haitian president Alexander Petion as 
well as with Simon Bolívar, then present under sanctuary. His personal 
overtures and offers of Swedish armaments to both were however met with 
reservation at this particular moment. In the wake of the revolutionary 
movements, many long-time settlers in St. Barthélemy gravitated towards the 
economic possibilities near the South American mainland. Artisans and 
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workers from St. Barthélemy settled in Angostura and Margarita as well as 
other settlements along the Venezuelan coastline.31 
Individual efforts of persons connected to the government in St. 
Barthélemy did much to further contacts with the Spanish Main. The clerk 
Carl Ulrich von Hauswolff had been envoyed to St. Barthélemy in 1810 as a 
replacement to the current notary public, and advanced amid a stormy career 
in the colony to the office of government secretary. His personal conflicts 
with other magistrates were seemingly the cause of his resignation and 
subsequent travels to South America. He conducted extensive personal 
research efforts on mining prospects in Colombia, and became an agent of the 
Colombian government, specializing in securing shipments of munitions and 
armaments. After a long sojourn in South as well as North America, he 
conducted two trips to Sweden in 1824, where he successfully promoted 
commercial expeditions among Swedish merchants and officials. One of the 
latter included Count af Wetterstedt, who consigned part of the cargo of the 
brig Cristoval Colon, bought and loaded with Swedish iron products during von 
Hauswolff’s stay in Sweden. Hauswolff’s general visit to Europe also went 
hand in hand with his functions as an agent for the Colombian government. 
He tried to exact Swedish recognition for the state as of Colombia well as the 
title of Swedish consul to Colombia for himself. Even though he was 
unsuccessful in this particular regard, he collaborated, through his financial 
contacts in London, in the notorious ‘ship contract’ (skeppshandeln) in 1825 
between Sweden and the Mexican and Colombian governments, respectively. 
The contract in question involved a plan to clandestinely sell a number of 
Swedish men-of-war to the newly independent states. Despite fairly 
complicated measure to keep the deal secret, Spanish authorities nevertheless 
unearthed the plans, which became the subject of international as well as 
domestic scandal in Sweden. The contract fell through, and did much to 
temper the Swedish commercial interests in South America, especially in 
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government circles. Von Hauswolff returned to settle in Colombia in 1825 in 
the town of Medellin, where his household became a rendezvous point of 
sorts for the shipping interests still present in St. Barthélemy. His position in 
Colombia however soon unraveled as his various mining projects undertaken 
with personal means became marred by disasters and bankruptcies. He was 
compelled to return to Sweden in 1831 in straitened circumstances.32 
Whereas the utility of St. Barthélemy experienced a brief revival through 
Swedish interest in South American markets, regional traffic as well as the 
local merchant activity was steadily decreasing in the postwar period. A 
Swedish officer visiting Gustavia in 1817 expressed his surprise when he only 
“saw very few American vessels” in the harbor, in stark contrast to the 
wartime traffic he had seen two years prior during a Swedish naval expedition 
to the colony. The local merchants were also moving elsewhere, or were 
simply running into financial difficulties after the war. In Gustavia of early 
1817, claimed governor Rosenswärd, there were no other “speculative 
tradesmen” left on in the colony except Johann Bernhard Elbers of the firm 
of Elbers & Krafft. In the period of post-war depression on the island, he was 
the only one among the cadres of naturalized merchants keeping regular 
contacts aloft with American vessels and neighboring colonies. His partner 
Krafft had long since then moved to the United States and become a resident 
of Baltimore. In the summer of the same year, Elbers was forced to cease his 
immediate commercial activities in the colony and declare bankruptcy. The 
totality of outstanding claims that was affixed to the firm’s business inventory 
exceeded half a million Spanish dollars. Nearly half that amount was due to a 
hefty loan in the merchant bank of Baring Brothers & Co. in London. The 
rest of the 78 other creditors dispersed in the West Indies, Britain, the 
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Netherlands, and the United States convey a wide commercial network that 
was unravelling helplessly in the state of peacetime affairs.33 
The bankruptcy case and the subsequent activities of Elbers is signicative 
in the general crisis and reorientation in colonial commerce towards the 
South American markets. In itself, the bankruptcy was a serious individual 
setback to the colony’s commercial activity and occasioned a prolonged and 
difficult proceeding in the colonial courtroom. Somewhat miraculously 
Elbers however could continue as the most active merchant in the colony even 
during the height of the claims process against his firm. He did so with the aid 
of persisting commercial contacts and sources of credit, despite being unable 
to trade directly under his own name. The firm would however never operate 
within the transit trade as it had done during the late war, but rather adapted 
to new possibilities offered by another conflict, the Latin American wars of 
independence.  
There are also fair reasons to believe that Elbers escaped his creditors by 
less than scrupulous methods. During the whole of the period of political 
unrest on the South American continent, Elbers stood in close connection to 
Admiral Luis Brion, acting as a middleman who handled shipments of 
supplies, money, munitions as well as troops to the Spanish Main. He even 
offered the use of his private armed frigate, El General Clemente, to Brion’s 
discretion, as well as other ships during various campaigns in Portobello and 
Cartagena. He married into a Bogotá family in 1823, and in October of that 
year he became a Colombian citizen. His apparent insolvency a few years prior 
comes into an interesting light when it is clear that he spent considerable 
sums of money on the patriot cause, administering personal loans to the 
Colombian government of 69,457 Spanish dollars in 1821 and 61,502 Spanish 
dollars in 1823. In his newly adopted home country, there was ill-natured 
gossip surrounding his purported lack of reputation and low business ethics, 
concerning specific reports of failed business ventures in Curaçao and the 
United States, as well as St. Barthélemy. High-ranking government officials 
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reported that he had arrived in 1821 with a hefty personal fortune in excess of 
500,000 Spanish dollars, in cash. Possibly this was money he had kept out of 
the reach of debtors, or money he had made in the arms business with the 
insurgent leaders, or quite possibly a combination of both. The claims about 
his wealth is reinforced by the fact that he received a personal monopoly on 
steam navigation on the Magdalena river, and financed the construction of 
steamboats and the accompanying infrastructure for many decades through 
his personal assets.34  
As a whole, the rebellions on the Spanish Main ushered in a brief but 
intensive last period of commercial activity for the ailing Swedish colony.35 
The Corsario Insurgente and the Resurgence of Illicit Trade in Gustavia 
In a similar way to the Guadeloupean privateering during the French wars, 
the Spanish American ordenanzas de corso allowed prizes to be carried into 
neutral ports, as opposed to ports exclusively controlled by the insurgents. 
This condition was made absolutely necessary by the transitory nature of 
territorial dominion during in Spanish America during the early years of the 
insurgencies. Spanish expeditionary forces pacified parts of the Spanish Main 
from time to time, effectively separating privateers from home ports such as 
Cartagena and forcing them to seek refuge in alternative bases in the West 
Indies. A wide variety of insurgent privateers frequented St. Barthélemy 
regularly, from Cartagena, Venezuela, Buenos Aires, Chile and Gran 
Colombia. Especially Artigas privateers made St. Barthélemy a regular base of 
operations. According to a news story in The Times in the early 1820s, Artigan 
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privateers had made the small dependency of Fourchue an “emporium for 
their booty.”36 
Under the auspices of the revolutionary government in Puruarán, 
privateering was authorized under the newly designed Mexican flag. Mexican 
privateering was in many ways synonymous with the activities of a Frenchman 
named Luis Aury, who amassed a sizeable maritime force of ships and 
established a base at Galveston, before embarking his privateers to Amelia 
Island, where the Scotsman Gregor MacGregor was struggling to defend his 
settlement against Spanish forces. In September 1817, Aury assumed 
command of Amelia Island and declared it part of the Mexican Republic. 
Towards the end of the year, however, the United States government sent 
troops to the island and removed Aury and his privateers. St. Barthélemy with 
remote out ports like Fourchue became somewhat of a surrogate for the lost 
bases of operation, although not congenial to the same kind of organization 
of offensive maritime forces. Fourchue nevertheless became a means for 
privateers to regroup and sell of their prizes, and conversely a means for 
financially ailing Gustavia burghers to remain in business. Many found a new 
lucrative branch as privateer agents. William Israel, for instance, was one of 
several merchants who acted as agent for Buenos Ayrean privateers.37 
A special trait of the privateering business during the South American 
Wars of Independence was the relative ease with which maritime 
depredations were conducted. A great factor in this condition was the British 
interest in the independence movements. The British government attempted 
to re-establish British trade with Spanish America on the same unofficial 
footing as it had enjoyed since 1810. Clandestine commercial and military 
efforts were frequently a part of these plans. As such, they too found use in 
neutral subterfuges to disguise their expedition. A corps of British 
mercenaries headed to aid and arm the insurgents in the South American 
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colonies departed with five different ships in London in 1817 with the aim to 
arrive conjointly in South America. First, however, they would touch at St. 
Thomas and St. Barthélemy before continuing with their mission. The British 
soldier James Hackett, a part of the military detachment described the 
general impression of shoreside commerce in Gustavia in 1818 as he arrived 
with one of the British ships: 
This island may be considered a place of general rendezvous for smugglers 
of every description. The flags of all nations (but more especially of 
America) are to be seen flying in the harbour of Gustavia, and the resident 
merchants, I understand, derive a large part of their emoluments from the 
intercourse with those engaged in contraband traffic.38 
Before they could mount their expedition on the main, they landed with their 
different vessels both in St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy, also convenient for 
mercenaries like Hackett to ascertain the state of affairs on the Spanish Main 
and plan their intended approach. While awaiting intelligence, the senior 
officers of the British expeditionary force was invited to a fête by the Swedish 
governor Rosenswärd, in honor of the birthday of Charles XIV. During his 
short tenure (1816–18), governor Rosenswärd had close contacts with at least 
one admiral of the patriotic fleet, Luis Brión. British-Spanish contacts had 
been facilitated through St. Barthélemy before. At a prior occasion to 
Hackett’s expedition, three British vessels had anchored at Fourchue laden 
with equipment, munitions, as well as hundreds of soldiers waiting to join 
ranks with the army of Simon Bolívar. Brión was there with his fleet to arrange 
the reshipment, all with the clandestine approval and supervision of the 
Swedish governor. A new item about the landing was however inserted into 
the local newspaper, but it only disclosed that Brión had arrived with two 
brigs and a schooner, and that he had been “immediately informed that he 
could not be received here, nor his vessels even be permitted within gun 
reach” and that he then retreated towards Fourchue, where his squadron lay 
anchor, from which station it was “impossible to force.”39 
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Gustavia’s record of illicit trade and smuggling during the post-war period 
conveys different, conflicting pictures. The actions of Swedish colonial 
magistrates sometimes displayed what can only be seen as an extremely risk-
filled policy towards privateers and smuggling after the conclusion of the 
French wars. The American consul Robert Harrison was convinced that the 
Swedish Governor was in league with the most notorious of South American 
privateers and “pirates”, as he called them. Harrison had initially been 
dispatched as U.S. consul in St. Thomas, but after some quarrels with local 
officials he became persona non grata in 1819, and relocated with a new 
consular letter to St. Barthélemy. He made a long-winding but ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt at achieving recognition as consul from Governor 
Norderling. He quickly grew embittered at his current state of affairs, but also 
found a source of grievance in the affairs of the colony. As an American 
citizen, he was appalled by the presence of South American privateers 
carrying American prizes into the port. He interestingly traced this tacit 
acceptance of privateering all the way to the Swedish government, stating that 
Governor Norderling was: 
[...] supported by Baron Wedderstadt [af Wetterstedt] one of the 
Ministers, who having an Iron-Foundry (or rather Cannon), sends a great 
many Guns and balls to the Governor, to dispose of to the Cruisers that fit 
out here. [- - -] Neither King, or Ministers, are over nice how the Governor 
gets money, so he sends it to them, and it is so with all petty depraved 
Governments and there is none more so than that of Sweden.40 
Harrison continued to make various impasses about the corruption of 
Swedish colonial officials, and is most certainly a source of libels f against the 
governor and council found in various newspapers. He accused Governor 
Norderling of taking bribes from pirates and the chancellor Wetterstedt of 
supplying them with guns and armaments from his private iron foundries. 
Harrison’s numerous testimonies are however difficult to assess, as he was an 
embittered official, disenchanted with the activities of the free ports after 
having been expelled from St. Thomas in 1819 after making similar 
accusations there. He was also never granted recognition by the Swedish 
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authorities as consul at his current post, and could thus not earn a living from 
his title. In his reports to the Secretary of State, he could spin unbelievable 
yarns about deposits of illicit riches piling up in Gustavia under the approving 
gaze of Swedish officials. All tendencies aside, he still hinted at a rough-and-
ready pragmatism that was very much a reality of free port governance.41 
American consuls were not the only ones that found irregularities in the 
commercial activity of Gustavia. Swedish Governors were in steady 
correspondence with French admirals and colonial officials about the course 
of clandestine commerce in Fourchue. Of particular interest to the French 
administration were reports of French subjects that were involved in 
smuggling, especially slaves, through the small islet. But they were also, as 
most other officials tasked with the protection of their own colonial 
commerce, highly concerned with the fact that privateers were offloading and 
selling seized vessels at Fourchue belonging to the French. The British Vice 
Admiral Charles Fleeming who had been stationed in the West Indies since 
1828, reported that even after the conclusion of conflicts in the South 
American continent, illicit trade continued to thrive in the free ports of the 
region. He mentioned that the “Dutch, Danish, and Swedish Governments 
have instructed their Authorities in the West Indies not to be too strict” in 
their adherence to international law. This condition, he observed, was 
motivated by “a false notion of encouraging trade.42 
In their communications with foreign officials, St. Barthélemy Governors 
consistently insisted that persons guilty of irregularities and illegal trade at 
Fourchue were immediately ordered to depart. There were also many 
instances when this held true. Privateers were sometimes even seized when 
their activities were found to be too harmful for the colony’s foreign relations. 
This condition most often occurred when privateers tried to arm their vessels 
while in Swedish waters. This was the crucial distinction which had been 
established already during the French wars, when Swedish subjects had tried 
to arm their ships while lying at anchor in Gustavia, either to be sailed under 
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the Swedish or any foreign flag whatsoever. In the course of time, however, 
magistrates increasingly started to look the other way. In a report to af 
Wetterstedt, Governor Norderling confessed that “Since I began to close my 
eyes about Fourchue, dubloons and sound piastres are everywhere [...] 
hundreds of sailors have amused themselves and drunk up all their wages.43 
The complaints from French and British colonial officials did not however 
lead to serious diplomatic confrontations or crises. The presence of the 
unacknowledged U.S. consul in Gustavia however did give rise to wealth of 
accusations against the Swedish council. A constant reiteration in Harrison’s 
dispatches are reports of depredations against U.S. shipping as well as U.S. 
citizens connected to it. Among these former was the “pirate” Joseph 
Almeida, who Harrison claimed lived in “wealth and splendour” on the island 
with his wife and nine children. Almeida originated from the Azores, but had 
become a U.S. citizen in 1805 and settled in Baltimore. As many other sailors 
and traders on the North American coast, he got a privateer’s license from the 
U.S. government in 1812. After the Anglo-U.S. war he had strove to continue 
with the lucrative privateering business, and served intermittently as a 
privateer under the flags of Buenos Ayres as well as the United Provinces of 
Rio de la Plata. He soon gained notoriety for his maritime exploits against 
Spanish and Portuguese shipping in the region, which earned him several 
lawsuits, including in his adoptive United States where he was charged of 
piracy, but acquitted in 1819. In 1822 he settled in Gustavia and acquired 
different properties both in St. Barthélemy as well as in neighboring islands. 
His activities in St. Barthélemy during the period 1822–28 seems to have been 
relatively legitimate, as he traded and worked as a local merchant with at most 
the capacities of agent for different privateers. He however returned to piracy 
in 1828, but on his final cruise, his crew mutinied and transported him to 
Puerto Rico where he was subsequently executed. Almeida is quite typical of 
the kind of actor who was involved in the privateering of the corso insurgente 
during the South American wars. Large cohorts of former U.S. privateers 
changed berths after the conflict with Great Britain and continued to cruise 
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under various insurgent colors, often taking up occasional residence in the 
imperial peripheries.44 
The majority of U.S. protests were however only written complaints which 
received little if any satisfactory responses from the Swedish government. 
This however changed dramatically when an individual U.S. naval ship 
decided to take decisive action against a privateer lying at anchor in Gustavia 
in December of 1828. The privateer in question was the Buenos Ayrean 
Federal. During a recent cruise, the Federal had plundered the U.S. brig Nymph 
of Boston of some manufactures. The privateer then proceeded to make sail 
for Martinique but was driven off course and a new destination was plotted 
for St. Eustatius and St. Barthélemy, where the privateer’s most recent spoils. 
Surprisingly, the ship was denied entry at St. Eustatius where it only received 
cannon fire from Oranjestad’s forts. While just outside port waters of 
Gustavia, the local privateer agent Abraham Haddocks of A. & Henry 
Haddocks received the ship and offered to buy the loot while the ship was 
lying offshore. The privateer’s command however knew that they would need 
a recent clearance of goods from the port of departure, and as they stolen 
goods on board, they would have to feign a need for repairing the ship in order 
to get the ship shoreside and present the goods to prospective buyers. This 
simulation was indeed arranged and the goods were duly sold, but before the 
privateer could lift anchor the next day, the U.S. sloop of war Erie cut out the 
Federal from the harbor during the night. Captain Turner of the U.S. naval 
ship had received intelligence about the Federal’s encounter with the Nymph, 
and decided to seize it before it could proceed elsewhere. Before the seizure, 
Harrison in Gustavia had demanded that the Swedish council seize the ship 
and deliver the property onboard belonging to U.S. citizens.45 
The affair resulted in a lengthy fallout in the communications between 
U.S. and Swedish governments. One obvious issue was the violation of neutral 
waters by a warship. The captain of Erie was under orders to protect American 
shipping but overstepped his authority when he entered Gustavia, and was 
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duly put on trial. The U.S. government also saw fit to replace Harrison with 
another consul. The most serious and practical issue was however the claims 
of several Gustavia burghers, who had bought or consigned parts of the cargo 
that was carried off the island in the night. The incident also put into an 
embarrassing light the kind of commerce that the island’s merchants now 
resorted to since many years. Reports from the island’s governing council 
after the incident showed a higher alertness in the handling of privateering 
business that had been turned away, and agents such as Haddocks and others 
were ostensibly being more and more scrutinized in their actions.46  
A Colonial Backwater 
During the 1820s and 1830s, the former maritime economy of Gustavia almost 
completely weaned off. The twilight of the former bustling free port is 
especially present in its dwindling population. In the decades after the war, 
thousands moved away to settle in other colonies. Still, the commercial and 
social community did not die overnight. In September 1819, a serious 
hurricane struck the island, whereupon hundreds of Gustavian houses, 
magazines, and stores were demolished. An equal number of buildings were 
seriously damaged whereas all berths and moorings were washed away. Most 
of the thirty-odd vessels lying in port were pulled ashore, leaving many beyond 
any means of reparation. Even in the face of this destruction, the usual 
commercial activity resumed after that hardly a month had passed, and 
dwelling-houses and means for the newly homeless were mustered in due 
course. Indeed, the town had like many urban societies in the region, 
recovered fairly well and quickly after past hurricanes. In 1819 the census 
tallied 2,910 inhabitants in Gustavia, and in 1828 there was only a decrease in 
a few hundred, at 2,311.47 
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After this time, however, the population of Gustavia quickly faded away. 
In 1838 the countryside populaton eclipsed the town population, and in the 
1850s and 1860s the population of Gustavia dropped below a thousand, 
whereas the countryside population slowly increased from 1,683 in 1854 to 
1,990 in 1866. The decline of the town followed from further disasters. Severe 
hurricanes occurred again at least once every decade, and all brought with 
them material and human destruction. A malignant intermittent fever 
epidemic in 1839–40 harvested some 300 lives, while the most serious 
destruction came when a fire provoked by strong winds in 1852 turned the 
western part of Gustavia ablaze. 135 houses were completely destroyed and up 
over 500 people were left homeless. Governor Haasum at that point feared 
that the colony was near the brink of the abyss. After the fire of 1852 most of 
the former constructions of Gustavia whittled away into a nearly desolate 
place, which was observed by Goës in his tour of the island in 1882. He saw 
vacated buildings and ruins overrun by cacti and bushwork where there once 
had been “gambling dens and hotels, meeting places for the stock brokers of 
Gustavia, politicians and demagogues, of which the town had apparently been 
well supplied.” The ephemeral nature of commercial enrichment was not lost 
on Goës, who also toured the colony’s countryside, and discovered the ruins 
of rural retreats which once belonged to the richest merchants in the island. 
There was the remains of a villa in Anse de Flamands, built by the unfortunate 
Carl Dreyer which had been blasted to smithereens after the hurricane of 1837 
and never rebuilt. Goës also witnessed the still visible foundation of the 
abandoned stone and marble mansion of Elbers & Krafft in Anse d’Ecailles, 
which had been largely picked to pieces over decades in order to supply 
building repairs in Gustavia. According to Goës, the remains of the white 
marble floor of its former antechamber still breathed an air of “West Indian 
arrogance and vanity.”48 
Notwithstanding the effects of the climate and individual disasters, the 
decay of the urban environment of Gustavia was still mainly a consequence of 
disappearing capital and economic activity. Landed property had depreciated 
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in value “beyond conception,” wrote an exasperated member of the local 
Haddocks family in the 1830s, and other settlers feared that if they chose to 
stay they would soon fall “into a state of beggary.” Most merchants and 
artisans were steadily leaving the island for employments and better prospects 
in other islands. Still during the early 1820s the public incomes indicate a 
viable economy, as incomes exceeded the cost of funding for the 
administration and public works. The colonial council of St. Barthélemy 
remitted a sizeable sum of 32,345 Spanish dollars to Stockholm in 1821 and 
25,058 Spanish dollars in 1822. The sources of this income would all but vanish, 
however, with the opening of British colonial ports. A brief intercession in 
this new liberty seemed almost to revive the old free port’s commercial 
fortunes, but it was only temporary. In the period 1829–31, the colony could 
still remit sums in excess of 20,000 Spanish dollars annually, but after this 
brief stint the activity faded away quickly.49  
The sudden halt in public proceeds occasioned the need for the Swedish 
crown to supply the colony with annual payments to cover expenses for 
official wages and public expenditures. The colony had finally become a 
financial burden for its owner. It is important however to note that 
notwithstanding the declining fortunes of the free port, Charles XIV was for 
a long time reluctant to part with the West Indian possession. The king was 
well aware that the extra income would soon dwindle as peace settlements 
were signed, but he underestimated how much the funds would be diminished 
after the war. When there was no longer any significant means flowing from 
the colony, the St. Barthélemy funds instead became a gravely abused loans 
account, mired in debts accrued from running costs in the work of the foreign 
ministry. Towards the end of 1829, when pressing economic matters were 
about to be settled in government, court chancellor af Wetterstedt was 
urgently proposing the sale of St. Barthélemy to a foreign European power, in 
order to relieve some of the debt that had grown heavy on the king’s different 
accounts during the preceding decades.50 
                                                          
49 Summary of St. Barthélemy’s revenue and expenditures, 1812–54, SBS 27 A, SNA; Haddocks to 
Lönner, 22 August 1826; Haddocks to the Lönner family, 8 January 1836, Abrahamssonska 
familjearkivet, Stockholms stadsarkiv. 
50 Fåhraeus, ”Statistiska upplysningar,” 263; Andreen, Politik och finansväsen, II:2: 254–58; Gihl, 
”Kabinettskassan,” 341–42; Charles XIV’s report to the Swedish Diet, 27 June 1815, 1815:10:11, 
Charles XIV to the Privy Council, December 1817, 1817:10, Bernadotteska familjearkivet, SNA. 
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Despite af Wetterstedt’s prior activism in this question, the offers that the 
Swedish government presented to foreign ministers did not meet with much 
appeal. In a series of deliberations between Sweden and the United States in 
1818–19, Sweden had proposed the sale of St. Barthélemy for 200,000 pounds 
sterling to a number of different foreign governments, primarily the United 
States and Britain. This offer, however, was promptly refused as “wild and 
extravagant.” by the U.S. government. Af Wetterstedt continued to court 
foreign governments in this matter, and tried several times during the 1820s 
to sell it as a strategic naval station, given that the “late piratical acts and 
events in the adjacent Seas, might give importance to the Island.”51 
Towards the middle of the century Italy was also approached with an offer, 
but upon learning that the Italians had plans of converting the island into a 
penal colony the offer was withdrawn. By then however the situation had 
turned critical for the few remaining persons who made up the Swedish 
administration of the island. In a very candid and succinct letter in 1860, 
Governor Carl Ulrich made very clear that the parent country could not 
expect to retain a colony with any functioning domestic presence if it could 
not spare more finances than it had during the preceding decades after the 
conclusion of the French wars. Ulrich made it abundantly clear also that the 
time was ripe for a cession back to France: 
[...] since there are here no more than half a dozen or maybe eight people 
(the civil servants and my eldest daughters included) who speak or even 
understand one single word of Swedish inasmuch as the island never has 
been a Swedish colony in the strictest sense of the word and any effort 
never has been made to make it such a colony by establishing Swedish 
schools and such like I cannot perceive that a return of the island to its first 
owner in such circumstances would in any way be contrary to the dignity of 
the country52 
                                                          
51 Russell to Adams, 21 October 1818 M45:3; Hughes to Clay, 7 February 1825, M45:5, RG 59, 
NARA; Sweden also tried to motivate the sale of Barthélemy at a discounted price to the U.S. 
with the argument that it would settle the Stralsund claims issue from 1810. See Carlson, Relations 
of the United States, 68–71. 
52 Ulrich to Bredberg, 24 March 1860, SBS 17, SNA; Quote also used in Tingbrand, ”A Swedish 
Interlude,” 77. 
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In 1876 France was approached in exactly this question, whereby a treaty of 
10 August 1877 was produced, by which content France consented to reclaim 
the island if it was in express will of the local settlers for it do so. A referendum 
was subsequently arranged, where 352 votes were cast out of a remaining 
population of over 2,000 persons. All but one vote was for the retrocession of 
St. Barthélemy into French dominion. The treaty was ratified in Stockholm 
and Paris the following year. In return for the island the French government 
paid a small sum for the remaining Swedish property on the island as well as 
for the costs of retirement for Swedish colonial officials. Thus, in March of 
1878, Swedish rule over St. Barthélemy ended. It ended inconspicuously, long 
after the island had had any significant role to play in the economic exchanges 
in the region. Life on the island had returned to a similar state as before the 
arrival of the Swedes in 1785. The local population lived and worked locally, 
claiming a living from the soil or from the adjacent waters of the Caribbean 
Sea, rather than from participation in intercolonial and transoceanic 
speculation that had become the norm under early Swedish dominion. Only 
the diminished city of Gustavia as well as scattered remains across the island 
remained as a memento of its fleeting days as an entrepôt and neutral 
subterfuge.53
                                                          
53 Hélène Servant, ”La rétrocession de Saint-Barthélemy à la France (1878–1884),” Bulletin de la 
Société d’histoire de la Guadeloupe 142 (2008): 13–39 ; Tingbrand, “A Swedish Interlude,” 78–79.  
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6 Commerce in Disguise – Conclusions 
How does one reconcile the two different views of the history of St. 
Barthélemy presented in the beginning of this study? The view offered by 
most historiographic tradition has glossed over the role of the Swedish colony 
in the maritime economy of the Caribbean due to its apparent lack of 
importance, whereas contemporary eye-witnesses living in St. Barthélemy 
during the height of the French wars reported of the rich windfalls of 
intensive transnational commerce. To this author it is clear that the first view 
needs some serious modification, according to a range of examinations and 
indications offered within the framework of this thesis. 
Firstly, one should note the continuity of the transit trade that the 
creation of the free port of Gustavia facilitated in the wake of regional 
upheavals towards the end of the 18th century. After the decline of the region’s 
arguably most important free trade colony, St. Eustatius, significant numbers 
of former merchants and traders of that colony quickly settled their 
businesses elsewhere, prominently featured in the waves of new settlers in St. 
Barthélemy but also rival free port colonies such as St. Thomas. The arrival of 
significant foreign capital constituted a success for Swedish colonial policy, 
and made possible the remarkably rapid development of Gustavia, which 
became a middling urban settlement in the region. This development should 
also be seen against the backdrop of further regional processes and events. 
Whereas both St. Barthélemy and St.Thomas gained in relative importance 
when St. Eustatius became a French dominion, St. Barthélemy remained as 
the only regional entrepôt after the Danish West Indian colonies became 
occupied by British troops in 1807. 
Following a general rule, the free port of Gustavia profited most during 
times of war, and conversely, suffered depressions in trade during times of 
peace. This study has shown that the period 1793–1815 was the most profitable 
period of the colony’s existence, with an uncontested apex during the late 
period of the war, 1809–14. There were at least two other notable periods of 
heightened activity, the first occurring at the tail end of the 18th century, and 
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the other actually occurring after the Treaty of Vienna in the 1820s. All of 
these peaks in trade activity have very specific and individual causes, tied to 
the different manifestations of the international conflict in the region. 
The first period of note, the 1790s, is tied to at least two phenomena, the 
redirection of trade from St. Eustatius and the activities of the revolutionary 
French island of Guadeloupe. Economic opportunities were available in both 
of these developments, but especially the latter. The economy of St. 
Barthélemy became increasingly tied to the French colonies under 
revolutionary rule, which garnered a more intensive economic relationship 
with them than before the outbreak of the war. This, however, was very much 
a mixed blessing. A large part of this commerce consisted of prize goods 
seized by French privateers, or in the very least some affiliation with this 
commerce. Neutral Swedish vessels were however not untouchable by the 
same French privateers which frequented Gustavia with their booty, 
especially not if they were found trading in British harbors. Conversely, the 
colony of St. Barthélemy gained an ungainly reputation by British Admiralty, 
who rightly saw that it was deeply infiltrated with their enemies. As a result, 
Swedish-registered shipping suffered under the renewed vigilance of British 
cruisers and privateers, and the British decision to invade St. Barthélemy and 
St. Thomas surely had independent reasons beyond the European-centered 
politics of armed neutrality. Internal politics and the Swedish dominion of St. 
Barthélemy also became decisively effected by the local power exerted by 
Guadeloupe and its network of privateering agents. A substantial number of 
St. Barthélemy court cases became influenced by the ambitions and 
machinations of Victor Hugues, and the magistrates of the Swedish colony 
were on a constant tight-rope walk between the economic relationship with 
Guadeloupe and the official neutral status of St. Barthélemy. 
As the aggressive maritime ambitions of Guadeloupe finally were 
tempered, and the first round of the international conflict was subdued by an 
uneasy peace at the start of the new century, so was the economic activity of 
St. Barthélemy’s merchants. The colony emerged in an unfavorable condition 
after British troops left it in 1802, but as the war started anew there was 
renewed vigor in shipping and trading. Most importantly, its ties to the 
French colonies remained strong, even persisting for some time in the face of 
Franco-Swedish hostilities a few years later. The lifeblood of the free port was 
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however not entirely dependent on the access to French colonial markets. 
Rather, it was the traffic from the continental United States which mattered 
most for the fortunes of local merchants as well as the Swedish colonial chest. 
From the early days of Swedish colonization, neutral American vessels were 
the most frequent visitors. American goods were vital as the key to the 
markets of neighboring colonies. Since the access to European-made 
manufactures and goods were limited at best, only the supply of American 
goods made any exchange with West Indian colonies possible. The integral 
role of the United States in the transit trade of Gustavia was immediately felt 
following the start of Jefferson’s embargo policies in 1807. During the war 
years, the economy of Gustavia was never in such dire straits as during this 
period, when there was no steady supply of the barest necessities from the 
North American seaboard. Even bare subsistence on the island became 
tenuous when victuals were scarce. 
Somewhat ironically, the continuous reorientation in U.S. embargo policy 
also became the signal to the most prosperous period of the colony’s history. 
In 1809, when the U.S. embargo became replaced with a policy of non-
intercourse, St. Barthélemy suddenly emerged as the ideal subterfuge through 
which U.S. exports could be funneled to British and French West Indian 
colonies. Swathes of American vessels seeking to subvert the ambitions of 
domestic prohibitions now appeared on the road of Gustavia, and there 
followed a resurgence in new settlers and naturalized mariners from the 
continent. The period also marks the highest point of demand for Swedish 
naturalizations of vessel in the Western hemisphere, especially during the 
War of 1812, when the St. Barthélemy-registered fleet reached record highs. 
After the war, economic activity seemed to disappear as quickly as it had 
surged a few years prior. The peace and the prospect of St. Thomas and St. 
Eustatius returning to their initial owners were causes for alarm in the 
commercial and administrative circles of St. Barthélemy. Despite a serious 
reorientation and refurbishment of colonial taxes, the Swedish colony failed 
to face the renewed competition from its former rivals. There was only one 
lingering source of commercial scope, which came now from the South 
American continent. The independence movements on the Spanish Main 
brought in its wake a fleet of new privateers in need of neutral entrepôts, as 
well as foreign, primarily British, capital with a trajectory towards the 
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insurgentes. St. Barthélemy filled some key supporting functions in this 
development, in likeness with other neutral or weakly controlled territories. 
The Swedish government’s active but discreet interests in the possibilities 
offered by the independence movement also served to give the colony a 
renewed lease on life, albeit for a brief period. 
After the hostilities of the South American independence movements died 
down, so did too any lingering economic prospects for the free port of 
Gustavia. The effect was compounded and made final by the opening of 
British ports to vessels of all nations during the 1820s. Nearly overnight the 
free port modeled after Dutch and Danish counterparts, a successful 
institution for centuries, became obsolete. No measure of administrative 
liberality could longer alleviate this fact. Gustavia remained as an occasional 
holdout and haunt for smugglers for decades, but nothing on the scale of the 
intensive wartime traffic which had built a foundation for a colonial society. 
In lockstep with disappearing capital, devastating hurricanes and disasters, 
the population of St. Barthélemy dwindled, especially among its urban 
dwellers. The colony reverted slowly but surely to its agricultural origins, as 
the once bustling harbor was slowly vacated. Since long realizing the 
inevitable decline of its possession on the other side of the Atlantic, the 
Swedish government started a campaign to sell it to a foreign power, although 
without success for most of the 19th century. 
Whereas the development sketched above are readily observable through 
the corpus of documentation, reports, and statistical indicators, it is an 
entirely other matter to gauge accurately the value of the transit trade through 
Gustavia. The most important quantitative information on this question are 
the records of issued sea-passes, Gustavia customs revenues, as well as the 
estimated values of American exports to the circum-Caribbean during the 
period 1790–1820. Keeping in mind the limitations that these sources have, 
they do however convey a comparatively clear image of the transit trade 
through Gustavia, especially as the U.S. records permit a comparative 
perspective with the foremost rival free port colonies of St. Thomas and St. 
Eustatius for the whole duration of the French wars. As a free port among 
others in the West Indies, Gustavia was not among the most frequented 
during the early stage of the war. Even if American shipping was the single 
most important source of its commerce, Americans tended to favor St. 
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Eustatius and St. Thomas. Still, this relationship is hard to establish decisively 
since the estimated total values only record the principal stated destinations 
of American vessels leaving home port, while it is known that these vessels 
tended to oscillate between different West Indian ports, ascertaining the best 
available markets before making any concrete transactions. The records of 
Gustavia customs revenues however tend to reflect the general image 
conveyed by the figures of U.S. exports, save for a few odd years. This 
continued as the general trend up until 1807, when both St. Thomas and St. 
Eustatius were seized by the British. Only then did Gustavia receive a mass of 
U.S. exports on par with its rival free ports during the preceding years. This 
massive expansion however quickly faded within the late stages of the war, 
and even though St. Barthélemy received over 30 percent of the total U.S. 
exports to the West Indies in select years, it was only 30 percent of a grossly 
diminished export sector 
It is more difficult still to make approximations of the commercial 
activities of the Swedish colony’s own merchants and actors. Considering the 
comparative numbers of their merchant fleets, St. Thomas had a substantially 
more developed indigenous commercial movement. St. Thomas annually 
dispatched sea registers for hundreds of vessels plying different routes in the 
Western hemisphere. The frequency and reach of St. Barthélemy maritime 
activity was much more circumscribed. Thus the character of Gustavia was 
that more of a commercial node in the wider Caribbean through which 
foreign vessels could exchange their goods as opposed to an independent 
center of Swedish-registered shipping. This diminutive fleet however kept a 
vigorous small-scale traffic open between its home port and the French 
colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Martin and the smaller outliers of 
the Lesser Antilles. The documentary evidence surrounding a few of St. 
Barthélemy’s most prominent merchants also reveal that the commercial 
actors in Gustavia were far from limited to a solely regional operation, but 
instead had trusted correspondents and agents on all the far sides of the 
Atlantic. Their wealth and influence also indicate their apparent successes 
during the high tide of commerce during the wars. 
 The institutional limitations to commerce in Gustavia were manifold, 
despite the liberal dispensations of its commercial and legal framework. In 
the earlier years of the colony the essence of the free port was hampered by 
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the presence of a small but influential chartered company, which kept a strict 
observance of trade limitations during its existence. Gustavia merchants also 
lacked many of the rudimentaries of commercial infrastructure due to the 
weak links with the metropole. The demands for financing and markets were 
facilitated instead mostly through other colonies and European ports outside 
of the Baltic. In connection with this last fact, naturalized merchants in 
Gustavia faced a serious obstacle: they were not permitted to sail their 
Swedish-registered ships to other European destinations than those in 
Sweden. Even if most restrictions could and were circumvented, the 
restrictions nevertheless produced their own set of disadvantages and costs. 
Gustavia merchants as well as traders of other neutral nations were playing a 
constant game of risk during the war, as neutral shipping rarely was respected 
by the belligerent maritime forces of Britain and France. Protections in form 
of convoys and territorial control of colonial waters were never fully attained 
by naturalized Swedish merchants in West Indian waters. The problem of 
protection culminated in 1810 after a prolonged effort of the Swedish 
administration to organize an internal defense erupted in a mutiny. The 
mutiny is also characteristic of colonial rule in St. Barthélemy, as it had its 
sources in other matters of popular discontent. 
Despite that a systematic account of the available statistics and other 
indicators show that St. Barthélemy played a secondary or tertiary role among 
West Indian free ports during the French wars, this study nevertheless shows 
that a great deal of the Caribbean transit trade flowed through this diminutive 
island in the Lesser Antilles. It was never considered ideal by most traders 
involved in the transit trade, but nevertheless found convenient and useful by 
traders looking to subvert and evade commercial restrictions in high-risk 
ventures. The creation of the free port of Gustavia constituted no less than a 
possibility for the continuity of the kind of trade conducted for centuries in 
Dutch, Danish, and other subterfuges in the region. Its brief yet significant 
value for state finances in the later stages of the war has also largely been 
overlooked by prior studies. 
This thesis also offers one of the first systematic assessments of the 
Swedish participation of the slave trade through St. Barthélemy, as well as the 
foreign involvement in this trade. The survey reveals a number of over 7,000 
transported African captives during the whole period of Swedish ownership 
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of the colony. Whereas this is a diminutive figure in the context of the whole 
European participation in the trade, it nevertheless reveals that the Swedish 
slave trade was larger than many earlier estimates. There are also important 
conceptual problems of what exactly constituted Swedish slave trade that have 
been considered, but the most important individual slave traders in the colony 
were in fact Swedes, whose activities have come into a new light. The 
historical development of the slave trade in the colony is also interesting 
because the neutral free port allowed foreign actors to circumvent 
international treaties and laws that were becoming prevalent in the overall 
efforts to abolish the transatlantic slave trade. The role of local agents as 
intermediaries in the trade also makes it difficult to arrive at any precise 
estimates, but it suggests that the final number presented in this thesis could 
still be revised upwards. 
One could also speculate that the greater importance of the free port’s 
existence did not lie within the quantities and values of goods shipped 
through it, but rather within the free port’s quality as neutral ground. The free 
ports were a colonial crossroads for goods and capital but also for people and 
information. In a colonial world officially closed off by mercantile restrictions 
and policed by maritime predators in times of war, the free port offered 
unique possibilities for the itinerant trading vessels plying the Caribbean and 
Atlantic Seas. As such, Gustavia at times seemed to exert a near magnetic 
force of attraction to privateers, smugglers, and freebooters of nearly every 
description. 
More significant queries surrounding Gustavia’s role include the question 
whose interests the free port ultimately served? Although Gustavia served a 
purpose for a range of actors in need of a neutral subterfuge, it is clear that 
the utility of it mirrored the prevailing power relationships in the region. In 
likeness to Holden Furber’s claim that smaller European nations contributed 
willingly or unwillingly to the establishment of British domination of India, 
so one could argue that St. Barthélemy was a service node on the periphery on 
the British Empire. True, during its early formative years the Swedish colony 
became juxtaposed in a network of almost subaltern colonies of the French 
empire, enough to warrant continuous British maritime harrassments as well 
as a final occupation in 1801. But this relationship did not last, and when the 
Caribbean Sea became more firmly in the grip of British maritime supremacy, 
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so did the nature and character of Gustavia commerce change. It became, 
more than ever, a neutral meeting place where American and British 
merchants could exchange goods despite the barriers erected by the war of 
1812, in order to alleviate the immediate aggravations of war. One could also 
pose the question if St. Barthélemy could have been the service node and 
entrepôt for insurgents and privateers from the Spanish Main had it not been 
for the stance of the British government in the Latin American independence 
movement. 
Especially the period of 1809–14 in the history of St. Barthélemy could 
offer some outlooks within the wider context of Atlantic and Early American 
history. The supply of British colonies during embargo and war years could 
give a significant additional evidence to the debate surrounding the so-called 
decline thesis of the British West Indian colonies. The decline thesis has held 
for a long period of time that the British plantation societies were set, by the 
end of the 18th century, in a state of irreversible decline. Newer investigations 
of quantitative data seem however to contradict this position. The availability 
of neutral markets such as St. Barthélemy for British colonists seem to 
support the latter position. 
Another aspect of the period is the significance of the free port for 
American merchants during the war. Barring the increased connections with 
Spanish ports, St. Barthélemy remained as one of the few West Indian market 
available to American shipping, which suffered its most significant setback 
since independence. This development should be allocated its space in the 
economic history of the United States, something which it has not been given 
before this study. 
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Swedish Summary – Sammanfattning 
Den här boken undersöker den svenska kolonin S:t Barthélemys ekonomiska 
historia i den karibiska regionen under de franska revolutions- och 
Napoleonkrigen mellan 1793–1815. Den centrala frågeställningen är vilken roll 
kolonins frihamn Gustavia innehade i den regionala transithandeln under 
denna tidsperiod. Ett grundläggande antagande för studien är antagandet att 
smuggling historiskt sett utgjorde ett naturligt och väsentligt inslag i denna 
handel. Begreppet smuggling har varit föremål för en rad undersökningar och 
debatter inom tidigare historieskrivning, speciellt äldre kolonialhistoria 
under första delen av 1900-talet såväl som inom den moderna avgreningen 
atlantisk historia. Inom dessa har den holländska skeppsfarten samt 
frihamnshandeln på det västra halvklotet stått i exceptionellt fokus. Både 
Sverige och Danmark innehade däremot frihamnskolonier och verkade som 
neutrala aktörer inom samma världsdel. Jag hävdar i denna bok att den 
svenska frihamnen Gustavia innehade en större och mer betydelsefull roll i 
den karibiska transithandeln än forskningen hittills antingen hävdat eller 
kunnat påvisa. 
Den tidigare forskningen kring S:t Barthélemy har bedrivits genomgående 
från ett nationellt svenskt perspektiv och hur kolonin påverkat svensk 
ekonomi och utrikeshandel. Eftersom denna forskning inte kunnat skönja 
någon stor betydelse av kolonin i dessa sammanhang, har också kolonins 
historia tillskrivits ringa betydelse i en rad andra sammanhang. Inom den 
internationella historieskrivningen har S:t Barthélemy inte uppmärksammats 
nämnvärt och endast rönt svepande omnämnanden från ett litet antal 
forskare. Däremot ger nedslag i källmaterialet och samtida litteratur under 
1800-talet en annan bild av kolonin. I brittiska polemiker om neutral handel 
framhålls den svenska kolonin som en av flera potentiella nedslagsplatser som 
kan användas av det brittiska imperiets fiender, och samtida observationer 
från Gustavia under Napoleonkrigen ger ibland ett intryck av frenetisk 
ekonomisk verksamhet genom frihamnen. 
Orsakerna till tystnaden inom tidigare forskning är många. Dels härrör den 
sig från att en stor och betydelsefull del av det primära källmaterialet inte varit 
tillgängligt under många årtionden, eftersom det återgått till Frankrike efter 
att kolonin återlämnades från Sverige 1878. Detta material har sedermera 
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blivit i mycket dåligt materiellt skick och varit stängt för forskningen. Dels 
beror situationen också på ett lågt intresse i Sverige kring dess koloniala 
förflutna. Perioden som kolonialmakt har inte resonerat väl med den moderna 
bilden av Sverige som ett progressivt välfärdssamhälle med engagemang i 
utvecklings- och biståndspolitik. Intresset för kolonin inom internationell 
historieskrivning har också varit marginellt, och de få bidrag som gjorts inom 
den har mötts av samma begräsningar gällande källmaterial. Det viktigaste 
inom det senare sammanhanget torde dock vara en förhärskande tendens att 
hålla sig inom nationella perspektiv och inte fästa stor vikt till 
gränsöverskridande fenomen såsom transithandeln via frihamnar just var. Ett 
vanligt narrativ inom atlantisk historia är den holländska dominansen inom 
frihandel, som till stor del överskuggat behandlingen av andra historiskt 
betydelsefulla neutrala aktörer i Västindien såsom Sverige och Danmark. 
Avhandlingen påvisar en del väntade och en del överraskande resultat. Som 
en generell regel upplevde Gustavias ekonomi sina bästa konjunkturer under 
krigstid och sina sämsta under fredstid. Detta var en normal utveckling för 
regionens frihamnar. Den närmast dramatiska tillökningen i S:t Barthélemys 
befolkning var en direkt följd av den franska revolutionen och kriget mellan 
stormakterna. Inflyttningen till S:t Barthélemy var störst ifrån de närliggande 
holländska och franska besittningarna i Karibien, vilka upplevde stora 
politiska och social omvälvningar i följd av kriget. Av stor betydelse var 
inflyttningen från St. Eustatius, den ditintills största neutrala handelsplatsen 
i de mindre Antillerna. Denna mindre flyttningsrörelse sattes igång efter det 
franska övertagandet av ön 1795. Inflyttningen förde med sig inflytelserika 
handelsfamiljer och deras medföljande kapital och kontaktnät. En del i denna 
flyttningsrörelse rörde sig även till andra frihamnar såsom danska Charlotte 
Amalie. Tidigare framställningar av den regionala transithandeln har ofta 
utfäst 1795 som slutpunkt just på grund av St. Eustatius nedgång, men som ett 
nytt resultat kan denna avhandling påvisa att de svenska och danska 
frihamnarna möjliggjorde en kontinuitet i regionens transithandel. 
Avhandlingen ger också en av de första utförliga redogörelserna och 
uppskattningarna av den svenska inblandningen av slavhandeln genom S:t 
Barthélemy. Källmaterialet påvisar en summa på drygt 7 000 exporterade 
slavar, antingen på svenska fartyg eller med andra anknytningar till den 
svenska kolonin. Karaktären av handeln genom frihamnen påförde däremot 
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en historiskt intressant utveckling där slavhandeln pågick länge under olika 
former trots den ökade kampanjen mot handeln i Europa. Trots sin 
begränsade omfattning fanns det betydande svenska aktörer inom St. 
Barthélemys slavhandel, och det utländska deltagandet i kolonins slavhandel 
blev allt större efter hand som den transatlantiska slavhandeln förbjöds i andra 
europeiska länder. Som neutral frihamn erbjöd St. Barthélemy möjligheter för 
slavhandelsaktörer att förbigå internationella restriktioner och lagar. Den 
svenska slavhandelsfrågan samt den svenska förhållningen till 
slavhandelsmotståndet under 1800-talet skulle förtjäna ytterligare 
undersökningar. 
Inom transithandeln skulle det däremot ta lång tid innan Gustavia steg till 
en liknande roll som sina danska och holländska föregångare. Det svenska 
västindiska kompaniet grundades som ett led i de svenska försöken att 
upprätta direkta handelskontakter från hemlandet till olika karibiska 
marknader. Avhandlingen visar dock i tydligare mån än tidigare 
undersökningar vilka problem och hinder som stod i vägen för kompaniets 
ansträngningar. Kompaniet var illa förberett finansiellt såväl som 
kompetensmässigt att möta de utmaningar som en transatlantisk handel 
ställde. Kapitalbristen i kompaniets hemstad Stockholm var stor, och 
direktörerna själva, ett par individer ur Stockholms handelsmannaelit, var 
tvungna att finansiera en stor del av insatsen själva för att upprätthålla en 
småskalig men regelbunden handelsrörelse med kolonin. Under sin knappt 
tjugoåriga oktrojtid mötte kompaniet och dess tjänstemän en mängd andra 
problem. Motståndet mot kompaniets privilegier i kolonin var stort, och dess 
tjänstemän lyckades aldrig etablera sig helt i regionens svårforcerade 
handelsnätverk. Kompaniets betjäning gjorde stora förluster i sin handel och 
i hemlandet saknade kompaniet ibland regeringens stöd för sina koloniala 
importvaror. Det tydligaste exemplet för detta var det svenska förbudet mot 
kaffekonsumtion som rådde 1794–96. I korthet berodde kompaniets problem 
i allmänhet på att frihamnsinstitutionen inte fungerade väl ihop med ett 
privilegierat handelskompani med stort inflytande i den koloniala styrelsen. 
Kompaniets oktroj upphävdes 1805 efter en förhållandevis kort diskussion i 
hemlandet och förnyades aldrig. 
Den internationella handeln genom Gustavia var också till en början 
obetydlig. Konkurrens från etablerade aktörer samt den ökande osäkerheten 
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under den tidiga krigsperioden var avgörande faktorer i denna tröga 
utveckling. Ett informellt handelsförhållande upprättades dock efter hand 
främst med de franska kolonierna Guadeloupe, Martinique, och S:t Martin. 
Under revolutionstiden skulle förhållandet intensifieras, med såväl positiva 
som negativa effekter. En stor inflyttning av franska bosättare inleddes under 
det tidiga revolutionsåren, och de franska revolutionskommissarierna i 
Guadeloupe upprättade ett franskt konsulat i S:t Barthélemy. Konsulatet 
agerade också som bas för franska kapare i regionen, på samma sätt som i 
många kringliggande, icke-brittiska kolonier. Konsulatet medförde en 
förhöjd ekonomisk aktivitet som gagnade öns handlande, men det bidrog 
också till den svenska öns ökande utsatthet inför den brittiska sjömakten. 
Som koloni och som ekonomisk institution var frihamnen mycket prekär 
att administrera och styra. Den lokala svenska administrationen, konseljen, 
ställdes kontinuerligt inför allvarliga utmaniningar under krigstid. Som en 
perifer europeisk makt med en liten kolonial besittning hade Sverige inga 
realistiska möjligheter att upprätthålla ett effektivt herravälde över ön. 
Kolonin sattes under utländsk ockupation 1801–02 (Storbritannien) och 1807 
(Frankrike). Ockupationerna hade olika handelspolitiska motivationer, men 
var relativt kortvarade och begränsade i förhållande till kolonins natur och 
utsatta läge. Ett utbrett missnöje hos den lokala befolkningen mot kolonins 
ledning ledde också till ett myteri bland kolonins milis 1810, med påföljden 
att öns justitiarie och platsmajor deporterades. Den svenska koloniala 
ledningen hade stora problem med att kontrollera befolkningens och 
individers agerande i politiskt och ekonomiskt viktiga frågor. Således antog 
Gustavia karaktären av ett samhälle som närmast fungerade som en 
marknadsplats som endast uthyrdes åt utländska intressenter. Det svenska 
inslaget i öns befolkning och samhällsliv var mycket begränsat. 
Efter en dålig ekonomisk period under början av 1800-talet, inledd av en 
instabil fred mellan stormakterna, ökade den ekonomiska rörelsen i Gustavia 
stadigt ända mot krigets slut. Danska Västindiens tillbakagång i kölvattnet av 
det brittiska besittningstagandet 1807 förstärkte den svenska kolonins roll i 
regionen. Förutom de traditionella kontakterna till de närliggande franska 
kolonierna förstärktes banden till amerikanska handelsnätverk. Gustavia 
intog mer och mer rollen som mellanhand i den amerikanska handeln till 
brittiska och franska kolonier. Detta förhållande ändrades dramatiskt på 
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grund av senare utvecklingar i amerikansk handelspolitik. Ett amerikanskt 
embargo inrättades emot handel på Frankrike och Storbritannien, vilket 
ledde till att S:t Barthélemys ställning som mellanhand blev ovärderlig. Under 
perioden 1809–12 upplevde kolonin sin mest intensiva handelsperiod, och 
avlöstes av en nästan lika lönsam period under 1812 års krig mellan 
Storbritannien och USA.  
Handelspolitik hade varit ett stridsämne i relationerna mellan dessa länder 
ända sedan den amerikanska självständigheten. I allmänhet var båda länder 
ekonomiskt intimt förbundna, men medan USA drev en frihandelspolitik 
hävdade Storbritannien sin exklusiva rätt på handeln i dess egna kolonier. 
Detta förhållande, samt de folkrättsliga diskussioner som uppstod i samband 
med amerikansk neutral handel på franska kolonier och fastlandet, ledde till 
att den amerikanska sjöfarten utmanades av brittiska krigsskepp och kapare 
under i stort sett hela krigsperioden 1793–1815. Efter en rad brittiska 
övergrepp mot amerikanska handelsskepp förklarade USA krig. Däremot var 
amerikanska handelsmän ännu i behov av brittiska marknader för sina varor, 
och St. Barthélemy blev den föredragna nedslagsplatsen där brittiska och 
amerikanska varor kunde byta händer, kriget till trots. Detta var en utökning 
av den amerikanska smuggelhandeln som tilltagit efter 1809, då den svenska 
kolonin började utgöra en bekvämlighetshamn för amerikanska handelsmän 
som var i behov av att kringgå förbud i den inhemska handelspolitiken. Det 
stora amerikansk-brittiska handelsutbytet genom ön under denna period 
utgör avhandlingens kanske största resultat, och har inte tidigare behandlats 
ingående. 
Fredsslutet 1815 medförde så småningom en dramatisk nedgång för 
kolonins handel och ekonomi. St. Eustatius och St. Thomas återlämnades 
efter kriget och var åter igen konkurrenter om den regionala transithandeln. 
En rad brittiska beslut under 1820-talet medförde även en utökad frihandel i 
de brittiska territorierna vilket skadade regionens gamla frihamnar. De 
sydamerikanska självständighetssträvandena blev däremot den möjlighet som 
höll Gustavias kommersiella funktioner i liv. St. Barthélemy blev en nedslags- 
och mötesplats för kapare under en rad nya sydamerikanska flaggor, och ön 
blev en slags mellanhand i vapenexporten till de sydamerikanska rebellerna. I 
denna utveckling deltog även den närmaste kretsen kring den svenska 
regeringen, som personligen gjorde affärer på ett antal expeditioner. I det 
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långa loppet var dock frihamnens roll utspelad, och kolonin upplevde stadiga 
förluster i sin befolkning under årtiondena efter kriget. Mot slutet av 1820-
talet kunde öns administration inte längre bestrida sina utgifter själv, och 
kolonin var tvungen att få ekonomiskt tillskott från svenska kronan. Kolonin 
hade blivit en ekonomisk börda för hemlandet, och under 1800-talets lopp 
försökte den svenska regeringen sälja kolonin till en rad länder. Detta 
lyckades ändå inte förrän 1878, då kolonin återförsåldes till Frankrike. 
Själva transithandelns karaktär, speciellt under krigstid, är sådan att den 
svårligen låter sig kvantifieras i precisa tal. Denna avhandling har dock gjort 
en systematisk genomgång av de tillgängliga indikatorerna i källor och 
statistik som finns tillgängliga. Resultatet är att S:t Barthélemy som sådan 
spelade en sekundär eller tertiär roll i förhållande till andra frihamnskolonier 
under kriget. Resultaten är dock tydliga i att en stor del av den karibiska 
transithandeln korsade den lilla svenskägda ön i Karibien. En rad 
begränsningar på det politiska såväl som ekonomiska planet begränsade 
möjligheterna för kolonin att vara en idealisk handelsplats för regionala 
handelsmän. Inrättandet av en frihamn på ön utgjorde dock inget mindre än 
en avgörande möjlighet för kontinuiteten av en slags gränsöverskridande 
handel som var en hundraårig tradition inom regionen. Gustavias korta men 
betydelsefulla högkonjunktur under Napoleon krigens slutskede är av speciell 
vikt även ur ett internationellt perspektiv. Det är också föremål för diskussion 
om frihamnsinstitutionens betydelse endast kan mätas i de sammanlagda 
varuvärden som kan uppmätas i kolonins handel. Frihamnar var en slags 
mötesplats mellan territoriella gränser, inte bara för utbytet av varor och gods 
utan även för mänskliga aktörer och information. I den merkantilistiska 
världen som det sena 1700-talets Karibien ännu var, så erbjöd frihamnen unika 
förutsättningar för kringresande handelsskepp på Karibiska och Atlantiska 
havet. 
En viktig utblickande fråga i sammanhanget är vilkas intressen som 
egentligen gynnades mest av den svenska frihamnen? Även om Gustavia var 
öppen för alla och drog till sig en mängd aktörer i behov av en neutral 
undanflyktsort, är det ända rätt klart att betydelsen av hamnen stod i en 
relation till rådande maktförhållanden i regionen. Jag hävdar att det går att 
göra ett analogt uttalande om S:t Barthélemy som Holden Furber gjort om 
mindre europeiska nationer i koloniseringen av Indien. Furber har framhållit 
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att mindre europeiska nationer såsom Danmark och Holland genom deras 
närvaro och sina handlingar på den indiska subkontinenten har bidragit mer 
eller mindre medvetet till etablerandet av brittisk dominans över samma 
territorium. I likhet med detta resonemang kan man framhålla S:t 
Barthélemys funktion som en läglig undantagszon i periferin på det brittiska 
imperiet i Karibien. Under den svenska kolonins första årtionden var 
visserligen den mera att betrakta som intagen i en fransk intressesfär, 
tillräckligt för att bli ockuperad av brittiska sjöstridskrafter i början av 1800-
talet. Men detta förhållande förändrades stadigt i takt med att Storbritannien 
erhöll en fastare kontroll över regionen mot slutet av Napoleonkrigen. I 
synnerhet var nödlidande brittiska kolonier väl betjänade av frihamnen under 
stridigheterna med Förenta Staterna. En kontinuerlig debatt inom brittisk 
kolonialhistoria är om de västindiska koloniernas nedgång under 1800-talet 
faktiskt var så allvarlig som den tolkats vara, och här kunde S:t Barthélemys 
roll som mellanhand vara förtjänt att inlemmas som ett ytterligare perspektiv 
i denna debatt. En viktig anmärkning i sammanhanget är också om S:t 
Barthélemy kunde ha haft en så utvecklad kontakt med sydamerikanska 
rebeller och kapare om den brittiska utrikes- och handelspolitiken inte skulle 
ha haft så stora ambitioner på Sydamerika. 
En sista betraktning är den om den svenska kolonins roll för den 
amerikanska neutrala handeln under hela krigsperioden. Före såväl som efter 
självständigheten levde amerikansk handel i ett nära förhållande till 
Västindien, som erbjöd koloniala stapelvaror i utbyte mot livsmedel och 
andra nödvändighetsartiklar som producerade i Nordamerika. Under de 
franska revolutions- och Napoleonkrigen blev den amerikanska neutrala 
handeln dock föremål för oerhörda risker och påtryckningar från alla 
krigförande länders flottor och kapare. I denna situation påtog frihamnarna i 
de mindre Antillerna en större roll än tidigare för förmedlandet av 
amerikanska handelsvaror till de olika kolonierna i Västindien. Under krigets 
gång utvecklades ett speciellt förhållande mellan amerikansk handel och den 
svenska kolonin, som utgjorde ömsesidiga fördelar, och ibland nackdelar, för 
svenska och amerikanska regeringar. I takt med Storbritanniens ökade 
herravälde över havet minskade de amerikanska handelsintäkterna 
dramatiskt, men S:t Barthélemy erbjöd en av de få möjligheter för handelns 
fortgång. Detta förhållande har inte utvecklats så djupgående så som den 
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gjorts i denna avhandling tidigare, och kan väl tjäna att uppmärksammas i 
Förenta Staternas ekonomiska historia. 
 
 
 265 
 
Appendices 
 266 
 
Appendix I 
A Note on Money, Rates of Exchange and Values 
This thesis presents values for the Caribbean transit trade via different 
entrepôts and port cities. The Spanish dollar, a silver coin, is used throughout 
this thesis as the common denominator for sums of money and for valuations 
of commodities and cargoes and overall trade statistics. This is because the 
Spanish dollar was the primary money of account in St. Barthélemy as well as 
many other Caribbean colonies. This meant that in an everyday transaction 
and bookkeeping entry of, say, 100 Spanish dollars, the onus was always on 
the debtor to produce enough coin of sufficient metal weight to equal the 
required sum in Spanish dollars, whatever real money was involved. I 
emphasize that all such values are understood to be current at the time they 
were given. Called variously the peso of eight reales, the piastra or piastre 
gourde, cob, dollar, and the piece of eight, the Spanish dollar was the universal 
money of the Atlantic world, as well as the primary mode of payment in Euro-
Asiatic trade in the Far East. This had been the case since the early sixteenth 
century, and had spread outwards from the Spanish empire by force of the 
vast silver output of the Spanish colonies in Latin America, and of the 
perennial need for bullion and specie of traders everywhere. It was the 
relatively most stable and least debased coin in the Western world. The 
Spanish government debased the value of the Spanish dollar as a coin a few 
times during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the result that it 
took greater numbers of reales to equal the nominal ”piece of eight”. As of 
1772, the Spanish dollar was divided into 11 reales (also called bits or escalins), 
and every reale into 6 stivers (also called dogs or noirs). Other prominent coins 
which featured in the monetary circulation of St. Barthélemy were the 
Spanish doubloon (gold, worth 16 Spanish dollars) and the Portuguese moeda 
(gold, worth 8 Spanish dollars). Large remittances of money were of course 
transacted by way of cashless payments, primarily by bills of exchange, but 
also by bartering commodities. Swedish officials and agents of the Swedish 
West India Company usually resorted to the merchant house of Wilson & 
Son in London for their credit and remittances, but occasionally also to firms 
and bankers in Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Paris. Buying bills of exchange 
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from British, Danish and Dutch colonies in the vicinity was also not unusual 
to meet immediate liquidity needs.  
The propensity for cheating and fraud, and the overall scarcity of bullion 
and specie, led to some serious problems in the colonial economies. 
”Clipping” coins by shaving, filing, or cutting metal from its edges was 
commonplace. It was very usual to cut a coin in not quite two halves by 
shaving and keeping a thin strip from the center. The list goes of techniques 
could go on, but the inevitable result of a these practices was a kind of profit 
for cheaters and a debased coinage for everyone. This explains the reliance of 
merchants on the weight of coins rather than accepting them by tale. A 
practical example is given by Euphrasén in 1788, who observed that the 
Spanish dollar in St. Barthélemy was usually in physical circulation as two or 
four cut pieces of a whole coin. Half a Spanish dollar was good for 5 ½ reales. 
A coin cut into four pieces, on the other hand, led to the problem that 2 pieces 
(two fourths of a coin) were always bigger than the other two pieces, which in 
practice led to the larger pieces being worth 3 reales a piece, while the smaller 
ones never went for more than 2 ½ reales each. Official measures by the St. 
Barthélemy council were enacted from time to time to combat abuse and to 
create a degree of monetary order, prohibiting underweight, cut, or otherwise 
debased types of coin and instituting the practice of countermarking coins for 
authenticity or value. There were even plans for an indigenous, copper 
colonial currency for the island in 1797, but these were never put into action 
as it was unrealistic. In an attempt to secure the supply of specie, the island 
council in 1797 fixed the value of Spanish dollars at a rate of 12 reales per dollar, 
instead of the usual 11. Still, the supply of specie and liquid assets remained an 
everyday problem. Administrative measures as a whole were never successful 
in regulating the monetary system of the island, which remained free and open 
to the whims and fluctuations of economic life at large.  
Concerning the rate of exchange between the Spanish dollars and other 
currencies, it has to be conceded that there are no longer exchange rate series 
due to lack of sources. Exhaustive series are only available from 1820 onwards. 
However imprecise, I have adopted the practical exchange rate which was 
often referred to during the period covered in this thesis. The rate of 
exchange applied by the British to the Spanish dollar was calculated a 
relatively stable and precise £1 sterling = 4.44 Spanish dollars throughout the 
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Revolutionary period. For general and practical purposes, at least during the 
Napoleonic wars, the rate was sometimes rounded in contemporary sources 
to £1 = 5 pesos. The Spanish dollar and the U.S. dollar were held to be at par 
throughout these years. In comparison with these currencies, the monetary 
system of the Swedish kingdom was much more complex. During the 18th 
century, Sweden had both silver and copper currencies as well as a paper 
currency. After the insolvency of the Sveriges Riksbank in November 1776, the 
rixdollar specie of 25.70 was declared the monetary unit. Thus the silver 
standard was reintroduced. Despite of this, new paper money was issued, i.e. 
the rixdollar banco (or bancosedlar) and additionally the rixdollar riksgälds 
since 1789. Through these developments, the silver currency was more or less 
put out of operation at the end of the 18th century. Exchange rate quotations 
were done for the most part in or for rixdollar banco of 6 rixdollars specie or 
48 shillings (skillingar) payable in bancosedlar. In the context of international 
trade, however, transactions were seldom made in Swedish currencies. 
Commercial centers such as Stockholm and Gothenburg were affiliated with 
international networks of cashless payment systems, but bills of exchange 
were rarely drawn from abroad on Sweden, and Swedish economic actors 
largely settled their commercial debts by drawing and remitting foreign bills. 
 
Sources: John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775. A 
Handbook (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press for the Institute 
of Early American History and Culture, 1978), 3–23, 81–86, 98–107; Markus A. Denzel, 
Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 32–33, 307–11, 
339–58; Frank Olrog, Med svensk krona: Den svenska kolonien S:t Barthélemys mynthistoria 
1784–1878 (Stockholm: Kungl. Myntkabinettet statens museum för mynt-, medalj- och 
penninghistoria, 1978). 
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Appendix II 
Notes on units of measurement 
Throughout the text use has been made of essentially two units for the 
measurement of shipping capacity or tonnage, the first of which is the 
Swedish last (svåra läster in plural) and the imperial ton (alt. weight ton or long 
ton). The common denominator for both units of tonnage is that they are a 
calculation of the total permanently enclosed capacity of the vessel, 
essentially the cargo hold of the vessel. This is not to be confused with either 
deadweight tonnage (the measure of how much weight a ship is carrying or is 
capable of carrying) or displacement (the weight of the water that a ship 
displaces when floating). 
Calculation of the tonnage units could be a complicated process, but after 
1726, standard procedures were employed in Sweden for the measurement of 
shipping capacity. A Swedish last was equal to a ship’s carrying capacity of 18 
ship pounds ironweight, or, 1 last = 18 ship pounds ironweight = 2.448 metric 
tons. That means that registered capacity of Swedish vessels were roughly 
equal to modern deadweight tonnage (but should still not be considered as 
such). The imperial ton, then, employed in the measurement of early modern 
British shipping, was equal to 2,200 English pounds, which is almost exactly 1 
metric ton (1,016 kg). Partly because of this accessibility and ease of 
understanding for a modern audience, the unit is used in comparative research 
and I have therefore decided to convert Swedish registered tonnage 
throughout text from lasts to imperial tons. For practical purposes, I have 
assumed a general rate of conversion of 1 ton = 2.5 lasts. 
An example how a measurement and conversion between these units 
functioned in practice is furnished in the ship documents of the Swedish brig 
Neptunus, captain Daniel Jäderbom. Measured in 1793 in Gamla Karleby 
(present day Karleby/Kokkola), the small brig had a measured length of 89 
feet and a width of 26 feet. Moreover, it measured an immersion of 5 feet and 
5 inches in the water (computed from a difference in immersion between a 
loaded and unloaded cargo hold, but these original measures were not 
specified). The Swedish royal reglemente of 11 March 1778 regulating the 
procedure of measurement was followed, and its specified formula can be 
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described as immersion (length * width)/112 = lasts. The calculation began 
thus: 
89 * 26 = 2314.  
2314 * 5.5 = 12727. 
12727/112 = 113 71/112  
The final tally was rounded down to 110 lasts, an acknowledgment of the fact 
that the total capacity included the crew’s living quarters as well, which could 
be deducted from the commercial capacity of the vessel. Now, when the 
Neptunus sailed over the Atlantic and engaged in tramp shipping in the 
continental United States, she would be described as a registered 270 tons 
burden, as she was in a Baltimore custom house document in February 1798. 
Then the following proportion can be deduced: 270 tons / 110 lasts =2.45. This 
goes to show that it is hard arriving at any perfect understanding of any vessel 
size when confronted with a number in either lasts or imperial tons. 
 
Sources: Measurement of Swedish brig Neptune 10 September 1793, 2L, vol. 197, ADG; 
Measurement of Swedish schooner Four Sisters, 16 October 1815, PJ 183, FSB, ANOM. 
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Appendix III 
Governors and commanders of St. Barthélemy 
 
Name    Term of Service 
 
 
Salomon Mauritz von Rayalin (1757–1825)  6 March 1785 – 
23 April 1787 
 
Pehr Herman Aurivillius Rosen von Rosenstein (1763–1799) 23 April 1785 –  
6 June 1790 
 
Carl Fredrik Bagge af Söderby (1750–1828) 6 June 1790 –  
17 November 1795 
 
Georg Henrik af Trolle (1764–1824) 17 November 1795 – 
26 January 1801 
 
Hans Hindric Ankarheim (1743–1814) 26 January 1801 –  
14 February 1812 
 
Berndt Robert Gustaf Stackelberg (1784–1845) 14 February 1812 –  
 10 August 1816 
 
Johan Samuel Rosenswärd (1782–1818) 10 August 1816 – 
 19 September 1818 
 
Carl Fredrik Berghult (1794–1834) 19 September 1818 – 
 20 August 1819 
 
Johan Norderling (1760–1828) 20 August 1818 – 
27 April 1826 
 
James Harlef Haasum (1791–1871) (co-governed for most of the time) 27 April 1826 – 
Lars Gustaf Morsing (1794–1860) 28 June 1841 
 
James Harlef Haasum 28 June1841 – August 1858 
 
Georg Wilhelm Netherwood (1829–1903) August 1858 –  
 4 December 1868 
 
Bror Ludvig Ulrich 4 December 1868 –  
 10 September 1878 
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Appendix IV 
American consuls stationed on St. Barthélemy, 1797–1827 
 
Name    Term of Service 
 
 
Job Wall    1797–1803 
 
Isaac Prince    1803–1809 
 
William Israel    1809–1813 
 
Nathaniel W. Strong   1813 
 
Joseph Ficklin    1816–1820 
 
Joshua Norvel    1820–1821 
 
Robert Monroe Harrison   1821–1823 
 
Hugh Steele    1823–1827 
 
 
 
Sources: Despatches from U.S. Consuls in St. Bartholomew, French West Indies, 
1799–1899, M72, RG 59, NARA; Walter Burges Smith, America’s diplomats and consuls 
of 1776–1865: a geographic and biographic directory of the Foreign Service from the 
Declaration of Independence to the end of the Civil War (Washington D.C.: Center for the 
Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1987).
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Appendix V 
Swedish consuls stationed in the Unites States, 1783–1834 
Station  Name  Term of Service 
 
 
New York  Henrik Gahn  21 November 1799– 
2 August 1834 
 
Baltimore  Henry Aquiton  17 May 1810– 
4 November 1818 
 
Boston  Richard Söderström 22 September 1783– 
27 February 1795 
 
Charleston  Adolf Schough  10 January 1784– 
17 October 1785 
 
Philadelphia  Carl Hellstedt  22 September 1783– 
28 February 1793 
 
Richard Söderström 27 February 1795– 
7 April 1815 
 
  Severin Lorich  25 July 1818– 
    August 1834 
 
 
 
Sources: J.A. Almqvist, Kommerskollegiums och riksens ständers manufakturkontor samt 
konsulsstaten. Administrativa och biografiska anteckningar (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1912), 
345–49.
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Appendix VI 
Description of the datasets 
Three separate datasets have been constructed for use in this thesis. These 
are (1) the Wilson dataset on the transit trade of St. Barthélemy and St. 
Thomas (2015), (2) the Wilson dataset on the Swedish slave trade (2015), and 
(3) the Wilson dataset on St. Barthélemy mariners (2015), referred to in this 
appendix as datasets (1),(2), and (3). The systematic collection of a large body 
of data from the archives have been organized through Filemaker software, 
and has been ongoing for the period of 2011–15. A large number of iterations 
have been made for each and every one of the separate datasets before arriving 
at the current structure. The data in the thesis are from the most current 
versions of the datasets (from 2015). 
The composition and structure of dataset (1) is the most complicated. The 
purpose of this dataset was to collect all the available information on free port 
shipping in the Caribbean during the relevant years, with an obvious focus on 
St.Barthélemy. In the end, a large amount of data on the shipping of St. 
Thomas was also included. The dataset combines two principal layouts, as 
they are termed in Filemaker. The first layout is the passport registration 
layout, where every single database entry is a ship registration with basic ship 
and crew data, information on passport duration, place of registry, and so on. 
The second layout is the so-called itinerary layout, where the entries consist 
of voyage data. In individual cases in the latter layout, it has been possible to 
collect many references for the same voyage, and thus trace a quite detailed 
record of the ship route, as well as the goods carried. In the majority of cases, 
information for individual ships is quite scarce, and there are only a few points 
of information regarding the ship’s passage. Taken together, dataset (1) 
includes 7,344 entries, out of which 4,507 are ship registrations whereas 2,790 
are voyages. In a few hundred cases there are overlaps between registered 
ships and their voyages, thus rendering a more complete picture of the 
individual vessel in question. 
Furthermore, the creation of databases also presents the constructor with 
the problem of standardization. Dataset (1) is constructed of various sources 
with widely differing proveniences. A large part is derived from the records of 
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St. Barthélemy shipping in the Report of Saint Bartholomew, registration lists 
and manifests found in the FSB, as well as material from the Sound Toll 
Registers and the Danish National Archives. I have not striven for wide-
ranging standardization of values and measurements in individual entries. 
Instead, the ambition has been to recreate the original record. I have only 
performed conversions when referring to specific ships in the text, according 
to the method explained in Appendix II. Conflicting pieces of information 
regarding individual ships is not uncommon, and is a result of several factors, 
the most important of which is the incompleteness of the general records. It 
is simply not possible to recreate most individual voyages in complete detail. 
Conflicts of information and inconsistencies are especially prevalent 
regarding flag colors and national affiliations. This is a common problem that 
is due to the nature of the trade surveyed, and has been covered to an 
appreciable extent in the thesis. 
Dataset (2) and (3) have been covered in chapter 2.2 and 3, and deserves only 
a few additional comments. The goal of dataset (2) was to collect all references 
to the Swedish slave trade with some connection to St. Barthélemy, and as 
such has been the dataset with the most serious conceptual problems 
regarding national affiliation. It has however been structured as far as possible 
in order to correspond to the information included in the Trans-Atlantic 
Slave Trade (TAST) database, which includes two levels of national affiliation, 
distinguishing between ship registration and ownership of the vessel. The 
choice has also been made in order to harness the wealth of data in this 
database, and hopefully to integrate the findings on the Swedish slave trade 
into the online TAST resource in the near future. Finally, dataset (3) is a 
database recreation of the information in one single source, and is the least 
problematic of the three. It is the ambition of the author to make the datasets 
available online in a convenient form for other researchers.
 27
7 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
V
II
 
L
is
t o
f v
oy
ag
es
 m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
W
es
t I
nd
ia
 C
om
pa
ny
, 1
78
7–
18
06
 
N
o.
 
Y
ea
r 
N
am
e 
Sh
ip
 t
yp
e 
T
on
s 
C
ap
ta
in
 
Ø
re
su
n
d
 
D
at
e 
of
 
ou
tw
ar
ds
 
p
as
sa
ge
 
St
 B
 D
at
e 
of
 
ar
ri
va
l 
St
 B
 D
at
e 
of
 
d
ep
ar
tu
re
 
Ø
re
su
n
d
 
D
at
e 
of
 
h
om
ew
ar
d
s 
p
as
sa
ge
 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
1 
17
87
 
E
n
ig
h
et
en
 
Sh
ip
 
– 
Jo
ha
n
 N
. D
am
p 
17
84
-1
1-
26
 
17
85
-0
1-
30
 
- 
17
85
-0
9-
10
 
C
ap
tu
re
d 
an
d 
co
nd
em
ne
d;
 R
us
si
a 
2 
17
89
 
L
’A
m
it
ié
 
B
ri
g 
– 
E
ti
en
ne
 M
or
in
 
– 
– 
– 
17
90
-0
9-
27
 
 
3 
17
91
 
W
ä
lk
om
st
en
 
B
ri
ga
nt
in
e 
– 
P
et
te
r 
M
el
in
 
– 
17
91
-0
4-
20
 
– 
– 
Sh
ip
w
re
ck
ed
 in
 S
t.
 C
ro
ix
 
4 
17
91
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
91
-0
8-
12
 
– 
– 
17
92
-0
6-
23
 
 
5 
17
91
 
L
’A
m
er
iq
u
e 
Sh
ip
 
23
8 
A
.F
. E
dl
in
g 
17
91
-1
1-
02
 
– 
– 
17
92
-1
0-
02
 
 
6 
17
92
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
92
-1
0-
01
 
– 
– 
17
93
-0
7-
03
 
 
7 
17
93
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
– 
– 
– 
17
95
-0
6-
30
 
 
8 
17
93
 
L
’A
m
er
iq
u
e 
Sh
ip
 
23
8 
A
.F
. E
dl
in
g 
17
93
-1
1-
03
 
17
94
-0
4-
25
 
– 
17
94
-0
8-
25
 
 
9 
17
94
 
L
’A
m
er
iq
u
e 
Sh
ip
 
23
8 
A
.F
. E
dl
in
g 
17
94
-1
1-
19
 
17
95
-0
2-
26
 
17
95
-0
7-
14
 
17
95
-0
9-
12
 
 
10
 
17
95
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
95
-0
9-
23
 
17
96
-0
1-
06
 
17
96
-0
4-
17
 
17
96
-0
7-
01
 
 
11
 
17
95
 
L
’A
m
er
iq
u
e 
Sh
ip
 
23
8 
A
.F
. E
dl
in
g 
17
95
-1
2-
13
 
17
96
-0
4-
03
 
17
96
-0
7-
03
 
17
96
-0
9-
09
 
 
12
 
17
96
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
96
-1
0-
31
 
17
97
-0
1-
24
 
17
97
-0
5-
31
 
17
97
-0
7-
22
 
 
13
 
17
97
 
L
’A
m
er
iq
u
e 
Sh
ip
 
23
8 
A
.F
. E
dl
in
g 
17
97
-1
0-
26
 
– 
– 
– 
Sh
ip
w
re
ck
ed
 in
 th
e 
E
ng
lis
h 
C
ha
n
ne
l 
14
 
17
98
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
98
-0
9-
04
 
– 
– 
17
99
-0
7-
17
 
 
15
 
17
99
 
T
ri
to
n
 
B
ar
qu
e 
32
8 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
17
99
-1
0-
23
 
– 
– 
18
00
-0
7-
03
 
 
16
 
17
99
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
La
rs
 E
ke
n
be
rg
 
17
99
-1
1-
29
 
– 
– 
18
00
-0
9-
09
 
 
17
 
18
00
 
T
ri
to
n
 
B
ar
qu
e 
32
8 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
18
00
-1
1-
11
 
– 
– 
18
03
-0
6-
15
 
C
ap
tu
re
d 
an
d 
ca
rg
o 
co
n
de
m
ne
d:
 U
K
 
18
 
18
00
 
L
’A
p
p
a
re
n
ce
 
Sn
ow
 
27
0 
La
rs
 E
ke
n
be
rg
 
18
00
-1
2-
18
 
– 
– 
– 
St
ra
n
de
d 
on
 th
e 
so
ut
h 
co
as
t 
of
 N
or
w
ay
 
 27
8 
 1
9 
18
03
 
T
ri
to
n
 
B
ar
qu
e 
32
8 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
18
03
-1
0-
15
 
18
04
-0
4-
24
 
 
 
 
20
 
18
04
 
T
ri
to
n
 
B
ar
qu
e 
32
8 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
18
04
-1
0-
26
 
18
04
-1
2-
23
 
 
 
 
21
 
18
06
 
T
ri
to
n
 
B
ar
qu
e 
32
8 
A
n
de
rs
 F
lo
db
er
g 
18
05
-2
3-
10
 
18
06
-0
1-
17
 
18
06
-0
6-
18
 
– 
C
ap
tu
re
d 
an
d 
co
nd
em
ne
d;
 F
ra
n
ce
 
So
ur
ce
s:
 S
W
IC
 M
in
ut
es
, v
ol
s.
 15
6–
57
, S
W
IC
 c
or
re
sp
on
de
nc
e,
 v
ol
s.
 16
8–
70
, H
an
de
l o
ch
 sj
öf
ar
t,
 S
N
A
; S
ou
nd
 T
ol
l R
eg
is
te
rs
 O
nl
in
e,
 17
87
–
18
06
, “
St
 B
ar
ts
” d
es
ti
na
ti
on
 a
nd
 p
la
ce
 o
f d
ep
ar
tu
re
, h
tt
p:
//d
ie
tr
ic
h.
so
un
dt
ol
l.n
l/p
ub
lic
/p
la
ce
s_
st
an
da
rd
.p
hp
?f
ro
m
na
m
e=
St
%
20
B
ar
ts
, a
nd
 
ht
tp
://
di
et
ri
ch
.s
ou
nd
to
ll.
nl
/p
ub
lic
/p
la
ce
s_
st
an
da
rd
.p
hp
?t
on
am
e=
St
%
20
B
ar
ts
, d
at
e 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 17
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
20
15
. 
A
pp
en
di
x 
V
II
I 
L
is
t o
f k
no
w
n 
re
gi
st
er
ed
 S
w
ed
is
h 
sh
ip
s w
it
h 
a 
st
at
ed
 d
es
ti
na
ti
on
 to
 S
t. 
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
fr
om
 th
e 
B
al
ti
c,
 17
85
–1
81
5 
N
o.
 
Y
ea
r 
N
am
e 
Sh
ip
 t
yp
e 
T
on
s 
C
ap
ta
in
 
Ø
re
su
n
d
 
D
at
e 
of
 
ou
tw
ar
ds
 
p
as
sa
ge
 
St
 B
 D
at
e 
of
 
ar
ri
va
l 
St
 B
 D
at
e 
of
 
d
ep
ar
tu
re
 
Ø
re
su
n
d
 
D
at
e 
of
 
h
om
ew
ar
d
s 
p
as
sa
ge
 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
1 
17
85
 
S
p
re
n
gt
p
o
rt
en
 
Fr
ig
at
e 
– 
P
uk
e 
 
17
85
-0
3-
06
 
17
85
-0
6-
30
 
– 
R
oy
al
 n
av
y 
ex
pe
di
ti
on
 
2 
17
85
 
A
n
to
n
et
ta
 
B
ri
g 
– 
G
.A
. G
yl
le
n
bå
åt
h 
– 
17
85
-0
5-
11
 
17
85
-0
6-
12
 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 L
.K
åh
re
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
3 
17
85
 
F
re
d
 o
ch
 
Y
m
n
o
gh
et
 
Sh
ip
 
– 
T
eu
ch
le
r,
 
A
n
de
rs
so
n 
– 
17
85
-1
2-
24
 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 N
. A
rf
w
id
ss
on
; r
eg
. i
n
 
G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
4 
17
85
 
L
o
vi
sa
 F
re
d
ri
ca
 
Sh
ip
 
– 
A
.A
. K
n
ap
e 
17
85
-1
1-
29
 
17
86
-0
2-
03
 
17
86
-0
7-
12
 
17
86
-0
8-
24
 
O
w
ne
rs
: L
. R
ej
m
er
s 
P
er
ss
on
, J
.P
. M
ül
le
r,
 
A
. W
es
te
rb
er
g,
 C
ar
l A
rf
w
ed
ss
on
, D
av
id
 
Sc
hi
n
ck
el
; r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
5 
17
85
 
S
t.
 O
lo
f 
– 
– 
D
.F
. H
ac
ke
r 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: S
.P
. R
ot
hs
te
in
, H
ac
ke
r;
 r
eg
. i
n
 
G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
6 
17
85
 
S
op
h
ia
 
B
ri
g 
16
5 
G
.A
. G
yl
le
n
bå
åt
h 
– 
17
86
-0
3-
11
 
17
86
-0
6-
01
 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: C
ul
lin
, G
.B
. S
an
te
so
n,
 J
.P
. &
 N
. 
H
ol
te
rm
an
, r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
7 
17
86
 
E
xp
ré
en
/ 
B
ri
g 
78
 
S.
 G
ra
n
be
rg
 
17
86
-1
0-
28
 
17
87
-0
5-
10
 
17
87
-0
7-
08
 
17
87
-1
0-
22
 
O
w
ne
r:
 E
sc
ho
lin
, r
eg
. i
n
 Å
bo
 
 27
9 
 
E
xp
ré
s 
8 
17
86
 
S
t.
 B
a
rt
h
él
em
i 
– 
25
5 
G
.A
. G
yl
le
n
bå
åt
h 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: K
åh
re
 &
 C
o.
 J
.P
. &
 N
. 
H
ol
te
rm
an
, r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
9 
17
87
 
G
å
p
å
 
Sl
oo
p 
– 
G
.W
. B
ag
ge
 
– 
17
87
-0
2-
27
 
– 
– 
R
oy
al
 n
av
y 
ex
pe
di
ti
on
 
10
 
17
87
 
G
u
st
a
f 
A
d
ol
f 
– 
– 
P
et
te
rs
on
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
L.
 K
åh
re
, r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
11
 
17
88
 
S
t.
 B
a
rt
h
él
em
y/
 
M
å
n
s 
 
Sl
oo
p 
– 
B
lo
m
 
– 
17
88
-0
2-
05
 
17
88
-0
3-
26
 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n 
12
 
17
88
 
A
n
to
n
et
ta
 
B
ri
g 
– 
B
.H
. K
na
pe
 
– 
17
88
-0
2-
08
 
17
88
-0
6-
20
 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 L
. K
åh
re
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
13
 
17
94
 
S
w
a
la
n
 
– 
93
 
G
. W
ill
em
ot
h 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 A
rf
w
ed
so
n 
&
 C
o.
; r
eg
 in
 
G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
14
 
17
97
 
F
ä
d
er
n
es
la
n
d
et
 
Sh
ip
 
– 
J.
 S
om
m
er
 
– 
17
95
-0
6-
29
 
– 
17
95
-0
8-
29
 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n 
15
 
17
96
 
M
a
rg
a
re
ta
 
– 
12
0 
M
. B
ör
je
so
n 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
A
. G
av
in
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
16
 
17
96
 
H
ed
vi
g 
– 
25
0 
M
. A
nd
er
ss
on
 
17
96
-0
9-
28
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n,
 J
. L
yc
ho
u;
 r
eg
. 
in
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
17
 
17
96
 
S
u
sa
n
n
a
 
Sh
ip
 
– 
C
. B
er
g 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 M
ic
he
l; 
re
g.
 in
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
18
 
17
96
 
A
le
x
a
n
d
er
 
M
a
gn
u
s 
Sh
ip
 
25
0 
A
. F
ri
be
rg
 
– 
17
96
-0
7-
02
 
17
96
-1
2-
21
 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: P
et
er
 M
ili
tz
 &
 P
et
er
 W
en
de
lin
; 
re
g.
 in
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
19
 
17
97
 
B
ea
ta
 
B
ri
g 
37
5 
C
. B
er
g 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n;
 r
eg
. i
n
 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
20
 
17
97
 
F
ä
d
er
n
es
la
n
d
et
 
– 
30
0 
C
.F
. B
er
gf
el
dt
 
17
97
-1
2-
02
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: C
.G
. E
kh
ol
m
, J
. S
ch
m
id
t,
 J
. 
W
es
ti
n,
 C
.F
. B
er
gf
el
dt
; r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
21
 
17
97
 
A
le
x
a
n
d
er
 
– 
37
5 
J.
 Å
ke
rm
an
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 S
et
on
 &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
22
 
17
97
 
E
li
sa
 
– 
24
0 
C
. B
er
gm
an
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 S
et
on
 &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
23
 
17
97
 
B
a
ro
n
 
L
il
je
n
cr
a
n
ts
 
– 
15
0 
C
. R
ad
el
of
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 G
.W
. B
ag
ge
; r
eg
. i
n 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
24
 
17
97
 
A
tl
a
s 
B
ri
g 
– 
W
es
te
rm
ar
ck
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 W
öl
ff
er
 &
 M
et
zl
er
; r
eg
. i
n
 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
25
 
17
97
 
M
ed
b
or
ga
re
n
 
Fr
ig
at
e 
– 
A
.N
. S
ch
al
e 
– 
17
97
-0
7-
01
 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
 in
te
r 
al
ia
: L
.E
. Y
vo
n,
 R
öh
l &
 
H
an
se
n
, Ö
st
rö
m
 P
ro
ct
er
 &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 
G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
26
 
17
98
 
E
m
a
n
u
el
 
– 
16
0 
C
. W
ik
st
rö
m
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 G
. B
ra
nd
t;
 r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
 28
0 
 2
7 
17
98
 
G
u
st
a
vi
a
 
– 
27
5 
J.
G
. H
ill
es
tr
öm
 
17
98
-1
0-
18
 
– 
– 
17
99
-0
7-
21
 
O
w
ne
rs
: S
ch
ön
 &
 C
o.
, R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n
; 
re
g.
in
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
28
 
17
98
 
M
in
er
va
 
– 
88
 
A
. H
jo
rt
be
rg
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 J
. H
al
l &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
nb
ur
g 
29
 
17
99
 
M
a
ri
a
 
– 
10
8 
H
.P
. Ö
st
er
be
rg
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 Z
yg
es
tr
öm
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
30
 
17
99
 
M
in
er
va
 
– 
88
 
A
. H
jo
rt
be
rg
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 J
. H
al
l &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
nb
ur
g 
31
 
17
99
 
G
u
st
a
vi
a
 
– 
27
5 
J.
G
. H
ill
es
tr
öm
 
17
99
-1
2-
04
 
18
01
-1
0-
06
 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
rs
: S
et
on
 &
 C
o.
, R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n
; 
re
g.
 in
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
32
 
17
99
 
G
u
st
a
f 
A
d
ol
p
h
 
– 
11
0 
F.
 O
ls
so
n 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 J
.G
. W
es
te
rb
er
g;
 r
eg
. i
n
 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
33
 
17
99
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
J.
 D
ur
ee
s 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n;
 p
os
si
bl
y 
re
g.
 in
 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
34
 
18
00
 
A
m
p
h
io
n
 
B
ri
ga
nt
in
e 
– 
A
. G
ra
ff
m
an
 
– 
18
00
-0
9-
27
 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n;
 r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
35
 
18
02
 
R
ed
li
gh
et
en
 
– 
– 
B
. E
lls
tr
öm
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r:
 S
et
on
 &
 C
o.
; r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
36
 
18
04
 
M
ic
h
a
el
 
– 
14
5 
C
.F
. H
ag
el
be
rg
 
– 
– 
– 
18
04
-0
8-
04
 
O
w
ne
r:
 M
.P
. H
am
br
é;
 r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
37
 
18
05
 
M
ic
h
a
el
 
B
ri
g 
– 
T
. C
hi
ld
s 
– 
18
05
-0
3-
27
 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n;
 p
os
si
bl
y 
sa
m
e 
as
 in
 n
o.
 
36
 a
bo
ve
. 
38
 
18
12
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
N
.P
. K
ro
ok
 
18
12
-1
0-
19
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n:
 r
eg
. i
n
 G
äv
le
 
39
 
18
14
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
B
. W
al
lin
 
18
14
-0
6-
16
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n:
 r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
40
 
18
14
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
Z
. K
ol
in
iu
s 
18
14
-0
7-
04
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n:
 r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
41
 
18
14
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
M
. R
um
pt
 
18
14
-0
7-
16
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n:
 r
eg
. i
n
 G
ot
he
n
bu
rg
 
42
 
18
15
 
N
/A
 
– 
– 
J.
F.
 B
ös
t 
18
15
-1
1-
03
 
– 
– 
– 
O
w
ne
r 
un
kn
ow
n:
 r
eg
. i
n
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
So
ur
ce
s:
 S
W
IC
 c
or
re
sp
on
de
nc
e,
 v
ol
s.
 16
8–
70
, H
an
de
l o
ch
 sj
öf
ar
t,
 S
N
A
; E
xt
ra
ct
 o
f A
lg
er
ia
n 
pa
ss
po
rt
s,
 B
oa
rd
 o
f C
om
m
er
ce
 to
 G
us
ta
v 
IV
 
A
do
lp
h,
 12
 Ju
ne
 18
04
, S
N
A
; S
ou
nd
 T
ol
l R
eg
is
te
rs
 O
nl
in
e,
 17
87
–1
81
5,
 “S
t B
ar
ts
” d
es
ti
na
ti
on
 a
nd
 p
la
ce
 o
f d
ep
ar
tu
re
, 
ht
tp
://
di
et
ri
ch
.s
ou
nd
to
ll.
nl
/p
ub
lic
/p
la
ce
s_
st
an
da
rd
.p
hp
?f
ro
m
na
m
e=
St
%
20
B
ar
ts
, a
nd
 
ht
tp
://
di
et
ri
ch
.s
ou
nd
to
ll.
nl
/p
ub
lic
/p
la
ce
s_
st
an
da
rd
.p
hp
?t
on
am
e=
St
%
20
B
ar
ts
, d
at
e 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 17
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
20
15
. 
 
 28
1 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
IX
 
L
is
t o
f s
la
ve
 sh
ip
s w
it
h 
kn
ow
n 
Sw
ed
is
h 
or
 S
t. 
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
af
fi
lia
ti
on
, 1
78
7–
18
67
 
N
o.
 
Y
ea
r 
T
A
ST
  
N
o.
 
N
am
e 
Sh
ip
 t
yp
e 
T
on
s 
F
la
g 
C
ap
ta
in
(s
) 
K
n
ow
n
 o
w
n
er
s 
an
d/
or
 a
ge
n
ts
 
Sl
av
es
 
ca
rr
ie
d
 
A
ff
il
ia
ti
on
 a
n
d
 
ou
tc
om
e 
K
n
ow
n
 s
to
ps
 
1 
17
87
 
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
61
 
B
ri
ta
in
 
Jo
hn
 S
to
ry
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
5A
 
 
2 
17
87
 
 
A
n
n
e*
 
Sl
oo
p/
Ja
ch
ts
hi
p 
92
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
32
 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
3 
17
87
 
 
S
w
if
t*
 
Sh
oo
ne
r 
86
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
6 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
4 
17
88
 
41
84
4 
F
el
iz
 
Fr
ig
at
e 
30
 
U
SA
 
A
le
xa
nd
ro
 
B
au
de
n 
N
/A
 
22
8 
5A
* 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 
Lo
ui
si
an
a*
 
5 
17
88
 
 
H
o
p
e*
 
B
ri
g 
50
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
34
 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
6 
17
91
 
 
A
m
it
y 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
30
 
Fr
an
ce
 
J.
P
 B
en
oi
t 
N
/A
 
12
 
5F
* 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y*
 
7 
17
92
 
98
85
2 
Z
om
b
ie
/Z
u
m
b
ic
 
Sh
ip
 
 
Sw
ed
en
 
R
ic
ha
rd
 R
og
er
s 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n 
10
0 
1E
 
A
cc
ra
 
8 
17
95
 
28
20
9 
S
to
ck
h
ol
m
 
Sl
oo
p 
58
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fe
rd
in
an
d 
D
eu
re
r,
  
P
et
er
 H
as
se
l, 
Jo
hn
 H
as
se
l, 
A
da
m
 B
ir
d 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n,
 G
. 
W
er
n
be
rg
, L
ar
s 
R
ej
m
er
s 
P
et
te
rs
on
 
45
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
9 
17
95
 
83
30
1 
R
eg
u
la
to
r*
 
B
ri
g 
13
3 
Sw
ed
en
/ 
B
ri
ta
in
 
T
h.
 D
en
n
et
t 
S.
 P
ar
so
n
s 
22
6 
3B
 
B
ar
ba
do
s 
10
 
17
96
 
 
L
a
 R
es
o
u
rc
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
D
es
id
er
io
 
B
ia
gi
n
o 
Se
ba
st
ia
n
o 
B
ia
gi
n
o 
N
/A
 
3A
 
N
ew
 B
ar
ce
lo
na
 
11
 
17
97
 
 
N
ep
tu
n
e 
(f
or
m
er
ly
 L
a
 
N
eu
tr
a
li
té
) 
B
ri
ga
nt
in
e 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
D
an
ie
l C
am
pb
el
l 
V
au
cr
os
so
n
 &
 fi
ls
 
ai
né
 
98
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
 
12
 
17
97
 
 
A
n
n
a
 M
a
ri
a
* 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
T
ho
m
as
 
Si
m
m
on
s 
G
us
ta
f W
er
n
be
rg
 
64
 
1F
 
H
av
an
a 
 28
2 
 1
3 
17
98
 
13
73
8 
N
ep
tu
n
e 
(f
or
m
er
ly
 L
a
 
N
eu
tr
a
li
té
) 
B
ri
ga
nt
in
e 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
D
an
ie
l C
am
pb
el
l 
V
au
cr
os
so
n
 &
 fi
ls
 
ai
né
 
18
5 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
14
 
17
99
 
28
20
8 
S
to
ck
h
ol
m
 
B
ri
g 
58
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fe
rd
in
an
d 
D
eu
re
r 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n,
 G
. 
W
er
n
be
rg
 
19
8 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
15
 
18
00
 
36
72
9 
W
il
li
a
m
 &
 
M
a
rg
a
re
t 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
95
 
U
SA
 
Jo
hn
 R
ea
d 
Jr
., 
M
ei
n
ha
rd
 
So
ub
ir
on
 
T
ho
m
 D
en
n
is
 
35
* 
5B
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
16
 
18
01
 
24
80
3 
C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Fr
ig
at
e 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
A
n
dr
e 
H
ag
be
rg
 
N
/A
 
86
 
2A
 
H
av
an
a 
17
 
18
01
 
41
54
5 
S
ve
a
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
P
et
er
 W
al
le
nd
er
 
N
/A
 
98
 
2A
 
P
ue
rt
o 
R
ic
o 
18
 
18
01
 
 
A
n
te
lo
p
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
B
ly
de
r 
(B
ly
de
n
) 
N
/A
 
37
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
19
 
18
02
 
13
96
6 
C
a
ro
l 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y 
C
a
ro
li
n
a
) 
Fr
ig
at
e 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
X
ag
le
er
g 
(p
ro
ba
bl
y 
H
ag
be
rg
) 
N
/A
 
19
3 
2A
 
H
av
an
a 
20
 
18
03
 
 
L
a
 P
et
it
e 
V
ic
to
ir
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
W
. R
ob
in
 
V
al
lé
e 
de
 C
ou
dr
e 
51
 
4F
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
21
 
18
03
 
 
A
n
te
lo
p
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
A
be
l B
ly
de
n 
Jr
. 
M
ar
ti
ns
 d
e 
C
la
re
n
ci
eu
x,
 J
ua
n 
M
ac
ia
s,
 S
am
ue
l 
B
on
ne
t 
41
 
1A
 
N
ew
 B
ar
ce
lo
na
 
22
 
18
03
 
 
T
ro
su
h
er
t 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
G
ar
di
ne
r 
N
/A
 
57
 
2A
 
H
av
an
a 
23
 
18
04
 
 
E
a
gl
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
55
 
Sw
ed
en
 
M
ar
sa
n 
J.
J.
 C
re
m
on
y 
N
/A
 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
24
 
18
04
 
 
G
a
gn
e 
to
n
 P
a
in
 
Sl
oo
p 
10
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fr
an
ço
is
 R
om
ie
u 
C
as
ta
gn
et
 &
 
D
au
m
as
 
N
/A
 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
25
 
18
04
 
 
D
is
tr
es
s 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
10
 
Sw
ed
en
 
W
ar
ne
r 
(p
os
si
bl
y 
C
ic
er
o 
W
ar
ne
r 
or
 r
el
at
iv
e)
 
C
ic
er
o 
W
ar
ne
r 
N
/A
 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
26
 
18
04
 
 
P
ol
ly
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
10
 
Sw
ed
en
 
W
el
ls
 (
po
ss
ib
ly
 
Jo
hn
 W
el
ls
 o
r 
re
la
ti
ve
) 
Jo
hn
 W
el
ls
 
N
/A
 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
27
 
18
04
 
36
98
7 
S
a
ll
y 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
40
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Lu
nd
el
l, 
J.
 
Ja
m
es
 M
ur
ph
y 
42
 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 H
av
an
a 
28
 
18
04
 
37
28
1 
H
o
ff
 
B
ri
g 
15
6 
D
en
m
ar
k 
B
en
ja
m
in
 H
ilt
on
 
Ja
m
es
 M
ur
ph
y 
17
7 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
 28
3 
 
29
 
18
04
 
 
D
a
rt
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Lo
rk
ik
 (
po
ss
ib
ly
 
W
ill
ia
m
 L
or
di
ck
) 
N
/A
 
66
 
3A
 
H
av
an
a 
30
 
18
04
 
 
A
ct
iv
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
30
 
Sw
ed
en
 
P
or
te
lly
 (
po
ss
ib
ly
 
Je
an
 P
or
te
lly
 o
r 
re
la
ti
ve
) 
Je
an
 P
or
te
lly
 
51
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
31
 
18
04
 
 
A
ct
iv
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
58
 
Sw
ed
en
 
W
ilk
in
so
n 
Jo
se
ph
 W
ilk
in
so
n 
13
6 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
32
 
18
05
 
40
73
8 
E
lm
ir
a
/A
lm
ir
a
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
U
SA
 
Sa
m
ue
l 
Sh
er
bo
ur
ne
 
N
/A
 
46
 
5A
 
H
av
an
a 
33
 
18
05
 
37
27
9 
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
U
SA
 
M
ac
ki
n
to
sh
 
N
/A
 
67
 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
34
 
18
05
 
82
20
1 
K
it
ty
’s
 A
m
el
ia
 
Sh
ip
 
27
2 
B
ri
ta
in
 
N
ew
ka
bl
e,
 
N
ut
ta
ll,
 T
ho
m
as
, 
Fo
rr
es
t 
H
en
ry
 C
la
rk
e 
21
0 
4A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
35
 
18
05
 
83
25
2 
P
ru
d
en
ce
 
B
ri
g 
12
6 
B
ri
ta
in
 
G
ri
ff
it
h,
 
C
hr
is
ti
an
, 
C
ha
rl
es
 
H
en
ry
 C
la
rk
e 
16
2 
4A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
36
 
18
05
 
37
28
2 
O
n
ly
 S
on
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
53
 
Sw
ed
en
 
La
m
it
t 
J.
J.
 C
re
m
on
y,
 J
.L
. 
K
id
de
r 
10
1 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
37
 
18
05
 
37
28
0 
E
li
sa
b
et
h
 
B
ri
g 
93
 
Sw
ed
en
 
P
yk
e 
Jo
hn
 F
ra
n
kl
in
 
G
ib
n
ey
 
17
6 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
38
 
18
05
 
 
A
u
ro
ra
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
83
 
Sw
ed
en
 
A
rn
au
d 
(p
os
si
bl
y 
P
ie
rr
e 
A
rn
au
d 
or
 
re
la
ti
ve
) 
G
re
go
ri
o 
C
ev
ad
a,
 
P
ie
rr
e 
A
rn
au
d 
14
6 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
39
 
18
05
 
81
42
1 
F
a
n
n
y 
Sh
ip
 
17
1 
B
ri
ta
in
 
A
rc
hi
ba
ld
 
K
en
n
an
 
Sa
m
ue
l N
ew
to
n 
20
7 
6C
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
40
 
18
06
 
25
47
0 
S
a
m
u
el
 
Sh
ip
 
84
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
W
ar
d,
 G
ri
ff
it
hs
 
Sa
m
ue
l G
oo
dm
an
 
19
8 
5A
 
C
ha
rl
es
to
n 
41
 
18
07
 
 
D
or
a
d
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
12
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fr
an
ci
s 
R
ob
er
ts
 
N
/A
 
14
 
1A
 
D
om
in
ic
a 
42
 
18
08
 
25
51
3 
F
a
rn
h
a
m
* 
– 
N
/A
 
U
SA
 
B
ur
ge
ss
 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n 
12
6 
4A
  
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 C
ar
ib
be
an
 -
 
co
lo
n
y 
un
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
43
 
18
08
 
 
L
e 
F
er
n
a
n
d
* 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
5F
 
N
/A
 
44
 
18
08
 
 
B
et
sy
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Ja
co
b 
A
nd
re
s 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
1A
 
P
ue
rt
o 
R
ic
o 
 28
4 
 4
5 
18
09
 
 
R
eb
ec
ca
 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Ja
m
es
 C
oh
en
 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
84
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
46
 
18
09
 
 
N
u
es
tr
a
 S
en
o
ra
 
d
el
 C
a
rm
en
* 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n 
M
an
ue
l M
or
ei
ra
 
R
am
on
 N
av
ar
ro
 
15
2 
6G
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
47
 
18
10
 
75
48
 
D
ia
n
a
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
B
er
th
é 
Je
an
 T
ur
en
n
e 
84
 
1C
* 
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
 
48
 
18
10
 
 
R
eb
ec
ca
 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Ja
m
es
 C
oh
en
 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
80
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
49
 
18
10
 
 
L
oo
ko
u
t 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Ju
an
 V
en
tr
e 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
40
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
50
 
18
10
 
 
H
o
p
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
R
ic
ha
rd
 B
ea
le
 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
24
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
51
 
18
10
 
 
E
li
za
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
H
ir
am
 B
ea
ke
r 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
33
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
52
 
18
10
 
 
M
in
er
va
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fr
an
ci
sc
o 
C
of
fe
e 
P
ed
ro
 C
ar
ri
ca
bu
ru
, 
Sa
nt
ia
go
 M
ar
ti
ar
tu
 
44
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
53
 
18
10
 
 
S
a
n
 F
ra
n
ci
sc
o
 d
e 
A
si
s*
 
Sh
ip
 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n 
N
/A
 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n 
14
0 
4G
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
54
 
18
10
 
 
R
eb
ec
ca
* 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
R
öh
l &
 H
an
se
n 
19
3 
1A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
55
 
18
11
 
 
M
a
ti
ld
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
C
ar
l L
in
dg
re
n 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
15
0 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
56
 
18
11
 
 
E
li
za
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Fr
an
ci
sc
o 
C
of
fe
e 
C
le
m
en
te
 d
e 
Ic
ha
zo
 
60
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
57
 
18
14
 
 
N
/A
 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
10
0 
7F
 
N
/A
 
58
 
18
15
 
 
P
il
ot
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
12
5 
Sw
ed
en
 
D
ev
re
ve
r 
(D
eu
re
r)
 
E
lb
er
s 
&
 K
ra
ff
t 
61
 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
59
 
18
18
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
7F
 
N
/A
 
60
 
18
18
 
41
89
9 
S
 J
a
go
 d
e 
C
u
b
a
 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n
/ 
U
ru
gu
ay
 
N
/A
 
M
ar
ti
n
 M
ah
er
 
N
/A
 
6E
* 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y,
 
Sa
va
nn
ah
 
61
 
18
20
 
11
2 
M
a
ri
a
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
B
en
oa
t 
N
/A
 
16
0 
1A
 
H
av
an
a 
62
 
18
20
 
34
19
0 
L
a
 P
ro
té
e/
L
e 
P
ro
cè
s 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
C
oq
ua
rt
 d
e 
P
ou
lig
ue
n 
C
oq
ue
be
rt
 
33
0 
6D
 
Fr
en
ch
 C
ar
ib
be
an
, 
va
ri
ou
s 
po
rt
s 
63
 
18
20
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n
/ 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
6D
 
Fr
en
ch
 C
ar
ib
be
an
, 
va
ri
ou
s 
po
rt
s 
64
 
18
20
 
23
29
 
Jo
se
p
h
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n
/ 
U
ru
ga
y 
de
 la
 C
ru
z 
Z
ac
ha
ri
ah
 A
tk
in
s 
N
/A
 
8C
 
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
 
65
 
18
21
 
 
P
ro
m
et
h
eu
s/
Jo
ll
y 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
38
0 
6D
 
N
/A
 
66
 
18
22
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
6D
 
N
/A
 
 28
5 
 
67
 
18
22
 
 
N
/A
 
H
er
m
ap
hr
od
it
e 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
U
SA
/ 
C
ol
om
bi
a 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
6D
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
68
 
18
23
 
27
54
, 
34
39
1 
 
L
e 
P
ri
n
ce
 
d
’O
ra
n
ge
/ 
C
h
a
ss
eu
r 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Fr
an
ço
is
 
T
hé
ba
ud
, 
R
ui
ne
t 
G
ir
au
d,
 R
en
au
d 
N
/A
 
7F
 
P
ue
rt
o 
R
ic
o 
69
 
18
23
 
34
44
3 
Ja
lo
u
x 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
C
la
rk
 
T
it
us
 (
P
hi
lip
pe
) 
B
ig
ar
d,
 W
ill
ia
m
 
P
an
ili
o 
10
7 
3C
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
70
 
18
24
 
 
L
a
 C
la
ri
ss
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Si
m
m
on
s,
 
Sa
ng
ui
ne
tt
i, 
G
as
pa
rd
 
T
it
us
 (
P
hi
lip
pe
) 
B
ig
ar
d,
 A
le
xi
s 
B
er
n
ie
r 
86
 
3B
 
P
ue
rt
o 
R
ic
o,
 S
t.
 T
ho
m
as
 
71
 
18
26
 
28
42
 
Ju
st
in
 
N
/A
 
12
4 
Fr
an
ce
 
T
ar
dy
 
T
ar
di
n
 d
e 
R
oc
he
 
N
/A
 
7F
 
N
/A
 
72
 
18
26
 
28
78
 
L
’H
er
m
io
n
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
96
 
Fr
an
ce
 
C
hi
rp
oi
n,
 G
ou
y 
A
. B
ou
ca
n
n
ie
r,
  
A
. F
er
ra
nd
, D
el
is
le
,  
P
er
ill
ie
r 
12
3 
7C
 
C
ay
en
ne
 
73
 
18
27
 
 
P
re
si
d
en
ta
 
(B
el
la
 
E
sc
h
o
lh
a
/B
el
la
 
B
ra
zi
le
ir
a
) 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
B
ue
n
os
 
A
yr
es
 
B
ea
sl
ey
 
H
ad
do
ck
s,
 D
in
ze
y 
6 
6F
 
N
/A
 
74
 
18
27
 
28
89
 
F
lo
ra
 
N
/A
 
82
 
Fr
an
ce
 
J.
 D
au
rs
 
G
ua
ru
d 
N
/A
 
7F
 
N
/A
 
75
 
18
28
 
 
G
a
vi
ot
a
 
Sh
ip
 
N
/A
 
B
ue
on
s 
A
yr
es
 
D
au
ta
nt
 
G
. R
öh
l 
N
/A
 
4G
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
76
 
18
28
 
 
L
e 
C
h
a
rl
es
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
M
or
as
 
B
ig
ar
d,
 A
rm
uz
ie
r,
 
M
on
tr
eu
il 
8 
4A
* 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
(F
ou
rc
hu
e)
 
77
 
18
28
 
34
61
9 
L
a
 C
o
ri
n
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Je
an
 D
eg
la
nn
e 
 
N
/A
 
7C
 
G
or
ée
 
78
 
18
29
 
93
1 
N
ir
ze
e/
N
ie
rs
ée
/ 
E
st
a
fe
ta
 
B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
B
ig
ar
d,
 D
ej
oy
e 
28
0 
4A
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
79
 
18
29
 
93
8 
L
a
 F
o
li
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
 
Fr
an
ce
 
P
to
lé
lé
 
N
/A
 
12
7 
7A
  
M
ar
ti
n
iq
ue
 
80
 
18
29
 
24
16
 
F
él
ic
it
é 
B
ri
g 
13
1 
Fr
an
ce
 
T
ho
m
as
 
D
au
th
on
 
C
ha
bl
e 
22
7 
5A
 
St
. B
ar
th
él
em
y 
81
 
18
30
 
34
65
9 
L
a
 V
ig
il
a
n
te
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
7C
 
G
or
ée
 
 28
6 
 8
2 
18
31
 
 
G
ot
la
n
d
/L
’E
to
il
e 
d
u
 N
or
d
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Sa
m
ue
l V
au
gh
an
 
Sa
m
ue
l V
au
gh
an
 
N
/A
 
1G
 
N
/A
 
83
 
18
31
 
34
71
9 
M
a
n
/M
a
rs
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
56
 
Fr
an
ce
 
R
ap
ha
el
 
Li
ar
d,
 F
ra
n
ch
es
ch
y 
N
/A
 
7B
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
84
 
18
31
 
34
72
1 
E
gl
a
n
ti
n
e 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
7G
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
85
 
18
31
 
 
P
ol
in
a
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sp
ai
n 
Fe
rr
er
a 
N
at
ta
 
N
/A
 
7G
 
C
ub
a 
86
 
18
37
 
 
V
ic
to
ri
n
a
/V
ic
to
ri
a
 B
ri
g 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
1F
 
N
/A
 
87
 
18
62
 
49
84
 
L
a
u
ra
 
B
ri
g 
30
3 
U
SA
 
D
io
n
is
si
s 
D
io
n
is
si
s 
N
/A
 
7G
 
A
n
ti
gu
a 
So
ur
ce
s:
 W
ils
on
 d
at
as
et
 o
n 
th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
sl
av
e 
tr
ad
e 
(2
01
5)
; R
ic
ha
rd
 L
ed
ée
, “
R
ép
er
to
ir
e”
 d
e l
a 
tr
ai
te
 n
ég
ri
ér
e: 
Sa
in
t-
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
(S
ué
de
), 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
kn
ow
n 
as
 th
e 
C
LA
SH
 c
at
al
og
ue
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.m
em
oi
re
st
ba
rt
h.
co
m
/s
t-
ba
rt
s/
tr
ai
te
-n
eg
ri
er
e/
pd
f/
re
pe
rt
oi
re
-t
ra
it
e-
ne
gr
ie
re
-s
ai
nt
-
ba
rt
he
le
m
y-
su
ed
e.
pd
f, 
da
te
 a
cc
es
se
d 
18
 Ju
ne
 2
01
5.
 
 
 
 28
7 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
X
 
L
is
t o
f s
hi
ps
 in
 th
e 
C
L
A
SH
 c
at
al
og
ue
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
be
en
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fr
om
 A
pp
en
di
x 
V
I 
 
N
o.
 
Y
ea
r 
T
A
ST
  
N
o.
 
N
am
e 
Sh
ip
 t
yp
e 
T
on
s 
F
la
g 
C
ap
ta
in
(s
) 
O
w
n
er
(s
) 
Sl
av
es
 
ca
rr
ie
d 
A
ff
il
ia
ti
on
/ 
O
u
tc
om
e 
K
n
ow
n
 s
to
ps
 
1 
N
/A
 
 
O
rb
it
 
 
 
U
SA
 
 
 
 
M
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 
go
ve
rn
or
’s
 r
ep
or
t 
in
 
co
n
ne
ct
io
ns
 w
. 
ac
cu
sa
ti
on
s 
ag
ai
n
st
 S
t 
B
. O
rb
it
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
n
ot
 
a 
sl
av
e 
ve
ss
el
 
 
2 
17
95
 
80
85
6 
C
le
ve
la
n
d
 
B
ri
g 
12
7 
B
ri
ta
in
 
W
ill
ia
m
 
R
og
er
s 
N
/A
 
12
0 
O
n
ly
 lo
os
e 
St
 B
 
af
fi
lia
ti
on
 
 
3 
17
99
 
 
P
eg
gy
 
 
 
U
SA
 
 
 
 
V
es
se
l s
ol
d 
in
 S
t B
 
af
te
r 
co
m
pl
et
io
n
 o
f 
vo
ya
ge
 
 
4 
18
00
 
36
73
4 
S
u
cc
es
s 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
11
1 
U
SA
 
P
au
l 
B
ro
w
ne
ll 
W
. G
re
en
e 
10
1 
O
n
ly
 lo
os
e 
St
 B
 
af
fi
lia
ti
on
 
 
5 
18
03
 
82
44
8 
M
a
rg
a
re
t 
&
 
E
li
za
 
B
ri
g 
16
3 
 
T
ho
m
as
 
B
ar
ry
, 
P
os
tl
et
hw
ai
te
 
W
ill
ia
m
 
T
ho
m
ps
on
, 
Sa
m
ue
l 
C
lo
ug
h 
25
0 
P
ur
ch
as
ed
 a
nd
 
n
at
ur
al
iz
ed
 a
ft
er
 
sl
av
es
 d
is
em
ba
rk
ed
 a
t 
an
ot
he
r 
lo
ca
ti
on
 
 
6 
18
06
 
25
45
7 
G
u
st
a
vi
a
 
Sh
ip
 
30
0 
U
SA
/ 
Sw
ed
en
? 
M
. H
ill
 
Sp
en
ce
r 
Jo
hn
 M
an
 
25
0 
N
o 
ap
pa
re
n
t 
af
fi
lia
ti
on
 w
it
h 
St
. 
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
ex
ce
pt
 fo
r 
th
e 
na
m
e 
C
ha
rl
es
to
n 
 28
8 
 
7 
18
07
 
36
94
8 
N
a
n
cy
 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
10
6 
U
SA
 
Jo
sh
ua
 V
ia
ll 
Jo
hn
 P
hi
lli
p 
70
 
St
 B
 a
 p
os
si
bl
e 
de
st
in
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 
ca
pt
ur
ed
 b
ef
or
e 
co
m
pl
et
io
n
 o
f v
oy
ag
e 
 
8 
18
15
 
 
H
a
n
n
ib
a
l 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
N
/A
 
Sw
ed
en
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
n
o 
sl
av
es
 o
n
bo
ar
d 
(“
st
av
es
” 
m
is
re
ad
 in
 
so
ur
ce
) 
Sa
va
nn
ah
 
9 
18
18
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
10
 
18
18
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
11
 
18
19
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
12
 
18
19
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
13
 
18
19
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
14
 
18
20
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
ag
ue
 S
t B
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
 
15
 
18
20
 
34
19
7 
L
a
 T
h
er
ez
a
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Su
ar
ez
 d
a 
C
os
ta
 
N
/A
 
19
2 
R
el
oa
de
d 
sl
av
es
 t
o 
a 
D
an
is
h 
ve
ss
el
 in
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e,
 w
it
h 
St
 B
 
as
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 n
ex
t 
de
st
in
at
on
. U
n
cl
ea
r 
if
 
it
 e
ve
r 
re
ac
he
d 
St
 B
. 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
16
 
18
24
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
V
es
se
l’s
 o
w
ne
rs
 t
ri
ed
 
to
 p
ro
cu
re
Sw
ed
is
h 
do
cu
m
en
ts
 fo
r 
a 
vo
ya
ge
 t
o 
A
fr
ic
a 
 
17
 
18
25
 
34
47
2 
L
a
 V
en
u
s 
Sc
ho
on
er
 
88
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Y
ve
s 
A
lla
in
, 
A
n
dr
é 
D
eb
ar
bè
s 
D
ub
uc
 
N
/A
 
B
as
ed
 a
t 
St
. T
ho
m
as
, 
on
ly
 r
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
to
 
bu
y 
ba
lla
st
 ir
on
 a
t 
St
. 
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
be
fo
re
 
de
pa
rt
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
as
t. 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
18
 
18
26
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
Fr
an
ce
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
A
rr
iv
ed
 in
 S
t B
 ft
er
 
di
se
m
ba
rk
in
g 
sl
av
es
 in
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e,
 a
rr
iv
ed
 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
 28
9 
 
w
it
h 
a 
cr
ew
m
em
be
r 
w
it
h 
su
pp
os
ed
 
sm
al
lp
ox
 
19
 
18
27
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
B
ue
n
os
 
A
yr
es
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
C
or
sa
ir
, t
ri
ed
 t
o 
se
ll 
a 
pr
iz
e 
in
 G
us
ta
vi
a,
 
de
n
ie
d.
 C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 w
it
h 
Fr
en
ch
 
sc
ho
on
er
 o
n
 o
pe
n
 s
ea
, 
w
he
re
 s
la
ve
s 
w
er
e 
pa
rt
 
of
 d
ea
l. 
G
ua
de
lo
up
e 
20
 
18
27
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
B
ue
n
os
 
A
yr
es
 
Jo
se
ph
 
A
lm
ei
da
 
 
N
/A
 
T
he
 o
w
ne
r 
w
as
 J
os
ep
h 
A
lm
ei
da
, S
t 
B
 b
ur
gh
er
 
18
23
–2
7 
an
d 
ve
te
ra
n
 
pr
iv
at
ee
r 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
pi
ra
cy
 a
nd
 s
la
ve
 
tr
ad
in
g.
 U
n
cl
ea
r 
if
 h
e 
us
ed
 S
t B
 a
s 
ba
se
 o
f 
sl
av
in
g 
op
er
at
io
n
s.
 
 
21
 
18
28
 
 
N
ym
p
h
 
 
 
U
SA
 
 
 
N
/A
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 p
ri
ze
 
br
ou
gh
t 
in
to
 S
t 
B
 b
y 
B
ue
on
is
 A
yr
es
 
pr
iv
at
ee
r 
F
ed
er
a
l. 
N
ym
p
h
’s
 c
on
fi
rm
ed
 
de
st
in
at
io
n
 w
as
 th
e 
co
as
t o
f W
es
t 
A
fr
ic
a,
 
bu
t 
it
se
lf
 n
ot
 
co
n
fi
rm
ed
 a
s 
a 
sl
av
e 
sh
ip
. 
 
22
 
18
28
 
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 s
ea
 c
ap
ta
in
 
te
st
if
ie
d 
to
 h
av
e 
se
en
 a
 
sl
av
e 
sh
ip
 n
ea
rb
y 
St
 B
; 
 
 29
0 
 
Sw
ed
is
h 
go
ve
rn
or
s 
de
n
ie
d 
th
is
. 
23
 
18
29
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
Fr
an
ce
 
 
 
N
/A
 
Sh
or
t 
ci
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
ac
cu
sa
ti
on
s 
of
 s
la
vi
ng
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 in
 S
t 
B
. 
 
24
 
18
30
 
34
63
6 
A
u
gu
st
e/
D
e
u
x
 F
rè
re
s 
B
ri
g 
21
2 
Fr
an
ce
 
Fr
an
ço
is
 
Ju
lie
n 
Sa
nt
ua
ry
 
R
en
au
lt
 
44
4 
D
is
em
ba
rk
ed
 1
 
m
ar
in
er
 a
t S
t B
 a
ft
er
 
sl
av
in
g 
vo
ya
ge
 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
un
co
nn
ec
te
d 
w
it
h 
St
 
B
. 
 
25
 
18
33
 
 
N
/A
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
/A
 
A
 s
hi
pm
en
t 
of
 
gu
n
po
w
de
r 
fr
om
 S
t 
B
 
to
 S
t T
ho
m
as
, 
su
pp
os
ed
ly
 g
oi
n
g 
in
to
 
a 
Sp
an
is
h 
sl
av
e 
sh
ip
’s
 
ca
rg
o.
 G
. R
öh
l 
im
pl
ic
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
de
al
. 
 
So
ur
ce
s:
 W
ils
on
 d
at
as
et
 o
n 
th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
sl
av
e 
tr
ad
e 
(2
01
5)
; R
ic
ha
rd
 L
ed
ée
, “
R
ép
er
to
ir
e”
 d
e l
a 
tr
ai
te
 n
ég
ri
ér
e: 
Sa
in
t-
B
ar
th
él
em
y 
(S
ué
de
), 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
kn
ow
n 
as
 th
e 
C
LA
SH
 c
at
al
og
ue
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.m
em
oi
re
st
ba
rt
h.
co
m
/s
t-
ba
rt
s/
tr
ai
te
-n
eg
ri
er
e/
pd
f/
re
pe
rt
oi
re
-t
ra
it
e-
ne
gr
ie
re
-s
ai
nt
-
ba
rt
he
le
m
y-
su
ed
e.
pd
f, 
da
te
 a
cc
es
se
d 
18
 Ju
ne
 2
01
5.
 
 291 
 
Bibliography 
Unpublished sources 
Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet, Stockholm) 
 
Diplomatica Americana 
vol. 1 Brev från Richard Söderström 1786–1808 
 
Diplomatica Gallica 
1:A 45 Erik Magnus Staël von Holsteins depescher 1783–90 
 
Guadeloupesamlingen 
vol. 2 Handlingar 1813–14 
vol. 4 Skogmans koncept 1813–15 
 
Handel och sjöfart 
vol. 9 Handlingar rörande utrikeshandel 1535–1840 
 
Handel och sjöfart, Västindiska kompaniets arkiv 
vol. 93–103 Huvudböcker 1796–1808 
vol. 110–120 Journaler 1796–1808 
vol. 156–157 Protokoll 1797–1805 
vol. 168 Brev från S:t Barthélemy 1790–94 
vol. 169 Brev från S:t Barthélemy 1795–99 
vol. 170 Brev från S:t Barthélemy 1800–07 
vol. 174 Skepparbrev 1802  
vol. 176 Insända dokument från S:t Barthélemy 1796–96, 1800–01, 1803 
vol. 190 Kungliga brev och resolutioner 
 Instruktioner och ansökningar 
 Skrivelser från kollegier 
 
Hans Axel von Fersens samling 
vol. 12 Inkomna skrivelser, brev från enskilda, A-D 
 
Kommerskollegii skrivelser till Kongl Maj:t 
vol. 301 Kommerskollegii skrivelse till Kongl Maj:t 9 April 1805 
 
 292 
 
Kommerskollegium, Huvudarkivet 
E VI aa Skrivelser från konsuler och ministrar: Lissabon, Cadiz, 
Marseille, Livorno, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Tanger, 
Tripoli, Tunis, Alger. 
 
Kommitterade för allmänna medels förvaltning 
vol. 32 Origin. redogörelse för St. Barthélemy-fonden (med 
verifikationer) 1813 
 
Pommerska expeditionen och kolonialdepartementet 
AI:3 Protokoll 1812–14 
AI:6 Protokoll 1817–44 
BII:3 Koncept i kolonialärenden 1818–20 
 
Rolf Lamborns samling 
vol. 107 Excerpts from the National Archives of The United Kingdom: 
 CO 152/75 Correspondence, Governor Bagge, 1794. 
 CO 152/77 Correspondence, Governor Bagge, 1794. 
 FO 73/32 Letters to the Foreign Secretary, 1804. 
 FO 73/20 Correspondence concerning ships under Swedish flags, 
1795. 
 FO 188/3 His Royal Majesty’s proposition 1812–18. 
 FO 188/13 From the Foreign Office 1821–23. 
 FO 188/14 From the Swedish government, 1821–32. 
 FO 188/15 To the Swedish government, 1822–30. 
 CO 152/98 St. Christopher, 1811. 
 CO 152/76 Leeward Islands, 1794–95. 
 CO 53/34 Leeward Islands, 1801–16. 
 CO 318/15 West Indies, military, 1794 
 CO 318/17 West Indies, mixed correspondence, 1791–99. 
 CO 318/13 Leeward Islands, from Whitehall, 1794 
 CO 318/143 Leeward Islands, reports from the navy, 1811 
vol. 110 Excerpts from the National Archives of The United Kingdom: 
 CO 239/2 St. Christopher, Foreign Office, 1816. 
 CO 239/3 St. Christopher, Foreign Office, 1817. 
 FO 188/128 To Foreign Office, 1877. 
 FO 188/110 Foreign Office, concerning sale of St. Bartholomew to 
USA, 1869 
 FO 73/160 To the Duke of Wellington, January–June 1835 
 FO 74/4 Drafts to the Secretary of State, 1784–1785. 
 FO 73/45 To E. Thornton, 1807–08. 
 FO 73/87 Domestic, various, January–July 1813. 
 FO 73/366 To Lord Stanley, 1868. 
 FO 73/373 Correspondence, Jerningham-Jocelyn, June–
December, 1869. 
 FO 73/432 From Erskine and Watson, 1877. 
 FO 73/131 Domestic, various, 1826. 
 293 
 
 FO 73/134 Domestic, Stierneld and Rålamb, 1827. 
 FO 73/138 Correspondence, Lord Bloomfield, 1829. 
 FO 73/142 Lord Bloomfield and Rålamb, 1830. 
 FO 73/149 Lord Bloomfield, 1833. 
 FO 73/150 Correspondence, Lord H. de Waldes, 1823–33. 
 FO 73/152 Domestic, Björnstjerna, 1833. 
 CO 152/65 Leeward Islands, Antigua, 1786–88 
 CO 152/88 Leeward Islands, Correspondence, Governor 
Lavington and Minister for Foreign Affairs Viscount 
Castlereagh, 1806. 
 CO 152/89 Leeward Islands, correspondence, 1807. 
 CO 152/90 Leeward Islands, correspondence, 1807. 
 CO 152/91 Leeward Islands, correspondence, 1808. 
 CO 152/101 Leeward Islands, Antigua, 1813. 
 CO 152/102 Leeward Islands, correspondence Elliot and Lord 
Bathurst, May–August, 1813. 
 CO 152/103 Leeward Islands, correspondence Elliot and Lord 
Bathurst, September–December, 1813. 
 CO 152/26 Leeward Islands, 1747–50. 
 CO 153/28 Reports from Stanley, 1794–98. 
 CO 318/38 Military reports of the Public Office, October–
December, 1809. 
 CO 318/47 Windward and Leeward Islands, military reports, 
October–December, 1812. 
 CO 319/7 Windward and Leeward Islands, 1801–02. 
 
Ruuthska samlingen 
 C.F. Bagge till Erik Ruuth, 16 juni, 12 juli & 5 juli 1790 
 
Saint Barthélemy-samlingen 
1 A Dokument rörande övertagandet av S:t Barthélemy 1784–1804. 
1 B:1 Guvernörsrapporter etc. 1784–1800. 
1 B:2 Guvernörsrapporter etc. 1784–1800. 
1 C Guvernör Ankarheims rapporter etc. 1800–11. 
2 Guvernör Ankarheims och Stackebergs rapporter etc. 1812–13. 
3 A Guvernör Stackelbergs rapporter etc. 1814. 
3 B Guvernör Stackelbergs rapporter etc. 1815. 
4 A Guvernör Stackelbergs och Rosenswärds rapporter etc. 1815. 
4 B Guvernör Rosenswärds rapporter etc. 1816–17. 
5 A Guvernör Rosenswärds och Berghults rapporter etc. 1818. 
5 B Diverse rättsdokument och protokoll från S:t Barthélemy 1818. 
6 A Guvernör Berghults och Norderlings rapporter etc. 1819. 
6 B Diverse rättsdokument och protokoll från S:t Barthélemy 1819. 
7 A Guvernör Norderlings rapporter etc. 1820. 
7 B Guvernör Norderlings rapporter etc. 1821. 
8 A Guvernör Norderlings rapporter etc. 1822. 
8 B Guvernör Norderlings rapporter etc. 1823. 
9 A Guvernör Norderlings, Haasums och Morsings rapporter etc. 
1824–26. 
9 B Guvernör Haasums och Morsings rapporter etc. 1827. 
 294 
 
10 A Guvernör Haasums och Morsings rapporter etc. 1828–29. 
10 B Guvernör Haasums rapporter etc. 1830. 
11 Guvernör Haasums och Morsings rapporter etc. 1831–32. 
12 A Guvernör Haasums och Morsings rapporter etc. 1833. 
12 B Guvernör Haasums rapporter etc. 1834–35. 
13 Guvernör Haasums rapporter etc. 1836–39. 
14 Guvernör Haasums och C. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1840–44. 
15 Guvernör Haasums och C. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1845–49. 
16 Guvernör Haasums och C. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1850–54. 
17 Guvernör Haasums och C. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1855–60. 
18 Guvernör C. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1861–64. 
19 Guvernör C. Ulrichs och Netherwoods rapporter etc. 1865–68. 
20 Guvernör B. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1869–73. 
21 A Guvernör B. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1874–75. 
21 B Guvernör B. Ulrichs rapporter etc. 1876–78. 
22 A Diverse dokument och korrespondens 1799–1816. 
22 B Diverse dokument och korrespondens 1820–73. 
23 Diverse dokument och korrespondens, utkast, memorialer etc. 
1785–1744. 
24 Diverse trycksaker, officiella utfästelser, tidningar etc. 1807–1863. 
25 A Räkenskaper 1793–96. 
25 B Räkenskaper 1796–1801. 
25 C Räkenskaper 1801–05. 
25 D Räkenskaper 1806–08. 
25 E Räkenskaper 1809–12. 
26 A Diverse räkenskaper. 
27 A Handlingar och räkenskaper för S:t Barthélemyfonden 1812–70. 
28 Inventarieförteckningar m.m. 1788. 
 Folkräkningar 1787, 1788, 1796. 
 Anmärkningar om staden Gustavias och landsbygdens kvarter. 
 Fartygslistor 1787 (mars–december). 
30 A Räkenskaper 1812–13. 
30 B Räkenskaper 1814. 
31 A Räkenskaper 1815. 
31 B Räkenskaper 1816. 
51 Diverse handlingar. 
 Kungörelser och författningstryck m.m. 
 
Sten Simonssons samling 
vol. 7 Vaucrosson, ed. Handlingar Uti Det hos Kong:l Maj:t anhängiga 
Mål, angående den af handelshuset på Öen St. Barthélemy, Vaucrosson 
& Son, i underdånighet förda klagan öfwer wåldsam medfart af 
Gouverneuren och Conseillen på nämnde Ö, m.m. Stockholm, 
Nordström, 1799. 
  
 295 
 
Swedish Royal Library (Kungliga biblioteket, Stockholm) 
Engeströmska samlingen 
M 298 Lorich, Severin, ”Rapport sur ses voyages en 1816 et 1817 à S:t 
Barthélemy à Haiti, aux Etats Unis de l’Amerique du Nord et en 
Egypte.” 30 May 1818. 
Newspapers 
The Report of Saint Bartholomew  
Inrikes tidningar  
Stockholms stadsarkiv 
Abrahamssonska familjearkivet 
Correspondence between the Haddocks and Lönner families, 1820–40  
Antikvarisk-topografiska arkivet hos Riksarkivarieämbetet 
Vitterhetsakademiens handskriftssamling 
F 16:20 Röhl, Hjalmar Jacob Eliasson, ”Wördsamt Memorial.” 14 januari 
1786. 
 
Uppsala University Library (Uppsala universitetsbibliotek) 
Fredrik Gyllenborgs brevsamling 
 Hans Hindric Ankarheim till Fredrik Gyllenborg, 20 oktober 
1801. 
 
Gustavianska samlingen 
F 420 Granville Sharp till Gustav III, odaterat, 1790. 
F 479 Gustav III till G. Ph. Creutz, 10 september 1779. 
 
Newspapers 
The Report of Saint Bartholomew  
  
 296 
 
Pehr Olof von Asps handskrifter 
F 812g:7 Pehr Olof von Asp, ”Om Ultramarinska Besittningar, i anseende 
till den nytta eller skada som, för en Europeisk Magt af 2ra eller 
3je ordningen, kan af dem härröra,” utkast till pro memoria, 12 
februari 1802. 
Danish National Archives (Rigsarkivet København)  
Generaltoldkammeret, ældre del, vestindisk-guineisk renteskriverkontor  
365: 384 Udskrift af St. Jan og St. Thomas søpasprotokol 1788–1807 
365: 488 Breve till direktionen for Det vestindiske handelsselskab 1801–
07. 
365: 496 Dokumenter betræffende toldvæsendet 1779–1789. 
365: 490 Ekstrakter, beregninger etc. vedr. den vestindiske handel, told og 
skibsfart 1764–1856. 
 
Reviderede vestindiske regnskaber 
S–12573 Matrikel for St. Thomas og St. Jan 1755–1915. 
571: 127.5 Toldregnskaber St. Thomas 1784–90. 
571: 127.6 Toldregnskaber St. Thomas 1791–1800. 
571: 127.7 Toldregnskaber St. Thomas 1801–07. 
 
Vestindiske lokalarkiver 
693: 11.53.169 St. Thomas og St. Jan guvernement mm; Gruppeordnede sager – 
Sociale og kulturelle forhold; Fortegnelse over indbyggerne på St. 
Thomas 1806. 
693: 11.53.171 St. Thomas og St. Jan guvernement mm; Gruppeordnede sager – 
Sociale og kulturelle forhold; Borgerbrevsprotokol 1755–88. 
693: 11.53.230 St. Thomas og St. Jan guvernement mm; Gruppeordnede sager – 
Næaringsvæsen; Beskyldning om indbyggeres slavehandel på St. 
Thomas 1825. 
705: 17.1.12 St. Thomas borgerråd; Forhandlingsprotokller 1783–1855. 
Danish Royal Library (Det kongelige bibliotek København) 
Newspapers 
Dansk Vestindisk Regierings-Avis   
Sanct Thomas Tidende    
The Saint Thomas Gazette   
 297 
 
The United States National Archives and Records 
Administration 
Record Group 59: General Records of the the Department of State 
M28 Diplomatic and consular Instructions of the Department of 
State, 1791–1801. 
M38 Notes to Foreign Ministers and consuls in the United States from 
the Department of State, 1793–1834. 
M60 Notes from the Swedish legation in the United States to the 
Department of State, 1813–1906. 
M664 Notes from foreign consuls in the Unites States to the 
Department of State, 1789–1906. 
M72 Despatches from U.S. consuls in St. Bartholomew, 1799–1899. 
M77 Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906. 
M78 Consular Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1834. 
T208 Despatches from U.S. consuls in Guadeloupe, 1802–1906. 
T230 Despatches from U.S. consuls in Stockholm, Sweden, 1810–1906. 
T350 Despatches from U.S. consuls in St. Thomas, 1804–1906. 
T431 Despatches from U.S. consuls in St. Pierre, Martinique, 1790–
1906. 
Archives departementales de la Guadeloupe 
2L Tribunal de prises de Basse-Terre 
vol. 28 Documents des bateaux saisis, Louisa (brick americain). 
vol. 35 Documents des bateaux saisis, Sterling (brick americain). 
vol. 38 Documents des bateaux saisis, Vulture (brick americain). 
vol. 41 Documents des bateaux saisis, Industry (brick americain). 
vol. 127 Documents des bateaux saisis, Neptune (brick suédois). 
vol. 170 Documents des bateaux saisis, Triton (navire suédois). 
vol. 178 Documents des bateaux saisis, Success (navire suédois). 
vol. 191 Documents des bateaux saisis, Aurora (goélette suédois). 
vol. 196 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1793. 
vol. 197 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1794. 
vol. 198 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1795. 
vol. 199 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1796. 
vol. 200 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1797 jan–sept. 
vol. 201 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1797 sept –1798 juin. 
vol. 202 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1798 jul–sept. 
vol. 203 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1799 juin–dec. 
vol. 204 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1800. 
vol. 205 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1801. 
vol. 206 Actes notariels, Saint Barthélemy 1797–1802. 
 
 298 
 
Archives nationales d’outre mer 
Fonds suédois de Saint-Barthélemy 
Serie M  1 Manifestes 1805–19. 
Serie PF 59–72 Proces-verbaux de finance 1812–30. 
Serie C 73–78 Comptes 1790–1877. 
Serie RG 125–27 Rapportes des Gouverneurs 1816–44. 
Serie PG 128–29 Proces–verbaux du Conseil de Gouvernement 
1812–40. 
Serie L 134–35 Decrets et proclamations 1787–1878. 
Serie PJT 136–39 Journaux et listes 1801–36. 
Serie PJ 140–249 Proces-verbaux du Conseil de Justice 1784–1836. 
Serie NP 250–55 Documents appartenant au Notaire Public 1783, 
1785, 1792, 1801, 1810, 1815. 
Serie C 256–64 Correspondance 1784–1878. 
Serie AM 265–275bis Affaires Maritimes 1778–1878. 
Serie N 276–280 Documents concernant des naturalisations 1796–
1875. 
Serie DT 281–84 Documents concernant la defence 1814–78. 
Serie ES 285–86 Documents sur l’esclavage 1802–48. 
Serie E 287–91 Documents sur l’etat civil du population 1756, 1785, 
1786, 1791, 1800. 
Serie PO 292–93 Roles de recensement 1787–1872. 
Serie R 294–95 Documents sur l’excercise des cultes 1795–1876. 
Serie D 296–300bis Documents divers 
Serie S 301–17 Inventaires des Successions 1787–1839.  
N/A 325 Documents non-inventoires 1785–1877. 
 
 
  
Hôtel de la Collectivité de Saint-Barthélemy 
Matrice Cadastrale Suédoise 
ca. 1791–1900 Register of real estate in the town of Gustavia 
 299 
 
Printed primary sources 
 
Adams, Henry. The Writings of Albert 
Gallatin. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 
1879. 
Anderson, Adam. Historical and 
Chronological Deduction of the Origin of 
Commerce, from the Earliest Accounts. 
London, 1801. 
Andrews, E.W. and Andrews C.M. Journal 
of a Lady of Quality; Being the Narrative of 
a Journey from Scotland to the West Indies, 
North Carolina, and Portugal, in the years 
1774 to 1776. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1923. 
Bergius, Olof Erik. Om Westindien. 
Stockholm: A. Gadelius, 1819. 
Bloomfield, Georgiana, ed. Memoir of 
Benjamin Lord Bloomfield. London: 
Chapman & Hall 1884. 
Boyd, Julian P., ed. The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. VII. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1953. 
Carlander, Christopher. Resan till S:t 
Barthélemy. Dr Christopher Carlanders 
resejournal 1787–88. Bidrag till Kungliga 
Svenska Vetenskapsakademiens 
historia XIII, edited by Sven Ekvall and 
Christer Wijkström. Falköping: 
Gummesons Tryckeri AB, 1979. 
Clarkson, Thomas. The History of the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade. London: 
Taylor, 1808. 
Coggeshall, George. History of the American 
privateers and letters-of-marque during our 
war with England in the years of 1812, ’13, 
’14: Interspersed with several naval battles 
between American and British ships-of-
war. New York: Edward O. Jenkins, 
1856. 
Coleridge, Henry Nelson. Sex månader i 
Westindien 1825, translated by C.A. 
Carlsson. Linköping: Axel Petre, 1835. 
Crusenstolpe, Magnus J. ”Hauswolffiana.” 
in Portefeuille. Skildringar ur det inre af 
dagens historia, vol. IV, 185–239. 
Stockholm: Hjerta, 1834. 
Dahlman, Sven. Beskrifning om swenska öen S. 
Barthélemy uti Westindien. Stockholm: 
Nordström, 1786. 
Dodson, John, ed. Reports of cases argued and 
determined in the High Court of Admiralty, 
commencing with the judgments of the 
Right Hon. Sir William Scott, Trinity 
Term 1811. London: Strahan, 1815. 
Donnan, Elizabeth. Documents Illustrative of 
the Slave Trade to America, 4 vols. 
Washington: Carnegie Institution, 
1930–35. 
Euphrasén, B.A. Beskrifning öfver svenska 
vestindiska ön St. Barthelemi i Westindien, 
samt öarne St. Eustache och St. Christopher. 
Stockholm: Zetterberg, 1795. 
Ford, Paul Leicester, ed. The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. IV. New York: 
Putnam, 1894. 
Ford, W.C. et al, eds. Journals of the 
Continental Congress from 1774–1789, vol. 
XXIII (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1914). 
Hackett, James. Narrative of the expedition 
which sailed from England in 1817, to join 
the South American Patriots. London: 
Murray, 1818. 
Hattendorf, John B. Saint Barthélemy and the 
Swedish West India Company: a selection of 
printed documents, 1784–1814, facsimile 
reproductions / with an introduction by 
John B. Hattendorf. Delmar, NY: 
Scholars’ facsimiles & Reprints, 1994. 
Heaton, Herbert. “Non-Importation, 
1806–1812.” The Journal of Economic 
History 1, no. 2 (1941): 178–98. 
Holroyd, John Baker. Observations on the 
Commerce of the American States with 
Europé and the West Indies. Philadelphia: 
Bell, 1783. 
Høst, Georg. Efterretninger om øen Sanct 
Thomas og den Gouverneurer, optegnede 
paa Landet fra 1769 indtil 1776. 
København: Møller & Son, 1791. 
Kellgren, Johan Henric. ”Til Nybyggens 
anläggande i Indien, och på Africanska 
Kusten.” Nya Handelsbibliotheket I. 
Stockholm: Nordström, 1784. 
 300 
 
Kelly, Patrick. The Universal Cambist and 
Commercial Instructor; being a Treatise on 
Exchange; including the Monies, Coins, 
Weights, and Measures, of all Trading 
Nations and Colonies: with an account of 
their banks and paper currencies. London: 
Lackington et al., 1811. 
Knox, John P. A historical account of St. 
Thomas. New York: Scribner, 1852. 
Lacour, Auguste. Histoire de la Guadeloupe, 4 
vols. Basse-Terre: Imprimerie du 
Gouvernement, 1855–60. 
Lowrie, Walter and St. Clair Clarke, 
Matthew, eds. American State Papers. 
Documents, Legislative and Executive, of 
the Congress of the United States, from the 
First Session of the First to the Third Session 
of the Thirteenth Congress, inclusive: 
commencing March 3, 1798, and ending 
March 3, 1815. Class IV. Commerce and 
Navigation, 2 vols.. Washington: Gales 
& Seaton, 1832. 
Macpherson, David. Annals of commerce, 
fisheries and navigation, 4 vols. London: 
Nichols & Son, 1805. 
Nissen, J.P. Reminiscences of a 46 Years 
Residence in the Islands of St. Thomas in the 
West Indies. Nazareth, PA: Senseman & 
Co., 1838. 
O’Leary, Simon B., ed. Memorias del General 
O’Leary, 34 vols. Ministerio de la 
Defensa: Caracas, 1981. 
Pitkin, Timothy. A Statistical View of the 
Commerce of the United States of America: 
Its connections with Agriculture and 
Manufactures: and an Account of the 
Public Debt, Revenues, and Expenditures 
of the United States. Hartford: Hosmer, 
1816. 
Quesne, J.S. Mémoires du Capitaine 
Landolphe, contenant l’histoire de ses 
voyages pendant trente-six ans aux côtes 
d’Afrique et aux deux Amériques. 2 vols. 
Paris : Bertrand, 1823. 
Raynal, Guillaume Thomas François. 
Histoire philosophique et politique des 
établissemens et du commerce des Européens 
dans les Deus Indes. Genève: Pellet, 1780. 
Silfverstolpe, Carl, ed. Anders Johan von 
Höpkens skrifter, samlade och i urval 
utgifna af Carl Silfverstolpe, vol. II 
Stockholm: Norstedts, 1893. 
Steinmetz, Andrew. A voice in Ramah; or, 
Lament of the Poor African, A Fettered 
Exile, Afar from his Fatherland. A Poem in 
Five Cantos. London: Harvey & Darton, 
1842. 
Stephen, James. War in Disguise, or, the 
Frauds of the Neutral Flags. London: 
Whittingham, 1805. 
Werfel, Johan. Efterretning om de Danske 
Vestindiske øers St. Croix’s, St. Thomas’s og 
St. Jans’s Indtagelse af den 
Engelskvestindiske Flaade. København: 
Holm, 1801. 
Wharton, Francis, ed. The Revolutionary 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United 
States, vol. VI. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1889. 
Wieselgrehn, P. ”Gustaf af Wetterstedt.” 
In Biographiskt lexicon öfver namnkunnige 
svenska män, edited by V.F. Palmblad, P. 
Wieselgrehn and K.F. Werner, 217–233. 
Uppsala: Lindh, 1852. 
 
 301 
 
Secondary works and 
published sources 
 
Abbattista, Guido. ”Edmund Burke, the 
Atlantic American war and the ‘poor 
Jews at St. Eustatius’. Empire and the 
law of nations.” Cromohs 13 (2008): 1–39. 
Adamson, Rolf. ”Swedish Iron Exports to 
the United States, 1783–1860.” 
Scandinavian Economic History Review 
17, no. 1 (1969): 58–114. 
Aghard, Anne Brink – Den svenske 
slavkaptenen. Stockholm: Atlantis, 2012. 
Ahlberger, Christer and Mörner, Magnus. 
”Betydelsen av några latinamerikanska 
produkter för Sverige före 1810.” 
Historisk tidskrift 1. (1993), 80–104. 
Ahnlund, Nils et al. Den svenska 
utrikespolitikens historia. Stockholm: 
Norstedts, 1951–60. 
Alimento, Antonella. ”Competition, true 
patriotism and colonial interests: 
Forbonnais vision of neutrality and 
trade.” In Trade and War: The Neutrality 
of Commerce in the Inter-State System, 
edited by Koen Stapelbroek, 61–94. 
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies 2011. 
Almén, Folke. Gustav III och hans 
rådgivare, 1772–89: arbetssätt och 
meningsbrytningar i rådkammare och 
konseljer. Uppsala: Appelbergs 
boktryckeriaktiebolag, 1940. 
Almqvist, Johan Axel. Kommerskollegium och 
riksens ständers manufakturkontor samt 
konsulsstaten. Stockholm: Norstedt 1912. 
Amirell, Stefan Eklöf. ”Den internationella 
historiens uppgång och fall: Trender 
inom internationell historieforskning 
1950–2005.” Historisk tidskrift 126, no. 2 
(2006): 257–278. 
Anderson, Edgar. ”Mysterious Swedish 
settlements at Tobago and Barima.” 
Swedish Pioneer Historical Quarterly 12, 
no. 4 (1960): 132–145. 
Andersson, Ingvar. ”Arkivalier från S:t 
Barthélemys svenska tid.” Arkiv, 
samhälle, forskning 8 (1965): 7–13. 
Andersson, Magnus. Omvälvningarnas tid, 
handelshuset Ekman i Göteborg på en 
europeisk kreditmarknad 1790–1820. 
En tidig Europamarknad 4. Göteborg: 
Preindustrial Research Group, 2011. 
Andersson, Magnus. ”Kreditförbindelser 
med utgångspunkt från Göteborg”. In 
Kommers. Historiska handelsformer i 
Norden under 1700– och 1800–talen. 
Opuscula Historica Upsaliensia 42, edited 
by Gudrun Andersson and Klas 
Nyberg, 54–62. Uppsala: Swedish 
Science Press, 2010. 
Andersson, Magnus. “Trade, Credit, and 
Trust. Examples from Gothenburg’s 
Merchants in the European Market at 
the End of the 18th Century.” In 
Preindustrial Commercial History. Flows 
and Contacts between Cities in Scandinavia 
and Northwestern Europe, edited by 
Markus A. Denzel and Christina 
Dalhede, 231–50 (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2014). 
Andreas, Peter. Smuggler Nation. How Illicit 
Trade Made America. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Andreen, Per Gudmund. Politik och 
finansväsen. Från 1815 års riksdag till 1830 
års realisationsbeslut. 2 vols. Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958–61. 
Arias, Hermodio. ”The Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyages in the Eighteenth 
Century.” The American Journal of 
International Law 9, no. 3 (1915): 583–593. 
Armitage, David and Braddick, Michael J., 
eds. The British Atlantic World 1500–
1800. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
2002. 
Armytage, Frances. The Free Port System 
in the British West Indies: a study in 
commercial policy, 1766–1822. London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1953. 
Auerbach, Jeffrey. “Imperial Boredom.” 
Common Knowledge 11, no. 2 (2005): 283–
305. 
 302 
 
Bamford, Paul Walden. “French Shipping 
in Northern European Trade, 1660–
1789.” The Journal of Modern History 26, 
no. 3 (1954): 207–19. 
Banks, Kenneth. “Official Duplicity: The 
Illicit Slave Trade of Martinique, 1713–
1763.” In The Atlantic Economy during the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: 
Organization, Operation, Practice, and 
Personnel, edited by Peter Coclanis, 229–
51. Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2005. 
Barbanson, Willibrord L. ”St. Barthélemy 
in den Zwedschentijd.” West-Indische 
Gids 18 (1935–36): 305–321, 337–348. 
Barbanson, Willibrord L. ”Grafschriften op 
Saint-Barthélemy.” West-Indische Gids 
39 (1958): 97–105. 
Barbanson, Willibrord.L. ”St. Barthélemy”, 
West-Indische Gids 16 (1958): 177–191. 
Barbier, Jacques. ”Silver, North American 
penetration and the Spanish imperial 
economy, 1760–1800.” In The North 
American role in the Spanish imperial 
economy, 1760–1819, edited by Jaques A. 
Barber and Allan J. Kuethe, 6–12. 
Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984. 
Batterson, Sarah. ”A Horde of Foreign 
Freebooters. The U.S. and the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade.” 
Diacronie 1, no. 13 (2013): 1–16. 
Barka, Norman F. ”Citizens of St. 
Eustatius, 1781: A Historical and 
Archaeological Study.” In The Lesser 
Antilles in the Age of European Expansion, 
edited by Robert L. Paquette and 
Stanley L. Engerman. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1996. 
Barton, H.A. ”Sweden and the War of 
American Independence.” William & 
Mary Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1966): 419–422. 
Benoist, Jean. L’esclavage au delà du sucre: 
couleur et société à St-Barthélemy. Paris: 
Les Indes savantes, 2006. 
Benson, Adolph B. ”The Swedish Colony in 
the West Indies.” The Chronicle: The 
American Swedish Historical 
Foundation 1, no. 1 (1954): 3–8. 
Benson, Adolph B. Sweden and the American 
Revolution. New Haven: The Tuttle, 
Morehouse & Taylor Company, 1926. 
Benton, Lauren A. Law and colonial 
cultures. Legal regimes in World 
history, 1400–1900. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Benton, Lauren A. ”Legal Spaces of Empire: 
Piracy and the Origins of Ocean 
Regionalism.” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 47, no. 4 (2005): 
706–721. 
Berg, Lasse. När Sverige upptäckte Afrika. 
Stockholm: Rabén Prisma, 1997. 
Bialuschewski, Arne. ”Pirates, Markets and 
Imperial Authority: Economic Aspects 
of Maritime Depredations in the 
Atlantic World, 1716–1726.” Global 
Crime 9, no. 1–2 (2008), 52–65. 
Bondeson, Lennart. ”Bokföringen i 
Västindiska kompaniet.” 
Affärsekonomi, no. 20 (1951): 1351–1353, 
1360–1361, 1372. 
Bridenbaugh, Carl and Bridenbaugh, 
Roberta. No Peace Beyond the Line. The 
English in the Caribbean 1624–1690. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1972. 
Bro-Jørgensen, J.O. Dansk Vestindien indtil 
1755: kolonisation og kompagnistyre. Vol. 1, 
Vore gamle tropekolonier, edited by 
Johannes Brøndsted. København: 
Fremad, 1966. 
Brändström, Dan. ”Det svenska arkivet i 
Västindien.” Västerbottens-kuriren. 
December 29, 1967. 
Burges, Walter Smith, America’s diplomats 
and consuls of 1776–1865: a geographic and 
biographic directory of the Foreign Service 
from the Declaration of Independence to the 
end of the Civil War. Washington D.C.: 
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of 
State, 1987. 
Börjeson, Hjalmar. Stockholms 
segelsjöfart: minnesskrift 1732–1932. 
Stockholm: Victor Petterson 1932. 
Campbell, Albert A. ”Note on the Jewish 
Community of St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin 
   
303 
 
Islands.” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 2 
(1942): 161–166. 
Cañizares-Esguerra, ”Entangled Histories: 
Borderland Historiographies in New 
Clothes?” The American Historical 
Review 112, no. 3 (2007): 787–799. 
Carlson, K.E. Relations of the United States 
with Sweden. Allentown, PA: H.Ray 
Haas & Co, 1921. 
Carrington, Selwynn H.H. ”The American 
Revolution and the British West 
Indies’ Economy.” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 17, no. 4 
(1987): 823–850. 
Carrington, Selwynn H.H. The British 
West Indies during the American 
Revolution: A Study in Colonial 
Economy and Politics. Caribbean 
Series 8. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1988.  
Cave, Roderick. “Early Printing and the 
Book Trade in the West Indies.” The 
Library Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1978): 163–
92. 
Cave, Roderick. Printing and the Book Trade 
in the West Indies. London: The Pindar 
Press, 1987.  
Christelow, Alan. ”Contraband trade 
between Jamaica and the Spanish Main 
and the Free Port Act of 1766.” 
Hispanic American Historical Review 
22 (1942): 309–342. 
Clauder, Anna Cornelia. “American 
Commerce as Affected by the Wars of 
the French Revolution and Napoleon, 
1793–1812.” PhD-dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1932. 
Coatsworth, John H. ”American Trade 
with European Colonies in the 
Caribbean and South America, 1790–
1812.” The William & Mary Quarterly 24, 
no. 2 (1967):243–266. 
Coclanis, Peter. ”Drang Nach Osten: 
Bernard Bailyn, the World-Island, and 
the Idea of Atlantic History.” Journal of 
World History 13, no. 1 (2002): 169–182.  
Coclanis, Peter, ed. The Atlantic Economy 
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: Organization, Operation, 
Practice, and Personnel. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 
2005. 
Coclanis, Peter. ”Atlantic World or 
Atlantic/World?” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2006): 725–742. 
Coleman, Deirdre. Romantic Colonization 
and British Anti-Slavery. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Cooper, Frederick and Stoler, Ann Laura. 
”Between Metropole and Colony: 
Rethinking a Research Agenda”. In 
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World, edited by Frederick 
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 1–56. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1997. 
Coughtry, Jay. The Notorious Triangle: Rhode 
Island and the African Slave Trade, 1700–
1807. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1981. 
Covo, Manuel. “I, François B.: Merchant, 
Protestant and Refugee – A Tale of 
Failure in the Atlantic World.” French 
History 25, no. 1 (2011): 69–88. 
Covo, Manuel. “Baltimore and the French 
Atlantic: Empires, Commerce, and 
Identity in a Revolutionary Age, 1783–
1798.” In The Caribbean and the Atlantic 
World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money, 
and Knowledge, 1650–1914, edited by 
A.B. Leonard and David Pretel, 87–107. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015). 
Craton, Michael. ”The Caribbean Vice 
Admiralty Courts, 1763–1815; 
Indispensable Agents of an Imperial 
System.” PhD diss., McMaster 
University, 1968. Open access 
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 6514. 
Crouzet, François. ”Wars, Blockade, and 
Economic Change in Europe, 1792–
1815.” The Journal of Economic History 24, 
no. 4 (1964): 567–588. 
Cuenca-Esteban, Javier. “British ‘Ghost’ 
Exports, American Middlemen, and the 
Trade to Spanish America, 1790–1819.” 
The William & Mary Quarterly 71, no. 1 
(2014): 63–98. 
 304 
 
Daget, Serge. Répertoire des Expéditions 
Négriéres Françaises á la Traite Illégale 
1814–1850. Nantes: Centre de recherche 
sur l’histoire du monde atlantique, 1988. 
Davidsson, Sten. ”Det gudomliga 
samhället. Swedenborgskt 
Afrikaprojekt och religiös utopi.” PhD 
diss., Uppsala universitet, 1975. 
Davis, Ralph. The Rise of the Atlantic 
Economies. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1973. 
Decker, Ken. “Moribund English: The 
Case of Gustavia English, St. 
Barthélemy.” English World-Wide 25, 
no. 4 (2004): 217–54. 
Denzel, Markus A. Handbook of World 
Exchange Rates, 1590–1914. Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010. 
Din, Gilbert C. Spaniards, Planters, and 
Slaves: The Spanish Regulation of Slavery 
in Louisiana, 1763–1803. College Station: 
Texas A & M University Press, 1999. 
Donnan, Elizabeth. Documents Illustrative of 
the Slave Trade to America. Washington: 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
1930. 
Dookhan, Isaac. A history of the Virgin 
Islands of the United States. St. Thomas, 
US Virgin Islands: Caribbean 
Universities Press, 1974. 
Drakenlordh, Rikard. “The British-
Swedish Relations in the Era of the 
American Revolutionary War: A Study 
of Diplomatic, Military, and Economic 
Relations, 1773–1783” (Unpublished 
PhD-thesis, forthcoming). 
Drescher, Seymour. Econocide: British 
Slavery in the Era of Abolition. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1977. 
Duarte, Feliciano Gámez. “El desafío 
insurgente. Análisis del corso 
hispanoamericano desde una 
perspectiva peninsular: 1812–1828.” 
Unpublished PhD-dissertation, 
Universidad de Cádiz, 2006. 
Du Bois, W.E. Burghardt. The Suppression of 
the African Slave-trade to the United States 
of America 1638–1870. New York: 
Longman, Green & Co, 1904.  
Dun, James Alexander. ”’What avenues of 
commerce, will you, Americans, not 
explore!” Commercial Philadelphia’s 
vantage onto the early Haitian 
revolution.” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2005): 473–504. 
Dunn, Richard S. Sugar and Slaves: The Rise 
of the Planter Class in the English West 
Indies, 1624–1713. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 
1973.  
Earle, Peter. The Pirate Wars. London: 
Methuen, 2003. 
Edmundsson, George. “The Swedish 
Legend in Guiana.” The Historical 
Review 14 (1899): 71–92. 
Egerton, Douglas R. et al., ed. The Atlantic 
World: A History, 1400–1888. Wheeling: 
Harlan Davidson, 2007. 
Ekerman, Jan. “Svindlande affärer i 
Gustavia.” S:t Barthélemyjournalen 
(1999).  
Ekman, Ernst. “A Swedish Career in the 
Tropics: Johan Norderling (1760–
1828).” Swedish Pioneer Historical Society 
15, no. 1 (1964): 3–32. 
Ekman, Ernst. “St. Barthélemy and the 
French Revolution.” Caribbean Studies 3, 
no. 4 (1964): 17–29. 
Ekman, Ernst. “Sweden, the Slave Trade 
and Slavery, 1784–1847.” Revue française 
d’histoire d’outre-mer 62 (1975): 221–231. 
Elisabeth, Léo. “La cession de Saint-
Barthélemy de Saint-Barthélemy à la 
Suède (1779–1785).” Annales des Antilles: 
Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire de la 
Martinique 31 (1997): 77–93. 
Elovsson, Harald. “Raynal och Sverige.” 
Samlaren 9 (1928): 18–84. 
Elovsson, Harald. “Kolonialintresset i 
Sverige under 1700–talet. Några drag.” 
Samlaren 9 (1928): 207–211. 
Elovsson, Harald. Amerika i svensk litteratur 
1750–1820: en studie i komparativ 
litteraturhistoria. Lund: Gleerup, 1930. 
   
305 
 
Eltis, David. “The Volume and Structure of 
the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A 
Reassessment.” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2001): 17–46. 
Eltis, David. “Atlantic History in Global 
Perspective.” Itinerario 23, no. 2 (1999): 
141–161. 
Eltis, David, Lewis, Frank D. and 
Richardson, David. “Slave Prices, the 
African Slave Trade, and Productivity 
in the Caribbean, 1674–1807.” The 
Economic History Review 58, no. 4 (2005): 
673–700. 
Emmer, P.C. “’Jesus Christ Was Good, but 
Trade Was Better’. An Overview of the 
Transit Trade of the Dutch Antilles, 
1634–1795.” In The Lesser Antilles in the 
Age of European Expansion, edited by 
Robert L. Paquette and Stanley 
Engerman, 206–222. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1996. 
Emmer, P.C. The Dutch and the Making of the 
Second Atlantic System. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Emmer, P.C. “The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–
1800. Expansion Without Empire.” 
Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 38 
(2001): 31–48. 
Emmer, P.C. “Slavery and the Slave Trade 
of the Minor Atlantic Powers.” The 
Cambridge World History of Slavery. Vol. 
3: AD 1420–1804, edited by David Eltis 
and Stanley L. Engerman, 450–475. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. 
Emmer, P.C. The Dutch in the Atlantic 
Economy, 1580–1880: Trade, Slavery and 
Emancipation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. 
Emmer, P.C. “Engeland, Nederland, Afrika 
en de slavenhandel in de negentiende 
eeuw.” Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch 
Jaarboek 37 (1974): 44–144. 
Emmer, P.C. “The Myth of Early 
Globalization: The Atlantic Economy, 
1500–1800.” European Review 11, no. 1 
(2003): 37–47. 
Emmer, P.C. and Klooster, Wim. “The 
Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800: Expansion 
Without Empire.” Itinerario 23, no. 2 
(1999): 48–69. 
Enthoven, Victor, “Going Dutch: 
Interloping in the Dutch Atlantic 
World.” In Small is Beautiful? Interlopers 
and Small Trading Nations in the Pre-
industrial Period, edited by Markus A. 
Denzel and Jan de Vries, 22–48. 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011. 
Enthoven, Victor. “’That Abominable Nest 
of Pirates’: St. Eustatius and the North 
Americans 1680–1780.” Early American 
Studies 10, no. 2 (2012): 239–301. 
Enthoven, Victor. ”Neutrality: Atlantic 
Shipping in and after the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars.” In Mercantilism Reimagined: 
Political Economy in Early Modern Britain 
and its Empire, edited by Philip Stern 
and Carl Wennerlind, 328–47. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Essén, Åke. “Johan Liljencrantz som 
handelspolitiker: studier i Sveriges yttre 
handelspolitik 1773–1786.” PhD diss., 
Lunds universitet, 1928. 
Essén, Åke, “Willhelm Bolts und die 
Schwedishchen Kolonisierungspläne in 
Asien.” Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche 
Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 7, no. 5 
(1935): 83–101. 
Fallope, Josette. “Négriers de la 
Guadeloupe sur la cöte africaine au 
début du XIXe siècle.” In L’Afrique 
entre L’Europe et l’Amerique. Le rôle de 
l’Afrique dans la rencontre de deux mondes. 
Mayenne:UNESCO, 1995. 
Feldbæk, Ole. India Trade under the Danish 
Flag 1772–1808. European Enterprise and 
Anglo-Indian Remittance and Trade. 
Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1969. 
Feldbæk, Ole. Dansk neutralitetspolitik under 
krigen 1778–1783: studier i regeringens 
prioritering af politiske og økonomiske 
interesser. København: Københavns 
universitet, 1971. 
Feldbæk, Ole. “Caracas-spekulationen 
1782–1783. Dansk 
neutralitetsudnyttelse under den 
amerikanske frihetskrig.” Historisk 
tidsskrift 12, no. 6 (1973): 159–176. 
 306 
 
Feldbæk, Ole. Denmark and the Armed 
Neutrality 1800–1801. København: 
Akademisk Forlag, 1980. 
Feldbæk, Ole. ”The Danish Trading 
Companies of the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Century.” Scandinavian 
Economic History Review 34, vol. 3 
(1986):204–218. 
Fick, Carolyne E. and Mayer, Francine M. 
“Slavery, Slave Emancipation and Social 
Reorganization in Nineteenth-Century 
Saint-Barthélemy, French West 
Indies.” Paper presented at the 
Conference on the peopling of the 
Americas, Veracruz, May 1992. 
Fick, Carolyne E. and Mayer, Francine M. 
“Before and After Emancipation: Slaves 
and Free Coloreds of Saint-Barthélemy 
(French West Indies) in the 19th 
Century.” Scandinavian Journal of 
History 18, no. 4 (1993): 251–274. 
Fischer, John. “Imperial ‘Free Trade’ and 
the Hispanic Economy, 1778–1796.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 13, no. 1 
(1981): 21–56. 
Fischer, John. “The Imperial Response to 
‘Free Trade’: Spanish Imports from 
Spanish America, 1778–1796.” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 17, no. 1 (1985): 
35–78. 
Fischer, John. The Economic Aspects of 
Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492–
1810. Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1997. 
Fog Olwig, Karen. “Narrating 
deglobalization: Danish perceptions of 
a lost empire.” Global Networks 3, no. 3 
(2003): 207–222. 
Forssell, Hans. “Minne av statsministern 
greve Gustaf af Wetterstedt.” In 
Svenska akademiens handlingar ifrån år 
1886, vol. 3, 53–492. Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 1906. 
Franzén, Gösta. Svenskstad i Västindien. 
Gustavia på Saint Barthélemy i språk- och 
kulturhistorisk belysning. Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1974. 
Fur, Gunlög. “Ädla vildar, grymma barbarer 
och postmoderna historier.” Historisk 
tidskrift 119, no. 4 (1999): 637–653. 
Fur, Gunlög. “Colonialism and Swedish 
History: Unthinkable Connections?” 
In Scandinavian Colonialism and the Rise 
of Modernity: Small Time Agents in a 
Global Arena, edited by Magdalena 
Naum and Jonas M. Nordin, 17–36. 
New York: Springer, 2013. 
Furber, Holden. ”In the Footsteps of a 
German ’Nabob’: William Bolts in the 
Swedish Archives.” In Private Fortunes 
and Company Profits in the India Trade in 
the Eighteenth Century, edited by Rosane 
Rocher. Aldershot: Variorium, 1997. 
Fåhræus, Fredrik Edvard. “Statistiska 
upplysningar rörande svenska kolonin 
S:t Barthélemy.” Statistisk tidskrift 2 
(1865): 256–265. 
Games, Alison. “Atlantic History: 
Definitions, Challenges, and 
Opportunities.” American History 
Review 111, no. 3 (2006): 741–757. 
Gares, Albert J. “Stephen Girard’s West 
India Trade, 1789–1812.” Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography 72 
(1941): 311–42. 
Garcia Bernal, Ricardo. Juan Bernardo 
Elbers: del Rhin al Magdalena. Bogotá: 
Rasgo & Color Ltda, 2007. 
Geggus, David. “Slavery, War and the 
Revolution in the Greater Caribbean, 
1789–1815.” In A Turbulent Time: The 
French Revolution and the Greater 
Caribbean, 1789–1815, edited by David 
Barry Gaspar and David P. Geggus, 1–
50. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997. 
Gervais, Pierre. “Neither Imperial, Nor 
Atlantic: A Merchant Perspective on 
International Trade in the Eighteenth 
Century.” History of European Ideas 34 
(2008): 465–73. 
Gervais, Pierre. “Why Profit and Loss 
Didn’t Matter: The Historicized 
Rationality of Early Modern Merchant 
Accounting,” in Merchants and Profit in 
the Age of Commerce, 1680–1830, edited 
by Pierre Gervais, Yannick 
   
307 
 
Lemarchand and Dominique 
Margairaz, 33–52. London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2014. 
Gihl, Torsten. “Kabinettskassan.” Historisk 
tidskrift 56 (1936): 341–392. 
Gilbert, Geoffrey N. “Baltimore’s Flour 
Trade to the Caribbean, 1750–1815.” 
Journal of Economic History 37, no. 1 
(1977): 249–251. 
Gilmore, Robert Louis and Harrison, John. 
“Juan Bernardo Elbers and the 
introduction of steam navigation on the 
Magdalena river.” Hispanic American 
Historical Review 28, no. 3 (1948): 335–
359. 
Goebel, Dorothy Burne. “British Trade to 
the Spanish Colonies, 1796–1823.” The 
American Historical Review 43, no. 2 
(1938): 288–320. 
Goebel, Dorothy Burne. “The ‘New 
England Trade’ and the French West 
Indies, 1763–1774: A Study in Trade 
Policies.” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1963): 331–372. 
Goës, Axel Theodor. “Minnen från vår 
förra besittning S:t Barthélemy.” Ymer 
(1882): 119–39, 150–64, 169–82. 
Gould, Eliga H. “Zones of Law, Zones of 
Violence: The Legal Geography of the 
British Atlantic, circa 1772.” The 
William & Mary Quarterly 60, no. 2 
(2003): 471–510. 
Goslinga, Cornelis. The Dutch in the 
Caribbean and in the Guianas 1680–1781. 
Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985. 
Grahn, Lance. The Political Economy of 
Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in 
Early Bourbon. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1997. 
Greene, Jack P. and Morgan, Philip D., eds. 
Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.   
Green-Pedersen, Svend-Erik. “The 
Economic Considerations behind the 
Danish Abolition of the Danish Negro 
Slave Trade.” In The Uncommon Market. 
Essays in the Economic History of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, edited by Henry A. 
Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn, 399–
418. New York: Academic Press Inc., 
1979. 
Green-Pedersen, Svend-Erik. “Colonial 
Trade under the Danish Flag. A case 
study of the Danish slave trade to Cuba 
1790–1807.” Scandinavian Journal of 
History 5 (1980): 93–120. 
Green-Pedersen, Svend-Erik. “Slave 
demography in the Danish West Indies 
and the Abolition of the Danish Slave 
Trade.” In The Abolition of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, 
Africa and the Americas, edited by David 
Eltis and James Walvin, 231–257. 
Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1981. 
Gøbel, Erik. “Volume and Structure of 
Danish Shipping to the Caribbean and 
Guinea, 1671–1838.” International 
Journal of Maritime History 2, no. 2 
(1990): 103–131. 
Gøbel, Erik. “The Danish Trading 
Companies. Their Organizations, 
Trade and Shipping 1671–1807.” In The 
Danish Presence and Legacy in the Virgin 
Islands, edite by Svend E. Holsoe and 
John H. McCollum, 1–14. St. Croix: St. 
Croix Landmark Society, 1993. 
Gøbel, Erik. “Shipping through the Port of 
St. Thomas, Danish West Indies, 1816–
1917.” International Journal of Maritime 
History 6, no. 2 (1994): 155–173. 
Gøbel, Erik. “Management of the Port of 
Saint Thomas, Danish West Indies, 
during the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries.” The Northern 
Mariner/Le Marin du Nord 7, no. 4 
(1997): 45–63. 
Gøbel, Erik. “Besejlingen af Sankt Thomas 
havn 1816–1917.” Handels- og 
Søfartsmuseets Årbog (2000): 7–35. 
Haggerty, Sheryllynne. The British-Atlantic 
Trading Community, 1760–1810: Men, 
women, and the Distribution of Goods. 
Leiden: Brill, 2006. 
Hall, Neville A.T. Slave Society in the Danish 
West Indies, edited by B.W. Higman. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992. 
 308 
 
Hammarström, Ingrid. “Svensk transocean 
handel och sjöfart under 1800–talet.” 
Historisk tidskrift 82 (1962): 377–481. 
Hancock, David. “The British Atlantic 
World: Co-ordination, Complexity and 
the Emergence of an Atlantic Market.” 
Itinerario 23, no. 2 (1999): 107–126. 
Hand, Charles R. “The Kitty’s Amelia, the 
last Liverpool slaver.” The Historical 
Society of Lancashire & Cheshire 82 (1930): 
69–80. 
Harley, C.K. “Ocean Freight Rates and 
Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy 
of Mechanical Invention.” The Journal 
of Economic History 48, no. 4 (1988): 851–
876. 
Hartog, Johannes. History of St. Eustatius. 
Aruba: De Wit Stories, 1976. 
Heckscher, Eli. Sveriges ekonomiska historia 
sedan Gustav Vasa, 4 vols. Stockholm: 
Bonnier, 1936. 
Heckscher, Eli. Den svenska handelssjöfartens 
historia sedan Gustav Vasa. Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1940. 
Heckscher, Eli. Merkantilismen: ett led I den 
ekonomiska politikens historia. 
Stockholm: Norstedt, 1931. 
Helfman, Tara. “Commerce on Trial: 
Neutral Rights and Private Warfare in 
the Seven Years War.” Trade and War: 
The Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-
State System, edited by Koen 
Stapelbroek, 14–41. Helsinki: Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies 2011. 
Hellström, Jan Arvid. ”… åt alla christliga 
förvanter…” En undersökning av 
kolonialförvaltning, religionsvård och 
samfundsliv på S:t Barthélemy under den 
svenska perioden 1784–1878. Uppsala: 
Erene, 1987. 
Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A 
Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2012. 
Higman, B.W. Writing West Indian 
Histories. London: Macmillan, 1999. 
Hildebrand, Ingegerd. ”Den svenska 
kolonin S:t Barthélemy och Västindiska 
kompaniet fram till 1796.” PhD diss., 
Lunds universitet, 1951. 
Hildebrand, Ingegerd. ”S:t Barthélemy.” In 
Den svenska historien 7, Gustavianska tiden 
1772–1809, edited by Gunvor Grenholm, 
88–90, 96–97. Stockholm: Bonniers, 
1968. 
Hoff, Henry B. ”Early Swedes on St. 
Eustatius.” Swedish American Genealogist 
3, vol. 3 (1983): 136. 
Hoff, Henry B. ”Additional Early Swedes 
on St. Eustatius.” Swedish American 
Genealogist 4, vol. 3 (1984): 118–121. 
Horn, Vivi. Den sturske Montgomery: 
kvinnotjusare, kungagunstling, statsfånge. 
Linköping: Medéns förlag, 2003. 
Hornby, Ove. Kolonierne i Vestindien. 
København: Politikens Forlag, 1980. 
Hyrenius, Hannes. Royal Swedish Slaves. 
Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 1977. 
Högström, Erik O.E. ”S. Barthelemy under 
svenskt välde.” Unpublished PhD 
thesis., University of Uppsala, 1888.  
Ipsen, Pernille and Fur, Gunlög. 
“Introduction.” Itinerario 33, no. 2 
Special issue on Scandinavian 
Colonialism (2009): 7–16. 
Israel, Jonathan. Dutch Primacy in World 
Trade, 1585–1740. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. 
Israel, Jonathan. The Dutch Republic. Its 
Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Jameson, J. Franklin. ”St. Eustatius in the 
American Revolution.” The American 
Historical Review 8, no. 4 (1903): 683–
708. 
Jarvis, Michael J. In the eye of all trade. 
Bermuda, Bermudians, and the maritime 
Atlantic world, 1680–1783. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 
2010. 
Johansen, Hans Christian. ”Scandinavian 
shipping in the late eighteenth century 
in a European perspective.” The 
Economic History Review 45, no. 3 (1992): 
479–493. 
Johansen, Hans Christian. ”The Reality 
behind the Demographic Argument to 
Abolish the Danish Slave Trade.” In 
   
309 
 
The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 
Origins and Effects in Europé, Africa and 
the Americas, edited by David Eltis and 
James Walvin, 221–230. Madison, WI: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1981. 
Johnson, Amandus. The Swedes in America 
1638–1938, 7:1, Swedish Contributions to 
American Freedom 1776–1783: including a 
sketch of the background of the revolution 
together with an account of the engagements 
in which Swedish officers participated and 
biographical sketches of these men. 
Philadelphia: Swedish Colonial 
Foundation, 1953. 
Johnson, Sherry. ”El Niño, Environmental 
Crisis, and the Emergence of 
Alternative Markets in the Hispanic 
Caribbean, 1760–1770s.” The William & 
Mary Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2005): 365–410. 
Johnson, Sherry. Climate and Catastrophe in 
Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of 
Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012. 
Jordaan, Han and Wilson, Victor. ”The 
Eighteenth-century Danish, Dutch and 
Swedish Free Ports in the Northeastern 
Caribbean: Continuity and Change.” In 
Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680–1800: 
Linking Empires, Bridging Borders, edited 
by Gert Oostindie and Jessica V. 
Roitman, 275–308. Leiden: Brill, 2014. 
Karras, Alan L. Smuggling, Contraband and 
Corruption in World History. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. 
Karras, Alan L. “Smuggling and its 
Malcontents.” In Interactions: 
Transregional Perspectives on World 
History, edited by Jerry H. Bentley, 135–
49. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 
2010. 
Keith, Alice B. “Relaxations in the British 
Restrictions on the American Trade 
with the British West Indies, 1783–
1802.” Journal of Modern History 20, no. 
1 (1948): 1–18. 
Keller, Albert Galloway. Colonization: A 
Study of the Founding of New Societies. 
Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908. 
King, James F. ”Evolution of the Free Slave 
Trade in the Spanish Colonial 
Administration.” Hispanic American 
Historical Review 22, no. 1 (1942): 34–56. 
King, Robert J. “Gustaf III’s Australian 
Colony.” The Great Circle 27, no. 2 
(2005): 3–20. 
Klein, Herbert S. The Middle Passage: 
Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave 
Trade. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978. 
Klein, Herbert S. ”North American 
Competition and the Characteristics of 
the African Slave Trade to Cuba, 1790–
1794.” The William & Mary Quarterly 28, 
no. 1 (1971): 86–102. 
Klein, Herbert S. ”The Cuban Slave Trade 
in a Period of Transition, 1790–1843.” 
Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer 62 
(1975): 67–89. 
Klooster, Wim. Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in 
the Caribbean, 1648–1795. Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 1998. 
Klooster, Wim. Revolutions in the Atlantic 
World: A Comparative History. New 
York: New York University Press, 
2009. 
Klooster, Wim. ”Other Netherlands 
Beyond the Sea: Dutch America 
between Metropolitan Control and 
Divergence, 1600–1795.” In Negotiated 
Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the 
Americas, 1500–1820, edited by Christine 
Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, 171–
192. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Klooster, Wim. ”Transnationalism 
’Beyond the Line, 1655–1763.” Paper 
presented at the 19th International 
Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, 
6–13 August, 2000. 
Klooster, Wim. ”Communities of port Jews 
and their contacts in the Dutch 
Atlantic World.” Jewish History 20 
(2006): 129–145. 
Klooster, Wim. ”Inter-Imperial Smuggling 
in the Americas, 1600–1800.” In 
Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent 
Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500–
1830, edited by Bernard Bailyn and 
 310 
 
Patricia L. Denault, 141–180. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009. 
Klooster, Wim. “Curaçao as a Transit 
Center to the Spanish Main and the 
French West Indies.” In Dutch Atlantic 
Connections, 1680–1800: Linking Empires, 
Bridging Borders, edited by Gert 
Oostindie and Jessica V. Roitman, 275–
308. Leiden: Brill, 2014. 
Knight, David W. and Laurette, T. Prime 
de. St. Thomas 1803, Crossroads of the 
Diaspora. St. Thomas: Little Northside 
Press, 1999. 
Knight, Franklin W. ”Origins of Wealth 
and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba, 
1750–1850.” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 57, no. 2 (1977): 231–253. 
Koninckx, Christian. The First and Second 
Charters of the Swedish East India 
Companu (1731–1766). Kotrijk: Van 
Ghemmert, 1980. 
Krantz, Olle and Schön, Lennart. Om den 
svenska konsumtionen under 1800– och 
1900–talen. Två uppsatser. Lund: Lunds 
universitet, 1984. 
Kreüger, Johan Henrik. Sveriges förhållande 
till Barbaresk staterna i Afrika. 
Stockholm: Norstedt, 1856. 
Lamborn, Rolf. ”The Archives of Saint 
Bartholomew Rediscovered.” The 
Swedish Pioneer Historical Society 15, no. 1 
(1964): 33–44. 
Lange, Ole. ”Denmark in China 1839–65: A 
pawn in a British game: An interim 
account of Danish economic and 
diplomatic activity.” Scandinavian 
Economic History Review 19, no. 2 (1971): 
71–117. 
Larsen, Kay. Dansk Vestindien 1666–1917. 
København: Reitzel, 1928. 
Lavoie, Yolande. ”Histoire sociale et 
démographique d’une communauté 
isolée: Saint-Barthélemy (Antilles 
françaises).” Revue d’histoire de 
l’Amérique française 42, no. 3 (1989): 411–
427. 
Lavoie, Yolande, Fick, Carolyn and Mayer, 
Francine M. ”A Particular Study of 
Slavery in the Caribbean Island of Saint 
Barthélemy: 1648–1846.” Caribbean 
Studies 28, no. 2 (1995): 369–403. 
Leather, John. The Gaff Rig Handbook: 
History, Design, Techniques, 
Developments. Penryn, Cornwall: 
Waterside Publications, 1994. 
Lebel, Anne. ”Saint-Barthélemy et ses 
archives: une connaissance historique 
éclatée.” Bulletin de la societé d’histoire de 
la Guadeloupe 159 (2011): 91–102. 
Leglaunec, Pierre. “A Directory of Slave 
Ships with Slave Cargoes, Louisiana, 
1772–1808,” Louisiana History 46 (2005): 
211–30. 
Lewis, James A. ”Anglo-American 
entrepreneurs in Havana: the 
background and significance of the 
expulsion of 1784–1785.” In The North 
American role in the Spanish imperial 
economy, 1760–1819, edited by Jaques A. 
Barber and Allan J. Kuethe, 112–126. 
Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984. 
Lewis, Gordon K. Main Currents in 
Caribbean Thought: The Historical 
Evolution of Caribbean Society in Its 
Ideological Aspects, 1492–1900. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983. 
Lindblad, J. Thomas. Sweden’s Trade with 
the Dutch Republic 1738–1795. A 
quantitative analysis of the relationship 
between economic growth and international 
trade in the eighteenth century. Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1982. 
Lindh, Björn. ”Det svenska Saint-
Barthélemy-arkivet.” Arkiv, samhälle, 
forskning 16 (1974): 21–25. 
Lindroth, Sten. Kungl. Svenska 
Vetenskapsakademiens historia 1739–1818. 
Stockholm: Kungl. 
Vetenskapsakademien, 1967. 
Liss, Peggy K. Atlantic Empires: The Network 
of Trade and Revolution, 1713–1826. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1983. 
Loit, Alexander. ”Sveriges kolonilotter.” In 
Den dolda historien. 27 uppsatser om vårt 
   
311 
 
okända förflutna, edited by Ronny 
Ambjörnsson and David Gaunt, 376–
395. Stockholm: Författarförlaget, 1984. 
López Cantos, Angel, “Contrabando, corso 
y situado en el siglo XVIII: una 
economía subterránea.” Anales : Revista 
de Ciencias Sociales e Historia de la 
Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico 
Recinto de San Germán 1, no. 2 (1985) : 31–
53. 
Luthin, Reinhard H. ”St. Bartholomew: 
Sweden’s Colonial and Diplomatic 
Adventure in the Caribbean.” Hispanic 
American Historical Review 14, no. 3 
(1934): 307–324. 
Lybeck, Olof et al., eds. Svenska flottans 
historia. 3 vols. Stockholm: Allhem, 
1942–45. 
Mabee, Bryan. ”Pirates, privateers and the 
political economy of private violence.” 
Global Change, Peace & Security 21, no. 2 
(2009): 139–152. 
Magnusson, Lars. Sveriges ekonomiska 
historia. Stockholm: Norstedts, 2010. 
Maher, Julianne. ”Fishermen, farmers, 
traders: Language and economic history 
on St. Barthélemy, French West 
Indies.” Language in Society 25, no. 3 
(1996): 373–406. 
Maher, Julianne. The Survival of People and 
Languages: Schooners, Goats and Cassava 
in St. Barthélemy, French West Indies. 
Leiden: Brill, 2013. 
Marshall, Bill. The French Atlantic: Travels in 
Culture and History. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2009. 
Marzagalli, Silvia. ”The French Atlantic.” 
Itinerario 23, no. 2 (1999): 70–83. 
Marzagalli, Silvia. “Guerre et création d’un 
réseau commercial entre Bordeaux et 
les États-Unis, 1776–1815.” In Guerre et 
économie dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe 
au XXe siècle, edited by Silvia Marzagalli 
and Bruno Marnot, 375–94. Pessac: 
Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 
2006. 
Marzagalli, Silvia and Marnot, Bruno. 
Guerre et économie dans l’espace atlantique 
du XVIe au XXe siècle. Pessac: Presses 
Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2006. 
Masonen, Pekka. ”Kustavilainen 
siirtomaapolitiikka ja Saint-
Barthélemyn kuume.” Historiallinen 
aikakauskirja 3 (2007): 330–345. 
Masson, Paul. Ports francs d’autrefois et 
d’ajourd’hui. Paris :Hachette, 1904. 
Mathieu, Jacques. Le commerce entre la 
Nouvelle-France et les Antilles au XVIIIe 
siècle. Montréal : Fides, 1981. 
Matthewson, Tim. “Jefferson and Haiti.” 
Journal of Southern History 61, no. 2 
(1995): 209–48. 
Matson, Cathy. Merchants & Empire: 
Trading in Colonial New York. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998. 
Matson, Cathy. ”The Atlantic Economy in 
an Era of Revolutions: An 
Introduction.” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2005): 357–364. 
McCarthy, Matthew. “A Delicate Question 
of a Political Nature: The Corso 
Insurgente and British Commercial 
Policy during the Spanish-American 
Wars of Independence.” International 
Journal of Maritime History 23 (2011): 
277–92. 
McCarthy, Matthew. Privateering, Piracy 
and British Policy in Spanish America 
1810–1830. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 
2013. 
McCusker, John J. Money and Exchange in 
Europe and America, 1600–1775. Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press for the Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, 1978. 
McCusker, John J. and Menard, Russel R. 
The Economy of British America, 1607–
1789. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991. 
McDonald, Michelle Craig. ”The Chance 
of the Moment: Coffee and the New 
West Indies Commoditites Trade.” 
The William & Mary Quarterly 62, no. 3 
(2005): 441–472. 
 312 
 
McMaster, John Bach. The Life and Times of 
Stephen Girard: Mariner and Merchant. 
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1918. 
McMillin, James A. The Final Victims: The 
Foreign Slave Trade to North America, 
1783–1810. Columbia: Columbia 
University Press, 2004. 
Menkman, W.R. ”Sint Eustatius gouden 
tijd.” West-Indische Gids 14 (1932): 369–
396. 
Middell, Mattias and Naumann, Katja. 
”Global history and the spatial turn: 
from the impact of area study of critical 
junctures of globalization.” Journal of 
Global History 5, no. 1 (2010): 149–170. 
Mims, Stewart L. Colbert’s West India Policy. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1912. 
Mundy, G.B. The Life and Correspondence of 
the late Admiral Lord Rodney. London: 
Murray, 1830. 
Mustafa, Sam A. Merchants and Migrations: 
Germans and Americans in Connection, 
1776–1835. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2001. 
Müller, Leos. ”Swedish-American Trade 
and the Swedish Consular Service, 
1780–1840.” International Journal of 
Maritime History 1 (2003): 1–16. 
Müller, Leos. ”The Swedish East India 
Trade and International Markets: Re-
exports of teas, 1731–1813.” Scandinavian 
Economic History Review 3 (2003): 28–44. 
Müller, Leos. ”Kolonialprodukter i Sveriges 
handel och konsumtionskultur 1700–
1800.” Historisk tidskrift 2 (2004): 225–
248. 
Müller, Leos. Consuls, Corsairs and 
Commerce: The Swedish consular service 
and long-distance shipping, 1720–1815. 
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis 
Upsaliensis, 2004. 
Müller, Leos, “Great Power Constraints 
and the Growth of the Commercial 
Sector: The Case of Sweden, 1600–
1800.” In A Deus Ex Machina Revisited: 
Atlantic Colonial Trade and European 
Economic Development, edited by P.C. 
Emmer, O. Pétré-Grenouilleau and 
Jessica V. Roitman, 317–51. Leiden: 
Brill, 2006. 
Müller, Leos. ”Sweden’s Neutral Trade 
under Gustav III: The Ideal of 
Commercial Independence under the 
Predicament of Political Isolation.” In 
Trade and War: The Neutrality of 
Commerce in the Inter-State System, edited 
by Koen Stapelbroek, 143–160. 
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies 2011. 
Müller, Leos, Rydén, Göran and Weiss, 
Holger, eds. Globalhistoria från periferin: 
Norden 1600–1850. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 2010. 
Mörner, Magnus. “En översikt av 
källmaterial till Latinamerikas historia i 
svenska arkiv.” Arkiv, samhälle och 
forskning 8 (1965): 46–95. 
Mörner, Magnus. “De svenska historikerna 
och internationaliseringen.” Historisk 
tidskrift 4 (1985): 430–452. 
Nadal, Goncal López. “Corsairing as a 
Commercial System.” In Bandits at Sea. 
A Pirates Reader, edited by C.R. Pennell, 
125–36. New York: New York 
University Press, 2001. 
Nakhimovsky, Isaac. “The ‘Ignominious 
Fall of the European Commonwealth’: 
Gentz, Hauterive, and the Debate of 
1800.” In Trade and War: The Neutrality 
of Commerce in the Inter-State System, 
edited by Koen Stapelbroek, 212–228. 
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies 2011. 
Neff, Stephen. “Britain and the Neutrals in 
the French Revolutionary Wars: The 
Debate over Reprisals and Third 
Parties.” In Trade and War: The 
Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State 
System, edited by Koen Stapelbroek, 
229–250. Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium 
for Advanced Studies 2011. 
Nichols, Roy F. “Trade Relations and the 
Establishments of the United States 
Consulates in Spanish America, 1779–
1809.” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 13, no. 5 (1933): 289–313. 
North, Douglass, “Ocean Freight Rates and 
Economic Development 1750–1914.” 
   
313 
 
The Journal of Economic History 18, no. 3 
(1958): 537–55. 
North, Douglass. “The United States 
Balances of Payments, 1790–1860.” In 
Trends in the American Economy in the 
Nineteenth Century, 573–628. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960.  
Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of 
the United States, 1790 to 1860 (Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1961) 
North, Douglass. The Economic Growth of 
the United States, 1790–1860. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961. 
North, Douglass. “Institutions.” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 
(1991): 97–112. 
Nováky, György. Handelskompanier och 
kompanihandel. Svenska Afrikakompaniet 
1649–1663. En studie i fe0dal handel 
(Uppsala: Acta Universitatis 
Uppsaliensis, 1990). 
O’Malley, Gregory E. Final Passages: The 
Intercolonial Slave Trade of British 
America, 1619–1807. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 
2012. 
O’Reilly, William. ”Genealogies of Atlantic 
History.” Atlantic Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 
66–84. 
Orenstein, Jeffrey. “Joseph Almeida: 
Portrait of a Privateer, Pirate & 
Plaintiff, Part I.” The Green Bag 10, no. 3 
(2007): 306–28. 
Orenstein, Jeffrey. “Joseph Almeida: 
Portrait of a Privateer, Pirate & 
Plaintiff, Part II.” The Green Bag 12, no. 
1 (2008): 35–52. 
O’Rourke, Kevin and Williamson, Jeffrey. 
Globalization and History: The 
Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century 
Atlantic Economy. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999. 
O’Shaughnessy, Andrew J. An Empire 
Divided: The American Revolution and the 
British Caribbean. Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. 
Obadele-Starks, Ernest. Freebooters and 
Smugglers: The Foreign Slave Trade in 
the United States after 1808. 
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas 
Press, 2007. 
Odhner, Claes Theodor. Sveriges politiska 
historia under Gustaf III:s regering. 
Stockholm, 1885–1905. 
Olán, Eskil, Marstrands historia: krigsminnen 
och badortsliv. Göteborg: Elanders 
boktryckeri AB, 1939. 
Olrog, Frank. Med svensk krona: Den svenska 
kolonien S:t Barthélemys mynthistoria 
1784–1878. Stockholm: Kungl. 
Myntkabinettet, statens museum för 
medalj- och penninghistoria, 1978. 
Olsen, Poul Erik. Toldvæsendet i Dansk 
Vestindien. København: Toldhistorisk 
selskab, 1988. 
Olsen, Poul Erik. ”Dansk Lov på de 
vestindiske øer.” In Danske og Norske 
Lov i 300 år. København: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1983. 
Olsen, Poul Erik. ”Negeroprør, termitter 
og landsarkivar Saxild: Om de dansk-
vestindiske lokalarkivers skæbne.” 
Arkiv 10, no. 3 (1985): 156–175. 
Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West 
Indies, 1739–1763. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1936. 
Pares, Richard. Colonial Blockade and 
Neutral Rights 1739–1763. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1938. 
Pares, Richard. Yankees and Creoles: The 
Trade between North America and the 
West Indies before the American 
Revolution. London: Longmans, 
Green, 1956. 
Paulin, Axel. “Skeppet Fortunas expedition 
till ‘Wilda Kusten af Södra America.” 
Forum Navale, no. 10 (1951): 38–95. 
Pearce, A.J. “British Trade with the Spanish 
colonies, 1788–1795.” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 20, no. 2 (2001): 233–
260. 
Pearce, A.J. British Trade with Spanish 
America, 1763–1808. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University, 2007.  
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. ”Témoignages sur 
la Guadeloupe en 1794.” Bulletin de la 
Societé d’histoire de la Guadeloupe, no. 47 
(1981): 5–33. 
 314 
 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. Étre patriote sous le 
Tropiques: La Guadeloupe, 1789–1794. 
Basse-Terre: Société d’histoire de la 
Guadeloupe, 1985. 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne, “Commerce et 
travail dans les villes coloniales des 
Lumières: Basse-Terre et Pointe-á-
Pitre, Guadeloupe.” Revue française 
d’histoire d’outre-mer 75, 278 (1988): 31–78. 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. “Cabotage, 
Contraband and Corsairs: The Port 
Cities of Guadeloupe and their 
Inhabitants.” In Atlantic Port Cities. 
Economy, Culture, and Society in the 
Atlantic World, 1650–1850, edited by 
Franklin W. Knight and Peggy K. Liss, 
58–86. Knoxville: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1991. 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. La ville aux Iles, la 
ville dans l’île: Basse-Terre et Pointe-à-Pitre 
Guadeloupe, 1650–1820. Paris: Karthala, 
2000. 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. ”The Pirate and 
the Emperor: Power and Law on the 
Seas, 1450–1850.” In Bandits at Sea: A 
Pirates Reader, edited by C.R. Pennell, 
25–54. New York: New York 
University Press, 2001. 
Peterson, Merrill D. “Thomas Jefferson 
and Commercial Policy, 1783–1793.” 
The William & Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 
(1965): 584–610. 
Pietschmann, Horst. “Burocracia y 
corrupción en hispanoamérica 
colonial: Una aproximación tentativa.” 
Nova Americana 5 (1985): 9–37. 
Pincus, Steve. “Rethinking Mercantilism: 
Political Economy, the British Empire, 
and the Atlantic World in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries.” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 69, no. 1 (2012): 3–34. 
Pitman, Frank Wesley. The Development of 
the British West Indies, 1700–1763. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1917. 
Postma, Johannes. The Dutch in the Atlantic 
Slave Trade 1600–1815. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Postma, Johannes and Enthoven, Victor, 
eds. Riches from Atlantic Commerce: 
Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 
1585–1817. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Price, Jacob. ”Economic Function and the 
Growth of American Port Towns in the 
Eighteenth Century.” Perspectives in 
American History, no. 8 (1974): 123–188. 
Putnam, Lara. ”To Study the 
Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and 
the Atlantic World.” Journal of Social 
History 39, no. 3 (2006): 615–630. 
Pålsson, Ale. “Our Side of the Water. 
Political Culture and Representation in 
St. Barthélemy in the early 19th 
century.” Unpublished PhD-thesis. 
Stockholm University, 2015. 
Rabuzzi, Daniel A. “Cutting Out the 
Middleman? American Trade in 
Northern Europe, 1783–1815.” In 
Merchant Organization and Maritime 
Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660–1815, 
edited by Olaf Uwe Jansen, 175–197. St. 
John’s, Newfoundland: International 
Maritime Economic History 
Association, 1998. 
Rediker, Markus. Villains of all Nations: 
Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 2004. 
Régent, Frédéric. Esclavage, métissage, 
liberté: La Révolution française en 
Guadeloupe, 1789–1802. Paris: Grasset, 
2004. 
Reich, Jerome. “The Slave Trade at the 
Congress of Vienna – A Study in 
English Public Opinion.” The Journal of 
Negro History 53, no. 2 (1968): 129–143. 
Reidy, Michael Charles. ”Admission of 
Slaves and Prize Slaves into the Cape 
Colony, 1797–1818.” MA diss., 
University of Cape Town, 1997. 
Roberts, Michael. The Swedish Imperial 
Experience, 1560–1718. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Rogberg, Martin. Svenskar i Latinamerika – 
Pionjäröden och nutida insatser. 
Stockholm: Lindqvist, 1954. 
Rodigneaux, Michel and Servant, Hélène. 
”La guerre de course aux Antilles 1793–
   
315 
 
1810.” Bulletin de la Societé d’histoire de la 
Guadeloupe, no. 142 (2005): 13–39. 
Rodigneaux, Michel. La guerre de course en 
Guadeloupe, XVIIIe–XIXe siècles ou 
Alger sous les Tropiques. Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2006. 
Roitman, Jessica V. and Jordaan, Han. 
”Fighting a foregone conclusion. Local 
interest groups, West Indian 
merchants, and St. Eustatius, 1780–
1810.” Tijdschrift voor sociale en 
economische geschiedenis 12, no. 1 (2015): 
79–100. 
Rosman, H. and Munthe, A. Släkten 
Arfwedson. Bilder ur Stockholms 
handelshistoria under tre århundraden. 
Stockholm, 1945. 
Runefelt, Leif. Dygden som välståndets grund. 
Dygd, nytta och egennytta i frihetstidens 
ekonomiska tänkande. Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 
2005. 
Rupert, Linda. “Inter-colonial networks 
and revolutionary ferment in 
eighteenth-century Curaçao and Tierra 
Firme.” In Curaçao in the Age of 
Revolutions, 1795–1800. Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2011. 
Rupert, Linda. Creolization and Contraband: 
Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic 
World. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2012. 
Rydén, Göran, ed. Sweden in the Eighteenth-
Century World: Provincial Cosmopolitans. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 
Rönnbäck, Klas. ”Flexibility and 
protectionism – Swedish trade in sugar 
during the early modern era.” In Varans 
vägar och världar – Handel och konsumtion 
i Skandinavien ca. 1600–1900, edited by 
Christer Ahlberger and Pia Lundqvist, 
116–131. Göteborg: Göteborgs 
universitet, 2007. 
Rönnbäck, Klas. ”Commerce and 
Colonisation: Studies of Early Modern 
Merchant Capitalism in the Atlantic 
Economy.” PhD diss., Göteborgs 
universitet, 2009. 
Rönnbäck, Klas. “Enlightenment, 
Scientific Exploration and 
Abolitionism: Anders Sparrman’s and 
Carl Bernhard Wadström’s Colonial 
Encounters in Senegal, 1787–1788 and 
the British Abolitionist Movement.” 
Slavery & Abolition 34, no. 3 (2012): 424–
45. 
Samuelsson, Kurt. Köpmanshusen i 
Stockholm: en studie i den svenska 
handelskapitalismens historia. Stockholm: 
Ekonomisk-historiska institutet, 1951. 
Shammas, Carole. “The revolutionary 
impact of European demand for 
tropical goods.” In The Early Modern 
Atlantic Economy, edited by John J. 
McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, 163–
85. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.  
Schnackenbourg, Eric. ”From ’hostile 
infection’ to ’free ship, free goods’: 
Changes in French neutral trade 
legislation.” In Trade and War: The 
Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State 
System, edited by Koen Stapelbroek, 95–
113. Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies 2011. 
Schnurmann, Claudia. ”Atlantic Trade and 
American Identities. The Correlations 
of Supranational Commerce, Political 
Opposition, and Colonial 
Regionalism.” In The Atlantic Economy 
During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: Organization, Operatino, 
Practice, and Personnel, edited by Peter 
A. Coclanis, 186–204. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 
2005. 
Scott III, Julius S. “The Common Wind : 
Currents of Afro-American 
Communication in the Era of the 
Haitian Revolution.” Unpublished 
PhD-dissertation, Duke University, 
1986. 
Scott, Julius C. ”Crisscrossing Empires: 
Ships, Sailors, and Resistance in the 
Lesser Antilles in the Eighteenth 
Century.” In The Lesser Antilles in the 
Age of European Expansion, edited by 
Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. 
 316 
 
Engerman, 128–143. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1996. 
Servant, Hélène. “La rétrocession de Saint-
Barthélemy à la France (1878–1884).” 
Bulletin de la Société d’histoire de la 
Guadeloupe 142 (2008) : 13–39. 
Setzer, Vernon G. The Commercial 
Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 
1774–1829. PhD-diss., University of 
Pennsylvania, 1937. 
Shepherd, James F. and Walton, Gary M. 
”Economic Change after the American 
Revolution: Pre- and Post-War 
Comparisons of Maritime Shipping and 
Trade.” Explorations in Economic History 
13, no. 4 (1976): 397–422. 
Sheridan, Richard B. ”The Crisis of Slave 
Subsistence in the British West Indies 
during and after the American 
Revolution.” The William & Mary 
Quarterly 4, no. 33 (1976): 615–641. 
Simonsen, Gunvor. ”Nye og gamle 
perspektiver på dansk kolonihistorie.” 
1066 – Tidsskrift for Historie, no. 2 (2003): 
3–13. 
Sjögren, Bengt. Ön som Sverige sålde. 
Göteborg: Zinderman, 1966. 
Sjögren, Bengt. ”Gustav III och 
’negerslaveriet’.” Recip Reflex, no. 8 
(1975): 40–43. 
Sjöström, Rolf. ”’En nödvändig 
omständighet’ – Om svensk slavhandel i 
Karibien.” In Svenska överord: en bok om 
gränslöshet och begränsningar, edited by 
Raoul Granqvist, 41–58. Stockholm: 
Brutus Österlings Bokförlag 
Symposion, 1999. 
Sjöström, Rolf. ”Conquer and Educate. 
Swedish colonialism in the Caribbean 
island of Saint-Barthélemy 1784–1878.” 
Paedagogica Historica 37, no. 1 (2001): 69–
85. 
Skytte, Göran. Kungliga svenska slaveriet. 
Stockholm: Askelin & Hägglund, 1986. 
Smith, Walther Burges. America’s diplomats 
and consuls of 1776–1865 : a geographic and 
biographic directory of the Foreign Service 
from the Declaration of Independence to the 
end of the Civil War. Washington, D.C.: 
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of 
State, 1987. 
Somos, Mark. ”’A price would be set not 
only upon our friendship, but upon our 
neutrality’: Alexander Hamilton’s 
political economy and early American 
state-building” In Trade and War: The 
Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State 
System, edited by Koen Stapelbroek, 
184–211. Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium 
for Advanced Studies, 2011. 
Sprinchorn, Carl. ”Sjuttonhundratalets 
planer och förslag till svensk 
kolonisation i främmande världsdelar.” 
Historisk tidskrift 43 (1923): 109–162. 
Stadin, Kekke. ”Att ta territoriet i 
besittning. Generalguvernörerna och 
maktens legitimering i provinserna.” 
Scandia 73, no. 1 (2007): 7–24. 
Stapelbroek, Koen, ed. Trade and War: The 
Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State 
System Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies, 2011. 
Stapelbroek, Koen. ”The Rights of Neutral 
Trade and its Forgotten History.” In 
Trade and War: The Neutrality of 
Commerce in the Inter-State System, edited 
by Koen Stapelbroek, 1–13. Helsinki: 
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced 
Studies, 2011. 
Stapelbroek, Koen. ”The Dutch debate on 
commercial neutrality (1713–1830).” In 
Trade and War: The Neutrality of 
Commerce in the Inter-State System, edited 
by Koen Stapelbroek, 114–142. 
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for 
Advanced Studies, 2011. 
Starkey, David J. British Privateering 
Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century. 
Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
1990. 
Starkey, David J. “The Origins and 
Regulation of Eighteenth-Century 
British Privateering.” In Bandits at Sea. 
A Pirates Reader, edited by C.R. Pennell, 
69–81. New York: New York 
University Press, 2001. 
   
317 
 
Stein, Robert L. The French Sugar Business in 
the Eighteenth Century. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988. 
Stein, Barbara H. and Stein, Stanley J. Edge 
of Crisis: War and Trade in the Spanish 
Atlantic, 1789–1808. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012. 
Stening, Jenny. Saint Barthélemy: 
arkitekturhistorisk promenad. Göteborg: 
Berghede arkitektur och design förlag, 
2008. 
Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. Merchant Networks 
in the Early Modern World. Brookfield: 
Variorum, 1996. 
Sundberg, Ulf. Svenska krig 1521–1814. 
Stockholm: Hjalmarsson & Högberg, 
1998. 
Swanson, Carl E. “Privateering and 
Imperial Warfare, 1739–1748.” The 
William and Mary Quarterly 42, no. 3 
(1985): 357–382. 
Swanson, Carl E. Predators and Prizes: 
American Privateering and Imperial 
Warfare, 1739–1748. Columbia, 
University of South Carolina Press, 
1991. 
Sveistrup, P.P. “Det Kongelige Danske 
octroyerde Vestindiske 
Handelsselskab 1778–85. En 
driftsøkonomisk Undersøgelse.” 
Historisk tidsskrift 10, no. 6 (1942): 385–
427. 
Sveistrup, P.O. and Willerslev, Richard. 
Den danske Sukkerhandels- og 
Sukkerproduktions Historie. København: 
Nordisk Forlag, 1945. 
Swärd, Sven Ola. Latinamerika i svensk 
politik under 1810– och 1820–talen. 
Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1949. 
Söderberg, Tom, Försäkringsväsendets 
historia i Sverige intill Karl Johanstiden. 
Stockholm: Norstedts, 1935. 
Tarrade, Jean. Le commerce colonial de la 
France à la fin de l’Ancien Regime: 
L’evolution du regime de ”l’Exclusif” de 1763 
a 1789. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1972. 
Taube, N.E. Svenskarna på S:t Barthélemy. 
Uppsala: K.W. Appelbergs 
boktryckeri, 1916. 
Thomasson, Fredrik. ‘”Contre la Loi mais 
en considérant les Circonstances 
dangereuses du moment.” Le tribunal 
suédois de l’île de Saint-Barthélemy 
pendant la période révolutionnaire.’ In 
Les colonies, la Révolution française, la loi. 
Ed. Frédéric Régent, Jean-François 
Niort & Pierre Serna, Rennes: Presses 
universitaires de Rennes, 2014, 231–249. 
Thomasson, Fredrik. “32 piskrapp vid 
quatre piquets: svensk rättvisa och 
slavlagar på Saint Barthélemy.” 
Historielärarnas årsskrift (2013): 7–29. 
Thomasson, Fredrik. “Thirty-Two 
Whiplashes at Quatre Piquets: Slave 
Laws and Justice in the Swedish Colony 
Saint Barthélemy around Year 1800.” 
In Ports of Globalisation, Places of 
Creolization: Danish and Swedish 
Possessions in the Atlantic World in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, edited 
by Holger Weiss. Leiden: Brill, 
forthcoming). 
Thomasson, Fredrik. “Raynal and Sweden. 
Royal Propaganda and Colonial 
Aspirations.” In Raynal’s ‘Histoire des 
deux Indes’ : colonialism, networks and 
global exchange, edited by Cecil 
Courtney and Jenny Mander, 201–15. 
Oxford : Voltaire Foundation, 2015. 
Thomasson, Fredrik. Swedish Caribbean 
Justice. Enslaved and Free Black in the 
Saint Barthélemy Court of Law 1785–1820 
(Forthcoming). 
Thomson, Janice E. Mercenaries, Pirates and 
Sovereigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996. 
Thornton, John K. Africa and Africans in the 
making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800. 
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tingbrand, Per. “Saint Barthelemy före 
svenskarna,” Piteå segelsällskaps sjörulla 
(1980): 79–91. 
Tingbrand, Per. “Femöarne – f.d. svenskt 
territorium.” Piteå segelsällskaps sjörulla 
(1991): 136–62. 
 318 
 
Tingbrand, Per. Med svenska örlogsmän till 
S:t Barthélemy: 1785–1994. Stockholm: 
Marinlitteraturföreningen, 1997. 
Tingbrand, Per. Who was Who in St. 
Bartholomew during the Swedish Epoch? 
Stockholm: S:t Barthélemy-sällskapet, 
2001. 
Tingbrand, Per. “A Swedish Interlude in 
the Caribbean.” Forum Navale 57 (2002): 
64–92. 
Truxes, Thomas M. Defying Empire: Trading 
with the Enemy in Colonial New York 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008. 
Vidal, Cécile. “The Reluctance of French 
Historians to Address Atlantic 
History.” Southern Quarterly 43 (2006): 
153–189. 
Vidales, Carlos. ”Bernadotte, San 
Bartolomé y los insurgentes de Tierra 
Firme (La ayida de Suecia a la causa 
bolivariana),” Instituto de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos, Universidad de 
Estocolmo, no. 53 (1988). 
Vidales, Carlos. “Corsarios y piratas de la 
Revolución Francesa en las aguas de la 
emancipación.” Iberoamericana. Nordic 
Journal of Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies 19, no. 2 (1989): 247–62. 
Vidales, Carlos. “S:t Barthélemy; en svensk 
koloni i frihetskämparnas tjänst (1810–
1830).” In Sverige – Latinamerika. 
Förbindelser och samarbete, edited by 
Weine Karlsson and Åke Magnusson, 
25–33. Stockholm: Latinamerika-
institutet, 1992. 
Villiers, Patrick. Marine royale, corsaires et 
trafic dans l’Atlantique de Louis XIV à 
Louis XVI. Lille: Atelier national de 
reproduction de theses, 2003. 
Vries, Jan de. “The Limits of Globalization 
in the Early Modern World.” Economic 
History Review 63, no. 3 (2010): 710–733. 
Wahlström, Lydia. Sverige och England under 
revolutionskrigens början: Bidrag till den 
Reuterholmska regeringens historia. 
Stockholm: Norstedt, 1917. 
Waldenström, Daniel. “Hur internationell 
är svensk ekonomisk historia?” 
Ekonomisk debatt 34, no. 5 (2006): 27–39. 
Walker, Geoffrey J. Spanish Politics and 
Imperial Trade, 1700–1789. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1979. 
Waller, Sture. “Det svenska förvärvet av S:t 
Barthélemy. Huvvudragen av de svensk-
franska förhandlingarna och parternas 
syften.” Historisk tidskrift, no. 3 (1953): 
231–255. 
Waller, Sture. S:t Barthélemy 1785–1801. 
Yttre förhållanden, handelspolitisk och 
statsfinansiell betydelse. Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1954. 
Webe, Gösta. “S:t Barthélemy – Svensk 
koloni 1784–1878.” Handels- og 
søfartsmuseets årbog (1981): 264–280. 
Weber, Klaus and Schulte Beerbühl, 
Margrit. ”From Westphalia to the 
Caribbean: Networks of German 
Textile Merchants in the Eighteenth 
Century.” In Cosmpolitan Networks in 
Commerce and Society 1660–1914, edited 
by Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, 53–98. 
London: London German Historical 
Institute, 2004. 
Weber, Klaus, “German Merchants in the 
Atlantic Trade of Colonial Goods and 
European Manufactured Goods, 
Linking Hamburg, Cadiz, and 
Bordeaux (1700–1830).” Jahrbuch für 
Europäische Überseegeschichte 1 (2000): 
169–174. 
Weber, Klaus, “The Atlantic Coast of 
German Trade: German Rural Industry 
and Trade in the Atlantic, 1680–1840.” 
Itinerario 2 (2002): 99–119. 
Weber, Klaus. Deutsche Kaufleute im 
Atlantikhandel: Unternehmen und 
Familien in Hamburg, Cádiz und 
Bordeaux. München: Beck, 2004. 
Wedberg, Birger. Tärningskast om liv och 
död: rättshistoriska skisser. Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 1935. 
Weiss, Holger. “Danskar och svenskar i den 
atlantiska slavhandeln 1650–1850.” In 
Globalhistoria från periferin: Norden 
1600–1850, edited by Leos Müller, 
   
319 
 
Göran Rydén and Holger Weiss, 39–74. 
Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2010. 
Weiss, Holger. ”Det svenska 
kolonialprojektets komplexa rum: om 
slaveri under svensk flagg i slutet av 
1700–talets karibiska och atlantiska 
värld” Sjuttonhundratal: Nordic Yearbook 
for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2012): 59–
92. 
Weiss, Holger, ”A Divided Space: Subjects 
and Others in the Swedish West Indies 
during the late-Eighteenth Century,” in 
Sweden in the Eighteenth-Century World: 
Provincial Cosmopolitans, edited by 
Göran Rydén, 275–300. Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013. 
Weiss, Holger. Slavhandel och slaveri under 
svensk flagg: Koloniala drömmar och 
verklighet i Afrika och Karibien 1770–1847. 
Helsingfors: Svenska 
Litteratursällskapet i Finland, 
forthcoming. 
Westergaard, Waldemar. The Danish West 
Indies under Company Rule 1671–1754. 
New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1917. 
Wetterblad, Magnus Victor. ”En 
örlogsexpedition till S:t Barthélemy 
1785–1786.” Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, no. 
120 (1957): 673–700. 
Vibæk, Jens. Dansk Vestindien 1755–1848: 
Vestindiens storhetstid. Vol. 2, Vore gamle 
tropekolonier, edited by Johannes 
Brøndsted. København: Fremad, 1966. 
Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994. 
Wikén, Erik. ”Adolf Fredrik Hansen – The 
First Swede on St. Barthélemy.” Swedish 
American Genealogist 7, no. 1 (1987): 32–
33. 
Williams, Greg H. The French Assault on 
American Shipping, 1793–1813: A History 
and Comprehensive Record of Merchant 
Marine Losses. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Co., 2009. 
Willis, Jean Louise. ”The Trade between 
North America and the Danish West 
Indies, 1756 to 1807, with special 
reference to St. Croix.” PhD diss., 
Columbia University, NY, 1963. 
Zahedieh, Nuala. ”The Merchants of Port 
Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish 
Contraband Trade, 1655–1692.” The 
William and Mary Quarterly 43, no. 4 
(1986): 570–593. 
Zahedieh, Nuala. ”Trade, Plunder, and 
Economic Development in Early 
English Jamaica, 1655–1689.” The 
Economic History Review 39, no. 2 (1986): 
205–222. 
Åberg, Alf. ”Smyghandelns svenska ö hade 
slavar 1847.” Kulturens värld, no. 3 (1998): 
38–41. 
Åberg, Bertil. ”Det svenska negerslaveriet 
1784–1847.” Recip Reflex, no. 5 (1975): 25–
35. 
Ågren, Karin. ”Kreditförbindelser med 
utgångspunkt från Göteborg”. In 
Kommers. Historiska handelsformer i 
Norden under 1700– och 1800–talen. 
Opuscula Historica Upsaliensia 42, edited 
by Gudrun Andersson and Klas 
Nyberg, 26–36. Uppsala: Swedish 
Science Press, 2010. 
Åmark, Karl. Sveriges statsfinanser 1719–1809. 
Stockholm: Norstedts, 1961. 
Öhman, May-Britt. ”’Sweden helps’: 
Efforts to Formulate the White Man’s 
Burden for the Wealthy and Modern 
Swede.” Kult, no. 7 (2010): 122–142. 
Önnerfors, Andreas. ”Swedish 
Freemasonry in the Caribbean: How St. 
Barthélemy turned into an island of the 
IXth Province” REHMLAC (Revista 
Estudios Históricos de la Masonería 
Latinoamericana y Caribeña) 1, no. 1 
(2009): 18–41. 
Önnerfors, Andreas. “Svenskt frimureri i 
Västindien: Hur S:t Barthélemy blev en 
ö inom IX:de Frimurare-Provinsen.” 
Acta Masonica Scandinavica 12 (2009): 
106–153.
 
Victor Wilson
Commerce in Disguise
War and Trade in the Caribbean Free Port of Gustavia, 1793–1815
Victor W
ilson | C
om
m
erce in D
isguise | 2015
Victor Wilson
Commerce in Disguise
War and Trade in the Caribbean Free 
Port of Gustavia, 1793–1815
The thesis studies the economic role of the free 
port of Gustavia on the island of St. Barthélemy, 
the Swedish colony in the Caribbean, during the 
French Revolutionary Wars of 1793–1815.
Departing from an unexplored source material, the 
study shows that Gustavia attained a temporary yet 
exceptional position during the period of interna-
tional conflict, which showed in the sizeable flows 
of cargo in transit through the Swedish colony as 
well as the increasing shipping under the Swedish 
flag in the region.
Åbo Akademis förlag | Åbo Akademi University Press    ISBN 978-951-765-806-5
9 7 8 9 5 1 7 6 5 8 0 6 5
